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MEMOIRS

CORRESPONDENCE AND MANUSCRIPTS

OF

GENERAL LAFAYETTE.

PUBLISHED BY HIS FAMILY.

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FRENCH REVOLUTION.

FEDERATION.*

(JULY 14TH, 1790.)

XIII.

THE federation of 1790 was one of the greatest events of the revolution. Fourteen thousand deputies, regularly elected by more than three millions of national guards, the deputations of all the land and sea forces, came to abjure, in the name of armed France, the ancient institutions, and take an oath to liberty and constitutional equality. The proposal which had been made on that subject, by M. Bailly, the 5th of June, at the head of a deputation from the town of Paris, was supported by the virtuous Duke de la Rochefoucauld, who was assassinated at Gisors after the 10th of August, one of the first martyrs of the constitution and national laws.

The Report of the Federation of the French, printed in 1790, gives the following relation:—

"The 10th of July the representatives assembled, by the desire of the staff of the Parisian national guards, in the house of commons of Paris.

"M. de Lafayette is unanimously proclaimed president of the assembly of the confederates, and only accepts after the most urgent and reiterated entreaties.

* Sequel of the compilation entitled, *Collection of several Speeches, from the year* 1784 *until the year* 1829.

" Several proposals relating to M. de Lafayette were made by different members of the assembly, and received with warm approbation; but the president having refused to put them to the vote, dissolved the meeting, and appointed the members to assemble at six o'clock the following evening.

" The 11th of July, the president informs the members that the national assembly and the king will receive, on the 13th, the deputation of the confederated guards. The form of the address is confided to M. de Lafayette and the committee.

" The 13th of July, M. de Lafayette, as major-general of the confederation, of which the king is chief, enters at the head of the confederates, and pronounces, at the bar of the national assembly, the following discourse :—

" GENTLEMEN,—The national guards of France are come to offer you the homage of their respect and gratitude. The nation, at length determined to be free, has charged you with giving her a constitution. But she would have desired it in vain, if that enlightened will, of which you are the organs, had not called into being the obedient force that reposes in our hands; and if the happy union of both these powers, replacing instantaneously the ancient order that the first movements of liberty had overthrown, had not been the first law which succeeded to the laws that were abolished.

" We may boldly consider as a recompence due to our zeal that festival which will assemble so many brethren scattered in various directions, but who, governed both by your influence and the imperious necessity, so dear to all good Frenchmen, of preserving the unity of the state, have never ceased directing all their efforts towards one common point. The unanimous feeling with which they offer, this day, to the constituent assembly of France, their adhesion to principles which they will swear, to-morrow, to maintain and defend, was also, doubtless, a recompence due to your exertions.

" Yes, gentlemen, you were acquainted with the wants of France and the wishes of Frenchmen, when you destroyed the Gothic structure of our government and laws, and only respected the principle of monarchy; when Europe, whose eyes were

fixed upon you, learnt that a good king might be the support of a free people, as he had been the consolation of an oppressed people.

" Complete your work, gentlemen, by marking out amongst your decrees those that must form the essential points of the French constitution; satisfy our just impatience by offering us that code of which the first legislature is soon to receive the sacred deposit, and of which your foresight will be enabled to secure more effectually the stability, as the constitutional means of revising it be more accurately specified.

" The rights of man are declared; the sovereignty of the people is acknowledged; powers are delegated, and the basis of public order is established. Delay not to restore to the forces of the state their wonted energy. The people owe you the glory of a free constitution; but they demand and expect from you that repose which cannot exist without a firm and complete organization of the government.

" We ourselves, devoted to the revolution, assembled in the name of liberty, the guarantees of individual and common property, of the security of each and of all,—we, who are impatient to behold our place in your constitutional decrees,—to read, to meditate on, our duties, and to know in what manner citizens will be armed to fulfil them,—we, summoned from all parts of France by the most urgent of all duties, feeling confidence in proportion to your wisdom, and hopes in proportion to your benefactions,—we pronounce, without hesitation, at the altar of the country, the oath you may dictate to her soldiers.

" Yes, gentlemen, our hands shall be lifted up together at the same hour and moment; our brethren from all parts of the kingdom shall pronounce the vow that will unite them. With what transport we shall unfurl before them those banners, the pledges of our union and of the inviolability of our oath! With what transport they will receive them!

" May the celebration of that great day be the signal of the conciliation of parties, of the forgetfulness of resentments, of peace, and of public felicity!

" And do not fear that this holy enthusiasm can lead us beyond the limits prescribed by public order. Under the auspices of law the standard of liberty never can become that of licence. We swear to you, gentlemen, to respect the law, of which we are the defenders; we swear it on our honour and free men and Frenchmen cannot give their word in vain."

"At the close of the national assembly, that depu-

tation presented itself to the king, whom M. de Lafayette thus addressed:—

"SIRE,—In the course of those memorable events that have restored to us our imprescriptible rights, when the energy of the people and the virtues of the king have presented such great examples to nations and their chiefs, we feel pleasure in venerating in your Majesty the most glorious of all titles, that of *chief of Frenchmen and king of a free people.*

"Enjoy, Sire, the reward of your virtues; let this pure homage, which despotism never could command, be the glory and recompence of a citizen-king!

"You wished us to have a constitution founded on liberty and public order. Your wishes, Sire, shall be fulfilled; liberty is secured to us; our zeal shall be the guarantee of public order.

"The national guards of France swear to your Majesty an obedience that shall have no limit but that of law, an affection that shall have no end but that of life.

"The answer of the king was equally noble and touching:—

"Repeat to your fellow-citizens, said he, that I should wish to speak to them as I now speak to you; repeat to them that their king is their father, their brother, their friend; that he can only be happy from their happiness, great from their glory, powerful from their liberty, rich from their prosperity, suffering from their calamities; let my words, or rather the feelings of my heart, penetrate into humble cottages, and into the dwellings of the poor: tell them that, if I cannot enter with you into their asylums, I will be with them by my affection, and by laws formed to protect the weak. I will watch for them, live, and, if it be necessary, die for them.

"(July 14th.) That day having been fixed upon for the celebration of the confederated compact of the eighty-three departments, the troops of the line, of the navy, and of other corps, assembled at the appointed place. The march was executed in the manner prescribed by the proclamation and orders of the major-general.

"Each department, preceded by its banner, took

its proper station; the troops of the line ranged themselves also around the altar of the country, which was in the midst of the Champ de Mars, and opposite to the national assembly.

"Detachments from each department, and a detachment of the troops of the line, carried the banners and the oriflamme* to the altar of the country. Those banners were blessed, and mass was celebrated, by the Bishop of Autun, to the sound of eighteen hundred instruments.

"Mass being ended, M. de Lafayette, as major-general of the confederation, advanced towards the king to receive his orders; and ascending afterwards on the altar of the country, he laid his sword upon it, and pronounced the following oath:—

"'*We swear to be for ever faithful to the nation, the law, and the king; to maintain, with all our power, the constitution decreed by the national assembly and accepted by the king; to protect, conformably to the laws, the safety of persons and property; the circulation of grain and subsistences in the interior of the kingdom, the receipt of public contributions, under whatever form they may exist; to remain united to all Frenchmen by the indissoluble ties of fraternity.*'

"At the same instant every hand was raised, and every voice exclaimed, *I swear it!* That oath, which each person repeated several times, was followed by discharges of artillery, and cries of—*Long live the national assembly! Long live the king!*

* "The oriflamme was neither a religious nor military banner; the commons of Paris have announced their intention of presenting it to you. The inscription they have placed upon it,—*National Confederation, July 14th*, 1790,—consecrates more fully that oath."—Speech of M. Chapelier. It was decreed that the oriflamme should be suspended at the dome of the national assembly.

"The 16th of July, the deputies having assembled before the arrival of the president, unanimously voted an address to M. de Lafayette, and the committee was empowered to draw it up; and the 17th, having again assembled under the presidency of the senior member, they unanimously accepted the following address; and the assembly having proceeded immediately to the house of M. de Lafayette, the senior member spoke as follows:—

"Sir,—He who, at the moment when the constituent assembly was threatened with the vengeance of despotism, dared to speak of the rights of man as a free man himself,—he who had co-operated in so glorious a manner in the revolution of the new world,—ought undoubtedly to devote himself to the one his own fellow-citizens have so lately achieved, and prove himself to them also the friend and defender of liberty.

"But you, who have done so much for the public cause, have determined to receive no recompence; you have refused the homage prepared for you by the hearts of our grateful citizens; you withdrew from our applause and testimonies of affection; and you have shewn us that a great man never conceives he has done enough for his country.

"The deputies of the national guards of France will retire with the regret of not having been able to appoint you their chief; they will respect the constitutional law, which arrests at this moment the impulse of their hearts; and what must for ever render you glorious is, that you proposed yourself that law, and fixed yourself a limit to our gratitude.

"But if you cannot become our chief, you shall be for ever our friend, our guide, our model. Accustomed to behold in you the man who has contributed so largely to the success of the French revolution, we shall never forget the great examples you have given us. If it were possible that an attempt should be one day made to take advantage of our love of liberty,—if it were possible that that love, so pure in its origin, should excite hopes in the partisans of licence, feel no alarm yourself; millions are ready to share your dangers.

"You, sir, the representative of the nation, be to the constituent assembly a guarantee of our zeal in executing their commands.

"Commander-general of the national Parisian guard, of those citizen-soldiers with whom we have just united, be to them the

guarantee of the inviolability of our oaths; be to a king who will only reign over a free people, an interpreter of our love and fidelity; regard, in short, the expressions of joy and affection which your presence excited amongst us, as a homage rendered to Him whom our regenerated country places at the head of her defenders.

"The answer of M. de Lafayette, made from the impulse of the moment, was to this effect:—

"The emotion I experience at this moment, gentlemen, does not allow me to find any expressions adequate to my feelings of gratitude. I have often recalled to you that the national guards of France, assembled here through their deputies, ought to present no address but to the national assembly and the king; judge, therefore, whether I can give my consent to the honourable and touching exception you design to make in my favour. No, gentlemen, permit me to consider it as a testimony of friendship you are giving to your Parisian brothers in arms, in the person of their commander. As to me, I concurred with them and you in our glorious revolution; I proclaimed, on the altar of liberty, the vow that unites for ever all her soldiers; I have been overwhelmed by your kindness; it only remains for me to aspire ardently for that day, so rapidly approaching, which, by terminating our constitutional labours, will allow me to devote myself altogether to recollections that will be ever dear to me, since they will recal incessantly my respect for you, my obligations and eternal devotion to you."

We have limited ourselves to merely giving this extract from the *Report of the Federation of the French*, signed each day by the president and secretaries. The journals and memoirs of the time give more details of the festivals of that great epoch, and of the immense popularity of which Lafayette received such unanimous and brilliant testimonies.

The 20th of July, after having been charged with expressing to M. Bailly and the electors the thanks of the deputies of the federation, M. de Lafayette closed the session by the following speech:—

"At the moment of our separation, I will neither speak of my deep and and eternal gratitude, nor of my devotion to the

cause of the people and the maintenance of their rights, to which my life has been consecrated. As I am not less secure of your confidence than you are certain of my feelings, I will only speak to you of our duties.

" We must, gentlemen, speak those last words of brethren who are separating, but who, when separated, must still act in unison; who, bound together by obligations as well as by glory, are united by one sentiment, of which the slightest infraction would be painfully felt from one end to the other of that numerous family.

" Let the love of liberty, gentlemen, ever be our guide. That word comprises all things; love of order, respect for the laws and for morality; with it, property is inviolable, and innocence protected; no guilt can exist but before law; all rights are guaranteed, all things prosper. Let us never forget, gentlemen, that Liberty, severe in her principles, dreads licence as much as tyranny; and to conquer, and, above all, retain her, is less an act of courage than a triumph of virtue.

" Let the unity of the state be our aim. The time no longer exists when Liberty was condemned to narrow limits; and since the representative constitutions have allowed her to diffuse herself, she does not establish herself more firmly in limited republics than in vast states who have a citizen king as chief.

" But in those states free men must, more than elsewhere, yield that obedience to law which secures its execution, and feel that hatred to despotism which preserves for ever from its inroads.

" Equality, gentlemen, is not injured by the exercise of those authorities that public utility renders necessary and that the constitution has established; but it is so by the slightest pretension which exceeds the limit traced by law. Let ambition obtain no power over you; love the friends of the people; but reserve blind submission for law, and enthusiasm for liberty. Pardon this counsel, gentlemen; you granted me the glorious privilege of giving it when you showered on me every species of favour a fellow-citizen can receive, and my heart, in its delicious emotion, could not avoid experiencing a feeling of alarm.

" I shall only add one word more, gentlemen. Confidence and brotherly affection have united our banners; in our assemblies we have discarded the slightest suspicion of the influence of armed force on the public will; we have sworn to the national assembly that respect for their decrees without which the state itself would be lost; we have presented our pure homage to the best of kings; we have shewn ourselves truly free on those days when assembled multitudes preserved that

moderation which the consciousness of their own dignity impresses on a people. Let us separate with the delightful feeling with which these glorious days have filled the hearts of all good Frenchmen; and let us never forget that justice and order must complete the revolution that generous exertions have begun."

INSURRECTION OF BELGIUM.*

XIV.

In Brabant a revolution had broken out, which was essentially ecclesiastical and aristocratical; a popular party had, however, formed itself.† England, Holland, and the French Jacobins, encouraged the

* The relation which ensues was placed in the *Collection of Speeches*, under the date of March 1790; but, to present events in a general aspect, we have united it to the Correspondence, and to the various documents we possess. The insurrection which it alludes to having been prolonged during the space of about a year, such a classification has not appeared to us contrary to chronological order.

† A manifesto of the 24th October, 1789, signed Vander Noot, plenipotentiary of the Belgian nation, contains the motive of this revolution. It declares that Joseph II. has violated the article 3 and the article 5 of his compact, styled the *Joyous Entrance*, by demolishing the fortifications without the consent of the states; the article 58, by suppressing in an arbitrary manner, notwithstanding the repeated appeals of the states, several monasteries and communities, and disposing of ecclesiastical property. The emperor is reproached with having supported the committee deputed by the states, with establishing intendants, and with having thus abolished religious and civil corps against the wishes of the people. It is also stated in that manifesto, that all the governors and captains lent their concurrence to the despotic acts of the governor Trautmannsdorff, who, the 22nd January, 1788, only gave four hours to the council to register a decree; that after resistance from various quarters, which caused the bloodshed of some citizens, an ordinance from the emperor had destroyed the council itself and all the privileges

first impulse given to public feeling.* Lafayette and his friends would have desired a revolution more favourable to democratical opinions. During that time the Belgian aristocracy endeavoured to engage the assembly in measures which might lead to war. The assembly preferred leaving the negotiation to the king.

of the province. Consequently, Joseph II., Duke of Brabant, was declared to have forfeited the sovereignty.

The town of Ghent fell, in November, 1789, into the power of the insurgents. Bruges, Ostend, Mons, Antwerp, and the other towns, followed that example. A month afterwards, General d'Alton, commander of the Austrian troops, was driven from Brussels. The 19th December, the states of Brabant assembled for the first time, and gave afterwards their adherence to the act of union of the province of Flanders. M. Vander Noot, an advocate and minister, supported with M. Van Eupen, grand penitentiary of the church of Antwerp, the party of the states which was opposed to every innovation of the ancient forms of government. M. Vonk and General Vander Meersch were at the head of another party, who demanded changes conformable to the principles of the constituent assembly of France. M. Vander Meersch was arrested, and his political friends prosecuted. In the midst of their divisions, Leopold II., successor of Joseph II., who died February 20, 1790, invaded Belgium with an army of forty thousand men, after having obtained, by the convention of Reichenbach, the consent of the cabinets of London, Berlin, and the Hague, who guaranteed to him the sovereignty of the Belgian provinces. The people of Brabant were defeated, and the Austrian army entered Brussels in the beginning of December, 1790.

* See, in vol. v., p. 523, of the *Revolutions de France et de Brabant*, by Camille Desmoulins, the following passage:—"It is for us journalists to endeavour to save the French people from the stain that Lafayette stamped on them by the success of the motion for abandoning the Belgians to the vengeance of their tyrants. It was his negotiator, Sémonville, who, while preaching prematurely here the pure democracy which he persecuted in the Jacobins, and aided by the credit of the house of Arenberg, has weakened the power of the congress, by misleading the respectable Vander Meersch and the *Vonkists*."

In the meeting of the 18th of March, the president read a letter from M. de Montmorin, in which that minister informed the national assembly that the king had received a letter from the congress of the Belgian states, which his Majesty had not judged proper to open.

The president then spoke of two letters presented to the assembly by the deputies of the Belgian states.

The king, about two months before that sitting, had submitted to the deliberations of the assembly the proposals of the citizens of Brabant, authors of the revolution. The 18th, when the debate was first opening relative to the measures which it was proper to take concerning the letters of congress, Lafayette ascended the tribune to propose leaving that affair to the discretion of the king:—

"Gentlemen," said he, "there is no friend of liberty, no Frenchman, who does not owe the Belgian people their good wishes and approbation. The present question comprises but two points—the address of the letter, and its authors.

"It is addressed to the constituent assembly of France, whose eminent functions are altogether foreign to the subject; it is written by a congress of whom no person respects the members more than I do, but who, from the present constitution of the Belgian states, does not yet offer the impress that emanates from the sovereignty of the people. I conceive, therefore, under all these points of view, that we ought to refer this affair to the king, with the firm conviction that any despot, any ambitious corporation, would only hasten, by the excitement they would awaken, the revolution which is impending. The king of the French, the restorer of our liberty, will never mislead us in respect to the conduct we must pursue with a people who desire to be free, and begin to be acquainted with their rights."

This was the proposal of Lafayette:—

"The national assembly, after reading a letter from M. de Montmorin, in which that minister announces the order the king gave him not to open one written in the name of the Belgian states; and also a statement of the internal condition of

the Low Countries, in which the congress of the present states does not appear to bear the impress emanating from the sovereignty of the people; conceives that they cannot do better than place complete reliance on the well-known wisdom and sentiments of the king."*

* We find amongst the papers of General Lafayette the copy of a letter which informs M. Van Eupen, grand penitentiary and secretary of the Belgian congress, of the dispositions of the assembly under these circumstances. It was written by M. de la Sonde, whom M. de Montmorin had charged with some diplomatic instructions for the Low Countries:—

"Paris, March 18th, 1790.

"You must have seen, undoubtedly, that M. de Lafayette ascended the tribune of the national assembly to provoke a decree as moderate as possible, when we consider the present state of things in the Belgian provinces. It would have been desirable that your agents here had not insisted on a subject of which your dissensions prevented the maturity: I had warned of this circumstance; you, probably, did not credit my assertion. However this may be, I doubt not but that the proposed decree would have been received with more interest, but for a miserable pamphlet, of which you will find subjoined a copy. I know not what incendiary rent it from your country in so profuse a manner; he addressed it principally to all the members of our assembly, the very day they were consulted on your affairs. This unworthy pamphlet is generally attributed to a defender of the congress, whose apology might have been made without attacking, as the author has allowed himself to do, the national assembly."

ON

THE INSURRECTION OF BELGIUM.*

We shall insert here the letters of the chiefs of the Belgian insurrection, those of MM. de Sémonville, Dumouriez, de la Sonde, employed by us in the Low Countries, the letters of congress, of their deputies in France, and of M. Cornet des Grez, a mediator between the various parties, comprehending that of the Emperor of Austria; there are also some letters from M. de Montmorin. The result of an examination of the articles here collected will be to recal more clearly to my friends the aim I then proposed obtaining—that of establishing liberty in Belgium with the fewest excesses and calamities possible, obliging the pretensions of the crown and the various aristocracies to yield to the grand principle of the national sovereignty, and the true liberty of the Belgian people. I said one word on this subject in my letter to M. d'Hennings.†

Frederic-William has been no stranger to the insurrection of Belgium.‡ The French government, the king, and his ministers, wished, above all

* This note of General Lafayette is at the head of a collection, made by himself, of several letters, instructions, and diplomatic documents, relative to the events of the Low Countries.

† See the letter to M. d'Hennings, in this volume, Witmold, January 15th, 1799.

‡ See, at page 30, the letter of General Schlieffen, commandant of the Prussian troops at Liege, to General Lafayette, (Feb. 22, 1790.) The king of Prussia permitted the Prussian general Schonfield to command the troops of Brabant.

things, to avoid a rupture with Austria. I endeavoured to avail myself of this ministerial timidity, of the embarrassments of the court of Vienna, and of the need which the Belgian aristocracy had of France, in order to bring all parties to the adoption of a national and representative system; but I could not permit myself to counteract beyond a certain point the policy of the French government. One might naturally enough have supposed, at this period, that there was a kind of alliance between England, the house of Orange, Prussia, and the Jacobins. It was then that Camille Desmoulins, in his "*Revolution de France et de Brabant*," wrote in favour of the Belgian congress. I could have wished the states to have adopted the principle of an assembly really national, for the purpose of framing a constitution on the French model. It little signified to me at that time that it might be an Austrian prince who would be put at the head of the government. But the aristocracy and the clergy wished to preserve their privileges and ancient immunities. I° did all in my power to reconcile with each other the influential men of the aristocratic and popular parties; the former refused to *nationalize* themselves, the latter flagged in zeal, in proportion as they saw that the efforts made were not exclusively in favour of the people. The French government did not choose to risk a war on this quarrel, and was in the right; it was the same with the other powers; the court of Vienna profited by it.

During this period, M. de Sémonville* was sent,

* Count de Sémonville, ambassador to the Ottoman Porte in 1793, then in Holland, after the 18th Brumaire; grand referendary of the Chamber of Peers since 1814.

but without an official character, to Brussels, and gave satisfaction. On his return, they sent Dumouriez. The latter hitched himself into a project with the aristocratic leaders, in which his own interests were not overlooked; and Montmorin, who was displeased at it, had no inclination to enter into his views. Here is an anecdote on this subject, striking enough. When, in 1792, the Jacobin ministry, at the head of which was Dumouriez, devised a plan of attack upon Belgium, there was inserted in my instructions a recommendation not to abandon myself too freely, in that country, to my democratic sentiments,—a piece of advice singularly at variance with the tone of the reproaches which these very men, and their friends, were daily addressing to me at the club and in the assembly.

CORRESPONDENCE.

TO M. DE MONTMORIN, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.*

Paris, Feb. 1st, 1790.

I SEND you, my dear Montmorin, Sémonville's last letter. MM. Torfs and de la Sonde dine with me to-day. I could wish to despatch Sémonville's courier this evening, whom these gentlemen will almost immediately follow. Our affair is going on well; both for the interests of liberty, which ought always to be foremost, and those of our policy. I beg of you to note your instructions in the margin, to guide me in my despatch: nothing more is required than decision and promptness.

Ought I not to praise Sémonville's conduct, renew our promises to him, and engage him to a continuation of his views and resources?

Yes; at the same time begging him not to go too fast.

I will send M. de Sémonville la Sonde's memoir. I will add to

Approved.

* This letter is accompanied by notes written in the margin in the hand of M. de Montmorin.

it, as the compass by which to shape his course, the note you made, and M. de Ternant copied.

Since then we have made a great stride. The convention obtained by Ternant from MM. de la Sonde and Torfs, and drawn up by the latter, ought to be the aim of our efforts, the goal of M. de Sémonville's negotiation. We shall be masters of the business, and protectors of Belgian liberty. I will, therefore, send Sémonville this project, and assure him, that as soon as it has been adopted by the Low Countries and the emperor, we will lose no time in giving him an official character.*

The two first articles will be executed; as to the third, as little time as possible shall be lost, and a decision come to without delay.

It appears to me that we ought, on our side, to endeavour to bring the emperor to a decision by a conversation with M. de Mercy,† a courier from the latter to M. de

* We have not found among General Lafayette's papers the convention or project drawn up by M. Torfs, agent of the states of Brabant, in France; but in a letter of Feb. 13, 1789, extracted from the archives of foreign affairs, and addressed to the Marquis de Noailles, ambassador of France at Vienna, M. de Montmorin alludes, in an obscure manner, to this project, as being based on the sovereignty of the emperor, or at least of the house of Austria, over the Low Countries; and the maintenance of the leaders of the Belgian revolution in the administration of their government. We may remark, also, in this letter of General Lafayette, that there had been at one time a question of a Belgian national convention, the form and conditions of which are entirely unknown to us. The accession of Leopold to the empire put an end to all negotiations of a similar nature.

† Count Mercy d'Argenteau, Austrian ambassador in France, died in London in 1794.

Cobentzel,* the sending back the Vienna courier, and the departure of M. de Ségur. The service rendered the emperor is important enough to be a reason for his receiving an impulse from us, instead of giving one. The article relative to the Belgian national convention is to me a sine quâ non, which the sovereigns of Europe will be obliging enough to submit to in their turn.

Can nothing be agreed on with M. de Mercy, whom you could see to-morrow by sending him an express? Has not M. de Cobentzel sufficient powers? Under any circumstances it is necessary Ségur should go; personal considerations can no longer arrest us.

M. de Mercy has no powers; he has no instructions respecting the Low Countries, M. de Cobentzel having full powers. All the former could do would be to acquaint the latter with the proposals made to him. It would certainly be useful to send M. de Ségur as soon as possible; but it is requisite that circumstances should admit of it, and that the arrangement respecting his predecessor be settled.

It is now six weeks, as you are aware, since I procured consent to the troops being assembled, which has not yet been done. The decrees of the national assembly respecting the army will pass about the middle of next week. The king might order preparations

I most fully coincide with your views on every point; but should the muster of the troops take place, it is absolutely necessary not to interfere in it, in order to avoid drawing upon one's self the storm which this arrangement is intended to prevent.

* Count Philip de Cobentzel had been employed by Austria to negotiate with the leaders of the Belgian insurrection.

to be made beforehand for mustering the troops, announce them then, and express himself on foreign affairs as becomes the head of a nation, great, proud, and free.

Such, my dear Montmorin, are the points on which I request your answer. Lacoste will, if you prefer it, write from your dictation, and I will conform myself to your instructions, in whatever I send to Sémonville, who must be very impatient to hear from me.

I embrace you with all warmth.

EXTRACTS FROM THE DESPATCHES OF M. DE SEMONVILLE TO GENERAL LAFAYETTE.*

Brussels, Jan. 27th, 1790.

General Vander Meersch has apprised the congress that it is impossible for him to undertake anything with the national militia alone; he repeated the same thing to the Duke d'Ursel, president of the council of war, and the question was agitated in the presence of MM. de Broukausen† and de Hamelberg, of asking for ten thousand Hessians and other aid. The decision was, that not a moment was to be

* We feel ourselves at liberty to extract from the numerous despatches addressed to General Lafayette by M. de Sémonville the following passages, which explain the project of assembling the French troops, alluded to both in M. de Montmorin's first letter and in General Lafayette's answer to M. de Sémonville, and the motives which induced the French government to adjourn the recognition of Belgium as an independent nation, at a time when its leaders appear to have submitted to the diverse influence of an Anglo-Prussian league.

† Agent of the cabinet of Berlin.

lost. M. de Hamelberg set out this morning to negotiate the affair, and is confident of success.

Nothing, beyond all doubt, can be more prejudicial to us than to see ten thousand Hessians here, as many Brunswickers, Prussians in Liege, or rather everywhere, and at the head of all these forces two of the first soldiers of Europe.

There exists among all respectable people a deep hatred and fixed resolution against the project of a *stadtholder;* but it is a very different matter with the proposition of abandoning Ostend to the English. A power in the act of establishing itself is not very fastidious about conditions a little more or less favourable; you can compute better than I can the injury which this arrangement would inflict upon our commerce, and if it would be worth our while to go to war for the purpose of frustrating it. These provinces are rich, but not commercial; the activity of the English would soon make them masters of the coasting trade; they would resell us the linen and grain. As to wines, it will be in their power to destroy this part of our commerce with the united provinces, into which they will introduce Madeira and Port wines, which are in great request there. I am not sufficiently versed in commercial and political calculations to say more to you on this subject.

I suppose, therefore, you will be inclined to effect a concentration of troops upon the frontier, in sufficient force to protect yourselves from those which are to be admitted here, and even imposing enough to support, if necessary, the democratic party, to hinder the Prussians from becoming masters of the country, and from crushing the national militia. This step, combined with that which will be taken

at the very moment of the notification of independence, will strengthen the French party in these provinces.

I presume the king and national assembly will declare their intentions to be in no respect hostile to the liberties of any other people, that never will the forces of the nation be employed to restrain them, but that they are compelled to wait until the Belgian people shall have defined their rights before they can treat with them as a sovereign nation; that until then, France will entertain with those individuals, who are at variance with the emperor, relations of friendship and interest founded on justice, &c.

Feb. 1790.

THE ministers, whom you will see, have a strong interest in opposing that revolution which you desire, and which it is your glory to protect. It is therefore of the highest importance not to disclose too much of your opinion on this subject.

A national assembly is in conformity with your views; but the erection of such an assembly must be attended with extreme difficulty. The privileges of the provinces, their peculiar constitution, their different languages, Flemish, French, and Walloon, the religious indifference of Flanders contrasting with the devotion of Antwerp, the partisans of states and those of a monarchical system, all these combined must produce inevitable schisms. . . . . You are obliged to assemble your troops, at the possible approach of the armies of Prussia and the stadtholder. The slightest explanation of your measures, and declaration of your purpose, will infallibly render you the mediators of the country.

While we are deliberating, others are acting, and

the inexhaustible energy of the Princess of Orange is preparing much embarrassment for us; she is pressing, with all her power, the courts of Prussia and England to explain themselves openly on the independence of the Low Countries, and would turn to the account of her own personal interests, the very last moments of the existence of the states. She is, doubtless, too well apprised of what is passing here not to know that the popular party has made rapid progress; she must necessarily fear and desire to check it before there is an explosion—first, by a recognition of independence made at first unconditionally and simply; secondly, by the troops, who will find a thousand pretexts to gain admittance under the title of auxiliaries. There cannot be a doubt but that such a declaration of independence, if made at once, would be fatal to the popular party; it would sooth the discontented and satisfy the people; the states would recover confidence; the auxiliaries, as I announced to you some days since, would, upon the simple requisition of the states, enter as much to maintain internal tranquillity as to defend them against the emperor. The three powers would be regarded as their protectors, and would, the very next day, command them. Whenever the emperor appears to shew spirit, the influential persons of this country become, in spite of themselves, more facile towards Prussia; I say, in spite of themselves, and consequently I am speaking of the Duke d'Ursel and his connexions, and not of Vander Noot, nor of Van Eupen, in reference to whom I would not make use of this expression.

The cabinet of Berlin has the design of obtaining a great pecuniary assistance here in exchange for that aid it shall have granted. . . . . Who can refuse it when the troops have once entered? The

dismemberment of Guelders and Limbourg has been talked of; to-day M. de Broukausen denies it stoutly, but has been clumsy enough to confess that these provinces would be of no use to the King of Prussia, except under the contingency of its being possible to exchange them with the Duke of Mecklenburg.

TO GENERAL LAFAYETTE.

(Extracted from a Despatch of M. de la Sondes.)

Brussels, Feb. 1790.

THE states of Flanders have just published one of their resolutions, prohibiting the printing of any MS. which has not been submitted to the civil and ecclesiastical censure, under pain of incurring the penalties specified by ancient ordinances. The Bishop of Ghent interdicts, by his mandate, not only the performance of plays during Lent, but all balls and masquerades during the approaching carnival. The states of Flanders have applauded this mandate, and recommended the other provinces to do as much. The Duke d'Ursel has just sent in his resignation as President of the Chamber of War, because, as is alleged, a Prussian general is about to take the chief command, as well of the Belgian army as of the contingent to be furnished by Prussia. The democratic party has sent up a petition to the states, requiring the right of representation for the people; but I am not of opinion that this document will produce any disunion amongst those invested with the sovereignty of the provinces. The states will remain sovereign, and the right of representation will be, and will always continue to be, hereditary.

It is certain—first, that the Belgian provinces sent deputies to the congress of Breda, to endeavour to enter into the union; that previous to this deputation, the project of introducing troops into Douai was known; and that it would be well still to look to the security of all our frontier places; secondly, the project of introducing foreign troops into Douai, appears to have been abandoned only since the evacuation of those that were concentrated at Tournay and Brussels; thirdly, that it is after the most attentive consideration of that project, and in the view of strengthening the French revolution, that some enlightened persons have resolved to form, provisionally, a republic of Belgian provinces, in imitation of certain Swiss cantons; fourthly, that the provisional formation of this republic shall take place immediately, according to the project of M. Cornet des Grez, and that it is the only way of avoiding a general war; fifthly, that the *National Assembly*, indicated in the said project, leaves a door open to pretenders to the sovereignty, or the stadtholdership of the Low Countries; that, consequently, they may be already at work in procuring suffrages; sixthly, that France, being suspected of having an eye to this sovereignty, cannot too carefully abstain from manifesting any wish, at least at the actual juncture; but that she will have a decided influence in the assembly of the nation if she knows how to avail herself of the favourable disposition of MM. Cornet des Grez and Vander Noot.

I have the honour to be, &c.

FROM GENERAL LAFAYETTE TO M. DE SEMONVILLE.

Paris, Feb. 8th, 1790.

THE return of your last courier, my dear Sémonville announced to you that of MM. Torfs and de la Sonde. They made me the most advantageous overtures, as you will see by the annexed project, and M. Torfs has frequently declared that if Vander Noot should not assent to it, he would break with him. This project has the approbation of MM. Montmorin, Ternant, Lacoste, Ségur, and myself. They thought it a little too much in my way of thinking, and M. de Mercy, to whom Montmorin shewed it without giving him a copy, fears the emperor will find it very extravagant; but M. de Cobentzel, who has full powers, and whose credit increases in proportion as the health of the emperor declines, will afford, as I am induced to think, greater facilities.

What we desire to know here, is the success a plan of this kind is likely to have at Brussels. It is not to be doubted that the popular cause and our policy must gain considerably by it. Can you contrive that these ideas should germinate? Could we cause them to be proposed to M. de Cobentzel, either by the people of Brabant or by ourselves? and on what could we calculate in the Low Countries? This, my dear Sémonville, is what we require from your sagacity and talents. M. de Montmorin desires to receive this development from your own lips. I told him, in case that were impossible, he might send Ternant to you for a few hours; he would prefer seeing you, but you will do as you please.

I had proposed sending to M. de Cobentzel; and

from Trèves a report would have been made of the arrangements of which mention is made. M. de Montmorin would first know on what you depend, and your reply, verbal or written, will decide our proceedings.

The assembling of the troops would have been already ordered, if M. Necker had not higgled about money. I press this subject with all my power, and ask for twenty-five thousand men in Flanders for M. de Rochambeau; also that a force should be collected in Alsace. The princes of the empire have been very tenderly treated in the report of the feudal committee, with which all parties will be satisfied.* We are going to deal very gently with the titular ecclesiastics.

You will find herewith some speeches and a letter of mine to the national guard, with which I correspond.

The king's proceeding has completely succeeded, and his inclinations are excellent.† He is going to leave Paris, and I hope to induce him to take a few excursions. Parties still exist in the assembly; but they conduct themselves with much more moderation.

I announced Ternant to you; but M. de Montmorin is not willing to send him until after having received your reply to this letter; possibly, too, the

* On the 8th of February, in pursuance of the decree of August 4th, 1789, a report of the feudal committee was read to the assembly, on the privileges abolished with or without indemnity, and was followed, on the 24th of the same month, by a decree, which gave occasion afterwards to complaints, preferred before the diet of Ratisbon, by the princes of the empire, proprietors in Alsace.

† The king and queen took the civic oath to the constitution on the 4th of February.

desire of chatting with you has a good deal to do with it. Do on that point only what seems best to you.

MM. Torfs and de la Sonde are constantly talking of the two leaders of the aristocracy; but provided the arrangement were made, we could easily console ourselves with being under no obligation on that account to the grand penitentiary and his friend.* I must confess to you the propositions of M. Torfs far exceeded our expectations. Can they be realized?

Adieu, my dear Sémonville; I cannot too often repeat to you how much satisfaction you have given. Pardon this delay in my correspondence, in favour of my varied affairs, which are going on well. I commit to your care, and to your resources, the fate of this negotiation, the success of which will ensure our own revolution, and prepare the way for others. You know my attachment, &c. . . .

Present a thousand tender *hommages* to the Duchess of Devonshire; ask her if she has received a letter from me, and prevail upon her to come to Paris, as I have already requested of her.

FROM M. SCHLIEFFEN, COMMANDANT OF THE PRUSSIAN TROOPS AT LIEGE, TO GENERAL LAFAYETTE.

Liege, Feb. 22nd, 1790.

Sir,—Having had the honour of making your acquaintance while on service in Hesse, at the time when, preceded by the reputation you had already acquired, you were passing through on your way to

* The grand penitentiary, M. Van Eupen, and M. Vander Noot, leaders of the party of the states.

Berlin, and finding myself now in your vicinity as a Prussian officer, at a juncture when the affairs of Belgium seem so nearly to concern both our nations, but when, for the want of mutual explanation, they run the risk of counteracting each other, I take the liberty, Marquis, of endeavouring to explain myself to you in a blunt soldier-like manner.

My country would desire that Austria, formidable as she is, had less influence in that province; yours (family engagements apart) ought to desire it also.

Mine, in occupying itself with the fate of Belgium, has no other object; it is indifferent to the form of government the latter may select; and if yours be guided by the same spirit, why should our measures clash?

M. de Lamark, does he, or does he not, act with the approbation of your nation?* Does he seriously desire the independence of Belgium, or would he bring about a reconciliation with its ancient masters, out of the midst of the fermentation which he is thus exciting?

Here are points, Marquis, on which a few comments may, in the position in which I now find myself, prevent mutually prejudicial mistakes. I do not speak to you of my stay at Liege; our policy is for nothing in the affairs of that country. We could have wished simply to have restored tranquillity upon equitable conditions, which the bishop-prince is blind enough to refuse.†

Nothing can equal the high consideration with which I have the honour to be, sir, &c.

* Count de Lamark, member of the constituent assembly, afterwards Prince d'Aremberg, took part, as a Belgian, in the affairsof his country.

† The people of Liege had, like those of Brabant, revolted

FROM M. DE LA SONDE TO GENERAL LAFAYETTE.

Douai, April 4th, 1790.

I HAVE the honour to inform you, that on the mere rumour of the arrival of the Counts de Mirabeau and de Lamark in this city, the committee of officers of the national militia resolved on a special meeting, and at the time I address you my inn is surrounded by national guards, who have by no means the air of being well disposed to give these gentlemen an agreeable reception.

Count Cornet des Grez has just been informed, in a positive manner, that General Vander Meersch's army has given in its adhesion to the patriotic assembly of Brussels, in the most formal way, adding, moreover, very sharp reproaches on the mode in

and driven away their bishop-prince, in order to give themselves a new government. A decree of the imperial chamber of Wetzlaër condemned this infraction of the laws of the empire, and commanded the directors of the circle to bring back the rebels to their duty. Frederic William, charged with the execution of this decree, wrote (March 9th, 1790) a letter to the prince-bishop, containing this passage:—"I feel convinced that my troops might now make a plenary execution of the decrees of Wetzlaër, as they are actually in possession of the town and citadel; but being there through a voluntary submission, and by a kind of capitulation, the laws of honour do not permit me to abuse the confidence of the people of Liege, nor to execute the arbitrary will of your Highness, and of your counsellors. But I shall feel myself obliged to restore the principality of Liege to them in the state in which I found it on the entrance of my troops." A detachment of the Austrian army, after the convention of Reichembach, entered the territory of Liege, which had been evacuated by the Prussian troops, and restored the prince-bishop in the month of January, 1791.

which the states have treated the army, and on the number of Prussian and Dutch officers with which it has been filled, so that there is just reason to believe that M. des Grez will very shortly prove to be in the right.

Receive, Marquis, &c.

Douai, April 6th.

General Vander Meersch has just acceded to the wish of the officers of his army, and to the tenour of the address of the patriotic committee of the 15th of March last.* The army now requires that M. Vander Meersch should remain its commander-in-chief, that the Duke d'Ursel should be again put at the head of the war department, and Count de Lamark be second in command under General Vander Meersch. This last request has been concerted between M. des Grez, the Duke d'Ursel, M. Vander Meersch, and the states of Flanders, merely for the purpose of binding the Count de Lamark and his family to the good cause. He will be decided by the hope of being promoted to the chief command.

I have the honour, &c.

* This step was followed, in a few days, by the arrest of General Vander Meersch, and the re-action of the government against the democratic party.

FROM GENERAL LAFAYETTE TO GENERAL SCHLIEFFEN.

Paris, April 7th, 1790.

SIR,—I have received the letter with which you honoured me; and it is with much pleasure I avail myself of the occasion to renew our former acquaintance, and to express to you my ardent wishes in favour of Belgium. I have no other desire than to see the rights and happiness of the people substantially secured. Be assured, sir, the French people have too high a sense of the value of their own liberty to wish to obstruct that of others, or to see with indifference that other powers are endeavouring, in any way, to check its development among their neighbours. As to the relations which may grow out of these affairs between our respective countries, it is for the heads of them to seek an explanation with each other. His Prussian Majesty will always find in the King of the French principles of liberty, justice, and moderation, as congenial to his personal character as to the national feeling, and that frank and ingenuous conduct which becomes a citizen king, now more than ever confident of being supported by a free and energetic nation, by which he is cherished on so many grounds.

It is my duty to inform you that the person you speak of acts solely on his own discretion as a citizen of Brabant, and that his proceedings in my own country are in no way directed by our government.*

* Note of General Lafayette, addressed to M. de Ségur, on sending him this correspondence with General Schlieffen, and several other documents respecting Belgian affairs:—"Count Auguste de Lamark was hurt at this disavowal. It was not, however, Lafayette's fault. M. de Lamark had himself declared that he set out as a Belgian, and did not consider him-

I shall always be happy, sir, to be enabled to concur with you in all objects of public utility; and I beg of you to receive my acknowledgments for the sentiments you testify for me, and also the consideration with which I have the honour to be, &c.

TO THE COUNT CORNET DES GREZ.

Paris, April 7th, 1790.

SIR,—I have received the letter with which you honoured me, and have read, with great interest, the development of the various subjects already discussed between you and M. de Ternant, and communicated to me on his return.

The profound exposé you have made of the general affairs of Europe, as well as of those peculiar to the Belgians, or relative to their neighbours, appeared to me as interesting for the truth of its details as important for the results it exhibits; and I very much regret that a multiplicity of occupations does not permit me to reply to each point as minutely as I could wish. I will therefore restrict myself at present to the most essential. The intelligent observations you favoured me with on the prospects of the Belgians, whether they remain independent, again place King Leopold at their head,

self as an agent of the French government. Lafayette's reply on this subject was conformable to truth. It was with Mirabeau that Lamark concerted his Belgian plans. M. de Montmorin would never have consented to Lamark's being accredited by Lafayette, from whom, moreover, no one ever requested credentials that would have been refused by the minister. Here is all that, from a thousand recollections somewhat confused, can be recalled on this subject. We have since been under great obligation to M. de Lamark's esteemed sister."

or a prince of his house, have induced me to write to the congress and General Schlieffen, copies of which letters you will find annexed; I hope you will approve their contents. It should evidently be our task to annihilate the whole influence of the house of Orange, whose sole object in maintaining ancient abuses is one day or other to appropriate their fruits. It seems to me to be equally essential to tranquillize the Belgians upon any apprehensions they may entertain of an excess of zeal on our part. As you think it better that we should just now have no public agent in Brussels, you may rest assured that I will oppose any one's being sent there, until I am informed by you that it is necessary.

As to the suggestions to be made to the cabinets of the Hague, London, and Berlin, that, in imitation of France, they should in no degree mix themselves up with the internal affairs of the Belgians, it is undoubtedly a wise measure, and I have no doubt that government will do in it whatever circumstances will permit. I shall lose no time, also, in laying before the minister your ideas of a general congress.* So vast a subject requires to be well

* France did not become a party to the convention which took place July 27, 1790, at Reichenbach, between Austria, Prussia, England, and Holland. These different powers bound themselves to assist the Emperor Leopold against the Belgian insurrection. M. de Ségur (vol. i. of his *Décade Historique*) has written the history of these events, and published documents communicated to him by General Lafayette. He has shewn how the cabinets, at first associated with the interests of the Anglo-Prussian league, (Prussia in particular, under the inspiration of its minister, M. Hertzberg, anxious for the humiliation of the house of Austria,) soon became alarmed at the progress of the French revolution, and met at Reichenbach, in a sort of European congress, in which the interests of monarchy prevailed over ancient jealousies.

weighed, and if it be practicable, especially if it can bring about constitutional reforms favourable to the cause of liberty amongst the different nations of Europe, I should be rejoiced indeed that my country should have the honour of making the first overtures. I will not conceal from you, however, that I see difficulties in it, which I will have the honour of indicating to you more particularly; but as this measure may prevent a war, of which the consequences might be detrimental to our own happy revolution, and at the same time disseminate the principles of liberty, I will not fail to recommend its receiving the most serious consideration.

As to the views and projects of King Leopold, I cannot, after all that I have heard of him, but believe them wise, and especially favourable to liberty; and I agree with you, that if he be seriously inclined to exhibit them in this light, and as soon as possible to develop them in his German and Italian states, it will be the most effective, and, to all appearance, an infallible method of recovering the Belgians, and attaching more closely than ever all who are subject to him. As to this, sir, I am personally anxious; and I believe our ministry desires no less warmly to be able to second them; but you must feel that one cannot do by anticipation what would be agreeable to him, without knowing what that is, and that we must at least wait until he has declared himself in some one way or other, which I believe he has not yet done since his accession. His connexion with England, should it be realized, might require a modification of measures; and on this point you will much oblige me by communicating your ideas. In any case, sir, I cannot but felicitate this prince and his relations on their having given

you their confidence, which could not be better placed. As the friend of humanity and liberty, I am attached to those monarchs who are desirous to become their champions ;* and I shall always learn with satisfaction that they continue to avail themselves of your wise counsels and great knowledge in political and administrative affairs.

It is impossible to be more grateful than I am for having been myself permitted to profit by them, and you will very sensibly oblige me, until I can have the pleasure of seeing you in Paris, by continuing your correspondence, to which I attach an inexpressible value.

To avoid, sir, all misunderstanding between us, I think we ought, on all essential points, to refer ourselves exclusively to what we write ; and this reserve will be the more useful, as I shall have none in my confidence in you, and will communicate whatever may concern the subject you are interested in, at the same time consulting you, whenever time will permit it, on every step which I may be called upon to take or to advise.

Receive the homage of these sentiments, and of the high consideration with which, &c. &c.

* Leopold II. had succeeded, fifteen days previously, the Emperor Joseph II. It is well known that while Grand Duke of Tuscany he introduced into his states reforms of the penal laws, improvements in the management of prisons, liberty of commerce, and also that he abolished various privileges.

TO GENERAL LAFAYETTE.

Rue Montmartre, No. 91, May 2nd, 1790.

It is time, my dear Marquis, to occupy ourselves seriously with Belgian affairs; I can treat of them with nobody but you. I hear the King of Prussia has proposed to the King of Hungary to guarantee the Low Countries to him in case of a general peace; I have much to say to you on this point.

I repeat that I have never deserved any suspicion on account of my connexions; that I have none with what is called the Orleans faction, that no overture has been made to me from that quarter; that I have no knowledge of its projects; that, as to him, I never met him in dinner company before last winter, and during the assembly of the notables; that at that time nothing was in agitation which could lead one to foresee or to meditate the revolution; and that since then, neither far nor near, have I had any communication with him, neither directly nor indirectly; neither with him, nor in reference to him. Accept, my dear Marquis, my sacred assurance of it, and even preserve my signature as the pledge of my veracity, and still more of my tender and sincere attachment.

Dumouriez.

TO GENERAL LAFAYETTE.

Rue Montmartre, No. 91, May 31st, 1790.

You may rely on me, my dear Marquis; I give you again and again my word of honour. Here is a note on the affair of the Low Countries: I have studied it well, and it very deeply concerns me: it is the point on which I can be the most useful to

the king, the country, and personally to you: there is not a moment to lose, and I beg of you at once to persuade M. de Montmorin to let me go. It is with you that I will agree upon whatever I may have to negotiate; I will place myself under your direction, and give you proof of my tender attachment. I will call upon you to-morrow morning between eight and nine; do procure this mission for me; you will have reason to be glad of it, and you will serve a faithful friend.

I broke off in order to go and dine with the Duke de Liancourt, to whom I shewed the annexed note. He took a copy of it, and means to confer upon it with you.

He is afraid that M. de Montmorin may object that I am too marked a person for this mission, and that it might appear as if I were sent out by the court. This objection falls of itself. First, because there would be the same risk of publicity in an inferior agent; secondly, because the same advantage could not be derived from an agent who had neither political nor military talents, nor the consideration due to a general officer who had made himself thoroughly acquainted with the affairs of the Low Countries.

Besides, having no direct correspondence with ministers, I should merely have the air of being a person in your confidence, and nothing seems more natural than that, in your position, you should be interested in having a thorough knowledge of what is passing in the Belgian provinces, and in maintaining the influence you already have, an influence essential to the success of the French constitution, to which your own fortune is inseparably attached.

The work which I composed on the revolution of the Low Countries will be my passport, and the advertise-

ment of what I may be able to do for the benefit of the Belgians. You must be as much persuaded as I am that the two revolutions, though proceeding in an inverse order, have too much analogy to permit that the good or evil destiny of the Flemings should be without its influence upon our own. We had agreed to wait for M. Cornet des Grez ; but the events are so urgent that it is better, should you procure me this mission, that I should go and meet him, in order to prevent matters from getting worse.

I am very anxious about this commission, and as much on your account as on my own ; we will discuss it to-morrow morning. I love as much as I esteem you, and that is saying everything.

DUMOURIEZ.

THE SOVEREIGN CONGRESS OF THE BELGIAN UNITED STATES TO GENERAL LAFAYETTE.

Given at Brussels, June 3rd, 1790.

MARQUIS,—The state of prosperity and reverses through which the Belgian provinces have successively passed are perfectly well known to you ; the Count de Thiennes, charged to deliver you this letter, will be able to state all the circumstances in detail ; and we request of you to bestow on him, as well as upon our cause, the fullest measure of your attention ; for free we will be, or cease to exist ; and whatever be the attempts of the enemies of our liberty, especially of the house of Austria, we will never fail to oppose to them all the efforts of a generous nation, which, in a little time, will find in its own energy, its citizens, and its wealth, an unconquerable force. We should be well satisfied, Marquis, if you would send us an officer of distinction possessed of your entire

confidence, and in whom the congress could justly place its own, as much in reference to our political relations as to the condition and operations of our army. The desires of the congress would be most fully realized if such a choice could at once fall on the Chevalier de Ternant,* colonel commandant of the royal regiment of Liege, who is already known to Count Cornet des Grez, and enjoys, moreover, a well-earned reputation.

By this means, the French may convince themselves that the Belgian republic is worthy of their support, and that its friendship and liberty ought not to be indifferent to them. It is this friendship, these ties, which will reciprocally assure us that happiness, which we have both of us conquered at the risk of our lives, and at the price of the blood of citizens; it is this friendship, which we will carefully cherish with France, that will place a barrier on our frontiers impregnable to all the enemies of French liberty.

We trust, sir, that in favour of these sentiments, which under any circumstances we will realize, you will be pleased to sanction the requests which the Count de Thiennes will prefer to you on our behalf.

We are, sir, your very affectionate, the Sovereign Congress of the Belgian States.

(Signed) DEGRAVE, President.
VAN EUPEN, Secretary.

* M. de Ternant, (the same who had been engaged in America during the war of independence, and served the cause of the Dutch patriots in 1787,) had just been sent to the German princes, proprietors in Alsace. He was subsequently French minister to the United States. (See concerning him, vol. ii. p. 202.)

REPLY OF GEN. LAFAYETTE TO THE SOVEREIGN CONGRESS OF THE BELGIAN STATES.

GENTLEMEN,—It is with respectful sensibility I receive the new testimonies with which you honour me, and I shall ever be eager to express my wishes for the welfare and liberty of the Belgian people. M. de Ternant is in Germany; I can as yet only offer you the homage of that gratitude which your confidence cannot fail to inspire in him. You have condescended, gentlemen, to correspond with me, though I have in this respect no other public character than that of a friend of liberty; permit me, then, in virtue of this title, in consideration of my concern for the union, the prosperity, of the Belgians, and for the cessation of intestine divisions, to include myself in the number of those who regard the liberation of General Vander Meersch* as the first and indispensable means of accomplishing those wishes that ought to animate every patriotic breast.

I am with respect, &c.

TO GENERAL LAFAYETTE.

July 9th, 1790.

IT is impossible, Marquis, that we can see each other at our ease before my departure. The federation engages you too much for me to occupy you with external affairs. I am, however, expected, on the evening of the 10th, at Brussels, and I have

* General Vander Meersch, promoted at the end of January, 1789, to the rank of Lieutenant Field-Marshal of the Belgian States, was imprisoned in the month of April, 1790, as leader of the party opposed to that of the States.

resolved to set out as much for the sake of redeeming your promise as from the necessity of the case.

I make all the advances for this journey, notwithstanding the scantiness of my means; but I know your delicacy too well to have the least apprehension on this point. I have to request you will sanction the arrangement I intend making on my arrival at Brussels; I will draw a bill of exchange upon you for 6000 francs, which I beg you will have the goodness to have honoured in Paris.

I love M. de Montmorin with all my heart, but we see the affairs of the Low Countries in an opposite light, and I fear that his opinion, if it be not modified, may compromise him. He looks upon our policy with the eye of a minister, and of an ancient minister. He has vowed a hatred to the Belgian cause, which magnifies, to his view, the errors of the congress; his wishes for the success of the Austrians are much too emphatic, and the influence of M. de Mercy much too marked. In fifteen days, the political system will change, and the nation cannot but view with suspicion and distrust the overclose adherence of ministers to the old one.

M. de Montmorin works according to his craft, and though my opinion be the reverse of his, I do not blame him; but your position is entirely different, and almost the opposite of his. You are the man of the nation; you ought, and can alone watch over its external dangers, and nothing you may do in this respect can compromise you.* I will leave

* M. Dumouriez says, in his Memoirs, (vol. ii., b. iii., c. iv., p. 90,) that the report he made on the revolution of Belgium, when there, in 1790, for the purpose of watching the state of things, "gave great pleasure to M. de Montmorin, and was received very coldly by Lafayette, who was absorbed in intrigues of which he was continually the centre." I believe

you to judge by my conduct in this journey, which will be very brief, if I am not aware of great means for advancing the welfare of both nations.

DUMOURIEZ.

THE SOVEREIGN CONGRESS OF THE BELGIAN STATES TO GENERAL LAFAYETTE.

Given at Brussels, August 6th, 1790.

SIR,—It is with great satisfaction, and no less gratitude, that we have seen the decree of the national assembly which revokes the permission that an insidious policy had succeeded in wresting from the best of kings in favour of the Austrians, in order to enable them more effectually to combat the liberty of the French and of ourselves, by a temporary occupation of their territory.* We have no doubt of

that this report gave little pleasure to M. de Montmorin; but if Lafayette received it coldly, it was not because he was absorbed in intrigues, but that he had attained a conviction that the Belgian revolution was nothing more than an intrigue of the aristocracy and clergy, in which the interests of the people were overlooked, and in which he could perceive no principle of liberty and of the rights of nations.—(Note of General Lafayette.)

* On the 27th of July, a denunciation from the administration of the department of the Ardennes had reached the national assembly, with reference to a letter of M. de Bouillé, who informed them, in pursuance of the king's commands, of the impending march of the Austrians across the territory of France and the frontiers of Luxemburg, on their way to the Belgian provinces. Six commissioners were immediately appointed, charged to demand explanations from ministers, who replied, that this measure was the consequence of a reciprocal arrangement contained in two conventions concluded with the Empress Queen in 1769 and 1772. On the 28th of July, the

its being partly the result of your noble efforts, and we offer you the merited sentiments of our gratitude, beseeching you, sir, to second, by your influence, the wishes of the nation we represent, of which M. de Thiennes is the bearer and interpreter.

At all times the Belgian states have had political relations with the French; and history furnishes several examples of treaties which have connected the two nations; may we have it in our power to add one more to those which, deciding the fate of our liberty, will for ever abolish the despotism that oppresses our vast and rich country. To this you may contribute, sir, as much by your talents as by the great influence you have obtained over the French nation.

Much do we regret, sir, that we cannot oblige you by the liberation of General Vander Meersch. Responsible to the nation, and accountable before it, it is not in our power to interrupt the course of justice, which would long since have been in full activity if M. Vander Meersch himself had not encumbered it with obstacles, and had not our delicacy towards him prevented us from surmounting them.

Proofs of this we have given to M. Dumouriez, and we have no doubt of his conveying them to you with the conviction they produced in him, and which he acknowledged to us. M. de Thiennes

assembly declared that, conformably to its decree of February 28th, the passage of no foreign troops across the French territory could be allowed but by virtue of a decree sanctioned by the king. On the 29th, an exculpatory letter from MM. de Montmorin and Latour Dupin was read, which exhibited a list of considerable forces stationed on the frontiers of Flanders and Hainault.

will communicate to you our sentiments upon this excellent and able man.

We are, sir, your very affectionate, the Sovereign Congress of the Belgian United States.

(Signed) F. Vander Meersch, President.
Van Eupen, Secretary.

FROM THE FEDERATION

TO THE

DEPARTURE AND ARREST OF THE KING,

(JUNE 21, 1791.)*

XV.

THE federation of the 14th of July had inspired too many hopes in the friends of liberty, union, and public order, not to instigate the enemies of the revolution to disturb this auspicious harmony by every practicable means. We observe that, on the 3rd of August, Lafayette was compelled to publish the following order of the day, which may be considered in the light of an address to the national guards:—

"The commander-in-chief, convinced that the revolution, which has restored to the people their rights, and laid the foundation of their happiness, can only be consolidated by public order, considers as an enemy of liberty and the constitution whosoever does not abhor licentiousness and anarchy; he knows that it is not in vain that the armed force of the kingdom has bound itself by a sacred oath; he has shared the indignation of his brothers in arms at beholding the attempts of a few perverse or misled men to agitate the capital, which, after having given the kingdom the signal of courage, owes it the no less valuable example of submission to the law. For some days the poniards of calumny have been multiplying; the most incendiary counsels disseminated in writings and public places; insurrection preached up against the decrees of the assembly and the constitutional authority of the king; culpable manœuvres and corruption employed. The citizens of Paris sigh for that public order, the essential fruit of a free constitution, which secures to

* Continuation of a collection, entitled, "Collection de Plusieurs Discours," &c.

every man his repose, his property, and the means of realizing his talents or his industry. It is impossible, then, to view without astonishment, the factitious effervescence which is labouring here, as in other parts of the kingdom, to compromise public wealth, and the fate of the creditors of the state, by terrors, disorders, and resistance to taxation; which, taking advantage of all events, inventing, in default of them, absurd lies, attempting to excite dissensions and jealousies of every kind, has evidently no other object than to overturn the new-born constitution, and to entail upon it the horrors of anarchy and intestine division.

"But in vain may our public enemies expect, by augmenting the fatigues of the national guard, to dispirit its activity or firmness. Devoted by our principles, as by our oaths, to the preservation of the constitution and public order, certain (the commander-in-chief is authorized to declare it in their name) of being sustained by all the national guards of France, we will do our duty with unextinguishable zeal, and, if it be required, with inflexible and severe firmness."

The details of this order of the day relate to the execution of various acts of the civil power.

For a long while attempts had been making to corrupt the discipline of the troops, and to sow divisions between the officers and soldiers; this was one of the main expedients on which the counter-revolution founded its hopes. The histories of that period have recorded the melancholy event of the revolt of the garrison of Nancy, quelled by the national guards and troops of the line under the command of General Bouillé.* The patriots, for the

* In consequence of serious disorders in one part of the army, the national assembly had passed, August 7, a decree prohibiting all deliberative associations in the regiments, save the council of administration, and appointing inspectors extraordinary, to be named by the king, for the purpose of auditing the accounts of each regiment, in presence of a certain number of officers, under-officers, and soldiers, &c. This decree was violated at Nancy by the revolt of three regiments, who arrested their inspector, M. de Malseigne, and a commandant, M. Denoue. On the 16th, the assembly passed fresh measures to subdue

most part, felt the necessity of giving him the countenance of the assembly, and, at the sitting of the 30th of August, Lafayette pronounced these words:

"The inquiries you have ordered will enable us, I hope, to discover the authors of the disturbances in the garrisons, and be the means of delivering them to the rigour of the laws.

"But it is the actual crisis which demands our care; at present our peril is delicate; and for that very reason a good citizen cannot hesitate to tender his advice.

"I am aware, gentlemen, that M. de Bouillé will display, in the execution of your decrees, his energy, his great talents, and that fidelity for which he is distinguished; but he requires, and your committee urges, a testimony in his favour, which you cannot be in too much haste to give.

"I claim it for him, and for the obedient troops who will unite with their general in suppressing the revolt."

The assembly adopted, at this sitting, a decree proposed by Barnave, in the same sense. The revolt was quelled, and General Bouillé received, on the motion of Mirabeau, the thanks of the assembly.*

Several national guards and soldiers of the line having been killed in this struggle of public order

the revolters; in consequence, M. de Bouillé, on the 31st, at the head of a corps composed of troops of the line and national guards, entered Nancy by force, and, after a sanguinary struggle, enforced the execution of the laws.

* The insurrection of Nancy, provoked by the aristocratic feeling of the officers, was nevertheless a very dangerous rebellion against the national government and the decree of the assembly. I contributed much towards furnishing the king and General Bouillé with the means of suppressing it; I managed the interests of M. de Bouillé with the jacobin chiefs of that time; I invited the national guards to co-operate with him; I united with Mirabeau, or, more properly speaking, I inspired him with his motion of thanks to M. de Bouillé and his troops; in a word, I served with zeal, not only the cause of public order, but the general, who, in his memoirs, regrets that he did not avail himself of these advantages sooner to betray the constitutional cause.—(Note of General Lafayette.)

against anarchy, the mayor of Paris, on September 16th, came to request the national assembly to assist, at least by a deputation, at the funeral service which the city determined to solemnize on the field of the federation, in honour of these defenders of the law. We should not have recalled this circumstance, if there were only question in it of the general, who was desirous that a homage should be thus rendered to public order; but we do so because the respectable and numerous assemblage around the funeral trophy of its defenders appears to us to contrast with the declamations that the constitutionalists have offered as the continual promoters of insurrection.

During the course of Lafayette's command there was but one house devastated in Paris; it was precisely that of the man of the emigration whom he loved and respected the most—the Marshal de Castries.* A duel had occurred between two deputies,† one of whom was the marshal's son; various challenges had passed, and appeared concerted. One of those riotous groups which form suddenly, and are recruited from the crowd, directed itself, on the 15th of November, to the Hotel de Castries, and scaled the garden. In half an hour all within it was demolished; nothing stolen. Threats of razing and burning the house were uttered; the national guard arrived in time to prevent the mischief. The rioters disappeared; the crowd dispersed; but great injury had been done; there was nothing saved but a cabinet, defended by a national grenadier. Numerous and recent instances, in countries not in a state of revolution, will not extenuate this scandal. But a still greater scandal was the lenity shewn with

* See page 197 of vol. ii.

† MM. Charles de Lameth and de Castries.

regard to this riot, while Lafayette was engaged in suppressing it, by Mirabeau, to whom, in spite of the provocation of the right side, it is to be lamented that some member of the other did not reply with merited severity.*

The debate on the jury, conducted by profound

* Madame de Stael has made a very just observation on the affair of the Hotel de Castries, in saying that it ought not to be preferred as an excuse for the emigration, inasmuch as it would thus warrant an unfavourable and ill-founded inference as to the dangers to which the members of the constituent assembly were exposed in Paris. It is quite true that this pillage was not a popular movement, but a blow devised by the Jacobins, friends of MM. de Lameth, at the head of whom were Cavallanti, Rotondo, and especially Giles, who, from the first months of the revolution, had been engaged in several riots. In the Memoirs of M. Bertrand de Moleville we read of this same Giles, principal agent of the committee called the *sabbat*, as being in the service of the court. It was he who, after causing the furniture to be broken, saved the king's portrait. Mirabeau made great use of this circumstance at the tribune. But the point on which every writer, especially every patriotic writer, is compelled to render justice to the Duke de Castries is, the charge of poison. It is impossible to suffer this popular calumny to pass without elucidating the fact. So little did M. de Castries think of poisoning his sword, that, for a long time, he insisted on fighting with pistols, for M. de Lameth being much more expert than he was, the chances between them were unequal. But the latter obstinately persisting in his choice of weapons, his adversary was fortunate enough to give him a slight wound, which injured a nerve, in consequence of which a few convulsions ensued during the dressing. This was enough to spread about the absurdity of a poisoned sword. It would certainly be very unjust to accuse M. de Lameth as the author of it, and we know how the spirit of party will often sweep along the underlings of a faction beyond the intentions of their chiefs. The sole reproach to be made against M. de Lameth, unhappily but too well founded, is, that when MM. d'Ambly and Saint Simon, the seconds of M. de Castries, went and requested him to give a formal contradiction to this atrocious and absurd imputation, he refused, alleging, that a similar declaration would displease the people.—(Note of General Lafayette.)

and eloquent lawyers, was, nevertheless, still tinctured with the prejudices of the old school. Adrien Duport was one of the most enlightened supporters of the new doctrines. Lafayette was for admitting no modification, not even any improvement of the American and English jury system in criminal cases, which he desired to have in all its genuineness; and, in fact, we have since had reason to remark, that, by change upon change, this fine institution has been in a great measure perverted. We find, in the legislative debates of Jan. 18th, 1791, the following opinion expressed by him in the shape of an amendment:*—

"The difficulties which accumulate upon us from every side, and have their origin in the attempts to blend opposite systems, indicate that mediations of this kind are incompatible with truth and unworthy of legislators. You have chosen to transplant amongst you that fine institution under the shadow of which the liberty of England has for so many ages prospered, and which America has retained in the creation of her novel institutions; receive it, then, in all the purity of its nature; and mutilate it not, destroy it not, by mixing with it the fragments of a barbarous jurisprudence, which you are now abolishing. I move the previous question on all the provisions of those articles of the project of the decree which authorize any species of writing."

During the first years of the revolution, the aristocracy was incessantly plotting, but in general with so little talent, that its plots frequently wanted even an air of probability. On the 29th of February,

* The subject under discussion was the following article of the project of the committee:—"The depositions of witnesses must be made by writing, and be received, to wit, in presence of the officers of police, as respects those witnesses that may then be produced; and in the presence of the foreman of the jury of accusation (the grand jury) as respects those witnesses who, not having appeared before the police-officer, shall be first brought up before the jury of accusation."

1791, they had flattered themselves they should be able to throw Paris into confusion by decoying the commander of the national guards out of the city never to return to it again. They tried the expedient, so often had recourse to since, of exciting a popular disturbance under pretext of destroying the tower of the keep of Vincennes. It is superfluous to say that this keep was no longer used. We learn from one of the documents found in the iron cabinet, that Lafayette had advised the king to take this direction in one of his rides, and give orders himself for its demolition;* but he could not brook the idea of its being done, under constitutional order, by a mob. When he heard, therefore, that a considerable number of people had flocked towards it, and that Santerre, under pretext of preserving order, had marched there with his battalion, he proceeded with his staff to Vincennes, but not without taking the precaution of sending a battalion to the Carrousel to watch over the public tranquillity. He found them in the act of demolishing the keep, reestablished discipline in a portion of the national guard which Santerre, and other factious persons, were endeavouring to mislead, commanded the rioters to be seized, whom he sent to the prisons of the Conciergerie, after threatening to open his artillery on the gates of the faubourg, which had been shut in his face. Some shots were fired at the officers of his staff, and on his return at night through the street St. Antoine, an attempt was made to trip up his horse and kill him. A bayonet, thrust from a national grenadier, frustrated the attempt; but report had got abroad that Lafayette was killed;

* See, vol. ii., p. 443, a letter addressed to the king, May 26, 1790, and found in the iron cabinet.

and here follows what was passing at the Tuileries.

From daybreak an attempt had been making to ply the national guards on service with drink, under pretence of treating them with breakfast. A crowd of royalists, many of whom had been invited from the departments expressly for this purpose, availing themselves of the facility possessed by the gentlemen of the chamber of distributing tickets of admission to persons on service and their acquaintances, had insinuated themselves into the apartments which separated the hall occupied by the national guards from the king's chamber. They were armed with small swords, sabres, sword-canes, pistols, and daggers. The king left his room to visit his apartments and those who occupied them. All this was going on, in an under way, without the knowledge of the national guard. It may be seen in the papers of the day, that advantage had been taken of the passages, which the people of the court disposed of, in order to avoid exciting the attention of the national guards assembled in the hall. The first alarum was given by a hot-headed person, the Chevalier de Saint Elme, who, setting ajar the doors of the apartment, exhibited a pistol to the national guards. This discovery produced a great sensation. The king was frightened; he begged the chivalrous company to disband themselves and lay down their arms. It was time, for the national guards, amongst whom the death of their chief was already circulating, were about to burst into the apartments. The chevaliers escaped with a few insults and blows as they went out.

While this scene was passing Lafayette arrived: he treated several of the courtiers sharply, and read a lecture in particular to the Duke de Villequier,

first gentleman of the chamber, of whom he had the most reason to complain. He saw the king, who expressed his regret at this piece of folly, begun, as it would seem, without his privity. The king told him, *that the false zeal, or the extravagance, of the people who called themselves his friends, would finish by ruining him* . . . . . a prediction but too well verified. On his return to the hall, the general-in-chief learnt, from public rumour, that a pile of arms had been secreted in the closets of the apartment, a measure not to be endured by those who were charged with the protection of the king and his safety, consequently he requested that an order might be given for the surrender of these arms. They were brought out in a great handbasket, and it was visible to everybody present that there were daggers amongst them. They were given up to the national guards, and broken in the court of the Tuileries with an exhibition of gaiety little respectful perhaps for the palace of the king, but especially offensive to the chevaliers, who had been already driven unceremoniously away, and who from this time bore the name of the "chevaliers du poignard;" but it must be acknowledged that the provocation was great, and the lesson necessary. They were not less shocked the next day, by an order of the day, in which the general-in-chief spoke in severe terms of the *chiefs of the domesticity*, an expression which gave great offence to many of the courtiers.

ON THE CIVIL CONSTITUTION OF THE CLERGY.

THE affairs of the civil constitution of the clergy* was one of the great events of the revolution. Its adversaries took able advantage of it in order to fill France with division and troubles.

Amid the tribulations and regrets which the spirit of faction and intrigue, of ignorance and misconception, has scattered over the career of Lafayette, none have been more painful to him than the excesses produced by the hatred against the nonjuring sects; not that he could have been convinced by the opponents of the civil constitution of the clergy, such as M. de Boisgelin, Maury, &c., the greater part of whose arguments was afterwards refuted by these very opponents themselves in the affair of the concordat, and the subsequent discussions with the holy see. "*We conducted ourselves, in* 1791, *like true gentlemen,*" one of our first archbishops has since declared,† "*for of the greater part of us it can hardly be said that we did so from religion;*" meaning, doubtless, to express in this way, that their resistance had been suggested by political considerations rather than by religious duties. In fact, amongst those with whom this latter motive had the greatest weight, there were some who, alarmed at the effects of a schism on the salvation of present and future generations, and oppressed by the conviction that nothing more than their assent was wanting to prevent such a calamity, distinguished themselves from the majority by conciliatory intentions, which the purely political party did not hesi-

* Voted Nov. 27, 1790; assented to by the king, Dec. 22.

† The Archbishop of Narbonne.

tate to elude. But, at last, on one hand and the other, on this, through an imprudence as much the result of an austere piety as of a careless philosophy, on that, by the hostile zeal with which this fault was elaborated, the mischief was done.* The remedy suggested, of leaving, as in the United States, each society to support its own temple and its own ministers, was rejected by all sides. Still the people, though desirous of religious liberty, persisted in not regarding the new dissidence in the catholic worship as a distinction of this kind; they were persuaded the entire explanation of it was to be found in this public avowal of the aristocracy of the principal nonconformists, and in the secret tactics that disturbed the peace of families. Habituated by the vice of their education to regard the administering of the sacraments as a public function, they inferred that these *functionaries* should be sworn.† In the midst of these intrigues and errors there existed a considerable number of really pious persons, sincerely attached to the nonjuring worship. Lafayette had near him an irrefragable proof that this opinion

* See at page 107 of this volume the efforts of General Lafayette to get the decrees relative to the civil constitution of the clergy expunged from the constitutional act.

† Without going as far back as the oaths of the league, which were approved of by the Sorbonne and the faculty of theology, we have only to remember that of the coronation, consecrated by the church, *to exterminate heretics;* an oath M. Turgot tried in vain to have altered at the coronation of Louis XVI., to which the clergy would not consent. The rigorous observation of another oath, that of the cross of St. Louis, by which one was bound to reveal everything injurious to the king's authority, might have the effect of introducing a spy into the family of each of those who received this cross. Lafayette changed the form of it two days after the 14th of July, for the admission of the first chevalier de St. Louis whom he received.—(Note found in the papers of General Lafayette.)

might ally itself with sentiments of the most liberal virtue and accomplished patriotism.

The prejudice against the nonconforming religious societies was nowhere more general than in Paris. Public opinion and individual zeal were repugnant to the protection with which the defenders of liberty desired to environ it. It had uniformly, at this period, been performed in many chapels, and especially in all the churches of those houses in which there had been nuns. It is thus that it has never ceased to be publicly practised by the family of Lafayette. But a great unpopularity was attached to this service.

We must, at the same time, confess, with shame and grief, that before the public force was able to put down an infamous conspiracy against the respectable women known by the name of Sisters of Charity, several of them were one day most indecently insulted as they were coming from mass.

It may be seen, by a letter of the minister of the interior to the directory of the departments, May 31st, 1791, that these crimes, by whatever party, or with whatever view, they were committed, occurred simultaneously in several parts of the kingdom.

In 1791, the department had authorized the occupation of the church of the Théatins by a society of the nonjuring worship. This decision, to which Lafayette was not a stranger, had not the success anticipated. The 2nd of June a mob formed upon the quay, the church was entered,* the terrified congregation took to flight, guilty emissaries overthrew the altar, and were meditating still greater mischief, when a numerous detachment of national guards appeared.

* See the "Moniteur" of June 4th.

"An account has been given," says a newspaper of that day, "in the greater part of the journals of a disturbance which happened at the church of the Théatins, occupied by a religious community; but they have omitted to mention that this scandalous scene, which from the calm that reigned in this church until noon was little to have been expected, was instantly brought to a close by the national guard, that the altar was restored, and that the non-conforming priests chaunted vespers the same day in that very church, without any fresh disorder having occurred."

It might have been added, that these vespers, at which the mayor and general-in-chief were present, were chaunted under the protection of the bayonets of the national guard. In vain did Lafayette urge and appeal to the heads of the Théatins to assist him in carrying this enterprise through; they thought perhaps, with reason, it would be better to wait for a calmer moment.

But it would have been impossible to have said anything better adapted to recal bewildered opinions, and to frustrate disorganizing intrigues, than what had been already proclaimed from the tribune in the excellent speeches of M. de Talleyrand and M. de Sièyes; the one in the name of the constitutional committee, the other in justification of the conduct of the directory of the department. These two speeches, which may be found in the "Moniteur" of May 9, 1791, and the principles of which were embodied in a decree, furnish the constituent assembly with one of the titles of its glory.*

* M. de Talleyrand is the only bishop ever appointed by the choice and at the request of the clergy of France. He was then abbé de Périgord, and agent of the clergy; but, contrary to the usual custom, especially in the case of a man of such high

As to Lafayette, if on other occasions we may attribute to him oversights, errors, and weakness, it is certainly not in reference to the cause of the liberty of religious worship that such reproaches can be applied to him, for it has always been his conviction that no human power has the right to interpose between man's heart and the Divinity: he detested all intolerance; that of incredulity, as much as that of any religious creed whatever. The purity of his zeal was acknowledged in those times of trouble, and even with a confidence that was touching to him, by all those whose devotion was not subjugated by party spirit. We may appeal to the conscience of these, and defy them to cite an occasion on which any personal consideration was, for an instant, put in competition with the unqualified devotion of Lafayette to even the smallest interests of religious liberty.

Such were his principles and conduct whenever called upon to speak or act on this question. We

birth, Louis XVI. had delayed appointing him. The general assembly of the clergy expressly voted that a representation should be made to the king, in their name, expressive of their astonishment that the abbé de Périgord was not made a bishop; and it was in consequence of this indication that the king at last gave him the bishopric of Autun. Though the Bishop of Autun had assisted at the ordination of the civil constitution, and had himself taken the oath of the stipendiary priests, he did not keep his bishopric, and always advocated religious liberty in favour of the unsworn priests. Those of his diocese were assisted by him in foreign countries. It was between M. de Talleyrand, Siéyes, and La Rochefoucauld, for the department, Bailly, for the municipality, and Lafayette, for the national guard, that the measures respecting the church of the Théatins were concerted, which, through the intrigues of the jacobins, succeeded so ill. Siéyes was obliged to justify the department at the tribune, in an admirable speech.—(Note found amongst General Lafayette's papers.)

see, in the Memoirs of Bourienne, (vol. v. p. 62,) and in the History of France subsequent to the 18th Brumaire, by M. Bignon, (vol ii. p. 188,) that previous to the consulate for life, Lafayette had been in communication with the first consul Bonaparte, in order to dissuade him from re-establishing a state religion, and to advise him to adopt, in all its integrity, the American principle of perfect equality among religious sects, by which each would be isolated from the government, and religious societies would form themselves at pleasure under the direction of priests of their own choice, paid from their own funds. The desire of liberty, of equality, complete and independent of political considerations, has been repeated by him, since the restoration, in his speeches at the tribune, and in his replies to the addresses of the ministers of different persuasions in the United States.

But while Lafayette and his friends were labouring to serve the cause of religious liberty, of public order, and the personal interests of the king within the limits prescribed by the constitution, they were assailed by the intrigues of the counter-revolutionary party, and of the anarchist factions. It has been since discovered, that on the 3rd of December, 1790, the king had severally addressed himself to the Emperor of Germany, the King of Prussia, the Empress of Russia, the Kings of Spain and Sweden, to suggest to them the idea of a congress of the principal powers, supported by an armed force.* Bertrand de Molleville has revealed the mission of Count Alphonse de Durfort, who, in the month of March, 1791, wrote, from the dictation of the king

* "Memoires d'un Homme d'Etat," attributed to M. Hardenberg, vol. i. p. 103.

and queen, to certify to the Count d'Artois, that "Lafayette is a scoundrel and factious fanatic, in whom no confidence can be placed;" on which the Count d'Artois (article 16 of his reply) observes, "He is very glad they have put it in his power to notify to every court, as need may be, that the reports which are in circulation of their Majesties having given their confidence to M. de Lafayette, and suffered themselves to be swayed by his perfidious suggestions, are entirely destitute of truth." It was stipulated (article 3) that the emperor should despatch five and twenty thousand men to the frontiers of Flanders and Hainault, that the troops of the circles should move on Alsace, that the Swiss should assemble upon their frontiers, that the King of Sardinia should enter Dauphiny with fifteen thousand men, and that the twelve thousand men of the King of Spain be increased to twenty thousand and should threaten the southern provinces. Bouillé, in his Memoirs, mentions a visit of the Duke of Lauzun, for the purpose of reconciling the Duke of Orleans with the court, and, of course, at the expense of liberty and Lafayette. He relates in them the reports of the court and his own to Mirabeau, "*on the ambition and cupidity on which they might depend*, he said, *while Lafayette was an enthusiast and a madman.*"

The project of evasion dates from that period; and the tumult excited, the 18th of April, 1791, to prevent the king from going to St. Cloud, as was frequently his custom, was for the purpose of furnishing the adversaries of the revolution with an argument against the independence of the monarch.*

* The king was preparing to go to Saint Cloud; to prevent his doing so, advantage was taken of the respect he was known

Mirabeau, since his intimate connexion with the court, had espoused fully all these views. He had even himself planned the tumult of Saint Cloud. His death deprived the counter-revolutionists of the counsels of that powerful genius; the whole plan suffered from that loss.

The motive of the journey was, it was said, the very natural repugnance of the king to perform the Easter ceremonies in his constitutional parish.* The power the volunteers possessed of changing service at any moment with their comrades, had facilitated on that day a composition of the guard, which was favourable to the proposed aim. Lafayette was ill seconded by the troops on service; this was the only time he had cause to complain of them. The battalion of the Carmelites, or of Saint Nicholas, which was in good order in the grand alley of the Tuileries, offered him, it is true, to secure the king's departure. This proposal might have inspired the other battalions with a noble emulation; but what the court desired was, to prove that they were forcibly detained in Paris. The majority of the national guards were perfectly sincere. Some of them might have been in the secret, namely, Danton, who had been long paid by the promoters of the tumult, and who arrived with his battalion, without having been summoned, under pretext of hastening to the succour of public order. Lafayette

to feel for the religion of his fathers. The club of the Cordeliers denounced him as refractory to law. M. de Lafayette vainly exerted himself to protect his departure; the faithful servants who surrounded him were forcibly dragged from him, and he returned to his prison.—(Extract from the proclamation of the king, of June 20th, 1791, at the moment of his departure.)

* The report had been spread that his project was to quit France.

had asked the king and queen to grant him a little time to open a passage for them; they instantly entered their carriage. He entreated them to remain there until the passage should be opened; and while he was engaged in the midst of the rioters, they were requested by a municipal officer to return to their apartment.

Lafayette then proposed to the king to declare frankly to the assembly, that while he would maintain, as regarded his public functions, the decrees that had been adopted, he demanded for himself the right which each man possesses of practising the religious ceremonies which may be agreeable to him, and that this would put an end to all the dissensions of which he was the object. The king appeared touched and grateful for the offer made by Lafayette to support with his whole influence such a measure; he only requested one day for consideration; but he consulted the council of his conscience, and that same evening he replied to Lafayette, thanking him repeatedly, "that his directors had told him it was sufficient, for the safety of his soul, not to perform his Easter duties at the church in which the oath had been taken." It was after this reply, that the commander-in-chief gave his resignation.

"The battalions of the national guard assembled after twelve o'clock," says the *Moniteur* of the 23rd of April; "twenty-three battalions repaired to M. de Lafayette's house; at nine o'clock at night, a great number of battalions mustered there with their arms and banners, others arrived as best they could from various assemblies. He was entreated, in the most urgent manner, and with the most touching expressions of affection and devotion, to withdraw his resignation. A great number of the national guards then proceeded to the municipality, accom-

panied by torches, and requested that corps to unite with them in solicitations. The municipality, with M. Bailly at their head, arrived at M. de Lafayette's at eleven o'clock at night. They entered, and had a private conference with him. The apartments, the court, and a part of the street, were filled with national guards. The municipality retired at midnight, and M. de Lafayette had not yet given an answer. Forty-two battalions at that hour had already repaired to his house; no positive answer had been given yesterday morning."

M. de Lafayette pronounced the following speech on that occasion, in a meeting of the general council of the commons of Paris, the 22nd of April, 1791; it was sent to the sixty battalions, by a decision of the general council, Friday, the 22nd.

"GENTLEMEN,—I come, in this house of commons, in which so many recollections recur to me, to acknowledge the last testimonies of your kindness with all the warmth of a heart whose first desire, after that of serving the people, is to be loved by them; and to express my astonishment at the importance they deign to attach to an individual, in a free country, where nothing should be of real importance except law.

"If my conduct on this occasion, gentlemen, could be but regulated by my sentiments of gratitude and affection, I should only reply to the regrets with which you and the national guard have honoured me, by yielding obedience to your entreaties; but as I was guided by no feeling of private interest when I formed that resolution, so also in the midst of the various causes for agitation that surround us, I cannot allow myself to be governed by my private affections.

"I do not think that the national guard, of whom the great majority have ever been inaccessible to the seductions of party spirit and of licence, can have beheld with indifference what has caused my discouragement: the constitutional authorities unacknowledged, their orders despised, public force opposed to the law, of which the protection has been confided to its charge. We are citizens, gentlemen, we are free; but unless we yield obedience to law, anarchy, despotism, and confusion, must be the consequence; and if this capital, the cradle of the revolution,

instead of protecting, by her knowledge and respect, the depositaries of the powers of the nation, besiege them by her tumults, and weary them by her violence, she will cease to become an example to Frenchmen, and may even become their terror.

"But, gentlemen, when I received such touching proofs of affection, too much was done for me and not enough for the law. I am convinced, with the deepest emotion, how well my comrades love me; I am still ignorant to what degree they cherish the principles on which liberty is founded. I express to you, gentlemen, this sincere avowal of my sentiments; deign to make them known to the national guard, from whom I have so joyfully received so many proofs of affection, and to whom I shall ever remain a grateful and an affectionate comrade. To command them, I own, it was necessary that I should feel certain that they unanimously believed that the fate of the constitution was attached to the execution of law, the only sovereign of a free people; that individual liberty, the security of each man's home, religious liberty, and respect for legitimate authority, were, without any exception, duties as sacred to them as to myself. We require not only courage and vigilance, but also unanimity, in the principles I have just brought forward; and I thought, and still think, that the constitution will be better served by my resignation, on the grounds I have given, than by my acquiescence in the request with which you have deigned to honour me."

The sixty battalions of the national guard passed successively the following resolution:—

"The national assembly has decreed that public force should be obedient, and a portion of the Parisian army has shewn itself essentially disobedient. M. de Lafayette has only ceased to command that army because they have ceased obeying law; he requires a complete submission to the law, not a servile attachment to his person. Let the battalions assemble; let each citizen-soldier swear on his word and honour to obey the law; let those who refuse be excluded from the national guard; let the wish of the army, thus regenerated, be carried to M. de Lafayette, and he will conceive it his duty to resume the command; let some individuals, who have so unworthily outraged the royal family, be punished and expelled from the national guard."

It was only after these new protestations of obedience to law, that Lafayette consented to resume the command; and it was thus that the momentary

error of a small number of national guards only served to prove more clearly the spirit that animated that citizen army.

The speeches, letters, and conduct of the commons, the promises of the battalions, the refusals of the commander-in-chief for some days, and the effect produced on public opinion by these events, contributed greatly to the order which, a short time afterwards, reigned in Paris at the departure of the king.

The debate relative to the situation of the free men of colour in the colonies caused a division of the popular party in the assembly. The greatest number of the members belonging to the jacobin club joined the members of the right side of the chamber to refuse granting them civil rights. Lafayette, La Rochefoucauld, and some of their friends, the members who since became girondists, and a portion of the jacobins, defended the cause of the men of colour. A bill was voted favourable to them; some words spoken by Lafayette (the 11th May, 1791), and for which he was severely reproached, contributed, it has been said, to this success.

"It appears to me, gentlemen, that we do not understand the question fully. I think it is clear that free men, proprietors, taxable to a colony, are colonists. The men of colour we are now speaking of are proprietors, cultivators, taxable, and free. Are they men? I for my part believe to them be so,—and it is therefore I vote for the previous motion of the committee."

Lafayette said, some years after: "I do not repent the influence I exercised over that decision; I even believe that the assembly was to blame, at the close of the session, and from the representations of ministers and governors, to report that decision, which was as politic as just, and which

engaged all free men of colour to the maintenance of tranquillity. My first object was undoubtedly the cause of humanity; but I have also ever conceived that the real interest of the colonies and of commerce required the abolition of the slave trade, the civil rights of the free blacks, and the gradual emancipation of the slaves. This opinion, as well as many others, has been misconstrued in a time of delirium, by measures which have been fatal to all parties; the reaction has not been less violent; its first effect was the destruction of Sierra Leone. We must, however, add, that this fearful act only took place after the English government had positively refused the formal proposal made to them by the French directory to give a character of neutrality to that establishment. Let us hope that we may also possess a Sierra Leone, and that the two governments will come to an understanding, to place both these philanthropic enterprises beyond the chances of European quarrels. This is the only reparation we can offer to the blacks for the crimes of several ages."*

* We see, in the *History of the Abolition of the Slave Trade*, by Mr. Clarkson, all the difficulties the friends of the blacks encountered; he speaks of different meetings that took place at M. de La Rochefoucauld's, of the assistance given by General Lafayette to a proposal that those interests so dear to humanity should not be discarded for the following legislature, because he did not conceive it allowable to adjourn it. Colonial intrigues, the credit of some influential deputies, then jacobin chiefs, had succeeded in rendering the assembly unfavourable; three hundred favourable votes could alone be depended on, unless England should consent to suppress the slave trade at the same moment. Mr. Clarkson undertook to present to Mr. Pitt a pressing letter from Mirabeau, making this proposal. Mr. Clarkson adds, that in the month of October 1789, the free men of colour sent deputies to assert their rights, and to offer General Lafayette the command of a national guard they had formed.

Since Lafayette delivered that speech, the wish he expressed has been fulfilled by the American society of colonisation, of which he has been named vice-president for life, and which has established on the coast of Africa the free colony of *Liberia*, formed of men of colour, which may contribute to the civilization of that part of Africa.

In the course of the debate of the 11th May, 1791, M. d' Esprémesnil accused Lafayette of having purchased and sold negroes; Lafayette made no reply to that assertion; but the next day the papers revealed a fact which he had not judged proper to mention; this was, that in 1785 he purchased negroes and land to the amount of a hundred and forty thousand livres, and consecrated them to an experiment of gradual emancipation.* The revolution of the 10th August put an end to this experiment; and although a girondist deputy, Brissot, an accuser of the general, but one of his fellow-members in the former society of the friends of the blacks, received from Madame de Lafayette most noble and touching protestations in favour of these cultivators purchased for liberty, the party who triumphed on that day carried party spirit so far as to sell as slaves the unfortunate inhabitants of that plantation.

General Lafayette accepted that honorary command, although he had refused that of the national guards offered by a great number of the municipalities of France.—(See the History of the Abolition of the Slave Trade, vol. ii., p. 128, 133, 166.)

* See, in the second volume of this work, a letter of 8th February, 1786, to General Washington.

DEPARTURE AND ARREST OF THE KING.

(JUNE 21st, 1791.)

XVI.

Amongst the various events of the revolution, the departure of the king is the one of which the most contradictory accounts have been given ; it may, however, be very easily explained.

It is first necessary to understand that the system of the constituent assembly being founded on the voluntary consent of Louis XVI., the constitutional diplomacy being conducted in the same spirit, and the pretended state of captivity of the king and his family being, on the contrary, a sort of protestation, externally and internally adopted by the counter-revolutionary party, the situation of the national guard and its chief became on this account extremely delicate, and only allowed precautionary measures, which were insufficient to guard against evasion.

It has been before mentioned, that it was not the chiefs of the revolution who dismissed the gardes-du-corps after the 6th of October, but the captains and officers of the latter, who wished to prove, in this manner, that the king was not free, while their ridiculous vanity rendered them reluctant to perform duty with the citizens of Paris who had become commanders of divisions and battalions ; for it cannot be supposed that it was from a groundless feeling of per-

sonal fear that they would expose the king to dangers they refused to share. Bailly recals, in his Memoirs, that the king having one day expressed to Lafayette some regret at not having his usual guards, the commons passed a bill requesting him to resume them; but the court decided that this offer should not be accepted. Duty was therefore performed in the apartments of the palace by the national guard and the hundred Swiss, and in the courts, by the national guard and the regiment of Swiss guard.

Lafayette commanded the troops in the palace, in Paris, and within a circuit of fifteen leagues. The king and princesses drove, rode, and walked out at pleasure, and, until the tumult of the 18th of April, went as formerly to Saint Cloud. Independent of the numerous persons employed on service, all those who wished to pay their court to the king, or see the inhabitants of the palace, were freely admitted.

On the other side, the demagogue papers had daily announced so confidently, for two years, the immediate flight of the king, imaginary warnings had succeeded each other so frequently, that at length every body ceased to believe in them.

Louis XVI., during the few days of Lafayette's resignation, had caused an official letter to be sent to the foreign courts, which the latter would not have advised, because it expressed a too complete and therefore unnatural approbation of all the principles of the revolution.* It has since become known that this circular was contradicted by the private correspondence of the king, and that, independently of the arrangements made with the Count d' Artois, of

* A circular, addressed to the ambassadors by M. de Montmorin the 23rd April.

which we have just spoken the real intrigue relating to his departure (begun through the agency of the Count de Lamark under the auspices of Mirabeau, known only by the Baron de Breteuil, who was on bad terms with the emigrant princes,) was continued through a secret correspondence with the Marquis de Bouillé. Montmédy was the place appointed for rendezvous; M. de Bouillé had collected in its neighbourhood a corps of troops, whose junction with the Austrians would have been easy, and of which the object, acknowledged by himself as it was in the manifesto left by the king at his departure, was to destroy all constitutional order. The confidants of the plot in Paris were, the Count de Fersen, three gardes-du-corps, and, in all probability, M. de La Porte. The ultra-patriotic letter sent to the ambassadors had been looked upon as the means of deceiving the vigilance of the Parisians. They might have been also glad to shew that the resignation of the commander-in-chief was not prejudical to the patriotism of the king; but the latter, who was in the confidence of Lafayette,* ought not to have lent himself to that gratuitous and inexcusable falsehood.

Lafayette took the precaution (and his personal affection for Louis XVI. induced him perhaps to place too much reliance on this measure) of speaking frankly to the king of the reports at that time so prevalent, and which had gained additional force during the last few days. That prince, whose insincerity on this occasion cannot be too deeply deplored, gave him such positive and solemn assurances to the contrary, that he thought he could

* The king knew General Lafayette had only given in his resignation to maintain in the minds of the national guard respect for the constitution and for liberty.

answer *with his head* for the non-departure of the king. His confidence in the word of the unfortunate Louis XVI. was so great, that he himself and the chiefs of the national guard felt some remorse at being still obliged to take measures of precaution ; none were, however, neglected.

The evening of the 20th, Lafayette, on his return home, paid a visit to Bailly, who had received from the committee of research some fresh denunciations, as frequently occurred, and although neither he nor Lafayette believed in these accounts, they agreed that the latter should repair to the Tuileries to inform Gouvion, a major-general, of this circumstance ; he also ordered him to assemble the principal officers on guard, and desire them to walk about in the different courts during the night.

After the usual ceremonies, styled the *coucher* of the king, at which the whole household on duty, and all those who came to pay their court, were present, Louis XVI. rapidly descended the staircase, without being more observed than the other individuals retiring at that hour from the palace. No particular watchword could have been given respecting him, and the attention of the sentinels, as we have before stated, could not have been officially called to prevent his escape. Still they were sufficiently aware of the circumstances to arrest him had they recognised him, and the officers were still better informed on the subject.

All the relations of that period have described in what manner the king and his family quitted the palace It is stated, in the Memoirs of M. de Bouillé, that he had proposed taking in his own carriage the former major of the French guards, M. d'Agout, a man of talent and courage, and that Madame de Tourzel, governess of the children of

France, from insisting warmly on her prerogative of having a place in the king's carriage, prevented that arrangement, which would, in all probability, have saved them. As M. de Lafayette's carriage entered or quitted it is uncertain which the court of the palace, it was met by the queen herself on foot; it matters little whether this encounter took place at the entrance or exit, for he did not remain long with Gouvion. The queen has since declared she never experienced so much alarm. A great number of men and women were passing backwards and forwards at the time, and several groups were retiring from the king's *coucher;* it was not, therefore, difficult to escape Lafayette's observation.

The departure was only known at five or six in the morning. The king's servants even in the palace had not perceived it; the ministers and royalists of the assembly, who were all ignorant of it, were left exposed to great danger, and during the first days of their irritation, they openly declared, that if Lafayette had been massacred, the disorders of the capital would have occasioned their ruin. The same fate would have awaited, not only the national guards on duty and their officers, but the most devoted friends of the king, the Duke de Brissac, commander of the hundred Swiss, and M. de Montmorin, who had very innocently given a passport under the name of the Baronness de Korf. "*If the king had not been arrested,*" says M. de Bouillé, *Lafayette would undoubtedly have been massacred by the people, who rendered him responsible for the escape of that monarch.*" Nor did the fugitives themselves believe that great disorders would not have ensued, if we may judge from a note of the queen to Madame de Lamballe, and from the surprise she testified when

an aide-de-camp of Lafayette* told her that he still existed at the head of the national guard. The members of the right were much displeased at having been thus abandoned, and M. de Cazalès betrayed this to several committees of the assembly.

Lafayette, first informed of this event by M. de André, deputy, and almost at the same moment by some national officers, flew to the Tuileries; he was joined in the street by the mayor Bailly and by Beauharnais, president of the assembly, and first husband of the empress Josephine. Every particular of the departure was in complete obscurity; no person knew to what extent it had been concerted with foreign powers, whether an invasion was to take place, and whether civil war had not been already organized. M. de Bouillé declares, in his Memoirs, that the king had apprised him that a corps of Austrians was to be sent to Luxemburg; and although the latter, from their habitual tardiness, did not hasten to execute their part of the arrangement, the intentions of the king are not at present less evident; it is well to consult the Memoirs of M. de Bouillé and those of M. de Choiseul on this escape. The president of the assembly and the mayor, while lamenting the perils to which the public were exposed, expressed their regret at the time that must inevitably be lost until the assembly, which had been instantly convoked, could give the necessary orders.

"*Do you think,*" said Lafayette to them, "*tha' the arrest of the king and his family is necessary to the public safety, and can alone shelter us from civil war?*" The answer was peremptory. "*Well, then, I take upon myself its responsibility.*" He wrote,

* M. Louis Romeuf.

with his own hand, a note, declaring that the enemies of the country having carried off the king and his family, all national guards and all citizens were ordered to arrest them; he dictated the same note to all those who came forward at the time, signed copies of it, and officers of the national guard set out in every direction. Fortunately for him (considering the atrocities those august victims experienced) their arrest was not owing to his orders, but in consequence of their having been accidentally recognised by a postmaster, and of their own bad arrangements.

The people assembled in vast crowds; public displeasure was each moment increasing against the national guards of the sixth division, who were on duty in the palace, against the Duke d'Aumont, commander of that division, and against the commander-in-chief.

He repaired to the Hotel de Ville, accompanied by a crowd, and found on the place de Grève a still more numerous band, who had seized M. d'Aumont. Lafayette extricated him from their grasp. Surrounded by that crowd, he first addressed them jocosely, by telling them that *each citizen had gained twenty sous a year by the suppression of the civil list;* but fresh groups having presented themselves, he harangued them in a more serious manner.

We find, in Toulongeon, the following relation, by an eye-witness to the scene, which the two initials B. P. designate as a very distinguished member of the constituent assembly:*—

"The fury of the people against Lafayette was extreme, and the long-tried and complete confidence

* M. Bureaux de Pusy, companion in captivity of General Lafayette, at Olmütz, died prefect at Genoa, 1806.

they had so long felt for that general, was the only thing that could arrest the first burst of their violence. But their fury ceased when they beheld the tranquillity with which Lafayette advanced, without any escort, into the midst of an immense concourse of persons assembled before the Hotel de Ville. Anxiety was, however, depicted on every countenance. Some lamentations on the misfortunes that had just occurred, which seemed addressed to Lafayette, gave him the opportunity of replying to those who were expressing their dismay, '*that if they termed that event a misfortune, he should like to know what word they would apply to a counter-revolution which would deprive them of liberty ?*' "

The constituent assembly had, in the meantime, met; and never did it appear more noble than on that occasion. One member* having expressed some suspicion of Lafayette, Barnave, who had hitherto belonged to a section of the popular party openly opposed to him, professed sentiments of the highest esteem for the commander-in-chief, and pointed out the necessity of all persons uniting with him at the present moment: this generous feeling was warmly applauded by the assembly. On the report of the danger Lafayette was placed in, the assembly sent a deputation of commissaries, selected from their own members, to summon him to return to them; but they found him in as high favour as ever, and he replied to their demand of an escort to accom-

* Rewbell, who became, later, a member of the convention, and afterwards of the directory. "I interrupt," said Barnave, "what the former speaker appeared to intend saying. M. de Lafayette, from the commencement of the revolution, both by his views and conduct, has given proofs of being a good citizen; he deserves public confidence, and has obtained it; and it is important for the nation that he should preserve it."

pany him and them on their return to the assembly, by saying, "*I will order one for you, as a mark of respect to the deputation; as to myself, I shall return alone, for I have never been in such perfect safety as at this moment, as the streets are all filled with the people.*" It may be supposed that the escort was not accepted.

When he arrived at the assembly, Lafayette was still ignorant of what had passed respecting the escape. He pronounced these few words:—

"The national assembly has been informed of the outrage that the enemies of the public committed last night against the king and a part of the royal family, in the mistaken hope of compromising the liberty of France. The mayor conceives it proper that M. de Gouvion, who was charged with the internal guard of the Tuileries, should relate to you the particulars of that event. I shall only say that, if the assembly consent to admit him to the bar, I will take upon myself the whole responsibility of an officer with whose zeal and patriotism I am well acquainted.

"M. Duport* has given the assembly an account of the disposition of the people in the capital; allow me to add, that the conduct of the national guard on this occasion has been to me the most convincing of all proofs that the French nation was worthy of liberty, and that nothing could deprive her of it."

It is well known how calm and noble the assembly appeared during that period of alarm. With the greatest firmness and dignity, they took every measure the occasion required; they gave orders similar to those that had already been despatched on every road; their decree was confided to M. Romeuf, aide-de-camp to the commander-in-chief, who had been arrested at the barrier at the moment when he was bearing, with the commander of battalion, Baillon,

* M. Duport had just made a report in the name of the commissaries sent by the assembly to the Hotel de Ville.

the first order of arrest.* Some idea was formed of the road the king had taken; a very large travelling carriage had been seen in the direction of Châlons; the aide-de-camp followed that direction.

The intendant of the civil list, M. de la Porte, came to the bar to present the manifesto the king had left with him. "How did you receive it?" he was asked. "The king had left it sealed in a note to me." "Where is that note?" inquired one member. "No, no!" cried the whole assembly; "it was a confidential note; we have no right to see it." This noble conduct deserves to be mentioned.

* Louis Romeuf received, at eight in the morning, at M. Bailly's house, where the president of the assembly and Lafayette were together, the order of setting out for Valenciennes; he was soon after arrested and dragged by the multitude to the national assembly. He there related what had just occurred, and communicated the order received from his general. The assembly not only approved of it, but charged him also with a decree forbidding the municipalities to allow any person to leave the kingdom. The delay Romeuf experienced from the violence of the people did not allow him to set out before twelve o'clock; the assembly was obliged to send two deputies to accompany him on foot to the barrier, to secure his safety. At the porte Saint Denis they were assured that the king had been arrested at Meaux, that violent threats were used, and that his life was in danger. Particulars were added which gave to this report the appearance of truth. The two deputies, Biauzat and Latour Maubourg, then conceived that Romeuf ought to repair as speedily as possible to Meaux. This circumstance changed the direction he was taking, and he followed, consequently, the road to Varennes. When he arrived at Châlons, he met the commander of battalion, Baillon, with whom he continued his road unto Varennes, whither they arrived at half-past five in the morning. The king had been arrested the night before, at eleven o'clock. Louis Romeuf had the happiness of saving the life (at much risk to himself) of MM. de Damas, de Choiseul, Floirac, and a quartermaster of M. de Damas' regiment.—(Note of General Lafayette.)

The summoned ministers appeared at the bar. A guard had been sent to protect M. de Montmorin, who had signed the passport for the Baroness de Korf. The danger to which this faithful minister, the personal friend of the king, was thus exposed, cannot be deemed one of the least blameable consequences of that escape. The seal of the state was deposited on the president's desk; the assembly restored it to the keeper of the seals, president of the ministry, and ordered him and his colleagues to continue their functions under the commands of the assembly. During this time, the people effaced everywhere the name and arms of the king; the national guard redoubled their zeal, and order was restored.

The national assembly, after having taken all necessary measures, again acted with great dignity; their president proposed resuming their former discussion, and the debate continued as if nothing extraordinary had occurred.

The proclamation of Louis XVI. was a lamentable one; he contradicted all he had previously said, accepted, and sanctioned, appealing to his declaration of June 23rd, 1789; he complained, amongst other things, of being ill lodged at the Tuileries; this manifesto was a complete abdication of constitutional royalty.

A meeting took place that evening at the jacobin club. It would be unjust to compare the jacobins of that period with what they afterwards became; it must, however, be added, that they might even then have been reproached with several great errors, since the inconsiderate admission of many anarchists within their number.* A portion of the left

* From the first formation of the jacobin club, when all the members of the left side of the house frequented it, La Roche-

side of the assembly had long abstained from taking part in their meetings; but as they were informed that Danton and Robespierre had the intention of proposing some incendiary projects, and of preparing a tumult, the whole left side of the house, comprising the members who had hitherto taken no share in the deliberations of the jacobins, repaired to the hall of that society to bind together the various fractions of the popular party by those principles of firmness and wisdom which circumstances rendered more than ever necessary. Danton, whose receipt for a hundred thousand livres was in the hands of the minister Montmorin,*

foucauld, as he has often since repeated, was much surprised at finding there a man whom he knew to be a great aristocrat. We might add many other examples to prove that the enemies of the revolution have always followed the system of disorganization and anarchy, by which they endeavoured to render it obnoxious, and have succeeded, after labouring for three years in the cause, in a manner which has proved so fatal to the whole human species.—(Note found in the papers of General Lafayette.)

* Danton had sold himself on condition that they would purchase from him, for 100,000 livres, his place of advocate, which, after the suppression, was only worth 10,000 livres. The king's present was therefore 90,000 livres. Lafayette met Danton at M. de Montmorin's the same evening that this bargain had been concluded. Can we blame with severity the unfortunate Louis XVI. for having wished to buy the silence and inaction of those men who threatened his life, and who would have sold themselves to the Orleanists, or to foreigners? As to Danton, he was ready to sell himself to all parties. While he was making incendiary motions to the jacobins, he was their spy at court, where he regularly reported whatever occurred there. He received afterwards a great deal of money; on the Friday previous to the 10th of August, 50,000 crowns were given him; the court, believing themselves sure of him, looked forward with satisfaction to the long expected movement of that day, and Madame Elizabeth exclaimed, "*We are tranquil, for we may depend upon Danton.*" Lafayette was apprised of

demanded the head of Lafayette on this ground:—"*The commander-in-chief promised on his head that the king would not depart; we must either have the person of the king or the head of the commander-in-chief.*" Danton proved he placed great dependence on the discretion of Lafayette, who, he well knew, was not ignorant of that secret transaction.

It is true, that had Lafayette betrayed that circumstance, the consequence must have been the death of the minister Montmorin, who had only bribed Danton to moderate his anarchical fury and culpable intrigues. Alexandre Lameth refuted what Danton had said, and expressed himself as Barnave had done at the assembly.*

The majority of the assembly appeared animated by the same spirit of liberty and public order.

Such was the state of affairs in Paris; at the meeting of the 22nd, all the generals who were in Paris took the following oath of fidelity to the assembly:—

the first payment, but not of the ensuing ones. Danton spoke of it himself at the Hotel de Ville, and, endeavouring to justify himself, said, "*General, I am a greater monarchist than you are yourself.*" He was, however, one of the leaders of the 10th of August. As Lafayette would not have allowed that the agents of M. de Montmorin should endeavour to serve a royalist counter-revolution rather than legal order, they soon ceased to make to him, as well as to Bailly, confidences of this nature. Some money was also advanced by the civil list to the municipal police, either to maintain order in the public places, or to prevent the tumults planned by the jacobins; but these expenses, which but very indirectly concerned the commander-in-chief, had not the slightest relation with the secret expenses of the civil list to obtain partisans for the king. The latter were almost always employed against Lafayette.—(Note found in the papers of General Lafayette.)

* We have neither that speech nor the one delivered by Lafayette, but the meeting was not tumultuous, and closed in a proper manner.—(Note of General Lafayette.)

"I swear to employ the arms which the nation has placed in my hands for the defence of my country, the maintenance of the constitution decreed by the national assembly and sworn by the king; to die rather than permit the French territory to be invaded by foreign troops, and only to obey the laws which will be given in consequence of the decrees of the assembly."

"I swear it," said Lafayette from the tribune, and he was interrupted by applause. "I have the honour to observe to the assembly," he continued, "that all my comrades in arms now surrounding the assembly who have learnt the oath which has been taken this morning, are most impatient to unite their oath to that of the members of the assembly, and to swear again to them a fidelity which nothing shall ever interrupt."

On the 23rd, a crowd of national guards, ranged around the hall, with Lafayette at their head, demanded to renew their oath to the national assembly.

A deep silence ensued.

"You see before you, gentlemen," said Lafayette, "citizens who have never measured the sacrifices they made to the country save in the scale with her necessities. They defended Liberty at her birth from the conspiracies formed against her; they rally round her still more zealously now that she is exposed to unforeseen dangers.

"Let our enemies at length learn, that neither by the multiplicity nor even greatness of their plots will they astonish men to whom the last events have only appeared like ordinary occurrences. Receive from these soldiers, who have been so long tried by great circumstances, a fresh assurance of their pure and boundless devotion. In times of confusion, they have been able to maintain public order, and have only felt alarm for the cause of liberty; they will still be responsible for the preservation of both the one and the other; and if it be true that our enemies are only additionally embittered, first, by their own plans being disconcerted, and secondly, by the tranquillity of the people, which causes their despair, you should send instantly to the places which are most exposed those who have always been able to brave them, that the first soldiers of liberty may be the first to repulse the soldiers of despotism."

General Rochambeau had set out to take the command of the northern army, and bear on the

rear of the enemy if they should enter France. A detachment of the national guards of Paris and of the departments were, in that case, to march under the command of Lafayette. The committees of the assembly had met together and taken the wisest measures; the most perfect order had been maintained in the capital, when the assembly learnt, and all the people repeated, that the king had been arrested at Varennes.

Some discussions have since arisen between MM. de Bouillé, de Choiseul, and other persons employed in this affair, concerning the circumstances which caused the failure of the escape. The most important one was, the king's being recognised, from his likeness to the effigy of the assignats, by the son of the postmaster of Sainte Menehould, who instantly proceeded by a shorter road on horseback to announce this event to the head attorney at Varennes. Some mismanagement in the change of horses at the bridge of Varennes delayed the king's progress. It is well known in what manner that head attorney, a tallow-chandler, found himself master of the destinies of the king and of France; it never occurred to him for a moment to take advantage of the circumstance to promote his own private fortune; he fulfilled his duty as citizen with respectful kindness but with proper firmness. A detachment of the troops who were waiting at the bridge united with the population of the place; the king was already a prisoner, when two officers of the national guard arrived and presented to him the decree which had been issued by the national assembly at the meeting of the 21st.

Another decree, adopted almost unanimously the 25th of June, was to this effect:—

Article 1st. As soon as the king shall arrive at the palace of

the Tuileries a provisional guard shall be given him, who, under the orders of the commander-in-chief of the national Parisian guard, shall watch over his safety and be responsible for his person.

Article 2nd. To the presumptive heir of the crown a private guard shall be provisionally given, equally under the orders of the commander-in-chief, and a governor shall be appointed for him by the national assembly.

Article 3rd. All persons who accompanied the royal family shall be placed under arrest and interrogated; the king and queen shall be heard in their declaration; the whole to be fulfilled without delay, that the national assembly may be enabled to pass any resolutions which shall be considered necessary.

Article 4th. A private guard shall be provisionally given to the queen.

Article 5th. Until fresh orders may be received the decree of the 21st of June, which enjoins the minister to affix the seal of state to the decrees of the national assembly without the sanction and acceptation of the king being necessary, shall continue to be executed for every measure which may occur.

Article 6th. The ministers and commissaries of the king, appertaining to the extra treasure, national treasure, and direction of liquidation, shall remain provisionally authorized to perform, each in his department, and on his own responsibility, the functions of the executive power."

The disposition relative to the governor of the royal prince was not put in execution.

As soon as the assembly learnt the return of the king, precautions were taken for his security; and, considering the state of public irritation, those precautions were not unnecessary. The king and his family were indebted for their safety on the road to the national guards of the departments, who spontaneously assembled to protect him. A commission was named to go forward and receive the royal family; it was composed of MM. de Latour Maubourg, Barnave, and Petion. They met the king on the road, and read to him the decree of the assembly which gave him a special guard, appointed by the commander-in-chief, but which was itself

responsible for him; which circumstance explains the severity of the precautions used against any new attempt at escape. And in truth, after the promises that had been made, it was not possible to place confidence in whatever might be said; hereafter the reply to any proposal of softening the precautionary measures invariably was—"We have been so completely deceived that we might be deceived again." Amongst the national guards the constitutionalists were not the least irritated, because they had, in opposition to the jacobins, asserted for the last two years that the king was sincere in his professions. They felt as a man would who had been deceived by a friend.

The royal family was conducted by the detachment employed for their security, to the barrier, on the 25th of June. Barnave and Petion were in the carriage with the king. It has been said, that the gardes-du-corps were chained on that carriage; that statement is false. M. de Latour Maubourg, who had left his two colleagues with the king, proposed to the queen to admit the gardes-du-corps into her carriage. "*Do you answer for their life?*" she inquired; "*I can at least answer for being killed before them.*" The queen determined, nevertheless, that they should remain on the box of her carriage. It was remarked that they wore fawn-colour clothes, which was the livery of the house of Condé. During the journey from Varennes, in the midst of the various movements which occurred around that carriage, a royalist who approached it was unfortunately massacred.

The royal family re-entered Paris under the protection of the commissaries of the assembly, and under the escort of the adjutant-general Dumas, whom the members of the assembly themselves had

selected to execute their orders. Lafayette, who had reason to fear some snares from factious persons, gave Dumas warning not to traverse the town, placed troops on the boulevards, and also from the barrier de l'Etoile to the Tuileries. The national guards completely lined the road; the regiment of Swiss guards were also ranged in battle order, and were punctual in obeying the orders of the commander-in-chief; an immense crowd filled the two sides of the road, and, without uttering cries or testifying any violence, looked at the passing procession with an air of dissatisfaction, but preserved the most perfect order; the national guards, resting on their arms, observed the same demeanour.

The constituent assembly, the town of Paris, and Lafayette especially, have been reproached with not having rendered royal honours to Louis XVI. from the time of his return to the capital until his fresh acceptation of the constitutional crown. This conduct was but the result of a principle proclaimed on the 11th of July, 1789, and adopted by the nation as well as by its representatives,—the sovereignty of the French people and the national rights over constituted authorities. The day in which Louis XVI. renounced the constitutional throne, and claimed his sovereignty of divine right, he abdicated in the opinion of the constitutionalists, the only authority they could recognise.

The carriages entered by the turning bridge,* at the extremity of the garden, which they traversed to arrive at the palace. Lafayette went forward to

* It was at the entrance of the Tuileries that the queen, anxious for the gardes who were seated on the box of her carriage, perceived the commander-in-chief, and exclaimed—"M. de Lafayette, save the gardes-du-corps."

meet the procession. During his absence an immense crowd had been allowed to approach the Tuileries; they endeavoured, as the royal family were descending from the carriages, to maltreat the two gardes-du-corps who had served as couriers during the escape, and who were then seated on the box of the king's carriage. The commander-in-chief saved them from all violence, and placed them himself in security in one of the halls of the palace. The royal family entered without having experienced any insults. The king was apparently calm; Lafayette, with a feeling of mingled respect and emotion, presented himself at the king's apartment, and said to him, "Sire, your Majesty knows my attachment to you; but I have never concealed from you that if you separated your cause from that of the people, I should remain on the side of the people." "That is true," replied the king; "you have acted according to your principles; it is a party business. I am now here. I will frankly own to you that, until the last events, I thought that you had surrounded me by a vortex of persons of your own opinion, but that such was not the opinion of France; I discovered, during this last journey, that I had been mistaken, and that such was the general opinion." "Has your Majesty any orders to give me?" "It appears to me," said the king, with a smile, "that I am more under your orders than you are under mine." Lafayette assured him that in everything which was not contrary to liberty and his duty towards the nation, he had always been desirous of seeing him satisfied with his conduct; he then announced to him the decree of the assembly, at which the king testified no displeasure. The queen betrayed some irritability; she wished to force Lafayette to receive the keys of the desks which had remained in the carriage. He replied, that no per-

son had thought, or would think, of opening those desks. The queen then placed the keys on his hat. Lafayette requested her to pardon the trouble he gave her of taking back those keys, and declared that he would not touch them. "Well!" said the queen, impatiently, "I shall find persons less scrupulous than you are." This did not prove the case, for not one paper was examined.* The king retired to his cabinet, and wrote some letters, which he gave to a valet to distribute, who informed Lafayette of the circumstance. The commander-in-chief was much displeased at such an act having been attributed to him.

It was from consideration to Lafayette that the assembly had not declared him especially charged with the guardianship of the king; but as the interior guards held, under his command, a personal responsibility, it may be conceived that it was almost impossible to exact from them a relaxation in their precautionary measures. He took care, however, to select for that situation the persons whom he thought would be most agreeable to the king. The expression of *private guard*, which had been used in the decree of the 25th,† appeared to indicate a separation of the members of the royal family. Some

* It is not remembered whether it was the evening of the next morning that Lafayette saw the queen; it appears most probable that it was the next morning, but it is easy to ascertain the fact. In the latter case, the desk must have been forgotten at night in the carriage. This little scene took place in the king's apartment. It was in the queen's apartment that the commander-in-chief held a conversation with her; she then told M. de Montmorin that she had been very well satisfied with Lafayette. —(Note of General Lafayette.)

† Article 2nd. To the presumptive heir of the crown, a private guard, &c.

Article 4th. A private guard shall be provisionally given to the queen.

deputies told Lafayette that it was in that sense he ought to have understood it; he replied that, "Whenever a rigorous measure was susceptible of two interpretations he always understood the most humane one." As he demanded, at the same time, some other softening measures, the united committees* proposed to him to have them specified by the assembly. "In that case," he replied, "I will take their responsibility on myself; it would be unworthy for the representatives of the nation to be occupied with these painful details, and it is better that the blame should fall upon me."

The domestic service was performed as usual; in the military service there was this difference—the commander-in-chief delivered the word of command without having received it from the king. The doors and courts of the garden were closed; but Lafayette had requested the royal family to communicate to him a list of all those whom they wished to be admitted to the palace. The list was very numerous, and chiefly composed of persons strongly opposed to the revolution. A certain number of officers remained in a room between the halls usually assigned to the guards and the apartments of the king and queen, into which strangers could only enter by passing through that small guard; the royal family could avoid this restraint by a more direct passage communicating between their apartments.† The king, when restored to liberty, ex-

* The diplomatic committee, the committees of constitution and report.

† The grossest calumnies had been spread relating to the events which then occurred. The instructions given by Lafayette might still, perhaps, be found in Paris, or, at least, the testimony of the officers charged with that internal guard might be obtained. The orders that were given them should be dis-

pressed his entire satisfaction at the conduct of the interior guard; one of whom, M. Guinguerlot, commander of a battalion, was killed, August 10th, 1792, in his defence. This state of affairs continued until the achievement of the constitution.*

The assembly had appointed, the first day, commissaries, who were to ask the king a series of questions; these were, MM. d'André, Tronchet, and Duport. They conducted themselves not only with respect, but with great kindness, in proof of which it need only be mentioned, that they postponed until the next day their conversation with the queen, to give her time to concert with the king replies conformable to those he had made.†

tinguished from what several of them, on account of their personal responsibility and the anxiety of the public, might have conceived, for the moment, necessary for their own security, or the repose of the royal family, and, above all, from what the king and queen voluntarily did to enhance the apparent evils of their situation. An example has been quoted of the queen, who called for the officer on duty to see her in bed; it may also be remembered, that when the commissaries of the assembly went to her, she affected, as M. Tronchet may verify, to give them arm-chairs, and take a common chair herself. Ought we therefore to conclude that the assembly had given orders relating to this ceremony? It must not be forgotten, that, during this guardianship of the royal family, the people and the different parties were in a state of great agitation; that the jacobin, Orleanist, and aristocratical factions, tended to disorder, each according to its own private views; that reports were continually spread that the king had departed, or was on the point of departing, &c. Lafayette was denounced several times, and once, in particular, to the committees of the assembly, by the deputy Sillery, the tool of the Duke of Orleans. Almost every night the officers on guard were disturbed by alarms outside the palace; and from all these causes they were obliged, as much for the security of the royal family as for their own interest, to take every possible precaution.—(Note of General Lafayette.)

* From June 25th until September 3rd.

† The queen had sent word she was in her bath, and this gave

The fact is, that almost all the members of the assembly did not wish for the completion of the republic,—that is to say, for a change of form in the executive power; for, with the exception of that one point, everything was republican in the constitution of 91. There were some republicans in the assembly; these might be divided into *political republicans* and *anarchist republicans;* but there were not, at the most, more than five or six of each species, and it appears that the former, after having ascertained the opinion of the public, frankly united themselves to the national will, which was, to establish the constitutional throne.*

the commissaries a pretext for delaying their interview with her. As to the persons arrested with the king, who had planned the plot of evasion, or only accidentally participated in it, as was the case with several officers, all, it is well known, had cause to acknowledge the kindness that was shewn them. Madame de Tourzel, governess of the children of France, ought, in the first place, to have been imprisoned; she remained in the palace, under the private guard of an officer. Two other persons may be quoted, who cannot be accused of partiality; one was M. Mandel, who, at the period of the declaration of war, finding himself under the command of Lukner, deserted with the regiment of royal Germans he commanded, and passed over to the service of Austria. Some months before that desertion, he publicly told Lafayette, at Metz, that he acknowledged owing his life to him. The other was M. Goguelat, adjutant-general, who appears to have shewn less gratitude. Arrested at Varennes, he was a prisoner at Mezières. Lafayette learnt that his rigorous imprisonment might injure his health, and, although not responsible himself for what might pass at Mezières, one of his aides-de-camp, M. Alexandre Romeuf, was hastily despatched to that town, to order that M. Goguelat might be treated with greater lenity, which was accordingly done, until he was conducted, after the decree of the assembly, to the prison of Orleans. These particulars, of which Lafayette was far from adducing the slightest merit, did not surely justify the words of the queen—"that he could feel for all men except kings."—(Note found in the papers of General Lafayette.)

* A few days after the 21st June, La Rochefoucauld, the

M. de Bouillé had written a violent letter to the assembly from Luxemburg, in which he denounced Lafayette as being at the head of a republican party to overthrow the constitution.

The latter, ascending the tribune, spoke, at the sitting of July 2nd, in the following manner :—

"GENTLEMEN,—I have received from Luxemburg, under the seal of M. de Bouillé, two printed copies of his letter to the assembly: should the projects he announces ever be realized, it would suit me better, undoubtedly, to fight with him than to reply to his personalities; it is not, therefore, for M. de Bouillé, who calumniates me, nor is it for you, gentlemen, who honour me with your confidence, but it is for those whom his assertion might deceive, that I now contradict it. M. de Bouillé denounces me as an enemy to the form of government you have established;—Gentlemen, I do not renew my oath, but I am ready to shed my blood for its maintenance."

The nation wished at that time to be monarchical, and the only question was to know who should be king. Should the crown be given to the Duke of Orleans, as a recompence for the conduct of his party since the first revolutionary troubles? Should a foreign prince be summoned? Was the king to be dethroned by his infant son? The idea of discarding the father and mother in favour of the young

intimate friend of Lafayette, assembled several deputies at his house, to examine the measures they ought to take under such serious circumstances, and explained himself in such a manner that his private wish for a republic was no longer doubtful. His opinion was warmly supported by one of the assistants, Dupont de Nemours; but the great majority of that committee shewed themselves so opposed to all idea of the kind, it was so clearly proved, by this essay on eminent men of the constituent assembly, that the capital, and almost the whole nation, shared the reluctance of their colleagues to change the form of government, that those republicans were obliged to renounce their hopes. It must be well conceived, that such men would have regarded with horror the idea of committing any violence for this purpose on public opinion.—(Note found in the papers of General Lafayette.)

prince appeared an improper one, and was giving him a bad lesson of morality. Should they take back Louis XVI., the best prince of his family, notwithstanding his late errors, and, all things considered, the best prince in Europe? This last measure was adopted by the almost unanimous consent of the constituent assembly; and, after the eloquent speech of Barnave, in support of the opinion of the assembled committees, the 15th July, Lafayette expressed his approbation by these words:—

"I support the opinion of M. Barnave, and I demand that the discussion be closed."

The assembly closed the debate; the decree, which was voted for by all the members, except Robespierre, Petion, and three or four others, disconcerted many internal and foreign intrigues.

It has been said, that the king had had confidants of his departure in the ministry and on the right side of the assembly, but no proof has ever been given in support of this relation; malevolence or party spirit has also endeavoured to suggest that he had advisers on the left side of the house; it has been pretended that MM. de Lameth, Duport, and Barnave, who had kept up for some time a secret relation with the court, were acquainted with this attempt; M. d'André, an influential member of the assembly, has also been accused; but no avowals, no proofs, have corroborated these vague assertions. The accusations that implicated Bailly and Lafayette on that ground are still more grossly absurd; for they were evidently the two men in France to whom the court would less have confided a project of that kind, of which the purport was to subtract France from their influence and protection, to place her under the charge of M. de Bouillé and the house of Austria, and of which the first effect, as the

fugitives foresaw, would be the massacre of the mayor and commander-in-chief; the latter especially required all his firmness to acquire, in one moment, more power than ever in the capital. Such an accusation, made at the same time both by the royalists and jacobins, was destroyed by the contradictory motives assigned to Lafayette; the jacobins declared that it was to give the king the power of combating, under the protection of M. de Bouillé, the principles that Lafayette had his whole life professed and defended; the royalists asserted that it was to complete the ruin of the king by causing him to be arrested in time; and yet it has been proved that, had the king managed his flight well, and with the least celerity, had he not been recognised by a postmaster, had M. de Choiseul not given a counter-order to the detachments, had M. de Bouillé shewn proper foresight, the arrest could not have taken place. The strangest suppositions were for some time formed, until a more accurate knowledge of facts, the depositions of some dying persons, the testimony of men of various parties, and especially of M. de Bouillé, added all moral and material proof to the conviction that might have been formed, with the least reflection, of Lafayette's character, and of the situation in which he was placed. That departure for Varennes deprived the king for ever of the confidence and affection of the citizens. This was evident from the moment of his return, from the precautions used relating to his captivity, the anxiety of the citizens, troops, and committees themselves of the assembly. This distrust continued until the epoch of the 10th of August. Louis XVI. was more universally blamed for this improper step, because, from having placed no persons in his confidence, none were

interested in defending him. Even the right side of the assembly, doubly offended at not having been informed of the decision, and at having been left exposed to danger, complained openly of his conduct.

Those who have reflected on the preceding events will not be astonished that the 21st of June should have kindled in the minds of some men, and reawakened in others, ideas of pure republicanism. Amongst the latter, Lafayette was naturally comprised. The king had himself violated the compact he had formed with the nation; he had carried away his whole family. The Orleans alone remained in France. It was necessary to negotiate with the king, elect another, or destroy royalty. To republican hearts, the last measure appeared to offer some probability of success; and it would be unjust to tax with inconsistency the feeling by which, at the first moment, Lafayette and some of his friends allowed themselves to be surprised. It is true that, at La Rochefoucauld's, Dupont de Nemours proposed forming a republic; and it was well known that that idea displeased neither the master of the house nor his friend. But that passing thought did not prevent their taking every measure which depended on themselves to arrest the king, whose departure would have been the signal of civil war. After having ascertained that the majority of the nation and their representatives wished to re-establish the constitutional throne, and foreseeing, undoubtedly, the calamities and crimes the overthrow of that throne could not fail to cause, they vigorously supported the decision the constituent assembly formed.

The constitutionalists have been blamed with not having, at that period, completed the republic. Doubts might at that time be entertained, for se-

ducing arguments could then be adduced on both sides of the question; but it appears the determination of the assembly was justified by the subsequent proof given by the nation, that she was not capable of making that one step further in advance; and, in consequence of her habits, ignorance, and peculiar disposition, not yet corrected by the new institutions, the more plausible reproach might be made by statesmen to the constitutionalists, of having aimed at making France more republican than she was then capable of becoming. Besides which, these men considered all that was not the declaration of rights, only as secondary combinations, and had no objection to the force of things destroying royalty, (if found incompatible with democratic principles,)—for they preferred democracy without royalty, to royalty without democracy; it must also be acknowledged, that they wished to establish an hereditary presidency of executive power, and invest it with the branch at that time on the throne; that they had preferred Louis XVI. to any other king; that they had sincerely desired that he should not betray the people, and should be loved by them, so that they themselves cannot be suspected of having deceived their fellow-citizens. The nation also wished for an hereditary royalty, but would not allow it to destroy the system of the declaration of rights, of equality amongst citizens, and of the principal basis of the constitution of 1791.

The system that may be termed truly monarchical is comprised in the English constitution: there, in reality, the king is more than a first magistrate, and possesses, in the opinion of the majority of the English constitutionalists, a station independent of the power and sovereignty of the nation; instead of which, royalty, according to French principles,

subordinate, from its origin, to the sovereignty of the people, from whence it derives all power, was only, in fact, an hereditary presidency of executive power. This was what France demanded, when she required rights and institutions incompatible with a more powerful royalty. The constitutionalists had established and defended that sort of royalty with the greatest loyalty. After they had secured to him who was its trustee a powerful and brilliant station, they instituted an executive power, over which he presided, and which, without being completely organized, or even possessing all the energy required, could nevertheless have kept all things in proper order for a length of time, had not the regrets of the ancient government on one side, and internal intrigues, supported by foreign influence, on the other, offered a resistance sufficiently strong to overthrow every barrier it was possible to raise.

FROM THE ARREST OF THE KING

UNTIL THE

CLOSE OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY.*

XVII.

PROCLAMATION OF MARTIAL LAW AT THE CHAMP DE MARS, JULY 17TH, 1791.

WHILE the most rational and moderate of the jacobins conceived the idea of re-establishing the constitutional throne, with more ardour even than the other members of the popular party, assemblages and tumults were excited, for which the factious took their revenge in two enterprises of the same nature, on the 10th of August, 1792, and on the 31st of May, 1793. A petition was drawn up by Laclos, secretary of the Duke of Orleans; in it the name of that prince was mentioned; the projects of the anarchists were so little republican, that Brissot acknowledged he had some difficulty in obtaining from Laclos that the name of the Duke of Orleans should be withdrawn from the proclamation.

The affair of the Champ de Mars has been misrepresented with an extraordinary degree of audacity; it became the pretext for the sufferings to which the magnanimity of the virtuous Bailly was so long exposed in that capital to which he had devoted him-

* Continuation of the compilation, entitled, "Collection of several Speeches," &c.

self, during the whole course of a very difficult magistracy, with an affectionate and enlightened zeal. He was aware of his danger, from the words we have before repeated.* At the present day, those accusations, those enmities, forgotten by all parties, are only reproduced in the recent writings of the partisans of former institutions; and this may tend to awaken reflection in the minds of many men who were misled in that period of popular confusion.

The two sections of the left side of the assembly having met, and although some petitions were presented against the re-establishment of the throne of Louis XVI., the almost unanimous desire of the French nation was expressed for the maintenance of that article of the constitution. " If that combination was deemed the best," they said, " why should another be adopted because the king has attempted to escape?"

The 14th of July, the anniversary of the confederation was celebrated. All appeared tranquil. But the 17th of July, a meeting took place in the Champ de Mars, to sign the petition drawn up by Laclos, and corrected by Brissot.

Two invalids, who, from a feeling of idle curiosity, had concealed themselves under the altar of the country, were seized; their heads were cut off, and placed on two pikes, to be exhibited through the streets of Paris. The commander-in-chief hastened to the spot, with a detachment of national guards. The rioters, with some ringleaders at their head, formed a barricade around themselves with carts; across one of these carts a man pointed a musket at the commander-in-chief, but it missed

* " It is not for the Champ de Mars that I perish, but for the oath of the jeu de paume."—See the 2nd volume, p. 266.

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fire. The national guards, springing over the barricade, seized the culprit, and dragged him towards the commander-in-chief, who ordered him to be set at liberty. It is well known that the jacobins imputed the deliverance of this assassin to a concerted scheme, until he came forward, himself, to boast of his conduct at the bar of the convention.* The people who surrounded the altar, and some of those who were in the Champ de Mars, promised the commander and two commissaries of the commons to separate, after having peaceably signed the petition, for no person had ever thought of opposing that signature.

Several hours thus passed; a detachment of the national guard had been stationed outside the Champ de Mars to watch over any hostile movements that might occur, and it was thought at the Hotel de Ville that all would pass quietly, when some persons came to denounce to the assembly the real projects of the rioters against the assembly itself. They intended doing what has been done since, on the 10th August, 31st May, and 4th *prairial.*

The national assembly decreed that the mayor of Paris should take measures to secure their safety,

* The 12th March, 1793, Marat himself designated, as the author of this attempt at assassination, Fournier, styled *the American,* who at that time, in a committee of insurrection drawn from the club of the cordeliers, threatened the deputies of the Gironde and a portion of the convention. Bourdon (of the Oise) accused that same man, the known agent of the massacres of September, of having excited some persons to take part in the murder of Petion. Fournier, at his own request, defended himself, on the 13th, at the bar of the convention; and, according to the *Moniteur,* denied only the fact stated by Bourdon. At the same meeting, the assembly reported a bill of accusation, which was pronounced against him, and merely summoned him to appear as a witness before the extraordinary tribunal.

that of the Tuileries, and of the capital. It was in consequence of the unanimous injunctions of that same assembly that the mayor of Paris and the council of the commune published martial law. M. Bailly sallied forth at the head of a battalion of grenadiers, which performed duty each day at the Hotel de Ville, to proceed, as a reserve corps, to the place in which public order was most disturbed; the commander-in-chief, to whom information of this step was given, joined them on the road.

They presented themselves before the entrance of the Champ de Mars, and were received with a shower of stones; some fire-arms were also used; a pistol was fired at the mayor, whom the ball narrowly missed, when he was on the point of making his proclamation. During this attack, the national guard fired in the air, to avoid wounding any one; but the assailants, emboldened by this moderation, redoubled their attack against the municipal officers and national guards, of whom some were wounded, and amongst the number an aide-de-camp; two volunteer chasseurs were killed; the national guard then fired in earnest. The loss that ensued on the part of the assailants has been most grossly exaggerated; the rioters were dispersed principally by the cavalry, who did not use their arms.

The account given by the mayor to the national assembly (sitting of the 18th July) is perfectly accurate:—

"After some words, which M. Bailly pronounced with a voice and expression of the deepest grief, says the *Journal de Paris* of the 19th, the report of the deliberations of the municipality was read aloud.

"The mayor, having received information that ill-intentioned persons proposed assembling on the place of the Bastile, and on the field of the federation, called together the councils of the municipality at seven o'clock in the morning. They first discussed

what precautions should be taken to secure a sufficient force to render law respected. The council then deputed commissaries charged with proclaiming the decrees issued the day before by the national assembly, and a decision of the general council of the commune, to prepare the minds of the citizens against the insinuation of factious persons, paid by foreigners, who endeavoured to mislead the people. That article also forbade any assemblage being formed in any place whatever.

" While the people were applauding, in all the public squares, the wisdom of these measures, the rebels collected together in the field of the federation. Some infuriated wretches had seized a lame invalid and another individual, whom they conveyed to the committee of the Gros Caillou; but they soon dragged them from thence to hang and decapitate them, and then carried about their heads on pikes. M. Cousin and M. Charton had been sent to the Bastile; they brought back intelligence that the rioters had proceeded to the field of the federation. M. Charton came to announce that the national guard had been commanded to proceed there. The council, still desirous of trying the effect of persuasion, deputed three municipal officers with a detachment of the national guard; but their solicitations were useless; the rebels signed, on the altar of the country, a protestation against the decrees of the national assembly.

" The council, who were receiving each moment more alarming intelligence,—having learnt that a shower of stones had been thrown on a detachment of the national guard; that two aides-de-camp of the general had ran a risk of their lives; that a chief of a division had been exposed to the same dangers; and that, in short, disorder was at its height,—determined, at six o'clock, to proclaim martial law, and raise the red standard.*

* " The municipality considering—

" 1st. That, for several days, numerous assemblages which alarm all citizens, expose to danger public tranquillity, and force all peaceful men to quit the capital:

" 2nd. That the horrible event that occurred this morning is the effect of irregular assemblages:

" 3rd. That all the accounts derived from it announce a complete conspiracy formed against the constitution and country:

" 4th. That foreigners, paid to divide us, have recently arrived in Paris; and that they and their emissaries govern, under various disguises, the popular movements:

" 5th. That the municipality, responsible to law for the main-

" It was only after having given time to the seditious to be informed of the measures that had been taken, that the council of the municipality, and some members of the commune, proceeded to the field of the federation, with a numerous detachment of the national guard, on foot and horseback, and two pieces of cannon. They arrived at eight o'clock in the evening. The rioters had placed themselves on the amphitheatres which surrounded the field. They allowed the advance guard and cannons to pass in perfect silence; but when the municipality appeared, they overwhelmed them with invectives, and assailed them with stones; one of them fired on the mayor a pistol, which struck a brave dragoon of the troop of the line, and wounded him in the thigh. The national guard then discharged their weapons, but in the air. The rebels, far from being alarmed, again showered stones on them from the elevation on which they were stationed..

" The national guard then fired on those ruffians, of whom eleven or twelve were killed on the spot, and ten or eleven wounded, and instantly carried to a hospital, where they are receiving all the care their situation requires. One national guard was thrown from his horse, and several of them wounded; two chasseurs, on their return, have been assassinated; a cannonier has been stabbed to death with knives. At ten o'clock at night the troops returned to Paris.

" The mayor then recalled to the assembly the letter he had received from their president; the necessity of quelling a con-

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tenance of public order, charged expressly, as well by the speech pronounced yesterday by the president of the national assembly as by his letter this morning, with taking the most effectual and vigorous measures to arrest disorder, after having vainly endeavoured, by various proclamations, to recal to peace those men misled by factious persons, and when the national guard is no longer respected, cannot delay fulfilling the duty imposed on it, however painful it may be, without becoming guilty of prevarication:

" 6th. Finally, that the proclamation of martial law must infallibly end the tumults which every day occur, and secure the liberty of the deliberations of the national assembly ,which all good citizens must watch over and maintain; determine that the preceding deliberation shall be immediately put in execution, and also that four of the members shall remain at the Hotel de Ville, to act according as circumstances may require. (It was then half-past six o'clock.)"

spiracy formed against the country, and of putting an end to troubles fomented by paid foreigners; the responsibility which devolved on him; the duty imposed on him of securing the life and property of the citizens, exposed to risk on every side; finally, the necessity of securing the freedom of the deliberations of the national assembly, and the inviolability of its members. He said, that one of those ruffians, standing close to M. de Lafayette, had aimed a pistol at him, which had most fortunately missed fire; that that man had been taken, but that M. de Lafayette caused him to be set at liberty."

M. Bailly, when he thus spoke, was then ignorant that, when they were on the point of firing a cannon, Lafayette, not having time to countermand the movement, rode his horse, (very imprudently, doubtless,) immediately before the cannon, and that the alarmed cannonier withdrew his arm; but this act has not prevented the jacobins from accusing him of sanguinary rage during the events of that day.

The thanks of the national assembly to the mayor and national guard were unanimously voted. The inhabitants of the capital felt that they had escaped a great danger, for, with the exception of some of the leaders, the persons of whom the rioters of the Champ de Mars were composed were far from removing fear. Several of the chiefs were legally arrested; a proceeding against them was begun; but the day on which the king accepted the constitution, this proceeding, the arrests, and the prosecutions of the counter-revolutionists, were all annulled by a decree brought forward by Lafayette, and unanimously voted by the assembly.

M. de Bouillé is the only person who, on that occasion, acknowledged what he called *the generosity of Lafayette towards him.**

* "Although I have often had occasion to blame the proceedings of Lafayette, I cannot help praising his generosity to-

REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION.

THE severity employed against the disturbers of public order secured the liberty of the constituent assembly until the close of its labours. It was necessary to revise the constitution, for it was essential to distinguish constitutional and truly organic decrees from the multitude of laws and decrees of circumstance, which mingled unavoidably with them at each meeting. The mass of the assembly, delighted with their own performance, opposed the most simple improvements, while the defects of the constitution of 1791 appeared more evident when its scattered members were, for the first time, collected together. The constitutional priests complained of the revision; they wished the civil constitution of the clergy to form a part of the organic act of France; the assembly contented itself with merely rendering constitutional their individual appointment. Lafayette had most zealously endeavoured to curtail from the constitutional act the *civil constitution of the clergy*, which he highly disapproved of, and he thought he had obtained a victory for liberty when he caused all decrees relative to that subject to be comprehended in the class of ordinary laws, which any legislature might abolish. This

wards me, which was the more meritorious, because, had the king not been re-taken, Lafayette, most undoubtedly, would have been massacred by the people. He was never, I repeat, a wicked man; but the enthusiasm of liberty with which he intoxicated himself in America, an immoderate thirst of glory, united to sentiments of philanthropy that exalted his mind, turned his good qualities towards a dangerous aim."—(Page 308, chap. xiii., des Memoires de M. de Bouillé, edition de MM. Berville et Barrière.)

triumph of enlightened patriots was also a triumph for Louis XVI., a truly religious prince, who was much grieved at the idea of joining schism to the constitution. Independent of his efforts in the committee to obtain this result, Lafayette, whose attention to public safety detained at that moment from the assembly, only spoke, during the whole debate, on the revision, to acknowledge the principle of *conventions*, and the right the nation possessed to change its constitution whenever the majority of the people expressed legally their wish to do so. On the 5th of August he made the following motion:—

"For a long time, gentlemen, the wishes of the people call for that constitutional act which, formed in consequence of our present scale of knowledge, appears no longer to admit of any delay, but which everything, on the contrary, urges us to settle instantly. It is when so many various passions are in agitation around us, that it is essential to proclaim those principles of liberty and equality, for the maintenance of which every Frenchman has irrevocably devoted his life and honour. The assembly, doubtless, conceives also that it is time for us to grant to all constituted authorities energy and unity of action,—that the nation may have its constitutional organs with other governments, to be enabled to demand of them the numerous explanations they owe us,—that the slumber of the royal functions cease, and that mutual confidence may be renewed.

"I will not speak to you, gentlemen, of those painful duties which the country has the right to expect from me, because every species of devotion is due to her, but of which I may be allowed, nevertheless, to count with impatience the duration.

"I propose, gentlemen, that the committee of the constitution be charged to prepare a project of decree of the forms on which the constitutional act, as soon as it has been finally decreed, shall be presented, in the name of the French people, for the most independent examination and free acceptation of the king."

The motion was adopted. But they were on the point of denying the inalienable right the nation possesses of modifying its own government, when

Lafayette appealed to a principle established in his declaration of rights, but which had been omitted in that of the assembly. (Meeting of August 30th, 1791.)

"I will not weary the assembly by a long debate; but having demanded the previous question, on the motion of M. d'André,* I will explain, in a few words, my motives. I think, gentlemen, that the same assembly who acknowledged the sovereignty to the French people, who acknowledged their right to give themselves a government, cannot deny the right they have to modify it. I think that every good constitution must—as I had the honour of asserting the 11th of July, 1789, in a project of declaration of rights—must, I say, offer the constitutional and peaceful means of revising and modifying its form of government; I think that it would be shewing contempt for that sovereign right of the French people, to adopt a proposition which would completely deprive them of it for the space of thirty years,—that is to say, for one whole generation; and I persist in demanding the previous question."

The constituent assembly contented itself with modifying the proposition of M. d'André, by recommending the nation not to exercise its right for thirty years; it also indicated a mode of revision which did not, as in the United States, distinctly separate the convention of revision from the legislative bodies, a first and fatal cause of the excesses of the convention of 1792, which ought to have restricted itself to a revisal of the constitution.†

* M. d'André had proposed that there should be no national convention to revise the constitution before the term of thirty years. The committees reduced that term to ten years. The motion of M. d'André was adopted; but, on the proposal of M. Tronchet, the assembly issued, the same day, the following decree:—"The nation possesses the most unbounded right of revising the constitution when it pleases; but the national assembly declares it is to the interest of the nation to suspend the exercise of that right during thirty years."

† It was decided, that when three successive legislatures

"I desire, at least," said Lafayette, at the meeting of the 3rd of August, "to propose an additional clause. The assembly has just decided that it is within the province of a constituted power to determine if there be any defects to be reformed in constituted powers; it is, moreover, a similar power which is to operate the reform. The reason alleged is, that the three legislatures will express the will of the nation, which in its turn will declare itself by re-electing the members who voted in favour of the reform; but how will it be possible to ascertain who these members were, unless you adopt a method, successfully practised in America, in conformity to which, I propose, that whenever an alteration is required in the organization of government, there shall be a printed list, with the names of every voter, in order that the people may recognise such as have acted in unison with their desires."*

The constitutional act, being completed, was carried with great ceremony to the Tuileries. The guard of arrest was instantly withdrawn. Lafayette took the king's orders respecting the usual guard, preferring to anticipate the period fixed by law for reinstalling him, rather than to suffer the slightest appearance of constraint to exist during the important deliberation he was about to undertake.

With the constitutional act the king was already familiar; several members of the committee, re-

required the alteration of an article of the constitution, the fourth legislature should deliberate upon it. M. d'André proposed, and the assembly further decided, that none of the members of the third of these legislatures could be eligible for the fourth. "M. de Lafayette," said the Journal de Paris of September 1st, "voted for none of these decrees; his views were entirely opposed to them; he had studied *constituent powers* too accurately in the United States, to wish to transfer their privileges to *constituted powers*, but whenever he cited the example of America, he was met by—'Oh! America!'"

* This motion, at first referred to the committee on the constitution, and supported by several members of the assembly, was rejected. On the 1st of September it was enacted, that no motion for alterations in the constitutional act should be made until the third legislature.

cently admitted into his entire confidence, had discussed its details with him, the queen, and those of his ministers on whom he most relied. A proposal was made to him to retire to the country, that he might be perfectly undisturbed, and decide according to his unbiased conviction; but, a few days afterwards, he accepted the act, with a thorough comprehension of all its bearings. He did more; he sent M. de Coigny, one of the most moderate of their party, to his brothers, to induce them to unite with him in adopting the constitution.* The leading members of the assembly would have been very willing to have proposed an allowance for these princes, independent of the civil list; and the legislative, like the constituent assembly, would not have hesitated to display a great and generous feeling on this point; for, both in the one and the other, the majority was sincerely desirous of recalling the emigrants to their homes, whose property, as yet untouched, was not sequestrated until a long time after, and not confiscated until a much later period still.

The king, it has been pretended, accepted the constitution solely to save the accomplices of his flight; but he was perfectly aware that, under any circumstances, they would be safe. No conditions of this kind were ever thought of, and, in fact, the determination to treat these persons with forbearance had been taken as early as the return from Varennes. It would be equally inaccurate to say that Louis XVI. hoped in this way to secure a general amnesty; for the constituent assembly had

* "*All or nothing!*" was the reply. MM. de Sainte Croix and Duveyrier received an official commission, more generally known, which met with the same fate.

already given a plain intimation of its feelings on this subject. Lafayette's motion in favour of it was hailed with enthusiasm, on the very day that the message announcing the royal assent was received.*

* This message expressed the desire of amnesty; notwithstanding this, the queen was resolved on war at the very time she supported the opinion of those who urged the king to accept the constitution, and even regarded it as near at hand. The king appeared to give his assent with sincerity, and with an intention of observing and executing the new constitution. It is to be lamented that this determination was not proof against the suggestions of the aristocracy, and especially against those of the queen. We see by Lafayette's Memoir, addressed to the king in the beginning of the revolution (see vol. ii., p. 418), that the heads of the constitutional party desired a constitution less disjointed and feeble than the one subsequently framed. Lafayette there expresses the hope, or rather the wish, of bringing the assembly to the scheme of an elective senate, in accordance with what has been his avowed opinion at all times; unhappily, the labours of the assembly were constantly disturbed or distracted by three causes, against which it was difficult to contend. First, the malice of the court, its stupid intrigues and inconsistencies, which prevented, on the part of the revolutionary leaders, a confidence, of which the king stood in as much need as they. He made promises, and broke them. Thus, the very evening of the fourth of February, 1790, on which day he for the first time received the *ensemble* of constitutional decrees passed by the assembly, he affected to converse exclusively with the members of the right, as if to make it appear to them he had acted under compulsion, &c. Secondly, the jacobin chiefs thought that the popular agitation ought to be kept up. "*By dint of saying the revolution is over, we shall have no revolution,*" was the reply of one of them to a demand for vigorous measures in support of public order. Thirdly, the policy of the aristocracy, which, by irritating, at one moment, the assembly, at another, by voting with the most violent party, endeavoured to carry the least reasonable measures.

It must never be forgotten, also, that at that period no popularity was proof against the consequences of a first attempt to stem the torrent. Lafayette was the only man who, shewing himself the supporter of order as well as the friend of

"I should feel, gentlemen," said Lafayette, at the meeting of September 12th, "that I was doing violence to those sentiments, which have just identified the assembly with the wish addressed to us by the king, if I did not, with a view to the regular order of the debate, restrict myself to moving the following decree:—

"The national assembly, having heard the message of the king, announcing his acceptance of the constitutional act, and participating in the sentiments there expressed, on the propriety of putting a stop to all prosecutions originating in revolutionary events, decrees as follows;

"1st. All persons under arrest, or accusation, in reference to the king's departure, shall be immediately discharged, and are hereby secured against farther molestation.

"2ndly. The constitution and criminal-jurisprudence committees shall, at the opening of to-morrow's sitting, bring up the form of a decree for immediately annulling all proceedings relative to the events of the revolution.

"3rdly. A decree shall also be presented to-morrow, abolishing the use of passports, and removing the restraints placed temporarily on the liberty of going or coming within or without the kingdom, which the constitution confirms to every citizen of France."

A burst of applause from the left, a part of the right, and the galleries, followed this motion. The assembly adopted by acclamation the form of the decree proposed by Lafayette. By this amnesty an end was put to all proceedings commenced against the factions of the Champ de Mars, and several enemies of the revolution, who were certainly guilty; it had also the valuable merit of restoring a great

liberty, was able to preserve for any length of time his authority over the multitude. But this instance of an influence sustained without severity or disorganization, is an exception to the general rule, for it was demonstrated during the storms of the revolution, that whosoever opposed himself to the tumultuous career of party, saw, in a very few days, his credit and popularity pass away. I am, of course, not alluding to the resources of terror or arbitrary power, but to that genuine republican influence which is founded on public confidence and love.—(Note by General Lafayette.)

number of persons to liberty, in the departments, who were the victims of obscure resentments and party hate. Paris and all France received the constitution offered them in this way with the liveliest joy.*

The constituent assembly undoubtedly committed faults; it was deficient in experience, and refused to avail itself of that of the United States, when it applied the principle of the unity of conventions to a legislative body. Its first committee proposed a senate elected for life, preferable, in the opinion of Hume, whose loyalty is beyond suspicion, to the hereditary principle of the English peerage. This unfortunate error of a single chamber, universally reprobated in this day, but common at that time in the minds of many excellent citizens, prevailed, however, only through the accession of their adversaries, whose malicious intentions were undisguisedly proclaimed.

Another and greater imprudence of the assembly was, its affording a pretext for a schism at the period of its consecrating the property of the clergy to the state. The ecclesiastical authority, which refused its assent to the civil constitution, has proved itself much more compliant since under Napoleon. It is much to be regretted, in this day, that the title of state-religion, inserted in the royal charter, has sometimes misled the courts of justice into subjecting to catholic discipline the general laws of the civil code. It was when the nonjuring worship was most unpopular, that it found in Lafayette a consistent and zealous champion of religious toleration.

But just emancipated from the evils of an aris-

* The constituent assembly closed its session on the 29th of September, and was succeeded on the 1st of October by the legislative assembly.

tocratic magistracy, the assembly did not secure to the new judicial order the independence it required, of which the main guarantee is, the being unable to remove the judges at pleasure.

Unfortunately, also, it was too generous, when, by yielding to vain criticisms and sinister influence, it sacrificed the public benefit that must have accrued from the *re-eligibility* of its members, to the necessity of satisfying and of displaying its disinterestedness.*

In fact, we must frankly acknowledge that the constitutional assembly, uneasy at perceiving in those who surrounded the king that doctrine of absolute power which releases monarchy from every engagement made with the people, and with those who defend their rights, weakened to excess the executive power and the springs of government, at the same time that, as much from its own impulse as from its fidelity to the national wish, it desired a constitutional royalty, the royalty, in fact, of Louis XVI. It gave ample evidence of its sincerity on this point soon after the return from Varennes.

It even sought an opportunity to repair the errors occasioned by the exaggeration of contradictory opinions during the perfect freedom of its debates. It respected the principles of inviolability in the monarch, of personal liberty in the nation, of impartial justice towards its enemies, and of freedom of the press for every party; for as to the latter, no provocation, whether general or particular, could for a single instant suggest the idea of its suspension, in a word, it voluntarily dissolved itself, without any of its members having acquired fortune, place, title, or power. It may, indeed, be

* See, on the subject of re-eligibility, the letter of pages 170 and 171 of this volume.

affirmed, that no assemblage of men was ever swayed by a purer devotion to whatever related to liberty, and, consequently, to the real honour of a nation.

Compelled, as the renovator of social order, to overthrow a vast edifice of corruption and abuse, this assembly found, from the resistance it encountered, that to reform anything it was necessary to demolish all. The constitution was imperfect; but it possessed the means of revision and commanded public confidence. The general principles of this constitution, founded on the primary rights of nature, and on the latest development of reason, were, beyond all question, of considerable value; for, in spite of all that was subsequently lost through anarchy and terror, through the maximum, bankruptcy, and civil war, and notwithstanding a dreadful struggle against all Europe, yet one thing is incontestably true; that agriculture, industry, national education, the ease and independence of three-fourths of the population, have been improved to a degree unparalleled in the history of any period, or in any portion of the old world.

The constitutional act being completed, Lafayette, faithful to his engagement, retired to his native place, at one hundred and twenty leagues from the capital. We give, in this place, his farewell to the national guards of Paris, on the 8th of October, 1791.

"GENTLEMEN,—The moment having arrived when the national constituent assembly lays down its powers, and the functions of its members cease, I, too, reach the term of the engagement I contracted, when, placed by the will of the people at the head of those citizens who were the first to devote themselves to the conquest and support of liberty, I promised the capital which had set so auspicious an example, to keep unfurled the sacred standard of the revolution that public confidence had entrusted to my care.

"At present, gentlemen, the constitution has been framed by

those who were empowered to do it; and after being sworn to by every citizen and section of the empire, has just been formally adopted by the whole people, and solemnly recognised by the first legislative assembly of their representatives, as it had previously been, with as much deliberation as loyalty, by the hereditary representative charged with the execution of the laws. Thus the days of revolution give way to those of systematic organization, to those of liberty, and to the prosperity which it secures; thus, while everything tends to lull the violence of our intestine troubles, the very enemies of the country must, at the sight of so much happiness, regard their own threats as the more insane, inasmuch as, whatever conspiracies may be formed against the people's rights, there is not a solitary freeman who would harbour the cowardly thought of trafficking with any of his own privileges, and liberty and equality, once firmly rooted in either hemisphere, will never retrograde.

"To serve you, gentlemen, until now, was a duty imposed upon me both by the sentiments that have actuated my whole life and by the just return of devotedness which your confidence requires. To restore at once, and unreservedly, to my country whatever power and influence she entrusted to me, during the late convulsion, for her defence, is what I owe to my determination already avowed, and which will satisfy the only species of ambition I possess.

"Having thus alluded to my own conduct and its motives, I will now, gentlemen, add a few remarks on the new position in which we are placed by that constitutional order which is now dawning. Liberty sprung up, surrounded by the symbols of peace, at the very moment when its enemies, provoking the defenders of the people, compelled the formation of national guards, their spontaneous organization, their universal alliance, in a word, that development of civic force which recals the use of arms to its genuine purpose, and justifies a truth, which at this moment it delights me to repeat, *that for a nation to be free, it is enough that it will be free.* But it is time to give other examples, more imposing still; those of an irresistible force exclusively devoted to the maintenance of the laws.

"It is with the highest gratification, gentlemen, that I look back upon your conduct, when, in the midst of hostile plots, ambitious intrigues, and licentious disorders, you opposed to mischievous combinations an unconquerable firmness; a pure love of your country to party violence and seductions of every kind; when, in the midst of the storms of seven-and-twenty months of revolution, you calculated the danger only to increase your vigilance, and measured its importance solely by the good or evil it could

do to liberty. True it is, we have had but too many disorders to deplore, and you are aware of the painful and deep impression they invariably left upon me. We have had ourselves, undoubtedly, many errors to repair; but where is the man who, recalling not merely the great epochs of the revolution, for which the amount of public obligation to you is so large, but also that unceasing devotion, those unlimited sacrifices, contributed by one portion of the citizens to the liberty, the safety, the property, and the tranquillity of all; who, reflecting, moreover, on that provisional condition of things, which, as far as respects yourselves, has but this moment ceased, and in which confidence was called upon to substitute law;—what man, I say, amongst those whom you protected even while insulting you, will dare to reprove the homage this day rendered to you by a faithful friend, a just and grateful general.

Beware, however, gentlemen, of believing that all manner of despotism is destroyed, or that liberty, because we sustain and love it, has yet taken sufficient root. It would not be so if, from one end of the empire to the other, everything be not permitted which the law does not forbid; if any restriction be placed on the free circulation of persons, and provisions, and money; if those obnoxious to justice can be protected from the law; if the people, negligent of its most precious duty and sacred debt, are neither zealous in repairing to elections nor exact in the payment of its taxes; if arbitrary combinations, the fruits of disorder or mistrust, paralyse the lawful action of legitimate authority; if political or personal opinions, and especially the sacred use of the liberty of the press, afford pretexts of any kind for violence; if intolerance in matters of religion, covering itself with the veil of I know not what patriotism, dare to admit the idea of a ruling sect, or a proscribed one; if the house of every citizen be not his impregnable fortress; in fact, if all Frenchmen do not believe themselves accountable for the support of their civil as well as of their political liberty, and for the religious execution of the law, and if the voice of a magistrate speaking in its name have not a more imposing force than millions of arms arrayed in its defence.

"May all the characteristics, all the benefits of liberty, while they consolidate more firmly the happiness of our country, be to the national guards of the empire, armed in the same cause, and united by the same feeling, the noble recompence of their zeal; and let me be permitted, in this place, to express to them a gratitude and devotedness as unlimited as were the testimonies of confidence and friendship which through their favour I enjoyed.

"Gentlemen, in thus relinquishing my command, at this painful moment of our separation, my heart, filled with the deepest sensibility, recognises more warmly than ever the immense obligations which it owes you. Accept the wishes of an earnest friend for the prosperity of all, for the personal happiness of each of you; and may the recollection of that friend often be present to your thoughts, blending itself with that determination which unites us all, to *live as freemen, or to die.*"

On the same day, Lafayette surrendered his powers to the commonalty of Paris, and received the most touching marks of affection and respect. The one hundred and twenty leagues were a succession of triumphs. The municipality of Paris voted him an emblematic medal, and a marble statue of Washington. It resolved that its decree should be inscribed on the bust presented, twelve years previously, to the capital, by the state of Virginia. The national guard of Paris voted him a sword, made from the bolts of the Bastile, and sent a deputation to his retreat, the official report of whose proceedings mentions the reception it experienced on its way, and the general's answer:—"You find me retired to the place of my nativity; I will not leave it but to defend or consolidate our common liberty, should it ever be invaded, and here I hope to remain for a considerable time."

The national guards in his vicinity, uneasy at the rumours of plots against his life, offered to guard him by turns; an offer which, as may be easily conceived, he refused. The primary electoral assembly of the Haute Loire having chosen him a member of the administration of the department, he replied to the deputation of the general council in these words:—

"Permit me, gentlemen, to assure the general council how greatly I appreciate this mark of confidence with which my fellow-citizens have honoured me, and my regret at being

compelled to decline the place which, in spite of my declarations to various members of the electoral assembly, they have unanimously condescended to confer upon me. My well-known sentiments, gentlemen, are satisfactory evidences of the value I attach to all appointments emanating from the people, which are the more important, inasmuch as they clearly evince to every citizen, and especially those of the country, the immense and constantly augmenting advantages of a revolution before which so many oppressions, at once degrading and ruinous to them, have disappeared. It is for you, gentlemen, by applying the sacred principles of liberty and equality to administrative details, more and more to endear a constitution of which the rights of the people are the foundation, their happiness the exclusive aim. It is for you, gentlemen, by destroying the pretexts by which its enemies would conceal the insignificance of their passions and their means, and under the orders of a king who solicits you to do it by his patriotism, and who supports you by his authority, to contribute efficaciously to the execution of the laws, to the prosperity of the country, and to the full enjoyment of that liberty and repose to which all, without exception, have an equal right.

"But occupations, useful and great as these, are incompatible with that imperious necessity for repose, which has restored me to private life, there to restrict myself to the duties of a simple citizen.

I trust, gentlemen, that the members of the directory will have the kindness to accept my grateful acknowledgments for the letter and resolution with which they have condescended to honour me on this occasion, and which I regard as invaluable proofs of their esteem."

CORRESPONDENCE,

FROM

THE FEDERATION (JULY 14, 1790,) UNTIL THE CLOSE OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY (SEP. 30, 1791).

.....

You were of opinion I ought to have done something of greater consideration for M. de Bouillé. The king, the minister, and myself, write to him by Desmottes the following letter. He is to take the civic oath on the 4th, with the national guards.* I shall render him great services at the assembly, at Metz, at the council, but nobody will give me credit for it. In the meantime, I beg of you to send me back the despatches, and I wish you good night.

P. S.—I know not how I can more distinctly mark my approbation of the attentions shewn to M. de Bouillé, and I could wish the king would speak to him of the command of an army, or the rank of a marshal of France; but he shall have it before my departure.

* M. de Bouillé (chap. vii. of his Memoirs) says, that in obedience to the king's desire, he determined to take the constitutional oath, May 4, 1790, at a federation of the national guards of Metz and the province, with the troops of that city. This letter, and that which follows, written by M. Charles de Lameth, some time previous to the federation, are, with General Lafayette's reply, the only letters not placed according to their date in that part of the correspondence which we publish. For all letters without address, see note at p. 46 of 2nd volume.

FROM M. CHARLES DE LAMETH TO GENERAL LAFAYETTE.

May 25th, 1790.

I UNDERSTAND, sir, that in consequence of the difference of opinion which has for some time past existed between us at the national assembly, and particularly in the discussion on the right of peace and war, it is everywhere asserted throughout Paris, that I desire to supplant you in the command of the national guard. Unprepared as I am to suppose that such a choice would fall upon me, and greatly as I may value the approbation of my fellow-citizens, I yet owe it to myself to declare, that a thought of this kind has never occurred to me, and that I would decline the honour if it were offered to me. Without ambition, and with the firm determination never to accept a place, have I devoted myself to the defence of liberty; and thus will I continue to labour for it until it shall have been achieved on those principles on which it was begun. I should blush if I could suppose that aught in my conduct would warrant the influence of its being guided by any motive of personal interest.

I have the honour to be, &c.

TO M. CHARLES DE LAMETH.

May 26th, 1790.

I CANNOT conceive, sir, what possible relation there can be between the command of the national guard, or any rumour of your being invested with that office, and a difference of opinion on two forms of a decree, more especially after your having adopted

that which I preferred.* But I hope the friends of liberty will always concur as to its true principles, and be likewise of one mind as to the best means of strengthening the constitution.

I have the honour to be, &c.

TO THE KING.†

July 17th, 1790.

I HAVE taken the liberty of representing to the king that, should he choose aides-de-camp from the departments, it will, to avoid exciting jealousy, be requisite to appoint eighty-three.‡ Another observation strikes me forcibly: I think that I have remarked, in the selections made by the king, certain names not very renowned for their attachment to the principles of the revolution.

I am of opinion, that a single preference of such a nature, into which the king might be misled, would produce an ill effect.

I do not hesitate to advise the king not to make a list of aides-de-camp, and I do só with the confidence inspired by my attachment and respect.

* This reply gave rise to a second letter from M. de Lameth, in which he asserts, that he has not changed his opinion to that of General Lafayette on the question of peace and war, and that he only withdrew his opposition to Mirabeau's motion in consequence of the amendment of MM. Freteau and Alexander de Lameth being adopted.

† Iron Cabinet, No. 348 (*bis.*)

‡ This plan of a royal and aristocratic state-major could not, in any respect, be agreeable to me.—(Note of General Lafayette.)

TO M. DE BOUILLÉ.

Monday.*

I AM aware, my dear cousin, that attempts have been made to injure me in your opinion; but by a heart pure and upright as yours, sincerity of purpose cannot long be misinterpreted, and friendship may be equally certain of making itself heard.

Many are the absurdities you have been told relative to my views, resources, and desires. It is natural that the ambitious should seek to discover the secret purpose of a man who, with the power to do much, has chosen to do only what was for the public good.

Efforts even have been made to cause personal disputes between us, and this is also natural; for, having made some men envious, and others discontented, I have incurred party hate in winning national esteem. My conduct has been very much blamed; sometimes unjustly, and sometimes with reason. The reproaches they have showered on me contradict each other, and I might take advantage of this circumstance to defend myself; but, while I judge my errors with severity, I render justice to my intentions, and if others might have done better, none could, at least, have acted more conscientiously than I have done.

In future, my dear cousin, when you think you have cause to be displeased with me, address yourself direct to me. Our dispositions are not the same; our political principles differ; but we are both men of integrity, and as they are extremely scarce, we shall understand each other better together than when others take part in the affair.

* M. de Bouillé speaks of this letter as written shortly after the federation.

I must frankly tell you, that the new promise demanded of the officers is a very bad measure.* It was first necessary to guard against the mania for disbanding troops, which had spread from one end of the kingdom to the other; to cause the acceptation of the system of camps, and render the engagement of officers common to all public functionaries; and after those points had been attained, there remains a formula of promises which is not particularly displeasing to the army, since it extends to all other professions, but which, in itself, is ill suited to the dignity of the French people, and to the weariness we must feel for oaths.

But as the assembly, far from wishing to displease the officers, were principally guided by the desire of offering them an opportunity, once for ever, of silencing calumny, and destroying every pretext for insubordination, we depend on your patriotism, my dear cousin, to enable us to avoid the interpretations that some will endeavour to give, and on your example, to unite all officers in the disposition which good citizens ardently desire, whilst mischievous men of all parties only wish to render them discontented.

My friend Emery is writing to you; he once required my services in his behalf with you; I now fear that I may stand in need of his; but I have nothing to fear if you render justice to my sincere and affectionate attachment.

* A decree which obliged the officers to engage themselves in writing, on their word of honour, not to do or order anything contrary to the constitution.—(Memoirs of M. de Bouillé, chap. viii.)

FROM GENERAL WASHINGTON TO GENERAL LAFAYETTE.

(ORIGINAL.)

New York, August 11th, 1790.

My dear Marquis,—I have received your affectionate letter of the 17th March by one conveyance, and the token of Liberty over Despotism by another;* for both which testimonials of your friendship and regard I pray you to accept my sincerest thanks. In that great subject of triumph for the new world, and for humanity in general, it will never be forgotten how conspicuous a part you bore, and how much lustre you reflected on a country where you made the first displays of character.

Happy am I, my good friend, that, amidst the tremendous tempests which have assailed your political ship, you have had address and fortitude enough to steer her hitherto clear of the quicksands and rocks which threatened destruction on every side. I am rejoiced that your young king, in all things, seems so well disposed to conform to the rights of the nation. In such an important, such a dangerous undertaking, you know full well my best wishes have never left you for a moment; but the accounts we received through the English papers (often our only channel for information) have sometimes caused our fears of failure almost to exceed our expectation of success.

How much will they who are *concerned* be indebted to the exertions of the principal pilot, when

* The principal key of the Bastile, and a painting, representing the demolition of that fortress.—(See Letter, page 428, 2nd volume.)

The ship shall, at the end of her dangerous course, reach that haven of national tranquillity, freedom, and glory, to which she is destined, and which I hope she is near attaining!

The congress, after having been in session ever since last autumn, will adjourn in two or three days. Though they have been much perplexed and delayed in their proceedings in some questions of a local and intricate nature, yet they have done a great deal of important business, and have left the public affairs in as satisfactory a state as could reasonably have been expected. One of the last acts of the executive power has been the conclusion of a treaty of peace and friendship with the Creek nation of Indians, who have been considerably connected with the Spanish provinces, and hostile to the Georgian frontiers since the war. Mr. Gelleway, and about thirty of their chiefs, are here. This event will leave us in peace from one end of our frontiers to the other, except where it may be interrupted by a small bandit of Cherokees and Shebanesses, who can be easily chastised, or even extirpated, if it shall become necessary; but this will only be done in an inevitable extremity, since the *basis* of our proceedings with the Indian nations has been, and shall be, *justice*, during the period in which I may have anything to do in the administration of this government.

Our negotiations and transactions, though many of them are on a small scale as to the objects, ought to be governed by the immutable principles of equity, as much as the European transactions, which are more extended in their compass.

What probability there may be that the misunderstandings between Great Britain and Spain should

lead to an open rupture, and what other powerful nations, in that event, will take an active part in it, are subjects on which we in these distant regions cannot decide. It seems to be our policy to keep in the situation in which nature has placed us,—to observe, as far as circumstances allow, a strict neutrality, and to furnish others with those commodities which our fertile lands so abundantly produce. This letter is committed to Col. Humphreys, to carry to London, whither he is going. Should he by any chance go to France, he will be able to give you a full state of our affairs and prospects. Gradually recovering from the distress in which the war left us, patiently advancing in our task of civil government, which consists in establishing a government completely distinct from European policy, wanting nothing but the free navigation of the Mississipi, (which we must have, and as certainly shall have as we remain a nation,) I have supposed that, with the undeviating exercise of a just, steady, and prudent national policy, we shall be the gainers. Whether the powers of the old world may be in peace or war, but more especially in the latter case, our importance will certainly increase, and our friendship be courted. Our dispositions would not be indifferent to Britain or Spain. Why will not Spain be wise and liberal respecting us? It would then be easy to annihilate all causes of future quarrels between that nation and the United States. Should a war take place between Great Britain and Spain, I conceive, from a great variety of concurring circumstances, that there is the highest probability that the Floridas will soon be in possession of the French. Adieu, my dear Marquis, &c.

P.S.—Not for their value, my dear Marquis, but as a memorial, and because they are the manufacture of this city, I send you herewith a pair of shoe-buckles.

TO M. DE BOUILLÉ.

August 18th, 1790.

You must have learnt, my dear cousin, the unanimous decrees of the national assembly respecting the insurrection of Nancy. M. de la Tour du Pin addresses to you the orders of the king; Desmottes, my aide-de-camp, who is their bearer, will give you any details that may interest you; I need therefore say but a few words on the subject. The time has arrived, my dear cousin, when we may commence the establishment of the constitutional order that must replace revolutionary anarchy. The directories are entering on their functions; the judicial order, although now defective, will soon be organized; we are on the point of completing the arrangements for the national guard; the army is forming its decrees at the present moment, and the king has already chosen his first general to command the most important of the four armies.* Let us not therefore feel discouraged, my dear cousin, and let us hope that, by uniting all our forces for the establishment of the constitution, by firmly resisting all internal and foreign difficulties, we shall secure both liberty and public order.

The decree respecting Nancy is a good one; it must be executed with nerve and decision. The king sanctioned it as soon as we had voted for it;

* M. de Bouillé had just obtained the command of the troops of la Lorraine, of l'Alsace, of la Franche Comté, and la Champagne.

M. de la Tour du Pin announced to the members that M. de Malseigne was named to execute it, and, after the former had proclaimed that selection, which was very agreeable to the assembly, he discovered that M. de Malseigne was at Besançon. I received, last night, a note from the king, desiring me to enter into an understanding with you, to see M. de la Tour du Pin, and to write to the national guards. It appeared to me that nothing had been done except sending the decree. A courier delivered to M. de Malseigne the order to proceed to Lunéville, to await your instructions. I am writing, not officially, but fraternally, to the national guards of the four departments, and my letter will be carried to Epinal by one of my aides-de-camp, who will await your orders at Lunéville, or give you an account at Metz of what he has done. We arrested here the deputation of the king's regiment, and we shall write to you to-morrow evening by Gouvernet, who is going to join you.*

It seems to me, my dear cousin, that we ought to strike a blow that may produce an effect on the whole army, and put an end, by one severe example, to the general desertion now preparing. If M. de Malseigne should not find great difficulties, the measures which they now intend taking will be sufficient; but in case of meeting with a great resistance, and, above all, of a concerted plan between the garrisons, all means must be combined to save the country from such peril, and I shall request you to permit me to proceed there with the title of your aide-de-camp. It is most important that our first blow should not prove a failure, and that we

* The rebellious garrison of Nancy had sent deputies to present an address to the assembly. M. de Gouvernet was charged by his father, M. de la Tour du Pin, to repair to M. de Bouillé.

take such measures that no doubt may be entertained of its success.

Farewell, my dear cousin; I unite myself to you with my whole heart, because I am sure you will serve our constitution, and because I desire as much as you do the establishment of public order. Send me your commands and commissions. I imagine cases may occur in which two officers of the national guard of Paris may be useful.

Yours most affectionately.

..... August —, 1790.

I SPOKE to the king and queen of the reports that some persons endeavour to propagate, and they replied in the most satisfactory manner. I then told them in what situation I stood with the jacobins. I saw them in the evening; they will not write, but only converse; I annex importance to writings; their manner has cooled my feelings towards them. Thouret is to see, to-morrow, Duport, with my articles. In two days we shall know on what ground we stand. In all cases, I desire an interview, to prove to them that I have done all I could do, and if no alternative be found, war shall only take place after I have exhausted every means to conciliate parties. I have sent to compliment the abbé de Barmont.* I am writing to Nancy; but do not believe that the municipality is

* M. Perrotin, abbé de Barmont, and member of the assembly, had been arrested, as implicated in the affair of M. de Maillebois, for having given an asylum to M. Bonne Savardin. He defended himself, on the 18th, at the bar of the assembly, after having expressed his gratitude to the national guard, who had just protected him against the violence of a popular tumult.

exempt from blame. Regnier and Prugnon* told me that the members stood in need of pardon; but that they must be spared, because they were, all things considered, good people. How can, for example, the order be excused to work the cannons against M. de Bouillé? I visited M. de Rochambeau with all the submission of an adjutant-general towards his general; his manner partook of a mixture of his situation, of our American equality, and of the dictatorship of the present moment; and the whole combined to render him very kind and polite to me; he is, besides, in the sense of the revolution, and will bring under military rule the whole northern army. I shall go to-morrow to court to see what appearance the Marquis de Noailles will make, for he delays, I believe, dining with me, until he is certain I shall not be hanged.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

Paris, August 28th, 1790.

My dear General,—What would have been my feelings had the news of your illness reached me before I knew my beloved general, my adopted father, was out of danger. I was struck with horror at the idea of the situation you have been in, whilst I, uninformed of it, and so distant from you, was anticipating the long-expected pleasure of hearing from you, and the still more endearing prospect of visiting you and presenting you with a tribute of our revolution, one of the first offsprings of your labour. For

* Deputies of Nancy. This letter is of the 18th or 19th.

God's sake, my dear general, take care of your health; do not devote yourself so much to the cabinet, especially as your habit of life has from your younger years accustomed you to constant exercise. Your preservation is the life of your friends, the salvation of your country. It is for you a religious duty not to neglect anything that may concern your health. I write whenever an opportunity offers; and, to my great sorrow, I hear my letters must have miscarried, or been detained. But as our correspondence can have no other bounds than the opportunities to write, it was not a reason, permit me to say, for you to miss any that may have offered. What would have been my situation had I known your illness before the news of your recovery had comforted a heart so affectionately devoted to you.

This letter will be delivered by two gentlemen, one of them an artillery officer, who are going to settle on the banks of famed Scioto. How profitable the scheme may be to them I do not determine; but as they are personally entitled to regard, and have been strongly recommended to me, I beg you will honour them with your kind reception and good advice.

The proceedings of the national assembly cannot fail being known to you. We have overthrown everything which existed; and perhaps it was the only way to get rid of the innumerable obstacles that opposed our revolution. We afterwards made an immense emission of resolves, constitutional, legislative, administrative, and of the latter a great deal too much. It is fortunate for us that I persuaded the assembly to begin with a declaration of rights, as amongst our decrees few may be found that are not consistent with the most perfect principles of national rights; so that our errors

being on the popular side, and of a speculative turn, monarchical influence and practice will fit us to meet in a few years a second convention; whereas, had we gone half way only, or taken another rule than that of nature, it would have been impossible to conquer difficulties or to destroy our prejudices. It is from this motive that I have been so eager to root out, not only the reality but even the smallest appearance of aristocracy among us.

Now we are disturbed with revolts among the regiments, and as I am constantly attacked on both sides by the aristocratic and the factious party, I don't know to which of the two we owe these insurrections. Our safeguard against them lies with the national guard. There is more than a million of armed patriotic citizens; and my influence with them is as great as if I had accepted the chief command. I have lately lost some of my popularity with the mob, and displeased the frantic lovers of licentiousness, as I am bent on establishing a legal subordination; but the nation at large is very thankful to me for it. The aristocrats have not yet renounced all hopes of making a counter-revolution. Nay, they do what they can with all the crowned heads of Europe, who hate us like the devil; but I think their plans will miscarry. I am rather more concerned with a division that rages in the popular party. The club of the jacobins, and another called 89, have divided the friends of liberty, who accuse each other; the jacobins being taxed with a disorderly extravagance, and 89 with a tincture of ministerialism and ambition. I am endeavouring to bring about a reconciliation. The affair of the 6th of October will be reported in the house next week. I don't think there will be against the Duke d' Orleans, and am sure there are

not against Mirabeau, sufficient charges to impeach them. There is something gloomy in the present systems of these two men, although they do not seem actually connected.

I hope our business will end with the year, when your friend, this so much blackened and ambitious dictator, will most delightfully enjoy the happiness of giving up all power, all public cares, and of becoming a private citizen in a free monarchy, the constitution of which I own as being very defective now, but which will lay a foundation for a better one to be established in a few years. The people begin to be a little tired with the revolution and the assembly. This may partly be ascribed to the French character and numberless private losses; partly owing to the faults of the assembly, the intrigues and ambition of most of its leaders. But we have still wind enough to run the ship into harbour.

I depend on my friend Short to give you political intelligences. His abilities, zeal, and the affection and esteem he enjoys, put him in a situation to give you the best information. Mr. Jefferson and myself know his worth, and can assure you of it. He is a most valuable man to do American business here.

My best respects wait on Mrs. Washington. I beg you to present my kindest compliments to Hamilton, Knox, Jefferson. Be so kind as to show them my letters as well as to Mr. Jay, to whom I also beg my affectionate compliments, and also to all friends.

TO THE KING.*

August 31, 1790.

I intended paying my court to the king yesterday; but I remained in the assembly for the affair of Nancy. I shall present myself this evening to the king to receive his commands.

If M. de Bouillé should have the good fortune to be followed by his army, he will have completed everything before the commissaries arrive to assist him; but, in any case, they cannot delay taking those measures which the decree of the assembly have demanded.

We have arranged that the proclamation should be less feeble than was projected yesterday; and some expressions have been inserted in it which will prevent M. de Bouillé from being compromised.

The ministers of the king told me what passed yesterday relative to the choice of the commissaries; but the assembly appears to me desirous that they should be sent from hence, and to conceive that the mission given direct to men departing for this express purpose, bears more fully the stamp of possessing the confidence of the king and of the assembly.

The presidents of the departments are little known here: should one be found who does not inspire confidence, murmurs will infallibly arise. Several members of all parties have spoken to me, and I

* Iron Cabinet, No. 350.—This note proves with what loyalty M. de Lafayette endeavoured to support M. de Bouillé in the execution of the decree of the national assembly, and what interest he felt in the king's committee sending him patriotic commissaries. Duport du Tertre not having been able to proceed there, it was Lafayette who proposed Cahier de Gerville.—(Note of General Lafayette.)

perceive that if the king should select two men of law, and one military man, if those commissaries were, M. Duport du Tertre (with whose merit the king is acquainted), M. Duveyrier, an advocate, who has been the secretary of the electors, and M. Dumas, who fulfilled his commission at Narbonne so well, all parties, whether on the left or right, would be satisfied. I have spoken on the subject to M. de Bouthilliers and M. Duchatelet, because several members on the left of the assembly and of the two clubs requested me to indicate selections of this kind, and even those abovenamed individuals, to the ministers of the king, and I am convinced they would all be satisfied with this measure.

It is most essential that the commissaries should have proofs of the confidence of the influential members especially, and if possible, of that of the assembly in a body; and this I hope to obtain for those of whom I had the honour of speaking to the king, and for whose integrity and prudence I will myself become responsible.

Such are the reflections I have thought proper to submit to the king, that he may decide between them and the proposals the ministers presented yesterday. M. de Montmorin has now returned to my opinion. The keeper of the seals still inclines for the presidents of the departments, and we agreed together that I should send this note to the king.

I entreat the king to grant me an audience this evening, and to receive with indulgence these observations, which are dictated by my attachment and respect.

.....

I PASSED my evening disposing of cannons and patrols; the national guard evinced great ardour.* I do not believe that the account of M. de Bouillé will arrive to-morrow. What think you of M. de La Tour du Pin, who concealed himself in another person's house, and M. Necker, who fled to Saint Ouen, and all because some motions were proposed against them? Good night. I have despatched couriers in quest of the first minister.

TO M. DE BOUILLÉ.

Friday.†

You are the saviour of the public good, my dear cousin; I enjoy this circumstance doubly, both as a citizen and as your friend. I shared your anxiety respecting the dreadful situation into which we were on the eve of falling, and I looked upon the execution of the decree of Nancy as the crisis of the fate of public order. Great efforts have been made to deceive the people relative to this event; nor does this surprise me, because that decree counteracts all projects of exciting tumults: but you have been such a scrupulous observer of every regulation, that malice itself has not been able to seize on one tangible point, and each suspicion has only produced examinations which have rebounded to your credit.

* The events of Nancy causing great agitation, some meetings took place the 2d and 3d of September. They demanded the dismissal of the ministers. M. Necker gave in his resignation on the 4th.

† This letter reached M. de Bouillé with two other letters of congratulation, one written by the king, September 4th, and the other written in the name of the national assembly by their president, September 6th.

I send you the copy of the decree which was almost unanimously voted for yesterday; not thirty members rose against it. You will receive the commissaries, bearers of a proclamation, of which one part has become more than ever necessary. These are, M. Duveyrier, advocate, secretary of the electors last year, and M. Cahier de Gerville, attorney-general, substitute in the commune of Paris; they are men of great integrity, with whom you will, I trust, be satisfied. I will write to you more fully to-morrow, my dear cousin, after conversing with Gouvernet, and I will then give you my opinion of all you wrote concerning the state of our frontier. In respect to the interior, a great movement still exists, and Paris has been for some days in a singular state of fermentation; but we must eventually conquer these difficulties, which alone, at present, retard the establishment of constitutional order. Our union, my dear cousin, is a means of serving the public good, which is peculiarly agreeable to me, and this sentiment is founded on the most tender attachment and most lasting gratitude for all the proofs of friendship and confidence that I have received from you. Good night, my dear cousin, I shall write to you to-morrow; the commissaries will arrive soon after this letter.

TO M. DE BOUILLÉ.

Paris, Sept. 15th, 1790.

M. DE GOUVION has given me your letter, my dear cousin; your commissions shall be executed in the best way I can do them. I had already written to the commissioners; I, this day, renew my recommendations. Desmottes, my aide-de-camp, will soon be with you, in order to give you our address

to such of the national guards as were under your command, and whom we beg you would have the kindness to indicate. I refer you to him for the news of this place; keep him some time by you, he will be useful to you. We are in the midst of intrigue, ambition, and self-love. I have been endeavouring to rally all parties around certain fixed principles, which would enable us to comprehend distinctly both where we are and whither we are going, and to secure the re-establishment of order, but the public interest is far more hated than loved. I am very sensible, my dear cousin, of the friendship you express for me; our union and reciprocal confidence are the great means of safety at this juncture. Most heartily do I give myself up to this sentiment, which is the more necessary to me, as I become more and more convinced of the scarcity of honest men. Be assured, my dear cousin, of the devotedness and tender attachment which will ever bind me to you.

TO M. DE BOUILLÉ.

Paris, Oct. 3rd, 1790.

I do not give you any account of your commissions, my dear cousin, because you will receive a very detailed one. There is but one article greatly in arrears, that of the organization of the national guard; the assembly is sensible how urgent an affair it is, but it finds the task a delicate one, and is constantly requiring it, without much desire of its being brought forward, so that other affairs take the lead, especially that of taxation, which will be considered without delay. I will give the best attention possible to the affair of the national guard. You are aware of the proceedings, report,

and decree of the assembly on the affair of the 6th of October. The Orleans party is trying to compromise, and even to attack me. They are concocting a memoir, and hiring motion-makers and libellers; the prince is employing himself in pistol practice, firing at eggs. From all this I am inclined to think nothing very alarming will issue; especially should the king stay a little longer in Paris, in order to disconcert the intrigues founded on the absurd report of his flight.

I conceive that the whole of that discussion of the 6th of October will produce a very lamentable effect.*

Despatch in the labours of the assembly is of more consequence than ever. I considered the combination of the popular party as the best means of coming to a speedy conclusion that could be suggested, provided certain principles were agreed on, more particularly in reference to the administration, and the entire functions of the executive power. But mutual hatred and self-love make it impossible. I have observed, in my conversations with the leaders of the clubs, that their ideas approximate much more closely than their opinions; I go, at this moment, near none of them, remaining with my friends, receiving everybody, and countenancing all those who are in favour of liberty, the constitution, and public order. A committee of revisal has been appointed, whose labours will almost exclusively influence the compiling of the constitution. It is very important that it should carefully distinguish principles and clauses essentially constitutional from ordinances relating merely to forms, and such mat-

* Debate on the report of M. Chabroud, and the proceedings of the châtelet against the authors of the disorders of the 6th of October.—(See the note, in vol. ii., p. 348.)

ters as it will be made the privilege of the legislature to frame. If this committee hold well together, its results will be the more useful, inasmuch as, being composed of members of both sections of the popular party, its recommendations will the more readily obtain the assent of the assembly.

Adieu, my dear cousin, give me your commands on all commissions you would have executed in order to put yourself in a state of defence against all our neighbours. I have the pleasure of informing you, that the aristocrats have disencumbered you of their inconvenient friendship ever since you saved the country at Nancy. Accept, my dear cousin, my best and warmest regards.

TO M. CHAMBONAS, COMMANDANT OF THE CITY OF SENS.

Oct. 14th, 1790.

M. WEYLER will inform you, sir, that I have yielded to the orders expressed through your means.* But I wish once more to express my lively sensibility to you for so flattering a testimony of the esteem and friendship of my brothers in arms. May they,

* On the 17th of July, the deputies of the federation had approved an address presented in their name by M. Chambonas, and conceived in these terms:—"The national troops, desirous of giving a mark of the esteem, respect, and high consideration, which they entertain for General Lafayette, and of indemnifying themselves, in some measure, for the regret they feel at being separated from him; anxious, too, that his image should be familiar to their wives, their children, their fellow-citizens, and be perpetuated to future generations, have resolved to ask his permission to have his portrait engraved, in order to strike off the greatest possible number of copies." The execution was entrusted to M. Weyler, painter to the king and the academy.

when they again gaze upon the features of the most affectionate of their comrades, recal the sentiments which he has consecrated to them until his latest sigh.

Receive, sir, the assurance of the fraternal attachment, &c.

Sunday.

No news upon anything which can interest you. Charles de Lameth observed, smartly enough, the other day, that *the executive power is counterfeiting death*, in order to induce people to increase its power.* I know not how long its chief will remain both deaf and dumb to my representations. M. de Montmorin can no longer retire, without being on ill terms with all the patriots; he must be either the head of the council, or our sentinel in it, and the latter would be highly disagreeable to the king, who has still the liberty of choice.† I see, with

* This letter belongs to the end of October, 1790. At the meeting of the 21st, M. Charles de Lameth, speaking on a motion respecting the disorders at Brest, made use of these expressions:—"The executive power is counterfeiting death to make it be supposed that you have destroyed it; but only give it more power than it ought to have, and you will see it revive more terrible than ever."

† After a report by M. de Menou, in the name of several consolidated committees, on the occasion of some insubordination in the Brest squadron, the project of requesting the king to dismiss all his ministers, save M. de Montmorin, was submitted, on the 19th and 20th of October, to the assembly, and rejected by a feeble majority. On the 23rd, the king accepted the resignation of M. de la Luzerne, minister of marine, who was succeeded by M. de Fleurieu. The ministers were again denounced, in the name of the commune of Paris; M. Duportail succeeded, on the 16th of November, to M. de la Tour du Pin, and M. Champion de Cicé, on the 22nd, gave up the seals to M. Duport Dutertre; there remained of the former cabinet none but M. de Montmorin at the foreign affairs, and M. de Saint Priest at the home department.

great regret, that royalty is daily ruining its own cause, and that between the Count d'Artois and the Duke of Orleans the king may be left entirely alone. The public interest and he must be saved, whether he will or not. I will tell them this evening all the danger to which they expose themselves; if they be not honestly at the head of the revolution, and will not unreservedly give themselves up to it, I cannot answer for anything. Royalty can only preserve itself by being in unison with the revolution, without which it must be destroyed, and I will be the first to contribute to it. The king is king neither of the aristocrats nor of the factious; he is king of the people and of the revolution, or else he may be dethroned either by the former or the latter. M. de Calonne goes to Turin; he has written a book, and the princes are making a manifesto against us. Conceive what will become of the king, and especially of the queen, if they are not frankly with us at this crisis. I am persuaded, that if they will but surrender themselves completely, the vessel will get safe into port, and they aboard with a good berth; but for this, they must know how to displease Madame de Tarente and Madame de Duras. As to the rest, we shall come to a conclusion to-night. M. d'Orleans intrigues like a madman. I send you his memoir to look at;* he is a very common-place person. Good night.

P.S.—M. de Saint Priest's affair is settled.

* This justificatory memoir belongs to the end of October. On the 2nd, M. Chabroud had made his report on the proceedings of the châtelet against the authors of the attempts of the 6th of October, 1789.

....*

I saw the king yesterday, and spoke to him of Montmorin and the paid guards; he was well inclined on the former point, ill on the latter. He wanted to sound me upon the appointments; I replied, that unless he attached great consequence to keeping in Montmorin, it would be a proof to me, that the spirit in which the ministry would be formed must prevent any close connexion on my part with his new council; that, consequently, I did not desire to influence his choice, but that he would always find in me the same feelings towards the public interest and himself. I added the phrase which we agreed on; all this appeared to me to make some impression on him. I attach the greatest importance to his writing to Montmorin, in order that he may retain near him a man to whom he is accustomed, and on whom I can rely for what is done in the council when I do not interfere in it. I will not forget the interests of Gouvernet.

The political situation of things is embarrassing; my personal position imperative. I lament that I am unable to seek in your presence the assuagement so needful to a heart sorrowful and betrayed, which sees a glorious revolution compromised by despicable passions, and which is perfectly indifferent in its choice between the fate of Washington and that of Sydney.

* This letter must be of the same date as the one before it.

FORM OF A LETTER FROM THE KING TO GENERAL LAFAYETTE.*

In compliance with your request, sir, I authorize you to present me a plan for the organization of the infantry belonging to my household, to take effect on the completion of the constitution. I promise you to admit into it, not only the grenadiers, but also a part of the fusiliers of the paid national guard; and I will consult you on the necessary details. You are aware, moreover, of its being my intention that the volunteers of the national guards should always form part of my body-guard.

FROM THE KING TO GENERAL LAFAYETTE.*

I apprise you, sir, that whenever I shall form the infantry belonging to my household, it is my intention

* Iron Cabinet, No. 345, (*bis.*) This letter is in General Lafayette's hand-writing, without signature; it has some erasures, and seems to have been merely the rough draft of a letter, which it was intended the king should copy and sign. It was in the months of October and November that the king's guard was under consideration.—(See note to the following letter.)

† Iron Cabinet, No. 164. The two notes of the king to Lafayette were known of at the time. It was natural that the general should be anxious to secure the most agreeable position to the paid national guard, which was composed of the French guards and soldiers who had quitted their standards on the 14th of July to take part in the Parisian insurrection. They would have been unavoidably disbanded; two regiments of the line had, indeed, been formed out of them, but Lafayette desired a more beneficial provision for them, and was besides anxious that the king's guard should be composed of patriots. While the whole force of the jacobin's influence was let loose against this project, that of the aristocracy was arrayed against it at the court. "How, sir," said the queen, in an angry tone, to Lafayette, "shall I reply to those who express their astonish-

to embody in it, according to your suggestion, the paid grenadiers of the national guard of Paris, and a part of the paid guard. I will consult you on the details at the time I mean to put it into execution, as well as on the service of the volunteers from the various national guards. You are aware my intention has always been, that they should do duty near my person, in whatever places I may be.

(Signed) Louis.

TO THE KING.*

My eagerness this morning to secure the good effects of the king's letter† was the cause of my

ment at seeing the king compose his body-guard of men who deserted him on the 14th of July?" "Your Majesty may remind them," answered Lafayette, coldly, "of the service they had the happiness to render him on the morning of the 6th of October." The king's promise had been given; the jacobins reproached him with the difficulty with which it had been obtained from him. The constituent assembly organized the king's guard in a very different way, but, for all that, it was not more patriotically composed, as all the world knows.—(Note by General Lafayette.)

* Iron Cabinet, No. 345.

† The preceding letter from the king, was read, on the 10th of November, at a sitting of the general council of the commune of Paris, by General Lafayette. It is thus the journal of the municipality and of the department of Paris, entitled, "Annals of the Revolution," (vol. iii., p. 109,) speaks of this meeting:—"The commander-in-chief rose, and said: That being informed that a note he had received from the king had given birth to rumours and apprehensions, he felt it his duty to allay them; that in a speech which the municipality had ordered to be printed, there was a passage explanatory of those facts which had been so strangely disfigured; that, nevertheless, it was a pleasure to him to reiterate explanations which at once proclaimed the real intentions of the king, his personal acts, and the insidious manœuvres of the foes to public peace; that the latter had been

being too late for his levee; the time for paying my respects to him was past, unless I interrupted him in his private apartments; but, unable to wait for the hour of ceremony, I take advantage of the form which the king indicated to me, to convey to his Majesty the homage of my lively gratitude and respect.

LAFAYETTE.

labouring to persuade the paid troops that the national assembly, the king, and the municipality, would forget or discard them; that attempts had been made to disquiet the capital about the pretended formation of a corps of six thousand men for the military service of the king's household, to be composed, amongst others, of those of the French guards who had not joined our standard; that he, the commander-in-chief, had thought it his duty to speak to his Majesty on this subject, and to repeat his personal desire with reference to two objects, which could not, under any circumstances, be effected until the national assembly and the king should take the formation of the king's guard into consideration, and until a bill, in conformity to the conservative principles of every free constitution, should have limited its number; that these two objects were; first, the constitutional admission of the volunteer national guards into the king's guard; secondly, the admission of the paid grenadiers, and a part of the troops of the centre, in every fresh formation which might occur of a French regiment of foot guards; that, in consequence of this conversation, he had received a note from the king, containing his Majesty's personal intentions (the note found in the Iron Cabinet, No. 164.)" "The Annals of the Revolution" adds, that after General Lafayette had read this note, he deposited it in the hands of the mayor, and concluded his speech with these words:—"Every citizen who cherishes liberty in his heart, seizes with eagerness all opportunities of explaining himself; I therefore thank the council for the request it made me; and I beg of every citizen, on every occasion, to demand from me such elucidation as he may feel that he requires." The general council, by an unanimous vote, expressed to the commander-in-chief its entire satisfaction at the explanation he had just given. It also appointed a commission to draw up a proclamation containing the king's letter, which was afterwards printed, posted up, and forwarded to forty-eight sections and sixty battalions.

TO THE KING.*

November 10th, 1790.

I HAVE the honour to report to the king, that the general council has seen in his Majesty's note a new and touching proof of his affection for the national guards, and of his attachment to the constitution; and that it is in this spirit the commissioners have framed their report upon it.

But the general council considers the printing of this note as an effectual method of disconcerting the malevolent, and all those who, under various pretexts, are endeavouring to mislead the citizens. They attached so much importance to it, and on such good grounds, that I undertook to request the king's permission. It is believed, that it will prevent confusion, and fill the national volunteer and paid guards with a sense of our obligations to the king for the intentions of which he apprised me.

Unless I receive prohibitory orders from the king, I shall construe his silence into a permission, in order to spare him the trouble of writing.

Although this incident has exposed me to some attacks, I persist in believing, and even believe more firmly than ever, in the good effects of the king's note.

I beseech him to receive my attachment and respect.

.....Monday.

I have had a long, and I think useless, conversation with the queen. I exhibited to her the three parties, as they appear to my view; the aristocrats,

* Iron Cabinet, No. 344, (*bis.*) See, in reference to this letter, the preceding note.

with M. d'Artois for their leader; the Orleanists, whose despicable chief is nevertheless a rallying point; finally, the popular and monarchical party, the most numerous, but least active, which presents the only means of safety for the king. The counter-revolutionists are as willing to cause or suffer the destruction of Louis XVI. as the Orleanists; and the latter are preparing a campaign against the queen, which will bring her to a divorce or the scaffold. I observed, that if I were accused of not having done all that might have been expected from me, it was because there had been no desire to act in the spirit of the revolution, as evinced either by the daily routine of their conduct, or by the agents of the executive power, and also that attempts had been made to neutralize the constitution by a vis inertiæ. I declared that the public interest was with me the first consideration, and next to that, the king. I required to be entirely satisfied as to the object and course of action which were to be pursued; because a temporising policy, dictated by adverse counsels, would ruin everything. I asserted, that as M. de Montmorin was known for his attachment to the constitution, the king, and myself, the annexing no value to his being retained was an act of hostility against either the constitution or me; that were I in M. de Montmorin's place, I would remain in office, supported by the wish of the people, as it is customary in England; but that the only mode of getting on was by establishing a perfect and reciprocal confidence between M. de Montmorin, the king, and myself. I added, that I should run considerable risk were I to appoint the ministry; that, if M. de Montmorin did not remain in it, I could not even offer my opinion upon any appointment; and that, in any case, I

should prefer his having the air of interfering in it rather than myself. It seemed to me that the queen was in suspense between contradictory opinions, and incensed by insinuations; that she was more intent upon appearing to advantage in the midst of the peril than on averting it; that she both hated and esteemed me, but believed that, for my own support, I required a coalition with the king. I remarked to her, that my political position, as well as that of the kingdom, would permit me to wait no longer. We have agreed on a conversation between her, the king, M. de Montmorin, and myself; I told her that in this each will frankly explain himself on the course he means to pursue; that my revolutionary principles being immovable, the basis of any arrangement must be some plan for promoting the revolution with all our power. This definitive conference will take place to-morrow. This is the point at which I have arrived. In the meantime, M. Chabroud is president of the jacobins, and M. Laclos, editor of the journal.* Madame de Lamothe has arrived, and the Duke of Orleans takes care of her. Adieu.

P.S.—Were the king disposed, I am confident that, with a popular ministry and a good course, we might save the state and him; I would concur in it with all my heart, and risk every thing for it; but they are too ill-advised.

* The first number of the journal of "Les Amis de la Constitution" appeared on the 30th of November. It was founded by the jacobin club, which gave the editorship of it to Laclos, secretary to the Duke of Orleans, in virtue of a resolution, signed Duport, Chabroud, presidents, and Feydel, secretary. That letter was written in December. On the 4th of this month, M. Delessart succeeded M. Lambert in the direction of the finances; on the 24th, M. de Saint Priest was charged, ad interim, with the home department.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

Paris, January 25th, 1791.

My dear General,—Give me leave to introduce and recommend to you M. Kellermann, the son of an able and patriot general officer in the French service. It is not under the embroidered regimentals that we find the greater proportion of friends of the revolution, for which reason I am the better disposed to oblige such as have sided with us.

Whilst I was engaged in quelling a riotous fight in one of the suburbs, the national assembly voted a bill to prohibit foreign oil, except that imported by the Americans; but, to my great concern, the aristocratic party, supporting the mercantile interest on our side of the house, have altered the article, so that the duty has been increased to twelve livres. In vain has it been moved to put off the debate until I could be present. Our opponents have carried it; but I hope we may get the diplomatic committee to interfere.

Adieu, my dear general.

TO M. DE BOUILLÉ.

Paris, Feb. 7th, 1791.*

It is a long time, my dear cousin, since I wrote to you; and I have not had it in my power since my conversation with your son, to give you any news of interest. Paris has been divided into factions, and the kingdom distracted by anarchy. The

* We see, in chap. x., of M. de Bouillé's Memoirs, that he attributed this letter to a clue which General Lafayette was in possession of, to a scheme of counter-revolution concerted be-

violent aristocrats dream of counter-revolution; the priests contribute towards it by fanaticism. The moderate aristocrats have not the courage to commit fooleries, but they utter many; the impartial monarchists, and the various shades of the right side, are merely endeavouring to play a part for which they are neither morally nor physically capable, and would be, if they could be anything, aristocrats. On the left you have a great number of honest people, who are waiting; a club of 1789, which wastes itself in philosophical speculations; a club of jacobins, of which the main part intends well, but the directory of which is everywhere causing disorder; and all this multiplying itself by means of associates of the capital and provinces, who unfortunately look more to number than discrimination, and are led by passions and selfish interests. As to ministers, they are in the revolution; once apart from this, they have no other rule than that of yielding to the popular party, whose denunciations they fear. The courtiers are, as they have ever been, very silly, very vile, and very aristocratic. The queen is resigned to the revolution, hoping opinion will change a little, but dreading war; and the king is solely anxious for happiness and tranquillity, beginning with his own. I forgot to speak of myself; I am violently attacked by all the party leaders, who consider me an obstacle which it is

tween the king and Mirabeau. The intention of the latter was to procure a dissolution of the assembly; the king and the royal family were to go either to Compeigne or Fontainebleau, where M. de Bouillé was to meet them with his best troops. Mirabeau considered Lafayette as one of those who would be most opposed to this project, which was subsequently abandoned, June 21st, for that of Montmedy.—(See 4th note, vol. ii., p. 350.)

impossible to corrupt or intimidate, and the first clause of every evil project is to overthrow me; add to that a double hatred, justly incurred, of the aristocrats and the Orleans party, which has more resources than it seems to have; add, again, the anger of the Lameths, with whom I was intimately connected; of Mirabeau, who says I despise him; add to that, the money and libels scattered about, as well as the dissatisfaction I give to those whom I prevent from pillaging Paris, and you will have the sum of what is doing against me. But with the exception of a small number of violent people, who are misled, all respectable persons, from the least wealthy part of the people up to whoever is not a mad aristocrat, are in my favour. I am on good terms with the national guards, excepting a few jacobins of no consideration; for the jacobins, honest men, are for me, in spite of my persisting in not going to their club. For the last two months I have had fewer relations than ever with the court; because they were to no purpose, and I only do what can be useful to my country. But I fear that advantage has been taken of my absence to intrigue; I know, in fact, that attempts have been made to plunge them into great follies, and that they checked themselves only at the very edge of the abyss. The queen is so ill-beset, the little intellects of the Tuileries are so voracious of hopes, and calculate on obstacles so badly, that it is to be feared lest an instrument so precious as public order should be neglected, and the king be converted into a tool of personal ambition. Such is the general position, and such are my ideas.

A few friends, more particulary Emery, are labouring with me in a course of action which

consolidates the revolution, established on good foundations, secures the constitution, and revives public order.

The men of greatest talent in the assembly, Mirabeau himself, could not help supporting such an association, and this is precisely what he is most fitted for. The tribunals are established; the juries and the police of the kingdom are decreed; by these means our voice may now be heard with strength, propriety, and utility.

You have accepted the coalition that both my feelings and patriotism have offered you. You said, the other day, to one of my friends, "If Lafayette and I were to understand each other, we should establish the constitution." I annex too much value to your friendship and opinion not to communicate to you all my ideas, and request you to give me yours, and I shall write to you in a few days with greater detail.

My most earnest wish is to end the revolution speedily and well, to secure the constitution on a solid basis, to employ for this purpose all the national confidence and private resources which I possess, and then to be nothing myself in France, either in the civil or military career, except an active citizen; and, in case of war, your aide-de-camp, without grade or command.

P.S.—There are many persons who secretly conceive vast projects, but this is the fruit of paltry ambition; I will give you my opinion of those projects as I become acquainted with them. As to men of probity like ourselves, it becomes us to go forward in a direct path towards a known and useful design; all mysteries and intrigues can only be useful to rogues, as the chimeras of men of heated imaginations can only prove useful to their opponents.

February 28th, 1791.*

THE day has been a busy one, but its object has not been fully accomplished, for I have not seen you. It was fortunate that I arrived in time at Vincennes, for they would not else have arrested any one. A portion of the troops was so ill-mounted, that I was obliged to say I should employ the most severe measures against any person who abandoned his station; but the majority of the national guards conducted themselves perfectly well. The mayor of Vincennes wished that no person should be arrested; I threatened to denounce him, and he at length yielded. We have taken sixty men; the faubourg rose to rescue them. We took most vigorous measures on our return; they did not dare to wait the result. Desmottes was three times fired at, and Depeyre once, but neither of them was wounded.

Imagine my anger when I learnt, on my return, that four or five hundred armed aristocrats were in the apartments; they were disarmed and driven away; there were none scarcely remaining on my arrival. I gave a lecture to M. de Villequier which he will long remember. You will hear that I have been severe with those gentlemen; but you know that I have good cause to distrust that aristocratical swarm. Conceive their having poniards, that could only serve for assassinations. It appears to me, that the passages of the royal apartments would be less secure if such weapons were admitted. Do not fear, however, any danger on my account; no evil will happen to me. I passed again to day through that faubourg, *tête-a-tête* with Desmottes, on my way to Vincennes, and no person dared to say a word to me. Good night; I am overcome with sleep, and am going to bed.

* Day of the poniards and of the tumult of Vincennes.

FROM THE KING.*

March 5th, 1791.

MONSIEUR DE LAFAYETTE,—I have read in the "Journal de Paris" an article which gave me the greatest surprise.† As it is equally contrary to truth and propriety, I am convinced that you have had nothing to do with its insertion in the paper, and I doubt not but that you will disavow it in the same journal.

TO THE KING.‡

SIRE,—What only excited in your Majesty surprise, awakened in me great indignation, because I fancied I discovered in it deep-reflected malice. I have written to M. Suard to know from whom he derives that paragraph, and as the first officers of the king's household have honoured me with a printed cor-

* Iron Cabinet, No. 341.

† Relating to the events that occurred, February 28th, in the king's apartments, the "Journal de Paris," of the 4th March, inserted the following paragraph:—"The king has confided the command of his household to M. de Lafayette. This commander-in-chief of the national guard has given the most precise orders to the two chiefs of the king's domestics, that order and decency may be maintained by them and their subalterns in the interior of the palace of the Tuileries."

‡ Iron Cabinet, No. 342. This answer relates to the little affair of the 28th February. The first officers of the king's household were silly enough to imagine that Lafayette intended to insinuate himself in their functions; a paragraph in the paper, which probably originated in their own terror, or in some of their petty intrigues, served them as a pretext to alarm the king. Lafayette, vexed by this foolish trick, replied to them with some degree of severity, but laughed very much with his friends at a supposition, worthy of those men, who, in the midst of the confusion of the 6th of October, had granted him, in the king's name, *the entrance of the cabinet.*—(Note of General Lafayette.)

respondence on this occasion, they will find with my disavowal of the article, an answer likewise to their letter.

I am, with respect, Sire, &c.

FOR THE JOURNAL DE PARIS.*

March 7th, 1791.

An article of the "Journal de Paris," copied in several other papers, has invested me with I know not what superintendence of the king's household, which is completely foreign to the functions of the national guard. Whatever may have been the motive of the first author of this fable, I must, while denying it, take notice of a letter signed by persons who are in reality charged with that superintendence.

It is in the name of the marshals of France, general officers, military men of all degrees, officers of the king's household, and different deputies of the confederates, that MM. de Villequier and de Duras pretend to speak. But might I not, myself, ask the marshals of France, and all those citizens designated in that letter who respect the constitution and cherish public order, what they themselves thought when they saw that numerous band of armed men place themselves between the king and those who are responsible to the nation for his security?

* This letter from General Lafayette, inserted in the "Journal de Paris," is, at the same time, a reply to an appeal made by MM. de Villequier and de Duras, on account of the events of the 28th February. It was preceded, in the same paper, by this recantation:—"We publish the following article precisely as it was addressed to us: 'An article has been inserted in the paper of the 4th of this month, relative to a pretended regulation of his Majesty, conferring the command of his household on M. de Lafayette. This fable, equally ridiculous and improper in every respect, has not the slightest foundation.'"

It is sufficient for me, to avoid any invidious interpretation, to declare that I meant, by *soldiers of liberty*, those, to whatever portion of the public force they may belong, who have taken an oath to the nation, the law, and the king,—who are recognised by the constitution, and who would live and die in that cause; that I meant by *several men very justly suspicious*, those who, bearing secret weapons, are only remarked by their incendiary and anti-patriotic speeches, and who, far from making themselves known to the posts of the national guard, with whom they intended, it was said, to unite, avoiding those posts, introduced themselves by an entrance which has been lately formed. Under such circumstances it was, most assuredly, allowable in the commander-in-chief of the national guard, charged with orders from the king to secure the safety of his palace, to take efficacious measures to prevent the repetition of such an event. If in the course of that day the result of my conduct may have proved useful, I am willing to abandon some of its details to the criticism of my enemies.

TO M. DE BOUILLÉ.

Paris, March 7th, 1791.*

I CONGRATULATE you, my dear cousin, on the marriage of Madame de Contades, and I hope you do not doubt of the interest I take in this event. We have been exposed to commotions on all sides for some time, and the 28th of February was a most unpleasant day; but the various events which oc-

* "During the first days of the month of March, I received the following letter from Lafayette; it was the last he ever addressed to me."—(Chap. x. des Memoires de M. de Bouillé.)

curred at Vincennes and Paris have extinguished, for the present at least, every wish to injure us. The correspondence of Emery must have apprised you of what has passed, and I shall only speak of the nomination of M. de Gelb in the departments of the Rhine. I know that this selection of the king's must have been more agreeable to you than any other could have been, and that the talents, virtues, and patriotism of M. de Gelb will render him useful in this commission. It would be very kind in you, my dear cousin, to persuade him to appoint, as one of his aides-de-camp, Desmottes, who is entitled to be selected by the decrees, and who, from his courage, talents, connexion with the national guard, and affection for you and for myself, I ardently wish to see placed in a situation in which he could be useful, and bring forward his talents. I should be delighted to owe such an obligation to M. de Gelb; but I have not the right of addressing him, and you, who are well acquainted with him, might render me this service. Farewell, my dear cousin.

I remain, yours most affectionately, &c.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

Paris, March 7th, 1791.

My dear General,—Whatever expectations I had conceived of a speedy termination to our revolutionary troubles, I still am tossed about in the ocean of factions and commotions of every kind; for it is my fate to be attacked, with equal animosity, on one side, by the aristocratic, slavish, and parliamentary, in a word, by all who are enemies to my free and levelling doctrine; and, on the other side, by the

Orleanist factions, anti-royal, licentious, and pillaging parties of every kind; so that my personal escape from amidst so many hostile bands is rather dubious, although our great and good revolution is, thank Heaven, not only insured in France, but on the point of visiting other parts of the world, provided the restoration of public order be soon obtained in this country, where, unfortunately, the people have been better taught how to overthrow despotism than they can understand how to submit to the law. To you, my beloved general, the patriarch and generalissimo of universal liberty, I shall render exact accounts of the conduct of your assistant in the service of this great cause.

You will hear that the national assembly have permitted the cultivation of tobacco throughout the kingdom, as it was already established on the frontier provinces, to which they have been induced on three accounts:—1st, Because they thought prohibition inconsistent with the principles of the bill of rights; 2ndly, because the removal of the excise barriers to the extremities of the empire made it necessary to have one general rate; 3rdly, because the departments of Alsace and Flanders, being greatly contaminated by a foreign and aristocratic influence, there was no doubt of the impending attack of the rebel princes Condé and Artois taking place, had we cut them off from that branch of cultivation all of a sudden.§

But what is greatly exceptionable is, a duty fixed on the introduction of American tobacco, with a premium in favour of the French vessels, and a duty, much too high, although it was lately lessened, on American whale-oil; but I beg you, and all citizens of the United States, not to be discouraged by those hasty and ill-combined measures, which I hope,

before long, to see rectified, in consequence of a report of the diplomatic committee, including the whole at once, and for which my friends and myself have kept our arguments. I will send you the report, the debate, and the resolution which will follow. Should we obtain an easy introduction of American tobacco, no cultivation of any importance can take place in France, and it will be the better for both countries.

M. de Ternant has been named plenipotentiary minister to the United States. I have warmly wished for it, because I know his abilities, his love of liberty, his early, steady, and active attachment to the United States, his veneration and love for you. The more I know Ternant, the more I find him a man of great talents ; a steady, virtuous, and faithful friend. He has obtained the confidence of the national assembly, of the patriotic side, I mean. The king has a true regard for him ; in a word, I hope he will, in every respect, answer your purposes, and serve America as zealously in the diplomatic career as he did when in the army.

Adieu, my beloved general. My best respects wait on Mrs. Washington. Remember me most affectionately to Hamilton, Jefferson, Knox, Jay, and all friends. Madame de Lafayette and children unite their tender respects to mine, for you and the family. Most respectfully and tenderly I am, my dear general, your filial friend.

FROM GENERAL WASHINGTON TO GENERAL LAFAYETTE.

(ORIGINAL.)

Philadelphia, March 19th, 1791.

In renewing to you, my dear Marquis, assurances of the most perfect esteem and affection, I beg of you to attribute the last interruption of our correspondence to causes which, I am persuaded, you will readily admit as excusable.

To the fulfilment of public duties, too interesting to be neglected, and too multiplied to allow me much leisure, I am forced to sacrifice the wishes of friendship and the pleasures of private life. This reason, to you, who suffer the same privations, will apologize for the abridgment of an intercourse ever grateful to my feelings and conducive to my happiness.

The tender concern which you expressed on my late illness awakened emotions which words cannot explain, and to which your own sensibility can best do justice. My health is now quite restored; and I flatter myself with the hope of a long exemption from sickness. On Monday next, I shall enter on your friendly prescription of exercise; intending, at that time, to begin a journey to the southward, after which I propose visiting all the United States.

Our country, my dear sir, (for it is truly yours,) is fast progressing in its political importance and social happiness.

The last session of congress has been occupied in additional arrangements of finances to establish the public credit, and to provide for the expenditures of government. A small increase of our

military establishment has also been judged necessary, to put a stop to, if possible, and to chastise, if required, the irregularities of some northern Indian tribes. Your friend, General St. Clair, is employed there as major-general.

The laws of the United States, adapted to the public exigencies, are framed with wisdom and moderation, and acquiesced in with cheerfulness. The administration of them is the more easy, as the affectionate attachment of the citizens dispenses with all unnecessary restraint; indeed, every circumstance is auspicious to the felicity of your fellow-citizens in this section of the globe.

That they are not less so in that country, I devoutly hope, which is more immediately the object of your patriotic attention. The distance which separates us, joined to the delicacy of the subject, has always suspended my opinion on your national affairs.

I am well aware that it is impossible to judge, with precision, of measures, the motives of which are sometimes unknown, and the necessity of them not always understood; but there is one circumstance on which I find it difficult to suppress an anxious wish, which is, that the present national assembly may not protract its existence too long. The confirmation of their decrees will be best made by a second representation of the people, and that representation, to act efficiently as a legislative body, may require to be re-organized. My affection for the French nation, my sincere wish that their government may be consolidated, and the people happy, must excuse me when I touch on this subject. This is the only occasion, I believe, on which I have ventured to offer you my opinion on the subject of the revolution.

Like you, my dear sir, I sigh for retirement; like

me, I am afraid that you must continue to make the sacrifice.

I have obeyed your request in communicating your remembrance to our friends.

Mrs. Washington unites with me in compliments to Madame de Lafayette; and I entreat you to be assured of the inviolable respect and esteem with which I am, &c.

P. S.—Your old aide-de-camp, George Augustus Washington, has got another son, to whom he has given your name.

Friday, ——.

I AM grieved to say you will receive no letter to day; but when a person is appointed attorney in chief of all the religions on the earth, and is occupied with making the fervour of his whole family agree with the *ifs* and *buts* of administrative bodies and the ecclesiastical committee, he may return home later than he expected. I have passed the two last days in debates and arrangements which relate to the full and immediate exercise of religious liberty. We shall spend the evening in the directory, because the law would protract for six weeks the execution of their decision,* if we did not endeavour to settle the difficulties; and, as the abbé Sièyes has only taken into consideration principles, the municipal corps obstacles, and the ecclesiastical committee dangers, I plead that no delay may be

* Decision of February 11th, 1791, of the directory of the department of Paris, concerning religious edifices, approved on the report of the ecclesiastical committee in the sitting of May 7th. The object was not to prevent the priests refusing to take the oath from performing mass.

allowed. It is a singular fact, that the democratic, and even moderate bigots are satisfied, that the curate of Saint Sulpice is so, and that the real aristocrats are displeased because we separate religion from their opposition. The ecclesiastical committee spoke to me to-day of the precautions that should be taken against refractory persons; I replied, that the national guard was an excellent instrument that would play every tune they chose, provided they did not attempt changing its key, which was the *declaration of rights*. You are mistaken in believing that nuns are forced to attend at constitutional masses; read the ninth article. There is no important news; some disorders have taken place in the regiments, but you may feel certain they were occasioned by the incorrigible aristocracy of the officers, whose speeches, conduct, and projects, were suspicious to the soldiers. It is almost impossible to bring into proper discipline the man we punish as much for his patriotism as insubordination. The king does all he can to make himself unpopular, but he has the right of practising the worship that may best suit him, and we will defend that right. The Lameth and Barnave party endeavour to draw closer to us, or, in consequence of our refusal, to strengthen themselves against us, either through the court or through the Pétion and Buzot party. But you know my ideas on this subject; I will even write them down that Maubourg may read them to them.

April 18th, 1791.

I AM so completely overcome by fatigue that I must refer you to —— for a relation of the famous day we have passed;* I well knew to what we should be driven by the folly of the court. Factious persons have taken advantage of it, and I believe affairs are in a very bad situation. I wished to give in my resignation to-day. They request me to wait and see what steps will be taken to-morrow by the assembly, where we advise the king to appear. My day has been painful and rather dangerous. I end it, at least, in an agreeable manner, by speaking to you of my tender affection.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

Paris, May 3rd, 1791.

MY DEAR GENERAL,—I wish it was in my power to give you an assurance that our troubles are at an end, and our constitution totally established. But, although dark clouds are still before us, we begin to foresee the moment when a legislative corps will succeed this convention; and, unless foreign powers interfere, I hope that within four months your friend will have reassumed the life of a private and quiet citizen.

The rage of parties, even among the patriots, is gone as far as it is possible, short of bloodshed; but, although hatreds are far from subsiding, mat-

* Tumult to oppose the king's going to Saint Cloud. (See page 63 of this volume.)

ters do not appear so ill disposed as they formerly were towards a collision among the supporters of the popular cause. As to myself I am always exposed to the envy and attacks of all parties, because they find in me an insuperable obstacle; and there appears a kind of phenomenon in my situation; all parties against me, and yet a national popularity, which, in spite of every effort, is still unshaken. I had an instance of this lately: I was disobeyed by the guard, unsupported by the administrative powers who had sent me, and unnoticed by the national assembly, who had taken fright. The king I do not mention, as he could do but little in the affair, and the little he did was against me. I was thus abandoned to all the madness of licence, faction, and popular rage; I stood alone in defence of the law, and turned the tide up into the constitutional channel.* I hope this lesson will serve my country, and help towards establishing the principles of good order; but I could only bring my fellow-citizens to a sense of subordination, in making them fear to lose the chief whom they honour with their affection. Inclosed is the speech I delivered on the occasion; I send it solely on account of the great effect it had on the minds of the people and of a national army of five and forty thousand men, of whom upwards of thirty are volunteers, and who are exposed to all the suggestions of a dozen parties and the corruptions of all kinds of pleasures.

The committee of revision is going to distinguish, in the immense labours of the assembly, every article that deserves to be constitutional. I hope

* General Lafayette here speaks of his resignation, which followed the riot of the 18th of April against the journey of the king to Saint Cloud.

that, after having recovered our national rights, and destroyed so many abuses, we may present to France some very good institutions, and form a government which will ensure to the people the principal consequences and advantages of a free constitution, leaving the remainder to legislative corps to mend into well digested bills, and waiting until experience has fitted us for a more enlightened and less agitated national convention In the meanwhile, our principles of liberty and equality are spreading throughout all Europe, and popular revolutions preparing everywhere.

Should foreign powers employ this summer with attacks against our constitution, there will be great bloodshed, but our liberty cannot fail us. We have done everything for the general class of the country people, and even if the cities were frightened into submission, yet the peasants would swarm around us and fight until their last moments rather than give up their rights.

Adieu, my beloved general. Most respectfully and affectionately I am, my dear general, your filial friend.

May, 1791.

I CANNOT describe to you how much your letter grieved me; a revolution I have wished for so ardently, that my own efforts in part produced, that I am supporting with all the means in my power, renders all those I love unhappy. I shall be devoted to that revolution until my latest breath; but all the charms it possessed for me have been destroyed by the effect it produces on the persons most dear to my heart.

Wednesday Evening.

You know, first, that M. de Clermont Tonnerre had yesterday a little quarrel with the people; some *brigands* took part in it;* they were all dispersed by the national guard, who arrested one or two men. Every one is satisfied with our promptness in guaranteeing personal inviolability. Secondly, the conversation of Emery and Alexandre† will take place to-morrow; but I recommended proofs being required at the tribune which should not leave the slightest opportunity of playing a double game. Thirdly, the legislative body and re-election will be discussed to-morrow and the day after by the national assembly. It is on this occasion that ambition and private interest will act their most prominent parts. As to myself, I wish that the report of the decree‡ should accompany the re-election, because a minister who does not co-operate with the revolution could not remain with those who have been its chiefs. The re-election for ordinary legislatures appears to me indispensable; it would also be an opportunity of destroying the absurd decree

* M. de Clermont Tonnerre, at the close of a debate, in which he declared himself against the union of Avignon and the Comtat to France, was attacked, on the 3rd of May, in a sort of tumult. The "Journal de Paris" of the 4th contains his thanks to the national guard, who, on that occasion, he said, had saved his house and person. This letter is of the 4th of May.

† M. Alexandre de Lameth.

‡ The decree of the 7th of April, which only allowed the members of the assembly to enter the ministry four years after the end of the session. The decree against their re-election at the approaching legislature is of the 16th of May in the same year.

that requires a mark of money to represent the nation; so that Rousseau could not have been a member of the assembly. I send you an indifferent translation of Payne as a sort of preservative, and to stand in my place with you. We still flatter ourselves that we shall have ended by the 14th of July.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

Paris, June 6th, 1791.

My dear General,—I most heartily thank you for your letter, dated March the 19th, the more welcome to me as I had long lamented your silence, and was panting for news from you, my dear general, wherein I could be informed of everything respecting your public and private concerns. I rejoice and glory in the happy situation of American affairs. I bless the restoration of your health, and wish I could congratulate you on your side of the Atlantic. But we are not in that state of tranquillity which may admit of my absence. The refugees hover about the frontiers, intriguing with most of the despotic cabinets, our regular army divided into Tory officers and undisciplined soldiers, licentiousness among the people not easily repressed, the capital, that gives the law to the empire, tossed about by anti-revolutionary or factious parties, the assembly fatigued by hard labour and very unmanageable. The question of the oath required of priests adds to the difficulties of our situation. But notwithstanding all this, we shall go on. We are introducing, as far as we can, religious liberty. The assembly has put an end to her existence by

a new convocation, has unfitted her own members for re-election in the next legislature, and has excluded them from all places in the executive. She is now reducing the constitution to a few principal articles, leaving to the legislative assemblies to examine and mend the others, and preparing everything for a convention as soon as our machine will have had a fair trial. I stand the continual check to all factions and plots. You will see that my resignation has had the effect of re-animating a little the power of thé laws; and were I equally supported in repressing it as I would be against aristocratic exertions, the people would soon be brought to a proper idea of the word liberty. As to the surrounding governments, they hate our revolution, but they dare not interfere with us, so afraid they are to *catch the plague.* We are going to take measures to discipline the army, both officers and soldiers: they will prepare to encamp and leave the cities; their generals will have the same power as in time of war. M. de Condé and his party will be summoned to explain themselves, and if they continue caballing and enlisting, will be declared traitors. I refer you to M. de Ternant for more particulars.

Mr. Jefferson and myself had long thought that Ternant was a very proper man to act as ambassador for America. He, in a great measure, belongs to both countries. He is sensible, honest, well-informed, and has a plain and decisive way of doing business, which will be very convenient. He has long been an officer under your command, feeling and acting as an American. He is personally much attached to you, and I had in this revolution many instances of experiencing his friendship. He might have been a minister in the council,

but was rather backward on the occasion, and behaved like a prudent, not an ambitious man. I think that he is the proper person to answer your purpose.

He will let you know what has passed in the assembly respecting American affairs. The last transactions are an undoubted proof of their sentiments, and shew that the error committed in the regulation of duties is to be attributed to a want of knowledge, not of friendship. They have considered me as an American who only thought of advantages to the United States, without understanding matters so well as some mercantile men, most of them on the aristocratic side of the house, who presented erroneous calculations, and you know the difficulty to unmake a decree; but you may depend on this point, that brotherly measures to unite the two nations with the ties of most intimate affection, of common principle, and common interest, will be most heartily received in France; and on that ground you may work your plan, and send a private copy for me. The United States and France must be one people, and so begin the confederation of all nations who will assert their own rights.

I have, in the affair of the black free men, voted according to my conscience, not to policy. If England seek to take advantage of the present situation, I hope you will influence the colonies to submit to a decree so conformable to justice. Mr. Short, who does the business of the United States with all the zeal and ingenuity of a patriotic and sensible man, is respected and loved in France in a manner equally useful to the public and honourable to himself. He has written to Mr. Jefferson respecting New Orleans. France will do everything in her power to bring Spain to reason, but it will be a difficult

and probably unsuccessful task. After all, we must have that navigation, and in case the people of Louisiana wish to make a fifteenth state, who can help it, and who ought not, the Spaniards excepted, to rejoice at it. Certainly, I should not be a mourner.

My best respects to Mrs. Washington. My compliments to the family—to my dear aide-de-camp, George. Most respectfully and affectionately, my beloved general, your filial friend.

FROM GENERAL WASHINGTON TO GENERAL LAFAYETTE.

(ORIGINAL.)

Philadelphia, July 28, 1791.

I HAVE, my dear Marquis, to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of the 7th of March and 3rd of May, and to thank you for the communications which they contain. I assure you I have often contemplated, with great anxiety, the danger to which you are personally exposed by your peculiar and delicate situation in the tumult of the times, and your letters are far from quieting that friendly concern; but to one who engages in hazardous enterprises for the good of his country, and who is guided by pure and upright views, (as I am sure is the case with you,) life is but a secondary consideration.

To a philanthropic mind the happiness of twenty-four millions of people cannot be indifferent—and by an American, whose country, in the hour of distress, received such liberal aid from the French, the disordered uncertainty of that nation is to be peculiarly lamented. We must, however, place con-

fidence in that Providence who rules great events, who, by his will, can produce order out of confusion, notwithstanding the dark clouds which threaten us at present.

The tumultuous populace of large cities is ever to be dreaded. Its discriminate violence prostrates, for a time, all public authority, and its consequences are sometimes extensive and terrible. In Paris we may suppose these tumults are peculiarly disastrous at this time, when the public mind is in a ferment, and when (as is always the case on such occasions) there are not wanting wicked and designing men, whose element is confusion, and who will not hesitate in destroying the public tranquillity to gain a private point. But until your constitution is fixed, your government organized, and your representative body unrooted, much tranquillity cannot be expected; for until these things be done, those who are unfriendly to the revolution will not quit the hope of bringing matters back to their former state.

The decrees of the national assembly respecting our tobacco and oil, do not appear to be very pleasing to the people of the country, but I do not presume that any hasty measure will be adopted in consequence thereof, for we have never entertained a doubt of the friendly disposition of the French nation towards us, and are therefore persuaded, that if they have done anything which seems to bear hard upon us, at a time when the assembly must have been occupied in very important matters, and which, perhaps, could not allow time for a due consideration of the subject, they will, in a moment of calm deliberation, alter it to what is right.

I readily conceive, my dear sir, the critical situation in which you stand, and never will you have

greater occasion to shew your prudence, judgment, and courage.

I have just returned from a tour through the southern states, which had employed me more than three months. In the course of this journey, I was highly gratified in observing the flourishing state of the country and the good dispositions of the people. Industry and economy have become very general in those parts which were formerly noted for the opposite qualities; and the labours of man are assisted by the blessings of Providence. The attachment of all classes of citizens for the general government seems to be a pleasing presage of their own importance and of their future happiness.

The complete establishment of our public credit is a strong mark of the confidence of the people in the virtue of their representatives and in the wisdom of their measures; and while in Europe wars or civil commotions seem to agitate almost every nation, peace and tranquillity reign among us, except in some part of the northern frontiers, where the Indians have been punished, and where proper measures are now being pursued. This contrast between the situation of the people of the United States and those of Europe is too striking to be unnoticed by the most superficial observer, and may, I believe, be considered as one great cause of leading the Americans to reflect more attentively on their own prosperous state, and consequently of approving more fully of the government under which they live.

But we do not wish to be the only people who taste the sweets of a good government founded on equality. We look with an anxious eye for the time when happiness and tranquillity shall prevail in

your country, and when all Europe shall be freed from commotions, tumults, and alarms.

Your friends in this country often express great attachment to you by their anxiety for your safety.

Knox, Jay, Hamilton, and Jefferson, remember you with affection, but none with more sincerity and true attachment than, my dear sir, your, &c.

.....

THE sitting has been a good one. After depriving priests of the acts of public functionaries, and raising the condition of the electors, the committees occupied themselves with the form of presentation to the king,* which will take place on Wednesday. The remainder of the week will suffice to organize the national guard, and the following will be, I hope, the period of the acceptation of the king and of my resignation. Adieu.

FROM GENERAL WASHINGTON TO GENERAL LAFAYETTE.

(ORIGINAL.)

Philadelphia, September 10th, 1791.

THE lively interest I take in your welfare, my dear sir, keeps my mind in constant anxiety for your personal safety, amidst the scenes in which you are perpetually engaged. Your letter of the 6th of

* It was in the meeting of the 27th of August, 1791, that the national assembly, occupied with revising their decrees, passed a bill on the state of the citizens and the conditions of legibility. The constitution was only presented to the king on Saturday, September 3rd.

June, by M. de Ternant, gave me great pleasure,—which I receive from all your letters which tell me that you are well; but the account that you there give, it did not appear that you would be soon delivered from your arduous labours; and from the information which we now receive, of an important event which has taken place since that time,* it does not appear likely that the clouds which have long obscured your political horizon, will be soon dispersed. As yet, we are in suspense as to what may have been the consequences of the event, and feeling, as we do, in this country, a sincere regard for the French nation, we are not a little anxious about them.

I am glad of Monsieur de Ternant's appointment to the country, for I have a good opinion of his ability, distinction, and proper views; as you observe, he seems to belong to both countries, and there is no doubt but this, joined to the good information which he possesses of the relative and particular interest of both, will enable him to render as much service, and be as acceptable to each, as any man can be. I shall, next week, set off for Mount Vernon, with Mrs. Washington and the children, where I shall enjoy a few weeks of retirement before the meeting of congress towards the latter end of October. Indeed, my presence there (as it will not at that time interfere with my public duties) is necessary for my interest. George, your old aide-de-camp, has for some time past been too much indisposed to pay attention to any concerns, and is now over the mountains for his health: the last accounts from him were favourable; he had received benefit from his journey.

* The departure and arrest of the king at Varennes.

I sincerely wish, my dear sir, that the affairs of your country were in such a train as would permit you to relax a little from the excessive fatigues to which you have of late been exposed; and I cannot help looking forward, with an anxious wish and a lively hope, to the time when peace and tranquillity will reign in France, under the sanction of a respectable government, founded on the basis of liberality and the rights of man. It must be so; the great Ruler of events will not permit the happiness of so many millions to be destroyed, and to his keeping I resign you, my dear sir, with all the friendship and affectionate attachment with which you know me to be your, &c.

Philadelphia, September 21st, 1791.

I CANNOT conclude this letter without congratulating you most sincerely on the king's acceptance of the constitution presented to him by the national assembly, and upon the happy consequences to your country which will result from it, as well as to mankind in general. The prayers and wishes of the friends of the human race attend the exertions of your nation, and when your affairs are completely settled, under an energetic and equal government, the hearts of all will be satisfied, and no one will rejoice in your felicity, and for the noble and disinterested part you have acted, more than your sincere friend, &c.

Chavaniac, October 20th, 1791.

I HAVE arrived in this retreat. I received, at Brioude, your two letters, for which I heartily thank you. My journey has been a long one, but I have been obliged to stop everywhere, and to traverse on foot towns and burghs, and to receive civic crowns enough to fill my carriage. I cannot travel so speedily as formerly. I quitted Clermont at night; the town was illuminated. We were accompanied by the national guard, and men bearing torches, which really produced a beautiful effect. Issoire, which place you are acquainted with, is extremely patriotic; you will suppose that I was honourably received there, as well as at Lempde; Brioude made fêtes of every description for me. You know how well I love my aunt, and may conceive how happy I was to see her; she is in good health, and would only believe in my return to Chavaniac when she saw me established in the house. All would go on well here if it was not for episcopal and aristocratical manœuvres to render the people dissatisfied with the revolution, under pretence that it will send them to hell; for the constitutional priests possess here the least power, and they constitute the oppressed class. On the other side, all those who love the constitution mingle religious ideas with those of liberty. All the curates have been renewed by priests who have taken the oath; and I can discover in the non-conforming priests, most of them very good people, traces of the poison sent to them from Paris. Two of them are deputed to lodge in a house belonging to me, which I preserve as a chapel, with this device: *peace and liberty*. The ancient curate of Chavaniac lives with me. The peasants, disencumbered of their restraints, paying but half what they used to pay, scarcely

dare rejoice in their freedom, from the fear of being damned. As to me, I enjoy, with the rapture of a lover of liberty and equality, this complete change, which has placed all citizens on the same footing, and which respects only legal authorities. I cannot express with what feelings of delight I bow down before a village mayor. A person must be somewhat of an enthusiast to enjoy all this as I do. I do not ask you to enjoy it with me, but at least enjoy it for me. They who believe that I came hither to achieve a revolution, are great fools. I now attach as much pleasure, and perhaps self-love, to complete repose, as I have done for fifteen years to action, which, ever directed towards the same point, and being crowned by success, leaves me no part to act but that of a husbandman.

P.S.—As you are superstitious, I must tell you that I arrived here the day of the anniversary of the capture of the army of Cornwallis.

TO M. DIETRICH.*

Chavaniac, Nov. 12th, 1791.

I KNOW not whether they will risk making crusades against the national cockade, or content themselves with the attempts of the emigrants;† but I do know that nothing, save the duty of defending that cockade, could tear me from the private life I am

* M. Dietrich, the same who brought forward, as mayor of Strasburg, in 1792, an address to the municipal council, to demand the punishment of the authors of the events of the 20th of June and 10th of August. He was summoned before the revolutionary tribunal, and died on the scaffold, in 1793.

† The legislative assembly had passed, on the 8th and 9th of November, several decrees against the emigrants, who were assembled together at Coblentz.

leading here, and which possesses additional charms for me from my having been so lately struggling in a rapid whirlpool. You will have as a neighbour, at Metz, my intimate friend Maubourg. He is to me a brother in arms, in affection, and in the cause of the revolution; he is an excellent officer, whose patriotic principles nothing can shake, and whose probity is proverbial with all those who know him. I advise you to correspond with him, and if affairs become serious, I should congratulate the country that possessed an advanced guard commanded by such a chief.

ON

THE ROYAL DEMOCRACY

OF 1789,

AND THE REPUBLICANISM OF THE REAL CONSTITUTIONALISTS.*

THE constitution of 1791 lasted so short a time, the part that concerned royalty was so speedily overthrown by popular movements, that the constitutionalists might, with apparent reason, be accused, as they have been in reality, of having deceived the people by an appearance of royalty, while giving them, against their own desire, a republic, and of having purposely left royalty itself without support, that, in a very short period, the slightest breath might demolish it. Let us examine what truth may be contained in such an assertion.

* After coming out of Olmütz, General Lafayette occupied himself, both in Holstein and Holland, with collecting, in conjunction with several of his political friends, materials for the publication of an account of the principal events of the French revolution, some explanations of the part they had acted, and a declaration of their principles. This project was not completely put in execution; but it gave rise to many notes, in which the following relation was comprised. It was addressed by General Lafayette, in 1799, to one of his principal coadjutors in this enterprize, who will become known to us from having furnished other documents.

It may be asserted, that any free constitution, including an improved imitation of that of England, such as was desired by the partisans of that system, would have encountered the same causes of destruction: a dissatisfied and treacherous court; emigrant princes; a nobility, more enraged from the chamber of peers itself only appearing an additional evil; a magistracy deprived of improper powers, which it still pleaded for with factious vehemence; a clergy deprived, to say the least, of nearly the whole of its possessions; a prince, adding the intrigues of a branch wishing to usurp the throne to that of the reigning branch, whose preservation, during a radical revolution, was perhaps even impossible. Every free constitution would have had against it the jacobins, the foreign *brigands*, the coalition of kings, who paid for internal tumults, excited divisions, and intrigued against the defenders of public order; the court would have encouraged, in the same manner, the counter-revolution, from the inertia of whatever power it had been invested with; and had it made use of that power, it would have excited against itself, in the same manner, the clamours of the anarchists and disguised counter-revolutionists; so that we may rationally suppose that a less democratic constitution would have been equally overthrown, and that all the bulwarks accumulated by the English constitution around the throne, would not have preserved Louis XVI. better than they had preserved Charles I.

Until the period of the French revolution, the impossibility of a free constitution in a great empire was considered a political axiom: the insular situation of the English was incessantly quoted as their sole preservative against the efforts of governments jealous of the advantages attached to liberty, and

at the same time terrified by its example. The idea of establishing in France an English constitution, and especially a constitution even more democratic than that of England, would have been looked upon as an impracticable dream by every person in Europe bearing any character for wisdom or experience. They who have adopted such prejudices cannot be astonished that the royal portion of the French democracy of 1789 should have been so easily overthrown, especially if they acknowledge that he, in whose favour the constitutional throne had been preserved, was in a state of perpetual conspiracy against the new system, which his family and court were continually endeavouring to destroy.

If it be asserted that the first constitution of France was republican, we acknowledge the justice of the remark; for when, in a given whole, ninety-nine parts are of one nature, and one part alone of a heterogenous nature, the denomination should undoubtedly belong to the former substance. Nor can I blame Burke, Mounier, John Adams, in a word, the most enlightened writers of the day, for having, when writing against the constitutionalist party, applied to it the name of *republican*, and having termed the state of France, from 1789, *a republic*.

If it be said that the constitutional royalty of 1791 did not possess sufficient force to maintain itself, the remark may not be completely false, although, in truth, circumstances, and the ill will evinced by the court, gave neither time nor means to put the experiment fairly to the test. If it be added, that the constitutionalists, by infusing a republican spirit into their social organization, by rendering all their institutions democratic, by combating, in all their decrees, that royal power which they wished, however, to preserve, provided it should

be very inferior to the most moderate ideas of the English prerogative, clogged completely the wheels of the monarchical government, and necessarily brought on the completion of the republican constitution, I might dispute these political assertions. But we are not now discussing the greater or less degree of prudence of the combinations of the constituent assembly; but I wish to shew what were their intentions, and to pass sentence of condemnation upon the errors of their conduct.

I will go still farther, and acknowledge, that in the constituent assembly there might be some men who, feeling no preference themselves for hereditary monarchy, foresaw, perhaps with some degree of pleasure, a time not far distant when that hereditary monarchy might cease to become necessary. Mr. Jefferson, vice-president of the United States, repeated several times that Lafayette had been mistaken in his calculation, when he believed that royalty would still last twenty-five or thirty years. Brissot published that he heard Lafayette assert, *it was not yet time to complete the republic.*

I might myself quote other testimonies of this opinion, which might possibly have been shared by some members of the assembly. But why should any person doubt their sincere support of the almost unanimous wish of the nation for the preservation of any royalty whatsoever, of their constant efforts to maintain the monarchical order which had emanated from the national sovereignty, when their devotion to that sovereignty, their fidelity to constitutional law, have ever been the basis of their political conduct?

The truth is, that not only the vast majority of the constituent assembly, but those members most

suspected of republicanism, far from plunging themselves into the deep combinations imputed to them by the royalists, endeavoured, with the greatest sincerity, to combine the preservation of an hereditary monarchy with the democratic, and all republican ideas which animated the greatest portion of the left side of the assembly, and diffused itself throughout the nation. It is true, that some of those republicans, from taste, had been the principal introducers of the new ideas; it is true, that the constituent assembly, while decidedly declaring for a king, without examining deeply the contrast offered by that decision and their other resolutions, were still less averse to destroy royalty than to renounce democracy, with which they had imbued, in some degree, all the other institutions; and it would have been easier, in 1790, to induce the assembly to vote, for example, for the eligibility of the first magistrate, than for an English constitution. It is possible that these two opposing principles, by forming what might with truth be termed a *royal democracy*, were ill suited to produce a perfect constitution; that, on one side, the aristocratical party endeavoured, by their perfidious tactics, to obtain the adoption of motions destructive to the system; and that, on the other side, the jacobins endeavoured to render the constitutional decrees more and more democratic, to gain popularity themselves, and enervate the executive power. But notwithstanding these circumstances, the assembly, in general, sincerely wished to preserve that hereditary magistracy; and even those members who foresaw its end, did all that their democratic ideas permitted them to do to support that constitutional royalty to which many of them had made such great sacrifices. All persons will be more convinced of this truth, if, select-

ing from the rest one man, peculiarly known by his republican habits, General Lafayette, his conduct in this respect be examined.

Lafayette's heart was formed republican by nature. At nineteen he espoused, with transport, the cause of the dawning republics in America; and even at that early period he had already given some bold proofs of his contempt for a court. On his first arrival in the United States, he thus expressed himself in a letter to France:—"I always thought that a king was, to say the least, a useless being; but, seen from home, he makes a still more sorry appearance." Associated from his youth to the formation, defence, and interest of the thirteen republics, it was natural that all republican ideas should be deeply rooted, both in his head and heart; that soil was, in truth, so well disposed to foster them, that, amongst the various shades of American customs, he always yielded preference to those that assumed the most popular character, and was ever himself considered as one of the most perfect democrats of the United States. To the feelings and habits of the first years of his public life may be attributed the perhaps exaggerated repugnance he expressed for the English constitution; and he always manifested the same opinion on his return to his own country. When questioned, on his first arrival from America, in 1779, by the council of ministers assembled at Maurepas' house, respecting the relative prosperity of each English colony before the revolution,—"It was," he replied, "in an inverse degree of the influence of royal power." When consulted by the queen, in 1782, relative to a present which it was intended to make to General Washington, in a manner which Lafayette deemed improper, he thus replied to an observation of hers

that the same form had been used towards the King of Sweden, and I forget what other monarch:— "They, madam, are only kings; Washington is the general of a free nation." In the military reviews of Louis XVI., Lafayette was seen wearing the American uniform, of which the shoulder-belt, according to a custom at that time very general, was decorated with an emblem that was left to the choice of each officer. The monarch having asked him for an explanation of the one he wore, discovered that that emblem was a tree of liberty planted on a broken crown and sceptre. As soon as he had taken a house of his own, in 1783, he placed in it the declaration of independence, leaving a vacant place by its side, "awaiting," he openly avowed, "the declaration of the rights of France." The opinions of Lafayette, which he alone professed at court, were so well known to be republican, that that epithet was exclusively applied to him on every occasion. One evening, at the king's supper, that monarch's brother, the pretender of the present day,* said publicly to him, "I hope, M. de Lafayette, that, republican as you are, you do not approve of the murder of Charles I.?" The reply of Lafayette, while disapproving of an iniquitous judgment, was conceived in strange terms for such a place. In a word, the democracy of Lafayette, remarkable even in the United States, his republicanism, universally acknowledged in France, leave no doubt as to the opinions he manifested during the American revolution; and it may be remembered that his last speech at the congress, in 1784, expressed the wish that the same con-

* Since, Louis XVIII.

stitutional principles might be established in Europe.*

I acknowledge, also, that from that period until 1789 the opinions of Lafayette breathed the same spirit. This was known in foreign countries; for when, at the close of the American war and of the year 1782, the Count d'Estaing debated, in the name of France, with the King of Spain, Charles III., a combined project between the allied powers, which, in case of the taking of Jamaica, placed Lafayette there for some time as commander-in-chief, —"No, no," replied the aged king, with warmth, "I will not consent to his remaining there; he would make it into a republic." And when, in 1785, Lafayette went to visit the courts and armies of Germany, he there openly professed his principles.

One day, after he had supported, in opposition to Frederic the Great, his opinion that neither a monarchy nor nobility would ever exist in America, and expressed with warmth his own ardent wishes on the subject,—"Sir," said, a moment after, that penetrating monarch, "I knew a young man who, after having visited countries where liberty and equality reigned, conceived the idea of establishing the same system in his own country—Do you know what happened to him?" "No, Sire." The king replied, with a smile, "He was hanged." Lafayette was much amused by this fable, and little foresaw at the time, that that great man's successor, who was then present, would be, some years afterwards, so near realizing the prediction.

When, in 1793, Bolman was charged to present

* See in p. 99 of the 2nd volume.

to M. de Lucchesini, the former favourite of Frederic the Great, and at that time the most influential minister of Frederic William, a memorial, drawn up by Lally-Tollendal, in favour of Lafayette, who was then prisoner of the Prussians, M. de Lucchesini replied: " M. de Lafayette has too much fanaticism for liberty: he does not conceal it; all his letters prove it. If he were out of prison he could not remain quiet. I saw him when he was here, and I shall always recollect one of his expressions, which surprised me very much at the time. ' Do you believe,' said he, ' that I went to America to obtain military reputation?—it was for liberty I went there. He who loves liberty can only remain quiet after having established it in his own country.' "*

When the society of Cincinnatus was instituted in America, Lafayette, even while fulfilling, in this respect, in Europe, all he owed to his brethren-in-arms, and receiving, with the most joyful ardour, this new pledge of affection and fraternity, expressed, in his replies to the society and to those members with whom he was most intimate, that such a mark of friendship becoming hereditary, might, contrary to their intentions, prove injurious to republican equality; and he learnt, with extreme pleasure, that the American officers had renounced that clause of the association. When, after the acceptation of the constitution of 1787, Washington was elected president of the United States, Lafayette wrote to him, " that that nomination afforded him more pleasure, because his paternal friend could, with greater disinterestedness and moderation than any other person, put to the test what degree of executive power

* Extract of a letter from Dr. Bolman, dated Berlin, November 23rd, 1793.

was necessary for the maintenance of liberty in a republic." Finally, in 1787 and 1788, Lafayette was engaged, with Paulus and other Dutch patriots, in forming democratic projects for the republic of Holland; but, while acknowledging the truth of all these indications of republicanism that I have repeated, with perfect frankness,—while confessing that all these recollections may have given rise to suspicions in the minds of zealous royalists,—I can, with equal truth, declare, that Lafayette supported, at all times, with frankness and with his whole heart, the constitutional monarchy.

It is, in the first place, evident that Lafayette did not foresee that hereditary royalty could at that period be destroyed. Bergasse, at the time of the elections for the states-general, having sent him a work, in which he demanded the English constitution, (a proposal which then appeared a very bold one,) Lafayette, as far as I can recollect, replied to him in these terms:—"That he could not approve of his idea of a chamber of peers; that hereditary power was hurtful wherever it was not necessary, and that it ought only to be preserved in the royal magistracy." And although Lafayette and Bailly are the only deputies of the national assembly who, being obliged to remain in Paris, did not participate in the constitutional decree of hereditary royalty, yet they never even conceived it possible that such a decree should not pass unanimously, which had been consecrated beforehand by the unanimous wishes and instructions of all France.

The discovery of an Orleanist faction attached Lafayette still more strongly to the maintenance of the reigning branch. The personal dangers to which that family were exposed naturally excited his feelings in their cause. "Those people," said

he to M. d'Estaing, on returning on horseback with him from Versailles, on the 6th of October, alluding to the crimes committed by factious persons,— "those people will make me a royalist." On the 8th of October, he said to the Duke of Orleans, "I have contributed more than any other person to throw down the steps of the throne; the nation has placed the king on the last of those steps; I will defend him there against yourself, and before you take his place you must pass over my body, which will be no easy matter to achieve."

And let it not be supposed that, from the first moment, the adoption of the national wish in this respect was an effort on his side. A passionate love of liberty filled the heart of Lafayette; to establish it everywhere, and especially in his own country, was his first and strongest wish; but, respecting France, he conceived that wish had been accomplished. After having exposed, in his declaration of rights, what appeared both indispensable and sufficient for liberty, he looked upon the various forms of government, provided each of those rights were there secured, but as secondary combinations; he felt in no haste to introduce into the executive power his ideas, or, as some may call them, his American prejudices; he would have reproached himself had he delayed, in the slightest degree, promoting public tranquillity; he even thought, whatever might be his private habits or tastes, that, inexperienced as they then were, and still are, upon representative governments, the best possible organization should be attempted, under that form of hereditary magistracy which the nation had desired; and he himself sincerely considered that system as the one best suited to promote the *general utility*, which he had declared ought to be the only cause

of distinctions between men. It was thus seen that if, in the debate on the *veto*, (at the time he was taking efficacious measures to prevent the Parisian agitators from interrupting the freedom of the deliberations at Versailles,) he shewed himself personally opposed to the *absolute veto*, he supported warmly the happy idea of a *suspensory veto*, which guaranteed to the king the certainty of only being obliged to yield his opinion at the end of six years, and then not merely to the will of one legislative body, but to the will of the whole nation, substantiated by the succession of three legislatures; and in the conferences which took place in September, 1789, in the American ambassador, Mr. Jefferson's house, between several members of the popular party, on the formation of the legislative body, if Lafayette refused decidedly to support the creation of a chamber of peers, or of a senate named by the king, he shewed no repugnance to unite parties by a compromise which would establish a *council of ancients*, of any species whatever, provided they were elected by the people, and not hereditary. I repeat these circumstances, to prove with what sincerity, even before the 6th of October, Lafayette consented to lend his support to the government in all that was not contrary to those great principles of liberty he deemed so indispensable; and if the *suspensive veto*, an *elective senate*, &c., should not be considered insufficient for the maintenance of monarchy, the political conduct of the constitutionalists may be blamed, but not their intentions, which were undoubtedly to give the king all the powers they conceived compatible with democratic liberty, the first object of their wishes and combinations, although influenced sometimes, perhaps, by exaggerated fears.

However this might be, Lafayette did not always

coincide in opinion with that party; and, as circumstances placed more fully in his hands the person and family of the king, he felt less disposed to take advantage of that power. Some authors have asserted, without believing it themselves, that, in 1791, he became more of a royalist: it was at that period, on the contrary, that he felt most dissatisfied with the court of Louis XVI., from the impossibility he had experienced, for two years, of obtaining a line of conduct useful to the country and to themselves. It might be said, with much greater reason, that, on the 14th of July, any prolonged resistance from the king and aristocracy would have induced the constitutional chiefs to abolish royalty; and that the king would have probably found less support in Lafayette, had it not been for the events of the 6th of October.

If the opinions Lafayette expressed in the tribune be examined, it will be seen that they ever tended to give energy to the executive power, and secure to it the means of action; and that, from the 6th of October, 1789, until the 21st of June, 1791, while supporting constitutional ideas, he did not pronounce one word which could, in the slightest degree, contribute to lessen that authority. During that long period, his friends and he were looked upon as the supporters of executive power against jacobin anarchy.

I challenge any person to quote one single instance, during that same period, at the assembly, at the Hotel de Ville, before the national guard, or popular assemblages, in his public speeches to the king, in the letters or addresses he wrote for Paris, the departments, and municipalities, in his replies to the national guards and patriotic societies; I challenge, I say, any person to quote one single in-

stance in which Lafayette, according to the example of so many other revolutionary chiefs, failed in respect with regard to the royal magistracy. Whenever the king was alluded to, he evinced the most sincere desire to inspire confidence in him, and render him respected and beloved. "It is necessary," said he to the assembly, in February, 1790, "that public power should acquire force and energy."* "This great revolution," he said, at the tribune of the constituent assembly, May 12th, 1790,† "will be marked by two principal traits—the energy of the people, and the probity of the king." And, in July of the same year, at the constituent assembly, at the head of the national guards of France, he said, "You were acquainted with the wants of France, and the wishes of Frenchmen, when you destroyed the Gothic edifice of our government and laws, and you only respected the monarchical principle when attentive Europe learnt that a good king might be the support of a free people, as he had been the consolation of an oppressed people."‡ In April, 1791, he made himself responsible for the monarch, replying to the people, that he would be answerable with his own head that the king would remain faithful to his civic oath. In a word, the whole public conduct of Lafayette, both in its general aspect and detail, breathes evidently the same sincerity in maintaining the constitutional monarchy, and in defending, and causing all men to respect, the person of the king.

Let us examine his conduct in private committees. Several of his deputy friends must re-

* Speech on the troubles of the provinces, p. 368 of 2nd vol.
† On the disorders at Marseilles, p. 384 of 2nd vol.
‡ Speech of July 13th, 1790, p. 4 of 3rd vol.

member having often heard him say—"From the republican feelings which you know I possess, you cannot suspect me of any partiality for royalty; but since we have established it, we must neither render it contemptible, nor weaken the executive power, without which the constitution cannot continue." Lafayette eagerly voted for the exorbitant civil list; and this I do not repeat as being in his favour; for that exuberance of national generosity, which was approved at the time by all parties, was one of the faults of the constituent assembly; but inference may be drawn from thence how far Lafayette and all his friends were removed from any wish of undermining the legal power of royalty.

Let the private relations which the place Lafayette held in the revolution rendered it necessary he should entertain with Louis XVI., be afterwards examined; in that intercourse there will not be found the perfidious counsels which the girondists boasted they had given the monarch to induce him to betray those who trusted to him, or the still more perfidious counsels of the aristocrats, who, as they themselves acknowledged, voluntarily exposed the king to danger to regain what they called royalty, that is to say, despotism, taking advantage of the timid conscience of that unfortunate prince to convert into remorse the patriotic feelings he occasionally experienced; the counsels given by Lafayette were well-intentioned and sincere, and were calculated both to render the king popular and serve the public cause. Let the letter from Lafayette to the king, written in 1789,* and found in the iron cabinet, be perused with attention; let the anecdotes diffused through these fragments, and many other

* See in the second vol., p. 430.

writings, be collected together; let the challenge I made, that not one instance could be found in which Lafayette may be even suspected of having wished to deceive the court by his counsels, be also recollected; and all persons must acknowledge that his conduct with the court was at all times perfectly sincere. Had Lafayette been ill-disposed towards the king, would he have urged his taking the measures, and pursuing the daily line of conduct, best calculated to render him popular? And if he did not himself believe in the long existence of hereditary monarchy, he at least did and advised all that he conceived, in the spirit of the constitution, would most conduce to prevent the downfal of Louis XVI. It may be seen in these pages, and several other works, and will be still more clearly proved by ensuing details, that Lafayette urged those measures being taken that were most likely to maintain and increase the personal importance of the king, and that it was the royalists of his own court, and the aristocrats of the assembly, who opposed the adoption of them.

And still more, however vexed Lafayette was at the obstacles, treacheries, and folly, of which he had endless causes of complaint,—whatever advantage he might have derived from these circumstances to render himself popular and justify himself from some false reports,—he never allowed himself to utter one word that could injure the king and his family. The patriots were in general ill received at the palace, and although the king and queen feared to treat Bailly and Lafayette with disrespect, the persons about the court, the ladies especially, testified towards them every mark of dislike they dared venture to betray; and this produced, as may be supposed, the worst effect on those persons

who were attached to the revolution. To the prudence of several presidents of the assembly, who were very indecorously received in the royal apartments, when bearing decrees to receive the sanction, the king is indebted for having been spared complaints which would have done him much harm. Several officers of the national guards have frequently, by their prudence, prevented scenes from taking place which would have proved very injurious to the king.

Of this systematic impertinence, which had been persevered in for some time at court, I will but give one example: at the commencement of the states-general, three deputies of the commons, dressed in the uniform they then wore, presenting themselves at the *oeil-de-bœuf* at a moment when all persons were admitted, were informed by the porter that they could not enter; they inquired earnestly why an exception should be made for deputies, when the door was open to all others; the noise of this altercation reached a general officer of the body-guard, a prudent and an intelligent man, who pointed out to the porter the absurdity of this proceeding. "I know it," replied he, sorrowfully, "but I have received particular orders." The general officer hastened to the minister, Montmorin, to acquaint him with what was passing; the latter repaired to the king, and it was discovered that the Marshal de Duras, first gentleman of the chamber, had given express orders to that effect for the deputies of the *tiers*, hoping, doubtless, that their indignation would occasion a scene which would enable them to render the king displeased with the commons. In this manner was this prince served by those who called themselves his friends.

Lafayette, whose complaisance was sometimes

carried to excess, never yielded those points which appeared to him essential. Thus, when the queen, at the confederation in 1790, wished to share, in her own name, at the sitting, the honours of the ceremony, and at the review, the military honours, which were only due to the first magistrate, she was much dissatisfied with the cold but decided refusals of Lafayette: he was not less desirous, on all occasions, of saving them from doing wrong, or preventing others from perceiving they had done so; and, to give one example of this, when he discovered (after having made vain efforts to persuade them to receive at court ladies who, under the ancient régime, could not have been presented,) that, in their excursions in Paris,* they had resolved only to admit into their carriage those chiefs of division who would have driven out with them in former times, he accompanied them himself, that their obstinacy in this respect might not injure them completely in public opinion; and I should even term such an act of complaisance, weakness, if the determination of the jacobins to take advantage of every opportunity of confusion had not rendered it, after weighing all circumstances, an act of prudence.

* The first of those excursions was to visit the looking-glass manufactory in the faubourg Saint Antoine, and the courtiers, pretending to believe that great perils were preparing for the king, assumed the appearance as if he were going to be secretly attacked. In another of those excursions, the king and his family went to see the manufactory of the Gobelins. Two singular accidents occurred there: when walking along the range of tapestries, then stretched on their looms, the king, the minister Saint Priest, and Lafayette, who entered by another door, met before the picture representing the death of Coligny, all three looked at each other; Lafayette smiled, and it was evident the same idea had occurred to the spectators. A moment after, the king, seeing a fine-looking workman, inquired whether he had served, and in what regiment? "Sire," replied he, "in your regiment

It may perhaps be thought that Lafayette, during the slight relations he held with the jacobins, shewed himself indifferent to the interests of the king; but such was not the case. He took pains, on the contrary, not to leave them the most distant hope in this respect. There would have been duplicity in his denying his republican feelings to those men to whom he had so repeatedly professed them even before the revolution; but there was not one of those individuals to whom he did not declare that the nation was not yet prepared for doing without some kind of royalty; that the destruction of the present dynasty would only bring forward another king, a civil war, or a dreadful state of anarchy; that, whatever might be his own republican feelings, he thought that, at the present moment, a constitutional royalty ought to be established, made trial of, and frankly supported; that he was resolved to do all he could to sustain it, not only from duty, but also from principles founded on the conviction that it was the only means of avoiding greater inconveniences. On the very rare occasions when he held any intercourse with the first directors of that club, then sincerely royalist, although they

of guards; but I quitted it some time before the taking of the Bastile, and the general refuses to give me the medal; it is very unlucky, for if I had been there, I should have done as the others did." The poor man firmly believed the king was become a patriot, and must approve of the insurrection of the 14th of July. That gold medal had been given by the town of Paris to each French guard, and Lafayette, who wore it also, as well as his whole staff, had had engraven on one side, some broken chains, with the date of July 14th, 1789; and on the other, a sword passed through a civic crown, with this verse of Lucan, which he was always fond of quoting:—

"Ignorantne datos ne quisquam serviat enses?"

(Note of General Lafayette.)

injured constitutional royalty by the disorganization they produced before they had obtained the confidence of the court, he always scrupulously stipulated for the interests of the king. Those jacobin chiefs having learnt, beforehand, the steps Louis XVI. was to take at the assembly, the 4th of February, 1790, (a step much desired by the generality of patriots,) and considering it as calculated to render its author popular, repaired to Lafayette to point out to him this consequence of the measure; but their representations did not prevent his urging the constitutional adherence, and regretting the hesitations of the court and ministers, their indiscreet consultations, which afforded time and means to counteract it, and the obstinacy of MM. Necker and de Montmorin in choosing Louis XVI. to pronounce, not a simple speech, that might have been attributed to himself, but an eloquent discourse, evidently fabricated by the first minister, which added to the insignificance that the private character of the king impressed on all his official acts. That same evening, while the royal speech was being engraved on steel, and that the Hotel de Ville was illuminating, the patriots of the assembly conceived it was their duty to appear at the *coucher* of the king; but the feeble Louis XVI., blamed, doubtless, by the aristocrats,* only took notice of these latter,

* Amongst the serious subjects of complaint of the aristocratical party, relative to the measure of the 4th of February, which appeared more favourable to the revolution from having been unpremeditated, and on the occasion of the civic oath taken on that day by the whole assembly, they reproached Lafayette with the evidently intentional act of bringing in and conducting out the king on the left side of the assembly, which became, afterwards, an adopted custom.—(Note of General Lafayette.)

and dared not hold any intercourse with the popular deputies. In another conference, which took place more than a year afterwards, with the same chiefs, Ramond, the friend of Lafayette, aided him in his efforts to convince the king of the good intentions of those gentlemen. They were, as I have before said, royalist in opinion, and not disinclined to renew their connexion with the court; during those first years of the revolution, however, they contributed largely, by jacobin manœuvres, to weaken all power.

Finally, it was with the king and queen themselves, in the confidence of intimacy, if that expression can be applied to the relation existing between them, that Lafayette gave most decisive proofs of his sincerity. "If it be necessary to choose," said he to Louis XVI., "between liberty and royalty, between the people and the king, you know that I shall be against you; but while you remain faithful to your civic duties, I shall sincerely support constitutional royalty." And he again said, "You know that I am naturally a republican, but my principles themselves at present tend to make me a royalist; I would not bind myself, from honour, to defend the authority that has been delegated to you, if I was not already obliged to do so from principle." Another time he said to the queen, "You ought to place, Madam, more confidence in me, from my not having any superstition concerning royalty; if I believed that the destruction of royalty were useful to my country, I should not hesitate, for what is called the right of one family to the throne does not in my opinion exist; but I am convinced that, under present circumstances, the abolition of constitutional royalty would be a public calamity. More dependence may be placed on a friend of liberty,

acting from duty, patriotism, and conviction, than on an aristocrat guided by prejudice alone."

I quote these expressions, which have been attested in letters and well-known conversations, to prove the frank loyalty of Lafayette's conduct towards the court.

But, according to the royalists, constitutional royalty was but a republican magistracy; and Lafayette was additionally hated, because, while preserving all outward forms of politeness and respect, he opposed an irresistible obstacle to that royalty raising itself above the level established by the constitution. He has been reproached, amongst other offences of the kind, with having been alarmed by the royalist tendency that the great federation of 1790 seemed inclined to adopt. He had, in truth, reason to believe that the court had gained over some confederates of talent, and amongst others, Delaunay, who was, I believe, the same person who acted a part in the convention.* He testified, I grant, some displeasure at the dinners he had the daily habit of giving to the confederates, when some voices proposed toasting Louis XVI. before the assembly, and because the national representation, to whom they were indebted for the establishment of public order, received less acclamation than the king. The queen was already much vexed at the assembly's not having placed her on a throne beside the king, in the midst of the representatives of the nation. A little scene appears to have been pre-

* There were two brothers of that name at the convention. The eldest voted in the legislative assembly, at the sitting of July 20th, 1792, for the accusation of General Lafayette. The youngest, sent as commissioner in La Vendée, was accused of conspiring against the revolutionary government, and died on the scaffold, in 1793.

pared, in which she was to be gently forced to quit her box and take the place she was so desirous of occupying. She betrayed much displeasure against Lafayette, who, seeing, from a distance, a crowd of confederate national guards collecting around the military school, in which the assembly and king were stationed, galloped up to them, and sent them to their posts around the altar of the country. The project of making the king take his oath on that altar, instead of taking it from his own place in the midst of the assembly—a project that the jacobins favoured, as they did many others, without being aware of its real aim—sprung also, I believe, from some aristocratical combinations.

From the unlimited confidence that Lafayette inspired in the fourteen thousand confederates, elected by all the national guards of France, it is probable that he possessed at that time sufficient influence to have increased the power of royalty at the expense of that of the assembly; from thence is it that the royalists resented so deeply his conduct, and although he endeavoured to enforce the greatest respect being paid to the king, and every point being yielded to him which was not incompatible with the spirit of the constitution, yet they conceived he was far from doing for him all he could have done.* The

* I recollect a little anecdote that occurred upon this subject. When Lafayette, at the head of the confederated national guards, had complimented the king, the guards earnestly requested him to present them to the queen; the general replied, that he would most willingly accompany them to pay her a visit, but not to make an official harangue, which was only due to the assembly and king. Lafayette, after having presented his brothers in arms, stood back himself, and remained in the crowd. Several of the guards having kissed the hand of the young royal prince, the queen carried him round the circle, that all might perform the same ceremony, but suddenly seeing Lafayette, she stopped, and contented herself with merely bowing to the rest.—(Note of General Lafayette.)

whole conduct of Lafayette during the revolution, by their account, but offers a continuance of the same wrongs. I do not here seek, in this acceptation of their word, to represent him as a royalist, for his own feelings were republican, and, in the eyes of true royalists, the principles of constitutional monarchy were destructive of all royalty; nor do I examine, I repeat, to what degree the policy of the constitutionalists was judicious, nor if several of them were right in believing that their work would last for a generation, but it is certain that they believed that the monarchy they had created was the only one compatible with their system of liberty and equality, and they wished that magistracy should be limited to a certain boundary, or cease altogether to exist. I prefer wearying my readers by long and insignificant details, to leaving the slightest doubt as to the sincerity of the constitutionalists in their exertions from the commencement of the revolution until the 21st of June, 1791, for the maintenance of royalty, as they conceived the term, and of the frankness of their public and private conduct with the king and his family.

ON THE LETTER TO M. D'HENNINGS.

After having amassed materials and recollections for the four years, or thereabouts, which preceded the opening of the states-general, I shall now, in pursuance of the same design, occupy myself with the constituent assembly during the whole period of its existence. Should I, as is not unlikely, die without having written any memoirs, my son will find in these documents, though relating exclusively to myself, some useful information. I will, by way of preliminary discourse, begin this part with a letter to M. d'Hennings, judge of Ploën, a man of very distinguished literary talents and character, who had requested me to give him various elucidations respecting the revolution.*

* After his release from the prisons of Olmütz, (Sept., 1797,) General Lafayette, having retired some little time to Holstein, near Ploën, formed an intimacy with M. d'Hennings, baillie of that little city, and editor of a magazine, entitled, "The Genius of the Times." The following letter, addressed to M. d'Hennings, was published during the lifetime of the author, and with his consent, and was placed by him, as may be seen by the preamble, at the head of the "Collection of his Speeches;" but it appeared to us, that, in the publication entrusted to our care, embracing, as it does, the political existence of General Lafayette for fifty-seven years, (from 1777 to 1834,) this letter would be better appreciated after shewing the various documents which precede it. General Lafayette often regretted the loss of parts of the materials for the illustration of the four years he alludes to, prior to the meeting of the states-general.

This species of introduction will suggest to me the subjects on which I may desire to enlarge, whether in the shape of remarks or reminiscences, or, especially, in the collection of contemporary documents. The appendix will be much more voluminous than the text. This form of irregular fragments, although not in proper form for a work, will suffice for the mere purpose of collection, which is my present object.

LETTER TO M. D'HENNINGS.

Wittmold, Jan. 15th, 1799.

GREAT as may be my reliance, sir, upon your understanding, and in spite of the pressing requests of several of my friends, I persist in declining to swell the crowd of memoirs, refutations, and notices, that have already appeared. The doctrine I profess has been succinctly defined in my speeches and writings, confirmed at all times by my conduct, and sufficiently brought into relief by the hatred and excesses, both revolutionary and counter-revolutionary of all the oppressors of mankind; my reputation is identified with a great event, in which I could not but have those against me who wished to arrest it, and those who wished to divert it from its object. To demonstrate the purity of my intentions, it would be enough to give the names of my detractors, and their contradictions, not only with each other, but with themselves. To determine if my ideas were sound, requires neither metaphysical dogmas, nor party discussions, but time, which, preserving the memory of the past, unveiling the secrets of the present, will develop the results of the future. Declaimers of this day, who have discovered religious massacres and ecclesiastical aristocracy in the gospel of Jesus Christ, pretend to attribute whatever is most liberticide in its effects to the

gospel of liberty; though, on the other hand, the profaners of this sacred name are much better pleased that the revolution should appear tainted at its source, than to acknowledge that it was poisoned by themselves. I believe it to be useless to add anything to the declaration of my principles, or to proclaim the apology of my own actions; but I have neither need nor desire for mystery, and my reply to your questions will be placed in your hands as a testimony of my deference and attachment to you.

An irresistible passion, which would induce me to believe in innate ideas, and the self-conviction of the prophets, has been decisive of my life; whatever there is of enthusiasm in religion, of ardent impulse in love, of certainty in geometry, has entered into the affection I have invariably borne to liberty. Scarcely had I left college, where nothing was disagreeable to me but the restraint,—when I beheld with contempt the grandeur and pettiness of the court, with pity the trivialities and insignificance of society, with disgust the elaborate pedantry of the army, with indignation oppressions of every kind,—the attraction of the American revolution suddenly transported me to my place; I knew not what tranquillity was, until, floating between the continent whose powers I had defied, and that when my arrival and our success were problematical, I could repose, at nineteen years of age, on the alternative of conquering or dying for the cause to which I was devoted.

It was for a principle affecting the right of taxation that thirteen colonies, already advanced in knowledge and liberty, took up arms; it was on the principles of natural and social right that they based their independence and institutions. Initiated into

military and political relations, through a confidence and with a popularity which were universal, I experienced everything that was personally agreeable.

Military qualifications, like all others, have for me no other value than as they contribute to the great object; *datos ne quisquam serviat enses*,—but I felt I was adapted to this profession. I was encouraged in it by the affection of the troops, by the paternal kindness of the commander-in-chief, and by a continued good fortune, which, in the campaign of 1781, produced essential results. The French court, impelled into this war by a public feeling, to which my departure had contributed, could not avow its new allies without at the same time recognising their rights. The need which it was supposed they had of me, my republican opposition to all the ideas of the day, my youth, and the fashion of the moment, rendered my existence a singular one in my trips from Europe, in which everything, whether business or pleasure, contributed to the service of the United States. I was in America in the midst of those social experiments in which a starting point had been taken from the public law of England, divested of its hereditary privileges; each step in advance was under the influence of principles; liberal ideas were everywhere, and ideas of nobility so remote, that this people cannot yet comprehend that our constitutional equality, against which the aristocrats arrayed themselves with so much clamour, differed in nothing from their own. It was there that my instinct of liberty, seizing whatever appeared to characterize and satisfy it, developed itself with precision in a doctrine that I have since presented under the title of "A Declaration of Rights," the realization of which has constituted my incessant occupation.

The American revolution had decided the inde-

pendence of the continental colonies, and precipitated a change of policy towards such as were insular; it was high time for the continent of Europe to begin to think of its so-named public law; that fortuitous medley of barbarous institutions and Gothic privileges; of legal and monastic subtleties, covered with a modern varnish of immorality, which fabricated, out of the degradation of the human race, a state of nature, and out of royalty, nobility, and the clergy, the three elements of social order. If to have preferred civil and religious liberty, co-extensive with all men and countries, be an offence, there was no one, sir, more culpable than myself.

You remember the petition signed by eighty thousand Irish volunteers; I should have joined them, if, while the French government withheld me, the English government had not in some measure appeased them. The Batavian patriots had given me proofs of their confidence; our ministry was on the point of consenting to my entering their service; but the robber-like conduct of the court of Berlin, the Machiavelism of that of St. James's, and the cowardice of that of France, did not leave me the time. This diplomatic corruption had grown to such a pitch, that, on one occasion, while engaged with Jefferson and some Italian ministers in forming a coalition against the Algerines, I received an intimation from our government, that the great powers found it to their interest to tolerate the piracies of the Barbary states. I also urged an expedition to Egypt, of which, as usual, an opinion will be formed according the event, and from which, among other good results, I hoped, through the cultivation of the cane, to derive a new means of abolishing the slave trade, and gradually emancipating the blacks. But while these scattered ideas, and several others, were overruled by superior obstacles, it was at the very

key-stone of the arch, at the centre of the empire of opinions, language, and fashion, that the electric spark exploded. The French people, at that time, undoubtedly, had need of some virtue, but the corrupting leaven was in its regime; of more knowledge, but it was neither permitted nor possible to enlighten it; of more deliberation, but our adversaries precipitated their own ruin, and left us to choose between a subjection from which there was no escape, and an instantaneous and complete regeneration.

It had been preceded from afar by the delirium of a regency drowned in debauchery, and by the infamy of the gangrened reign of Louis XV., which ended by being draggled in the mud; it had been prepared by a philosophic amelioration in literature; the decisions of Montesquieu, the shafts of Voltaire, the thoughts of Rousseau, the declamations of Raynal, and so many other productions odious to the court, proscribed by the clergy, burnt before the parliament by the executioner, constituted the delight of every one who had received but little instruction. The Voltairian school, in spite of its aristocratic tendency, had emancipated men's minds; the pure economist school, though too positive, had formed them; the theological school, in the quarrel between Jansenism and Molinism, had preached up resistance; and the American school taught the political lesson of the rights of man. In spite of this, the unfortunate Louis XVI., with simple tastes and upright intentions, suffered abuses to double themselves; for as he knew neither how to preserve good ministers nor reject bad ones, the merits of the one served only to bring into relief the faults of the others.

Turgot had maintained, in opposition to the parliament, that the people of France were not naturally

taxable and subject to the *corvée*. Necker had enlightened the administration of finance, and declared that a thousand crowns lavished on a courtier represented the taxation of a village. But whosoever took note of the obstacles which they and all other financiers, whether honest or not, encountered in doing the slightest good, must acknowledge, that, with such a composition of princes, courtiers, magistrates, farming of the revenue, privileged persons, nobles, ecclesiastics, officers, &c., with the numerous guarantees which hedged in every vice of state, it was difficult to correct anything without demolishing the whole. The court, in assuming an air of familiarity, without exhibiting itself in a more popular light, had merely superadded the inconveniences of private life to those of royalty. It is true that, during the latter times, while the people were still suffering, the higher classes were enjoying at once the repose of slavery, and the dawn of liberty; but it was merely a transition to something which everybody anticipated, and no one dared to define. Often have I smiled at the stupid objection, that a revolution would find no leaders; it was accomplished, and still the old language was held; yet all parties had contributed to it—nobility, clergy, parliament, with this difference, that they worked for themselves, and we for the nation.

For my part, sir, convinced that the human race was created to be free, and that I was born to labour in its cause, I neither can nor desire to deny the share which the duties of my destiny assigned to me in this great event; wherever I was able, in my own country more especially, I from calculation abetted every enterprise, against whatsoever illegitimate power it was requisite to destroy; and I avouch to you, that, in 1787 and 1788, the resistance of the privileged classes, of those even who

were the ringleaders of the aristocracy, was as visibly stamped with the marks of faction as any other insurrection I have since seen.

True it is that, in the first session of the notables, the idea I had of compelling the king to sign a capitulation was attended with no success, and that my formal demand for a national assembly was not supported; but with how much fury, and how many intrigues, did these very notables, especially the bishops, resist the propositions of the king, conveyed through M. de Calonne, as in the following year, and in the same spirit, they resisted the doubling of the third estate. True, that if, during the parliamentary disputes, some men desired, with La Rochefoucauld, a patriotic revolution, the greater part aimed solely at acquiring personal importance, and places, or at warding off the financial operations that would have crippled them; and when the parliament, urged by the force of things to speak of the states-general, was taken to the very letter by the government, both the one and the other, though the object of either was but to give itself an air of alarm, became, in spite of themselves, mutually engaged; yet this did not at all prevent a coalition of the judicial tribunals against the courts, its orders being despised, its soldiers excited to revolt, seditions fomented in various cities and in the capital, the most distinguished agents of which, in 1789, had learnt their lesson in the riots of the palace.* True, that the nobles of Brittany, conspicuous for their energy, were equally so for their attachment to ancient ideas and forms; but, in stirring up the provinces against the *cour plénière*, the bailiwicks against the edicts of the king and the commissioners, against his officers and troops,

* The Palais de Justice, where the courts of law were held.

did they not set the example of what was called rebellion? The opposition of Dauphiny, approximating much nearer to sound principles, had, like the rest, its disobedience, riots, and excesses; and the obstacles the event met with in various provincial assemblies were not due to the democrats alone. In fact, until the decisive question of the doublings of the third estate, of which M. Necker, in his last work, exonerates the king's council, and which, indeed, we were resolved to carry at any cost, the combination against the royal authority had confounded parties, which succeeded in disentangling themselves only with the aid of time.

But in the midst of these agitations, which were maturing men and things, patriotism advanced onwards to its object. Good citizens were they, who, subordinating every other passion to that for the public good, harmonizing all pretensions by the destruction of all privileges, and beginning with their own, prostrated every authority before the sovereignty of the nation; who, in the sincerity of their hearts, searched for the incontestible rights of men and of societies, consequently for their duties based upon the reciprocal warranty of these rights; who placed their country in a position to select from various constitutional combinations that by which it thought the most essential conditions of liberty would be best secured; who felt that obedience to the law was to be to them now what insurrection against despotism had been to them before; and who, in the latter occasion, as in the former, discharged the most sacred of civic obligations.

My profession of faith, of July 11th, 1789, the fruit of my past, the earnest of my future career, was at once a manifesto and an ultimatum. As far as I am concerned, whatever clashes with that is inadmissible, whatever does not affect it is but

secondary. It was prior by three days to the national insurrection, the last that I desired, and the last that was necessary. The Bastile fell; in Paris I had the title of commander-in-chief; the actual command everywhere. Bailly was at the same time chosen mayor, and afterwards, on the creation of the department, Rochefoucauld was appointed its president; here were three honest men.

The revolution had armed France; it was most urgent to give her a military organization; my attention, in America and in various parts of Europe, had been directed to this object. The national guard was instituted. It was the only armed force capable of maintaining order without favouring despotism; it was an infallible method of repelling foreign aggressions, and of reducing old governments to the impossibility of defending themselves against us if they did not imitate us, or against their own subjects if they did. This institution was perverted: within, by the oppressors of the public will; but without, it was demonstrated, in spite of the drawback of the jacobin regime, that there was no absurdity in calculating on the resistance of such a people of citizen-soldiers. In training for three years, they met in their camps experienced veterans, the first engineers and artillerymen in the world; there were no longer to be met there the folly-mongers of that ancient regime which had the effect of stunting everything, which now, on the contrary, political equality was about to give free scope to, and talent and patriotic enthusiasm were combining with military honour against the over-vaunted system of automaton armies. Be it observed, however, although I publicly declared, as I exhibited the first tri-coloured cockade, that it would make the tour of the world, my wishes for the emancipation of other nations were not sullied by a single idea injurious

to their independence. I always intended that, whatever might be the effect of the pacific propagation of our doctrine, or the more precocious result of the coalition of kings, each nation, once restored to itself by its own efforts or our aid, should instantly resume the plenitude of its rights, and be guided in all its ulterior operations solely by its own sovereign will.

The two first steps of the French revolution were accomplished; the first was, the king's being compelled to convoke the nation, and the nation's being apprised that it was called upon to regenerate itself; the second was, the opposition of the court and privileged classes, incompatible with any real reform, being overthrown by a vast triumph of the people. It still remained for us to construct a social organization, and, by provisional means, to render as little disastrous as we might the interval between new laws that did not yet exist, and the ancient bulwarks of public order that had disappeared.

Of all the various methods of modifying the divers elements of political power, one only had been positively and unanimously prescribed to the deputies, that of royalty. The decree that confirmed it had, therefore, every voice in its favour; it would have had mine, had I been present. A party, more active than strong, hoped to secure it for the Duke of Orleans; several republicans of a recent date had only become so with this idea. For my own part, prizing liberty beyond everything, but yet wishing to have it at the smallest possible cost, I never harboured the idea of any other king than Louis XVI. I became still more confirmed in this opinion, as his position, by placing him under my protection, inspired me with a growing interest in his preservation. Some patriots, distinguished by

their just claims upon public esteem, who were convinced, not only of the actual fitness, but of the eternal necessity, of an hereditary royalty, attempted, by uniting themselves with the moderate aristocrats, and those lukewarm neutrals that are for ever floating between two opinions, to give us a constitution on the English model. We, whose only exclusive predilection was for the declaration of rights, thought their premium of assurance for monarchy was higher than what appeared to us to be the value of the object itself. Such was the distinction between the monarchists and the constitutionalists. I pass over those abstractions which the supporters of monarchy are equally embarrassed to admit or to deny, as well as their mysteries, which England, in her various transitions, has been able to retain, but which did not suit our revolution. I will merely observe, that, for the imitation to have been a close one, we must have had "*a power of the crown,*" which the house of commons, on the motion of Mr. Burke, declared "*had increased, was increasing, and ought to be diminished;*" we must have had a parliamentary representation, which Mr. Pitt asserted to be contrary to liberty; and had we adopted the English ideas of improvement, it would have been, in the language of the patriots of that country, a radical reform,—in that of their antagonists, a revolutionary change. We should, therefore, have been again exposed to the peril of experiments; all we should have secured would have been a house of hereditary legislators and judges, an administration expensive to excess, and a royalty which, by the confession of all parties, would become despotic, did not the insular position of England exempt her from the necessity of large armies and strong places. We should have conciliated neither the nobility, to whom the selection

of two hundred families would have been more intolerable than our system of equality; nor the clergy, who, just as much impoverished, would have found the supremacy and intolerance of the Anglican church much harsher than our own ecclesiastical laws; nor the courtiers, who are only wedded to abuses that require no merit. The king, too, would have been as little satisfied, and just as ill advised on this as on the constitutional throne, and, like Charles I., would have found in it no better protection from the causes and effects which finally overwhelmed him.

But though it had been my constant wish that our monarchy should be more republican than the one I had been in the habit of condemning with severity; though I experienced a lively pleasure at hearing of the meeting of the night of the 4th of August; yet great was my regret at the adoption of the principle of a single legislative body. I had seen the United States, in the first fervour of democracy, and, at the weighty suggestion of Franklin, commit the same error, and afterwards acknowledge and repair it. Prevented, by the state of Paris, from being personally present, I implored my friends, and various members, to avail themselves of such recent experience. But there is, in politics, a circle of ideas which it is necessary to go through. This idea was rejected by the metaphysicians, by the economists, by the mob of levellers, who mistook an elective senate for a house of peers, and by the flatterers of this mob; nor less pertinaciously by the violent aristocrats, who, as one of the most conscientious of their prelates took occasion to boast, voted for the very thing they thought the worst. So complete, moreover, was the ignorance of the American distinction of constituent and legislative bodies,

that, as late as 1795, Sièyes was still in the habit of calling it a French discovery. Our assembly, from having experienced the benefit of the consolidation of orders, had, to the end, a horror of two conservative chambers. In fact, if to the immutable majority of the advocates of a single body, we add the partisans of the hereditary principle, or of the nomination of a king for life, there would remain very few deputies who were, like me, desirous of two elective bodies, of which one, by its composition and duration, might serve as a barrier against the impetuous democracy of the other.

The assembly had got thus far in its labours; the king, although he had, on the 15th of July, appeared personally at it, and, on the 17th, mounted the cockade in Paris, was still adhering to some adverse observations on the resolutions of the 4th of August, and persisting in his refusal to accept the déclaration of rights, which, during my absence, they had been attempting to improve amidst the violence of debate, when the movement of the 5th of October, to which I must here allude, after violently removing all these obstacles, changed the residence of the representatives and of the court.

Figure to yourself, sir, the population of Paris, after ages of servitude and corruption,—the crowd of foreigners that at all times swarmed in it, but which factious intrigues had multiplied from every quarter,—the shattered instruments of the ancient regime, whose only hope was in disorder,—and the thousands of soldiers from different regiments, who had joined the French guards, themselves agitated by every party. At the outburst of this confusion, all institutions were destroyed; all men suspected; the leaders had no other power than their popularity, no other law than their conscience. It was as little

easy as it was important to restrain those terrible elements which, three years afterwards, at the moment when every document of liberty, every guarantee of public order, every constitutional institution had been organized, exploded with such appalling and deadly force. The happiness I felt at preventing various murders, and in saving the lives of several people, having, in the very commencement of these scenes, been destroyed by the impossibility of snatching Foulon and Berthier from a frantic multitude, I gave in my resignation: they implored me to resume my command. The only two crimes of this kind which were perpetrated in the city, one in October, 1789, on a baker, the other in July, 1791, on two invalids, were expiated; the former by the punishment of the principal culprit, the latter by the infliction of martial law.

To the armed multitude which, on the king's first entrance, had lined the streets with far more order than I had dared to hope, succeeded six fine divisions of national guards, forming sixty battalions, each composed of six volunteer, and one paid company. The ancient grenadiers of the guard, the chasseurs of the barriers, a park of artillery, consisting of a hundred and forty guns, and the mounted gendarmerie, completed this civic force. Several of its officers have since become generals; the staff, as well as my own aides-de-camp, combined talent with zeal. The spirit of the great majority was excellent; that, too, which animated the assembly of electors, who deserved so well of their country; and the magistrates who succeeded them; the acquirements and virtues of our worthy mayor; the favour with which I was heard, were so many means of inspiring the people with reasonable ideas and upright feelings. While I summoned Paris, in my

speeches, to make herself the metropolis of the enfranchised world, it was my ambition that she should also be its pride and its example; but our desires were frustrated by scoundrels of all classes, and speculators on every species of revolutionary profit; by the faction of M. d'Orleans, who made the crown the object of a traffic in which the only thing of value that he would not hazard was his life; the only thing that gnawed upon his heart, his money; persuaded, moreover, by the aristocratic faction, which, but little chivalrous in its resistance, adopted, from the beginning, the spiteful policy of preferring anarchy to civil order, bad measures to useful laws, dangerous and degrading appointments to such as were patriotic, and which was more willing to hazard its consequences than to despair of abuses and prejudices, when destruction typified to them the end of the world. Add to this the machinations of foreign governments, who, in the tocsin of the 14th of July, heard the signal of their ruin, and more especially of the English government. Its minister, bred up in hatred of France, imagined that emancipated France would eclipse his country; and from that moment, and without a single pause, devoted his great talents to disfiguring the cause of the people, to rendering the aspect of liberty equivocal and its name odious, to vitiating to their very roots the resources of our prosperity and power: the result of his efforts was, the sacrifice of enormous sums, of torrents of blood, of even the emigrants he employed, and the king he pretended to defend.*

* It would be extremely interesting to make a compilation of all that has been uttered against the despotism of the French, the humiliating servitude of the people, the abuses of government, by certain English aristocrats, who, since the revolution, have taken upon themselves the defence of the ancient regime:

While these various intriguers distracted the capital and its chiefs, and we were defending its tranquillity and subsistence against them, we were compelled to restrain within its walls an excitement which it was their intention to direct against Versailles. We had been apprised of an aristocratic plot, extremely stupid and rambling, as were the most of them; the project was, to raise the regrets of the French guards at no longer guarding the king; to excite a movement on the assembly and the chateau; to remove the court thence, &c. The language of the barracks and public places were in unison with these ideas, which were laid hold of by more successful conspirators, especially by the partisans of M. d'Orleans.

The ministry, informed of these attempts, availed itself of a note of mine to send for a regiment of the line without our knowledge; a note very simple in itself, but on the contents of which an oath of secrecy was exacted from a considerable number of persons; the reciprocal bickerings of the assembly and the court, and the scarcity of flour, gave effect to these instigations and blunders. The last of these was the celebrated fête, which I cannot better characterize than by a remark of the Emperor Joseph's: "What is there to say," he replied to Segur, French minister in Russia, who requested his commands,— "What is there to say to people who get up their banquet of the gardes-du-corps without being sure of their army?" It was on the morning of the

we should see that such of them as were not guided by servile inclinations, must have been led by their jealousy and hatred of France; as to their generosity to the emigrants, it may well be compared to the care which Samson took of the three hundred foxes that he meant to let loose on the harvests of the Philistines.—(Note found among General Lafayette's papers.)

5th of October that the Hotel de Ville was attacked, and Paris convulsed, by the most unmanageable tumult I had yet seen; the immense crowd, after spending some time in cries of "Bread! bread!" now led for the demand of going to Versailles. For eight hours, during which I was resisting the billows that were breaking at my feet, I was able to restrain the fiery, but disciplined, impatience of the national guard; but I learnt that, in addition to the vast concourse which obstructed the avenues, numerous armed hordes had left Paris; these were they who, united with the people of Versailles, committed the excesses of that day. I was instantly aware that, whatever might be the complicated combinations of such a movement, the public safety left me no choice but to make myself master of it. I required, at the Hotel de Ville, an order and two commissioners; I made rapid arrangements for the protection of Paris, and marched with several battalions upon Versailles. On approaching the hall of the assembly, the troops renewed the civic oath, and did not advance until I had paid my respects to the president, and received the king's orders, who, after hearing the commissioners and myself, told me to occupy the post of the old French guards. I did so, and, after billeting the troops, visited the hotel of the gardes-du-corps, the hall of the representatives, and stationed patrols in the city and courts; for the gardes-du-corps at the château, and those who, with the Swiss sentinels, were mounted in the garden, were not under my orders; I again returned to the king: they assured me he was asleep. The remainder of the night I passed with the minister, Montmorin, within gunshot of my first post. Toward daybreak all was quiet; I went to the Hotel de Noailles, which was close by, where the staff re-

ceived its reports; I made some arrangements for Paris that were extremely urgent, took some refreshment, and should have supposed that the exhaustion of my strength needed some little rest, had not a sudden alarm, within a few minutes afterwards, restored it. I ran to the château: scoundrels, concealed in the shrubberies, after killing two, and wounding three, faithful guards, had broken into the queen's bedroom. On the first alarm she had been conducted to the king's apartment, by the young Victor Maubourg, one of the only three officers on duty who had not gone to bed. At the same moment, Cadignan, my aide-de-camp, and his sergeant, Hoche—so celebrated since—apprised by the attacking one of the sentinels, and by one of our superior officers, rushed forward with their grenadiers. The bandits took to flight, and the château was saved. But on the outside, various armed groups were on the point of assassinating the gardes-du-corps whom they had made prisoners; I snatched them from their fate; our patrols were reinforced; and the courts, lined round with national guards, were filled by an effervescent multitude. To stop the carnage, to calm the people, to support the troops, and, as soon as the king had announced the intention, now become necessary, of inhabiting Paris, and the queen the courageous resolve to follow him, to conduct them to the Hotel de Ville, to establish them in safety at the Tuileries, were, in the midst of horrors that I could not prevent, yet did all I could to punish, successes so unhoped for, that party-spirit itself was for a moment constrained to silence, and even to applause. We desired to preserve the gardes-du-corps, but the courtiers opposed it, as they again did at a much later period, when the city requested the king to recal them.

The duty was performed by the national guard, the *cent-Suisses*, and the regiment of Swiss guards.

As, however, the Orleanist party, though disconcerted, was still formidable, I took advantage of a tête-à-tête with its leader, who consented to leave France. The assembly established itself at Paris, with the exception of five or six members, whose separation grieved me; one of them, who combined admirable talents with every attractive quality, has since had great claims upon my affectionate gratitude.* Another had distinguished himself in the transactions of Dauphiny, and by the immortal oath of the jeu de paume.† He would have imparted greater weight to his charges against us, had he not added, that in those days of inquisition and tyranny, by which, according to him, the 6th of October was followed, he was for eight months engaged with impunity, though unsuccessfully, in raising up his province against us. The disclosures which, with that perfect liberty of speech enjoyed by our most prominent adversaries, he might have made at the tribune, were consigned in a judicial affidavit, to obtain which from him they were obliged to send to Switzerland. This occurred on the occasion of that most criminal prosecution in which the commune of Paris was plaintiff, all the documents of which were published, but wherein the falsehoods asserted by some of the witnesses were turned by the jacobins to the account of the principal defendant.

This name of jacobin, which recals so many fatal, and has perverted so many useful, ideas, had not the honour of being mixed up with that decisive revolution which had felled the aristocracy and

* M. de Lally Tollendal. † M. Mounier.

royalty of the old times by a mortal blow. It was unknown even three years later, when the divers artificers of civil war, dupes of their own schemes, had contrived to place the assembly and the king under the immediate protection of the very general they had been labouring to destroy. At that time the leading distinctions of parties were much better defined; the first, composed of aristocrats and absolute royalists, increased by certain admirers of the English system, who gave it a qualified support, and by the heartier adhesion of those who beheld in this system the least of two evils;—the second, which, under the constitutional standard, represented the triple alliance of liberty, equality, and public order, and was sanctioned by the great majority of the citizens, who, satisfied with the revolution, asked for nothing more than to enjoy its fruits;—the third, a part of it, at least, embodying the promoters and instruments of disorder, which, after having strengthened itself by anarchy, succeeded in reigning by terror.

Jacobinism, in fact, has been but too frequently an engine of confusion, and the direction of it the source of a power by far more brilliant than solid. Foreign agitators, Orleanists, aristocrats, all concurred to exaggerate the influence of ostensible leaders, in order to conceal their own. In a word, if, on the one hand, I foresaw the tendency of this sect from the very moment of its existence; on the other, it is well known that one of its fundamental objects was to persecute me as its most prominent foe—and how could I be otherwise, I who, from the 15th of July, 1789, feared only for our cause the excesses committed in its name? So completely in unison with this sentiment has my conduct been, that notwithstanding the share I have had in the

revolution of America and Europe, it is as much in my character of champion of public order as of the friend of liberty; that I am still present to the memory of the French.

No sooner had the first authorities arrived in Paris, than we took immediate precautions that this transfer, instead of dividing France, should rally her men closely around us. The mayor and myself, supported by the representatives of the commune and by the national guard, occupied ourselves incessantly with maintaining the independence of the assembly, the safety of the king, the liberty and property of citizens of every party. I would by no means assert, that in the midst of circumstances so rough, of intrigues so active, of materials so inflammable, we succeeded completely in our aim; we cannot expect from a deeply agitated nation, nor exact from a free one, the discipline of a camp: the obedience of the national guard is itself not of a nature entirely passive; it is absurd to suppose, especially in these days, that because a man has had the power to influence great measures, and to surmount a great crisis, it depended entirely upon him to create every event and to modify every detail. Still, in spite of the aptness of the anarchists to confuse the discussion, and of the aptness of the royalist to provoke excesses in order to put them upon record, we may easily convince ourselves, by reading the debates, that during the whole of our session, in that very capital where succeeding assemblies were so shamefully overawed, the constituent assembly continued to enjoy a perfect liberty in its discussions and its votes. Was it at all unusual, at the close of one of those meetings at which our most virulent adversaries had taken all possible pains to irritate them, to see the national

guards defiling along the line of their passage, and respectfully watching over their security? or when one of them, the younger Mirabeau, for instance, drunk with aristocracy and wine, attempted to cajole the people in a public place, did they not, with a patience equal to their zeal, prevent the ill effects of this effrontery? The reproach so often made me of not having made use of my power arbitrarily to impose better laws, is, it appears to me, an inconsiderate one; for, admitting I had the means of transgressing the maxims of liberty I professed, what they overlook is, that the peculiar character which would render the violation of these maxims but little dangerous, implies the incapacity of violating them.

The want of such a capacity, moreover, seems to me by no means to be regretted; and if we may here allude to the giants of history, what survived of all the violence of Sylla but a precedent for Cæsar and the jacobins of Rome? What remained to Pompey, of all his illegal practices, but an impotence to avenge the good cause? And the only man who could have saved it, who was he, but that one whose scrupulous inflexibility had so long been a topic of abuse? But this reproach, which has been recently revived in your country, is another testimony to our unalterable devotion to the rights of national representation.

As to the preservation of the king and his family, no one ever doubted that to save their lives I would a thousand times have sacrificed my own; it is equally true, that, within constitutional limits, I was just as sincere in my defence of royalty. The need which Louis XVI. had of me, imposed upon me that of supporting him, not according to the good pleasure of the counter-revolutionists, nor the

monarchists, nor of this prince himself, who adhered to the principles of the 23rd of June; but according to those conditions on which I conceived his political existence to depend, and within which it was my earnest desire to see the executive power, whose chief he was, invested with effectual strength, and willing to employ it. My opinions in the assembly, my suggestions in the committees, my counsels at the Tuileries, my transactions with the popular party, never deviated from this line. To the king my manners were equally respectful, my language less republican than during the ancient régime. When the queen said "that I had sensibility for everybody excepting kings," * it is probable the observation alluded to regrets and wishes to which I was insensible, and was never forgiven for it; it was not applicable to my behaviour to her and her consort, to whom, full of loyalty myself, I endeavoured to attach the good feelings of the public. In this attempt, my difficulty was less from the machinations of their enemies than from the stupidity and malice of their pretended friends, whose vile interest it was that they should not be content, nor appear to be free. From the great event of the 4th of February, which was partly discomfited beforehand by imprudent consultations, partly, on the same evening, by the affectation of speaking only to the members of the right, I was, down even to the minutest details, some of which have escaped oblivion, always well-disposed in my advice, and discreet on their refusals and their repugnances; the bawlings of the jacobins are a proof

* This *mot* of the queen's was suggested by the affair of the quai de la Ferraille.—(Note found in General Lafayette's papers.) See letter of May 25, 1790, vol. ii. p. 441.

that I never endeavoured to make myself popular at their expense.

Advantageous as any comparison would be for us with the distractions of other times, or more especially with the subsequent distractions of the 10th of August, I will not have recourse to them to extenuate the disorders of our first revolution. Much exaggerated they certainly were; it was the discovery which thousands of foreigners made of the falsehood of those statements which afterwards rendered them more incredulous as to the real evils of our country. But were I disposed to deny that there were, in several parts of France, though less frequently after the 6th of October, great and indecent turbulence; military revolts, almost always the result of instigation; seditions in the cities, especially the sea-ports; and that our best sailors must be charged with the conflagration of châteaus, and, what is more lamentable still, with numerous murders, I should receive the lie from my own denunciation on the floor of the assembly. "What need of rigour?" it was replied; "do we not see the presence and voice of a single man in Paris bring back the people to their duty?"—"By dint of saying the revolution is over, we shall have no revolution," said another.—"Before we can punish, we must have courts which decide in the spirit of the revolution," exclaimed a third. And while the patriotic orators were combating this doctrine, the chiefs of the aristocrats gave their perfidious support to our opinions merely to be able to infer from them that the assembly ought to abdicate its powers, and confer a dictatorship upon the king. But it is unquestionably true, that, far from giving an official character to the excesses, as has since been done, and very recently in the measures against Ireland,

the assembly often rebuked, and never sanctioned them. On occasions, even, its resolutions were severe, in the affair of Nancy particularly; and the national guards exhibited that pure and unshaken zeal for liberty and legal order, to which they have since done me the honour to affix the name of *Fayettism*. The comparative tranquillity of the capital was another consolation to us; nevertheless, besides various tumults that were seasonably repressed, there occurred the destruction of the furniture of the Hotel de Castries, so shamefully celebrated by Mirabeau. Great complaint was made, and with reason, of incendiary publications; the most infamous author of which, attacked by the courts, eluded our pursuit. But if our devotedness to the liberty of the press encouraged abuses that it did not desire, we at least took good care that this liberty should be common to all parties, as may be seen by the publications of that day: happy could we have as successfully protected that of religious worship.

High as the august sentiment of pure deism and freedom of thought may soar beyond dogmatic creeds, it is nevertheless true that no power on earth may interpose between the heart of man and the Divinity. To whomsoever recognises any other revelation than conscience, the first of rights is to practise in peace the worship it prescribes; to him, the worst of taxes is, the support of a worship which he believes to be blasphemous. Opposed to every superstitious and philosophic intolerance, I was anxious that the decree on the liberty of creeds should privilege none, but leave each community, as in the United States, to maintain its own church and ministry. They were not yet ripe enough for this idea. Narrow calculations and petty vengeances gave birth to an

arrangement, which, coming at the moment the clergy was deprived of its property, could not fail to produce a schism. An oath was exacted from all stipendiary priests; and the consequence was, that the people were led into the fatal error of identifying political opinions with these bickerings. In certain parishes, the majority paid a nonconformer, then the conformer was insulted; but in general, especially in Paris, the former was the object of public hatred; several of those respectable women, styled sisters of charity, were grossly insulted as they came from mass. The non-jurors, in our time, always had several chapels and all the nunneries; but they abandoned them after the first attempt at the church of the Théatines, which the department rented to them, and when we could maintain them only by force. I love to remember that neither the censures of these priests, nor the unpopularity which attached to all efforts in their favour, could for a single instant relax my zeal, and that, in the same spirit in which I had formerly devoted myself to the cause of the French protestants, I ever persisted in declaring myself the defender of the oppressed sect. Oh! where is the consequence of a just principle that can alarm the true lovers of liberty? Are they insensible to the sublimity of its doctrine, to the immensity of its power? Is it not, on the contrary, an execrable persecution that has compressed, and again restored to fanaticism, the spring which religious equality had for ever relaxed?

You are aware, sir,—to pass on to another of your questions—that during these three first years, in the midst of continual conspiracies, and in the same country which has since so cruelly recalled the words of Lucian—"Satis est jam posse mori,"

but one man suffered for a crime of state. Favras, the object of grave charges at the Hotel de Ville, was arrested in an act which seemed to confirm them; he was taken to the châtelet; a court of acknowledged integrity, little favourable to the revolution which suppressed it, and to which had been provisionally confided all affairs of lèse-nation. It had acquitted the Baron de Besenval, much more odious to the people, and who, after his trial, lived unmolested at Paris. It did the same with M. de Lambesc, in a case of default, accused, proved to have sabred citizens in one of the royal gardens. The ancient form of proceeding still existed, with this difference, that, in consequence of my formally refusing to be concerned in the arrest of any accused person, unless he was allowed, as in England, a copy of the indictment, a public trial, the cross-examination of witnesses, and the assistance of counsel, a deputation from the city to the assembly, then sitting at Versailles, had procured these immediate improvements. My transactions with the judges of Favras were simply these:—Two of the witnesses having deposed to a project of assassinating the mayor and me, we endeavoured to annul this charge by officially communicating to the court that one of these men was the principal informer. The two principal magistrates having called on me respecting some general arrangement about their guard, "I am very far from believing," was my reply, "the châtelet capable of being influenced by fear; it would be a very gratuitous infamy in this case, for I answer to you for everything, and your decision, whatever it may be, shall be enforced." In a word, the conduct of this tribunal appeared to me beyond reproach. The observation of Counsellor Quatremère, who exhorted Favras "to a death essential to the

public tranquillity," was a common-place consolation, to which, coming from his mouth, it would be absurd to attach any other sense. Favras met his death with self-command, and a noble courage. Though, at the fatal moment, the crowd testified its feeling in vile and barbarous applause, his death rests heavily on those alone who compromised him. The proceeding of the actual pretender at the Hotel de Ville was not the vilest of the acts committed on that occasion. No sooner had Favras ceased to live than the voices of his accomplices were heard; they were seconded by every one who had an interest in discrediting, beforehand, the legal procedure of the 6th of October. His brother has written his justification; I do not examine whether in doing it he yielded to self-conviction or the obligations of blood. His widow, they say, speaks of me with an injustice which I respect, and which is not less suited to her situation than her grief.

If I am not at all concerned with the responsibility which attaches to this affair, the case is very different to that of the celebrated decree of June 17th, 1790, which defined civil equality. I will, in the first place, remark, that the adversaries of this principle chose to reply to what we never said; they identified constitutional doctrines with jacobin ravings, as one might confound Christianity with the frenzies of the Munster anabaptists. Observe, moreover, that the gospel is much more of a leveller than our laws: it curses the distinctions of wealth; its primitive practice tended to the common possession of riches, and after Jesus was immolated to the vengeance of princes and priests, the congregations of his disciples were regarded as societies for propagating doctrines subversive of every social inequality. Our equality restricted itself to the pro-

scription of privileges and hereditary impediments between citizen and citizen in their relation to the political order of things, and the use of their personal faculties, so that the mere birth of a man did not ingraft upon his life either a prerogative or a legal incapacity; consequently it recognised no rights of nobility to any territory whatsoever, prejudicial to contiguous property. We are not speaking here of the civil or military subordination which our laws have consecrated, nor of that feeling of regard for the descendant of a celebrated father which it is superfluous to corroborate by law, nor of the division of wealth in families which they did what they could to favour. But wherever no man is privileged, either in virtue of the title of his property, or by exemptions from public burdens, or by preferences of admission in the different professions, or by political rights, it is there impossible for a nobility to exist. Every qualification which, in the ancient jurisprudence of France and that of Europe, characterizes these privileged persons, became therefore inadmissible in ours; and at the risk of compelling women, outraged by the idea of conceiving nothing better than a simple citizen, to go to the frontiers to be delivered of a baron or a count, we passed a very reasonable law when we abolished in our own country all distinctive signs, the usurpation of which would not be tolerated either in Germany or England. I do not, however, mean to defend certain clauses relative to patronymic names, armorial bearings, and liveries, which it would have been enough in good policy to have left open to all; but when, with the approbation of the members of the committee of constitution, I requested the king to allow me time to rectify these trivial errors, his council, from malicious motives, gave a hurried sanction to the original form.

The aristocracy reproaches the patriots and ex-nobles with having sacrificed their order; royalism reproaches the constitutionalists with having established a republic. Deeply imbued with American ideas, I ever declared myself the advocate of equality; my electors were aware of it. According to my promise, I waited until the majority passed over to the chamber of the third estate, which, in fact, could not be long delayed. As soon as the assembly was united, the revolution burst forth, and each man took up his position. I was one of the representatives of the nation, and the head of its patriotism in arms; I assigned public utility as the basis of all distinctions, and assuredly the distinctions of persecution, or emigration, or even those of the old régime, could not to any man be worth the advantages of a free constitution. If by the name *republic* we are to understand the participation of several in the act of legislating, it is with justice that Montesquieu describes England as a republic. At Venice our own aristocrats had been good republicans. If, on the other hand, the question reduces itself to a choice between anarchical, oligarchical, or royal forms of despotism, the pure constitutionalist, who neither loves, nor hates, nor values administrative bodies but as they bear on public happiness and the rights of men, has no concern whatever with this idle controversy. To him the sounds of republic and monarchy are of much less consequence than the substance of liberty; for it is the essential characteristic of the constitutionalists, that the most republican amongst them prefer a free monarchy to an arbitrary republic; and that the most royalist are ready to shatter every crown in favour of a liberal principle. But if, to subordinate all institutions to the declaration of rights, and all authorities to national sovereignty, to confide legis-

lative powers to a representative democracy, to create municipal and administrative bodies and popular courts, to divide and define with precision the various descriptions of power, and to continue the hereditary principle merely in a presidency of the executive power entirely inoperative of itself, if doing these things is to be republican, then, it cannot be denied, this title belongs to the constitutional assembly. Yet its aim invariably was, to lay the foundation of a legal throne, of which, though it might dread the influence, it did not desire the overthrow. As to myself,—whose natural republicanism, nourished by the American revolution, had been everywhere displayed, who thought that political science, already much advanced by representation and the press, would one day recognise the inutility of hereditary royalty,—even I was persuaded, that not only the will of the nation, but every circumstance connected with us, imposed upon me the duty of supporting and defending a constitutional throne. Moreover, my republic, the republic such as I wished it, was depicted in my declaration of the 11th of July; then I beheld the religion of liberty: *for it, insurrection and every sacrifice; with it, subordination and repose.* Let nations, after having discovered in nature their duties and their rights, their reciprocal relations and their frontiers, then endeavour to perfect the details of their government, not by a miserable uniformity, but by considerations of local fitness; yet, while doing this, let them never deviate from the common doctrine; whoever has apprehended the revolution according to this view of it, will be more disposed to accommodate it to the ideas and situation of his country than to stake it against secondary modifications.

The constitutional basis was founded, when, on the 14th of July, 1790, fourteen thousand deputies, chosen from the whole of France by four millions of national guards, and accompanied by the representatives of the troops of the line, gathered round the altar of the country in order to associate themselves by the most solemn of civic oaths. The assembly and the king, after two signals which I gave from the altar, having been successively sworn, I pronounced in the name of my fellow-citizens the sacred formula; and the acclamations of three hundred thousand spectators re-echoed from one end of the empire to the other. That evening they danced on the ruins of the Bastile.

Previous to the 21st of June, sir, although the king was unavoidably subjected to patriotic vigilance, it is false that he was a prisoner, as so many princes have been made by their nobles and clergy; as Clement VII., by a catholic king, chief of the holy empire; Charles I., by a parliamentary army; Mary of Scotland, and Ivan of Russia, by their cousins; Victor Amedeus, by his son; Peter III., by his wife; Poniatowsky at Grodno, and Louis XVI. himself in the Temple. A prince of Wales is not at liberty to leave England, or to marry without the consent of the legislature; and who that met the king of the French on horseback, with only two officers and others of his suite, setting out with his family for his country seat, or going to the assembly, but must have felt that he was more respected than the king of England, afraid, in spite of the illegal vigour of his minister, to expose himself by going to meet his parliament in an open carriage. We followed the system of voluntary assent and real action, recognised as belonging to the new royalty; they who doubted it were called malignants; there

could not, therefore, exist any official warranty for the king's detention, consequently no satisfactory precaution against his escape; but as all parties identified counter-revolution and civil war with his withdrawing, there resulted that position the responsibility of which I took upon myself, and not that asserted state of captivity which did not really occur until after his return from Varennes.

To comprehend this event, we must single out from the contradictory intrigues of the court its connexion with Mirabeau, who, after having served M. d'Orleans, and made advances to me by writing, as a pledge of his sincerity, two letters, capable of ruining him, ended by coming to terms with the queen, and shewed his esteem for me by a renewal of his enmity. The basis of his plan for a counter-revolution was, the king's escape, to be rendered necessary by a sham riot, and supported by an army under M. de Bouillé's command. The idea was followed; but the directing genius was no more. The king having, in the first fortnight of Easter, given notice of one of his usual trips to St. Cloud, met a resistance which appeared to delight the court; and, while I was endeavouring to suppress it, returned to his apartments. For the first time I was dissatisfied at the king's guard; I was equally so with the assembly, which did nothing; with the department, which, in spite of La Rochefoucauld's efforts, accompanied by his resignation, only read a lecture to the king; and with the king himself, whom, not only on account of this particular incident, but also for the sake of his liberty of religious worship, I wished to associate with myself in a decisive proceeding, in which I would have supported him with all my power; but, after some consultation, he determined to give up Saint Cloud, and to

go to the schismatic church, resolved, at the same time, to abstain from communicating. I resigned my command. Public regret, to which I did not yield until after the expiration of several days, inspired new zeal. During my retirement, the court had written and published a letter to the foreign ministers, glowing with patriotism. Although, for now twenty months, the agitators had been daily announcing a clandestine flight, I was made easy on that point by its difficulties, by our vigilance, and by the protestations of the king and queen, for whom I answered to the people with my head. In consequence, however, of some information, we redoubled our usual precautions on the very evening of the departure; in spite of which, it was not until the next morning that any tidings of what had occurred reached the guard, the people of the château, or myself. I mounted my horse, and met the president of the assembly and the mayor; we felt it would be late before the sitting commenced; I did not hesitate to issue an order commanding a general resistance to this attempt. It was circulated, by means of officers, in every direction. The fermentation was increasing; I breasted the storm, and when, three hours afterwards, some deputies were sent to the Hotel de Ville, to extricate me, as they supposed, they found me more powerful than ever. The assembly exhibited itself noble and calm; a manifesto from the king, extremely ill written, was presented to it; the ministry were invested with executive functions; the tranquillity of the capital secured that of France. On the rumour of some excitement at the club of the jacobins, various deputies, entirely unconnected with it, repaired thither—but all that passed off. After having taken general precautions against any attempts of the

king or his allies, we were becoming accustomed to his absence, when the news of his arrest reached us. I received the expression of public joy with coldness: not that I repented of having, as far as in me lay, prevented a civil war, but because the inconvenience of hostilities would have been much less disastrous than that of such a return; and after the execrable treatment which the unfortunate family underwent, I am happy to remember it was not through one of our couriers, but the postmaster, Drouet, that they were recognised.

The charge of having connived at the king's flight, in order to serve him by letting him depart, according to the jacobins,—of ruining him by causing him to be arrested, according to the aristocrats,—was not less absurd than false. Must I not have been insane, to send him, under the protection of another general, to attack our cause and my person? And though the queen, astonished at seeing me alive, exclaimed, "He has now a fine game for the republic!" could I risk all for a thing against which I had declared myself at the moment of its supposed success? Should I, under the first supposition, have caused him to be pursued before the opening of the assembly?—under the second, should I have waited until he had eight hours start? Besides, these Machiavelian tactics so little suit my character, as to render this double calumny still more ridiculous. I do not deny, that when I thought the king in arms against the nation, I had no difficulty in conceiving that the organization of the executive power might be brought into harmony with the order of the day; and that while the three commissioners of the assembly, sent to protect him, were bringing him to Paris, my friends and myself were discussing the question of his restoration.

At this day, the republic, in the eyes of too many people, is but a monster born of the 10th of August, of the crimes of September, baptized by Collot d'Herbois, causing itself to be preceded by the scaffolds of terror, the maximum, and famine, establishing itself by the sound of the cannon of Vendemiare, and requiring speedily the regime of Fructedor; but the quarrel should rather be with that abominable profanation of words and things, which has rendered unpopular the names even of patriot and citizen, nay, the sacred name of liberty itself. The right of rectifying so fatal an error may be vindicated by men who were more devoted to the revolution than these revolutionists, to democratic interests than these demagogues, to legal royalty than the royalists, to the safety of Louis XVI. than his friends, and who, having experienced greater vengeance from the hatred of kings than any republican, and more hopes by the people's axe than the enemies of the people, have never ceased to annex to their expressions ideas as pure as have ever been their principles, their intentions, and their means! The republic, at that time, was only the simple exchange of an hereditary presidency for an executive power, the election of which had nothing heterogeneous in it; instead of sullying and sanctifying royalty by a martyrdom, we should have said to Louis XVI.," Let us separate in peace; you have shewn the incompatibility of the throne with our essential laws; may your private fortune be worthy of yourself and the nation; and may the cause of monarchy be for ever decided by our experiment of the best of kings." Moreover, though, in consequence of our repugnance to the dethronement of the father by his son, and the greater inconveniences of any other choice, we decided on

preferring Louis XVI., even in his actual state, we could not conceal from ourselves that he would find it hard to recover public confidence and consideration.

But, on the other hand, it was observed that our constitution, already popular, had more need of reaction and counterpoise than of an augmentation of democracy. There was reason to fear we might induce a foreign war, and alienate those royalists whose faith was still plighted to our monarchy. Though the internal torrent would have been better restrained than by the ringleaders of the 10th of August, of whom some lost their influence on their very first cry for justice and public order, and others could preserve it only by making themselves instruments of the reign of terror; yet they at last but too well justified our anxiety to avoid convulsions, prevent disorders, and close the revolution of our country. The three principal persons of the jacobin club energetically declared themselves in favour of this determination. Sièyes went still further; he insisted, in two publications of the 6th and 16th of July, "that the republican form of government did not suffice to secure liberty; that, in every view of the matter, there is more freedom in a monarchy than under a republic; and that government should be crowned by a single irresponsible, inviolable, hereditary, executive power." To these peremptory dogmas might have been opposed, not anarchical and Orleanist frenzy, nor opinions open to suspicion, either in morality or patriotism, but the honest and deliberate views of several good citizens. The majority of these, since victims to their fealty to laws they had sworn to observe, felt their opinion could not triumph save at the expense of liberty of suffrage, and in defiance of

the national will. The impression produced by a great misfortune, the horror of the regicide suggestions of certain jacobins, the desire of doing honour to the French people by a moderation for which foreigners were but little prepared, contributed to that very near approach to unanimity which, on such an occasion, it was important to command. I took no half measures. After having done, without the assembly, whatever could most contribute to assure its independence, guarantee the life of Louis XVI., and awe the factious, it was I, who, in the last meeting, supported the eloquent speech of Barnave, by moving that the decree should be put to the vote.

The disturbers of the public tranquillity then resolved to strike a great blow, of the same kind as that which, on the 10th of August and 31st of May of succeeding years, was more successfully repeated. A numerous assemblage, under the pretext of signing a petition, gathered (July 17) around the altar of the country; its first act was to cut off the heads of two invalids; the scoundrels who were parading these through the faubourg of Gros Caillou fled at our approach; the national guard was posted at the entrance of the field of the federation, where, on the promise of an immediate separation, accepted by two municipal officers, it contented itself with merely watching the mob. Meanwhile, incendiary motions and mischievous projects were in active circulation. It was not, however, until after several hours of patience, and in the last extremity, that the municipality proclaimed martial law. The troops debouched by the three openings into this vast *enceinte*. I accompanied the magistrates and the red flag. The moment they advanced they were assailed with cries and stones; the first

pistol fired—for some of them were armed—was at the mayor. The national guard, which had at first merely fired in the air, finding that by doing so it only emboldened the rioters, at length gave them a volley, on which they dispersed. The number of the killed has been strangely exaggerated. The artillery was not brought into play, and the indignation of the volunteers was restrained; we lost two men, some others and an aide-de-camp were wounded.

Paris hailed us as its saviours, and the thanks of the assembly were unanimous; the leading rioters were judicially prosecuted. Such, sir, was this affair of the Champ de Mars, which, at a later period, when crime was triumphant, became one of the grounds of that long and painful punishment by which the illustrious Bailly expiated, in the midst of the Parisians, the services he had rendered them, and wherein the atrocity of the assassins was equalled only by the magnanimity of the victim.

It had been decreed that, until the completion of the constitutional act, Louis XVI. and his family should be detained at the Tuileries. I have been reproached with not having rendered him the customary honours of royalty; but it had been laid down as a fundamental maxim, "that the principle of all sovereignty resides imprescriptably in the nation; that no individual can possess an authority which does not expressly emanate from it." Louis XVI. had abjured his legal title; officially to treat him as king, therefore, was, according to this avowed doctrine, impossible. As to the personal treatment of the king and queen, they had free communication within, and kept up their correspondence without; the persons of their suite, their numerous servants, the ministers, and all those they desired to see, had

free access to them. Nothing was changed in their accustomed service, only that between the rooms occupied by the usual guards and their apartments there were special guards chosen by me, whom the assembly had made, subject to my orders, personally responsible. This consideration for me became embarrassing, because it gave each person an interest, and in some sort a right to criticise the measures of precaution. As, however, these officers were respectable men, their disagreeable interference was, by themselves, restricted to barely such a sacrifice of their repugnance as in their opinions was exacted by the public agitation, and consequently by the safety and repose of the royal family itself. I will not specify here what my own measures were, but content myself with observing, that all the acts of the assembly, of the constituted authorities, and of the armed force, had for their object the king's restoration. The committee, which a long time before the 21st of June had been occupied with revising the fundamental decrees, in order to separate them from simple laws, and to collect them into a systematic form, accelerated its labours. You have seen it accused—in a notice of more asperity than truth,* of having vitiated the constitution; it is amusing to find the author, himself a member of this committee, and never once protesting against any of the reports made in his name, censuring me, who had no concern with it, and who, while the revision was pending, spoke solely to vindicate against it the principle of *conventions*, and to establish this national right. The fact, on the contrary, is, that the assembly, which had modelled its political ideas

* Notice on the Life of Sièyes, published by Sièyes himself, in 1794.

on its own decrees, was incessantly on the watch against any alteration of its work. The moment it was completed, it was carried with much ceremony to Louis XVI. His guard of arrest was withdrawn; the guards of the château received his orders; but he did not choose to leave Paris; and as there would have been no personal risk to himself, nor to his friends, had he refused the throne, his deliberation was unfettered, and his assent appeared to us sincere. I took advantage of the moment to procure the unanimous abolition of all the judicial prosecutions of the revolution, and of the use of passports.

As to the assembly, never did a national deputation present a collection of men more conspicuous for every kind of pre-eminence. In spite of intrigues and errors, which I do not mean to deny, good intentions had greatly the preponderance, and of talent there was more than enough. In it the sections of the popular party were seen frequently coalescing under a common desire for liberty and the public good; and even in the other party, feelings worthy of good Frenchmen were often distinguishable in spite of certain dislikes. Its immense labours were pursued with zeal and perseverance, a merit common to all who sat on our side of the house, but which was not confined to it; for to cite a single instance out of many, a deputy of the right, a person* who, in 1788, had refused to be minister, and, in 1789, had lost the first place in France, brought to the very last, and down to the most obscure details of the committees, all the experience of his public, and all the probity of his private life. If a small number of aristocrats and democrats occa-

* The Duke de Châtelet.

sionally, to a certain point, parted with their independence, the assembly, very far from making a system of doing so, as elsewhere, always held it in antipathy; its precaution against the ambition of its members, its impatience to have them replaced by others, its decree of incompetence to exercise legislative and ministerial functions for two successive years, or to enjoy the favours of the government and court, testify to its disinterestedness. In severity against excesses it was too often deficient; and in its work of destruction, it might, at no great cost, have softened many a regret; still history furnishes no examples of civil dissensions, in which the losses were so indiscriminately diffused among all parties. The assemblies which succeeded have contributed to the good reputation of the first. In fact, its greatness always rose with events; nor was there, during the revolution, a single measure beneficial to the people, which it had not decreed, or expressly prepared. But, to return to myself, sir, I will add, that I was in possession of the most of its good will, and that its confidence embraced not only my anticipated duties, but all contingencies that might arise out of them. The aristocrats detested me; the jacobins could not forgive me the security of public order; but the latter, for the sake of the real interests of the revolution, and all for the sake of their personal safety, were equally dependent upon me. I had relations with some committees, and the representatives who came to see me; there were meetings at La Rochefoucauld's, without exception the best citizen and most virtuous man I ever knew, and whose intimate friend I had long been. In the assembly, I spoke little, and with the reserve suitable to the general of the armed force. As to the I know not what coalition of 1791, against

which the girondists have cried out so much, it consisted merely of my ceasing to be on ill terms with various deputies of great energy and talent, one of whom,* judicially assassinated two years afterwards, had behaved with much generosity to me in the crisis of the 21st of June; but it is not true that I at any time took the slightest part, directly or indirectly, in the connexion they were at that time forming with the court. So many absurdities have been circulated by party spirit, that it will not be out of place to assure you here, that no personal bias ever modified my public conduct. During three years of power, I solicited no man's praise, and prevented no man's censure; and to ascertain the terms on which I was at any given period with the leading men of the revolution, it is only necessary to determine what, at the corresponding moment, were their writings, their speeches, and their acts.

I have as yet, sir, said nothing either of the emigration or of our external relations. The former was recruited at first from compromised courtiers and ultra-aristocrats, subsequently from peaceful people, who, driven from their district, either by actual tumult, or, more usually, by the apprehension of it, passed into foreign countries, and drew their friends after them. A little later, vanity, fashion, ambition, were the inducements. The inconsiderate rushed into it; the moderate followed with regret. Sensible men, men respected and happy, after making a stand for some time, yielded at last to the stupid presence of a distaff;† for if the desertion of one's corps, having first robbed the military chest,

* M. Barnave.

† It was usual to send distaffs to those who were reluctant to emigrate; a sarcastic imputation of feebleness and effeminacy against such as remained.—(Note by the translator.)

was deemed a noble exploit, serving one's country and guarding one's home were thought disgraceful to a gentleman. However, while guilty leaders were unmercifully sporting with their unhappy followers, the constituent assembly treated all of them as mutinous children, who would one day repent.

Passports were never refused them; and while the counter-revolutionists were filling Europe with calumnies, hawking about civil war in France, and everywhere mendicating foreign war, the national guard was watching over their property; their correspondence was free; their revenues at their own disposal. We did more than this; and after the 21st of June, 1791, a personal friend of Louis XVI. went and proposed to the princes to identify the return of their party with the king's restoration. "No," they exclaimed, "all or nothing!" . . . . At this day, one and the same list confounds the seducers and the seduced, simple fugitives and proscribed patriots; even persons naturalized abroad have been arbitrarily inscribed upon it. It is undoubtedly a register of persecution and iniquity; but equally true is it, that the ignominy of having left the emigrants who were made prisoners at the mercy of the conqueror during the whole course of the war, belongs exclusively to the coalition of kings.

As to our diplomatic concerns, I had hardly any connexion with them. Having, at the moment of my debut, declared what, twenty years later, I repeated in the prisons of Olmütz, "that my principles were incompatible with the safety of those governments," there was but little for me to say to them. I did, however, in 1790, observe to the Austrian ambassador, that the intervention of his court would be useful only to the jacobins, and fatal to the queen. Montmorin, who was weak enough

to leave several malcontents in possession of their places, and for a long while defended a public enemy from me, because he happened to be an enemy of his own, was nevertheless intent upon averting war. Seeing, as I now do, the first men of the empire upon their knees, I cannot but recal their disdain for certain indemnities proffered to them by the assembly and their government. It is true, Edmund Burke had decided, in his wisdom, that France would henceforth be nothing more than a great blank in the affairs of Europe. Upon this, Mr. Pitt was going to attack Spain, our ally, when the assembly, on the occasion of a message from the king, restrained him by a decree. But with the exception of the dear and sacred interests of the United States, and of some Batavian transactions, my personal exertions were confined to the affair of the Belgians. An aristocratic movement had been fomented by the courts of Berlin, the Hague, London, and by the jacobins of Paris. They requested my assistance. I had but little respect either for Austria or her rivals, or an aristocratic and ecclesiastical revolution. My endeavour, therefore, was to bring this people to the adoption of our doctrine; and I urged the French government to a mediation which would have left to that of Vienna a bare supremacy, but little irksome to those obeying it. But the aristocracy marred everything. Surely, it would, in general, have been much wiser, on the part of the old powers, to have yielded, with a good grace, to necessity. How puerile, at the end of nine such years, to believe in the perpetuity of arbitrary thrones and feudal establishments. And, while the friends of liberty were in suspense on the difficult question of the executive power, if monarchy had hastened to conjoin the rights of men with those of

legal royalty, it would have been better for them than that convention of Pilnitz which I styled, at the time, the magna charta of the jacobins.

This coalition, the basis of all the others, was not hatched and put forth against the crimes of August and September, or against the scaffolds and the reign of terror, which were their foreseen, or instigated consequences; but against a constitution deliberately framed by a national assembly, after twenty months of incessant labour, enthusiastically adopted by the nation, accepted by the king, notified by him to all the courts of Europe, and subsequently re-suggested by them with the most dishonest protestations of sincerity.

Having thus, sir, accomplished the object of this letter, it might, perhaps, be proper to conclude it by a comparison of ancient with modern France. We might, for instance, contrast the fantastic divisions into provinces opposed to each other in their local administration and interests, the aristocracy of the pays d'Etats, the intolerable despotism of the intendants, with the departimental topography of Bureaux de Puzy, which, under the indivisible protection and enlightened legislation of a great empire, secures to us all the advantages of a small republic. On one side, we should see arbitrary taxes, from which, this man being exempted, an additional burden was cast upon that; parks and gardens paying nothing, the poor man's field paying more than its produce; industry capriciously taxed; local distinctions keeping up a war of smugglers and tax-gatherers; impediments, vexations, absurdities of all sorts, harassing agriculture and the mechanical arts, manufactures, and commerce, from which, moreover, prejudice was incessantly absorbing families and fortunes that owed their existence

exclusively to them; on the other side, we should see equality and simplicity of taxation; the suppression of internal custom-houses and barriers; the abolition of rangerships and of all privileges founded on personal servitude, with right of redemption as to others, as well as unqualified liberty in the application of every moral and physical faculty. Instead of an impending bankruptcy, we should see the return of public confidence and a mass of national wealth, which, after providing for religious worship, for pensions, and for leaving the nuns in their retreats, will assure great resources to the public purse; resources, however, which, great as they will be, will be less great and inexhaustible than is befitting a nation as industrious as powerful, in possession of a true constitution, and whose soils, and waters, and position, are calculated to command the most multiplied products, manufactures, and internal and external communications. On one side would be the police of espionage and *lettres de cachet;* hereditary venality, by the mere fact of places of judicature; chicaneries, which ruined the man who had recourse to law,—privileges, which dragged him to Paris,—demurrers, which foiled him; the barbarism of the criminal law; the intolerant code of Louis XIV. attenuated, in 1788, by Louis XVI., and subsequently copied by that assembly which defiled the name of convention. On the other hand, while freely acknowledging the imperfections of our new judicial institutions, we could exhibit, by way of contrast, our law of *habeas-corpus*, our justices of peace, our courts of compromise, our adoption of the trial by jury, our supreme court, and our religious toleration, consecrated by the constitution, from which we have not erased even the regulation peculiar to the salaried clergy. As to comparisons

on military matters, Europe herself has made them; and though jacobinism attempted to divide the national guard in actual service, to suppress that part of it which was not called out, and to destroy the amalgamation of citizen soldiers; though it was prodigal of men and means, alienated nations, and disgusted the patriots of every country, we have seen what France, constitutionally armed, was capable of achieving. Our navy, too, disembarrassed of exclusive admissions, securing our colonies, our external relations, and possessed of many good admirals, might have been destined to brilliant deeds,—but to follow out such a parallel would lead me beyond the limits you have prescribed. I have no wish to dissemble the errors, but too natural, of a large assembly, agitated by internal factions and the hurricane of public passion; like all bodies newly revolutionized, it was led to mistake for aristocracy all conditions of legislative stability, or judicial independency; and for despotism, all resources of executive vigour. I shall be satisfied with recalling this single fact, that its prodigious destruction of abuses, and its liberal and pregnant institutions for the public welfare, were guaranteed by a constitution founded on the obvious and sacred doctrine of natural and social right. The defects of this constitution could be amended, partly, by simple laws; while, for the revision and improvement of the constitution itself, nothing more was required than the desire of three successive legislatures, or the free and peaceful expression of the national will. Meanwhile, there was every appearance that its existence would be secured by the interests of the legislative assembly, to which it had bequeathed so fine and useful a career, and wherein, against its violators of every description, so many anathemas

were unanimously directed; by the interests of the king, who, besides his supreme dignity and thirty millions of revenue from the civil list, or from domains embellished with splendid palaces, could expect, from constitutional order alone, the means of happiness, of influence, or even of safety; by the interests of every citizen menaced at the same time by counter-revolution and that deadly violence which plunged France into a bondage of blood, and every honest bosom into everlasting mourning; finally, by the first of safeguards and political expedients,—the nation's confidence in, its enthusiastic love for, that constitution to which it had sworn.

Quæ est autem in hominibus tanta perversitas ut, inventis frugibus, glande vescantur? But at that time, far from supposing the retrocession of my country into bondage possible, much less that vile, infernal tyranny to which, with all its motives and means of resistance, it so unaccountably succumbed, I was justified in anticipating for liberty nothing short of a prosperous career: my ambition was therefore satisfied. No sooner did the opening of the legislative assembly give the finishing touch to the establishment of the new order of things, than, conformably to my avowed intention, at all times expressed, I relinquished the extraordinary position to which, by the wants of liberty and the affection of my companions, I had been called; I withdrew a hundred leagues from the capital to the place of my nativity, there, in peace and the bosom of my family, to enjoy my unsullied recollections and philanthropic hopes. Salutation and friendship.

LAFAYETTE.

OF

THE FRENCH ARMIES

UNDER THE OLD MONARCHY, AND DURING THE FIRST YEARS OF THE REVOLUTION.

BEGINNING OF THE WAR IN 1792.*

THE Gaulic nation was always renowned for its martial ardour and the impetuosity of its attacks. It was recruited from the élite of the Roman armies, the Francs and Normans. France could hardly fail, therefore, to exhibit a people formidable in arms, especially at their first onset. When feudalism had compressed almost the whole of the population, this national characteristic was perpetuated in that small number of persons permitted to appear in arms. During the course of our wars, a heedless ardour has been the cause of some disastrous days—it has often been the source of victory.

But one popular war has occurred, the *Jacquery*, if, indeed, we can discern anything like a real struggle in this insurrection of peasants, incited to despair, presenting their naked and unarmed bodies to the lances of the nobility, mailed in steel. By

* It is evident, from various passages of this notice, that it was composed shortly after the hundred days.

degrees the enfranchisement of the commons, the adoption of regular troops, the invention of powder, changed the nature of war and arms. Brilliant knights we still continued to possess; our strong places, such as Mezières and Metz, were defended by Bayards and Guises; the Duke de Nemours, the Constable de Bourbon, Coligny, Henry IV., and many others, did gallant feats of arms at the head of warriors worthy of them; but the Swiss infantry, the Spanish bands, and even the German reîtres, challenged a superiority over us, until the battle of Rocroy, when the great Condé, destroying the Spanish infantry, gave us the pre-eminence. It was ably sustained by our generals during the youth of Louis XIV. At that epoch of the science of war, French military terms were introduced into all the languages of Europe. Louis XIV. waged the most unjust wars; his ambition was unbounded. The burning of the Palatinate, executed by Turenne, one of his most virtuous generals, surpassed all known excesses of the kind. At the same time, the accumulated hatred and contumelies of modern coalitions have never surpassed those of which this prince was the object. The end of his reign was unfortunate; still there remained good troops under Louis XV., commanded by Marshal Saxe. The battle of Fontenoy was on the verge of being lost because forty thousand men were reserved, to guard the king, out of gun-shot. Those campaigns of Flanders, where women followed their husbands or lovers, where balls and plays were interrupted by only one or two sieges or battles, after which everybody went to spend the winter at Paris, form a strong contrast with the perils and fatigues of our modern warfare; but during that period Frederic appeared, and changed the whole military system.

In that which he chose he was guided by the nature of his country, its inhabitants, and the necessity of partly composing his army of foreign vagabonds and deserters. Appropriating the idea of Marshal Saxe, that "the art of war is in the legs," an idea of which the revolutionary generals made so much use, and which the most celebrated of all of them carried even to excess, unable, moreover, to depend upon the *morale* of his soldiers, he was satisfied with having the power to move them by his tactics, at the same time that he restrained them by his discipline. The seven years' war was disgraceful to France, not that there was any lack of courage, or even of second-rate talents; Hastemberck, Berghen, Saundershausen, Klostercamp, prove, moreover, that it would have been possible to have found good generals; but the corruption and frivolity of the court, the pretensions of the high aristocracy, the extortions of contractors and of some commanders, (witness the pavillion of Hanover,* built by Marshal de Richelieu,) the intrigues of ministers, of courtiers, and mistresses, destroyed our armies and our renown. The plans of campaigns were traced at Madame de Pompadour's, who used to mark the concerted points with those small patches of court-plaster with which the ladies of that day were in the habit of ornamenting their faces. The king's mistress, the minister, the head of the staff, and two or three lieutenant-generals, had usually no other occupation than that of disconcerting the general in command, who could do nothing without

* Such was the name given by Richelieu to a hotel in Paris, which he built and richly embellished with the fruits of his enormous rapine while commanding the French army in Hanover.—(Note of the translator.)

an order from the court. These malpractices, still more than our defeats, which generally terminated in a rout, had brought our armies into utter disrepute. Military men, of all countries, were of one opinion in assigning to us the lowest rank, and even those of our own concurred, strangely enough, in this manner of estimating us.

The American war, however, raised us a little in public opinion. Several difficult positions in the Antilles had been bravely carried by the troops under the command of the Count d'Estaing and the Marquis de Bouillé. A corps of from five to six thousand men, sent as an auxiliary force to the United States, under General Rochambeau, could not fail, in its first campaign, to draw attention to its discipline and good appearance while at Rhode Island; but being ordered, in the following year, to appear before New York, by Washington, the commander-in-chief, it was led by this officer to the siege of York, into which the American General Lafayette, after five months' manœuvring in Virginia, had driven Lord Cornwallis and his army. Three thousand French, under the orders of the Marquis de Saint Simon, brought from the West Indies by the Count de Grasse, had previously joined Lafayette. The American and French troops strove to outvie each other in good conduct. Lord Cornwallis was forced to lay down his arms on the 19th of October, 1781. This success compelled the English to a peace, by which the American independence was recognised, and the degrading condition of receiving a British commissioner at Dunkirk annulled. The French also conducted themselves well in India. At Gibraltar the young courtiers rivalled each other in zeal. A spirit had begun to

ferment in our armies, which had been preceded by great improvements in our system of military instruction.

In fact, after the seven-years' war, attention began to be directed to the political and military degradation into which France had fallen; but the reflections it gave rise to did not extend to the adoption of a system of tactics suitable to our position. The only thing thought of was, to imitate a system having the least analogy with our natural advantages or defects. Rigidity of discipline, the hierarchical pride of rank, corporal punishments, the conversion of the soldier into a machine, precision of movements, steadiness of ranks, a courage, based on the fear of inspectors placed in the rear of the troops, rather than on a pressing desire to rush onwards,—combinations which excluded all individual intelligence, that they might be entirely under the control of the talent and experience of the commanders,—such was the Prussian system: it did not suit us, and would not have failed to have kept us in a state of inferiority. Yet our efforts to imitate it were attended with many advantages; the corps became easier to move; the troops learnt to manœuvre; and as much of the German pedantry was retained as contributed to the obedience, the *ènsemble*, and the exactness, required by the profession of arms. The infantry exercised their legs, the artillery was compelled to become lighter, and the cavalry was pushed into a gallop. It is astonishing, however, that the general and field-officers of reputation, some of whom had already seen service, who went to instruct themselves in the school of the first military genius of his time, should have brought back nothing better than ridiculous pretensions, founded on the apish imitation of a dress closely docked, on

the exaggeration of a brutal discipline, without having mastered a single conception that was truly military, without having comprehended even those minute mechanical means which fascinated every eye by their result. It was necessary, for instance, that a lieutenant, of the name of Pirsch, should escape from the Prussian service, in order to communicate to us the secret—if what ought to have been so well known may be called such—of forming an alignement by dressing on the colours advanced to the front. People were delighted that Pirsch should condescend to accept a regiment, and become the preceptor of the French army. But though the troops were worried to excess with drilling and manœuvring, it never happened to these field-day soldiers to be able to effect any military combination with the enemy before them. Singular as our assertion may appear to that portion of the army that does not date further back than the revolution, military men of the old time will have no difficulty in remembering to what an extent our busybodies were absorbed in the fooleries, or, at best, in the mere mechanism, of their profession; so much so, indeed, that the true science of war seemed to be a superfluous accessory, and one almost entirely overlooked. But while our ministers, generals, and commanders of regiments, were going astray in these crooked paths, the troops, though often unseasonably harassed, had picked up a considerable degree of skill in manœuvring; they had become more manageable and better disciplined; and our engineer and artillery corps, improving with the progress of knowledge and the exact sciences, preserved and even augmented their superiority over those of the rest of Europe.

On the other hand, the increase of philosophical

and liberal ideas, and particularly the revolution of the United States, a source of instruction and interest to the whole nation, could not fail to influence the *morale* of the army, a part of which had shared in the war of American independence; while the great aim of the government appeared to be, to consolidate all abuses the most at variance with the public spirit of the times. The rank of officer had been always the appanage of the privileged class. The line of exclusion was rendered still more palpable by the regulation which positively required, as a qualification, the proofs of four degrees of nobility. From the earliest times, the nobility of the court had been favoured with the superior grades, the great commands, and even those of regiments, at the expense of the provincial nobility, not unfrequently the most ancient and the least mixed of the two. Another source of irritation to the latter was, the distinction of families presented at court, for which the privilege of attaining the rank of colonel at twenty-three, the command of a regiment at twenty-nine, consequently the qualification of being a general-officer, became a species of right, while the rest of the nobility languished in the inferior grades. And these lower grades themselves were interdicted to men not noble, who sometimes attained them, under the designation of officers of fortune, but only by dint of long service and patronage. And even when a lieutenant of cavalry had been lucky enough to surmount the many obstacles opposed to him, he could never, in this branch of the service, rise to the rank of captain. Nay, the gentleman himself might not, until after long service, aspire to that command of a company which the young courtier was competent to obtain the moment he reached his eighteenth year. The introduction of blows with

the flat side of the sabre, by the Count de Saint Germain, humiliated, irritated the whole army, and became a cause of implacable hatred, on the part of the soldiers, to those officers, colonels, and generals, who had the weakness or folly warmly to espouse this innovation. There sprung up, also, among these officers, an emulation of harshness, martinetship, and brutal folly, towards the corps and individuals under their command, which, preventing all genuine ideas of military merit, made it to consist exclusively of the sallies of an activity without object, and of a severity without judgment. Colonels, armed with blank powers to break officers, invite the commanders of other corps, as to a fête, to hear the most affronting charges, or to witness corporal punishments, of which they appeared to make a pleasure and a pastime. They fancied themselves distinguished soldiers in proportion as they were finical, harsh, and detested by the troops. These practices alienated a great proportion of the officers. The corps of engineers, necessarily composed of well-informed and reflecting men, possessed a feeling of independence which subsequently attached it, almost without an exception, to the cause of the revolution. The artillery officers were more divided; but yet contained a larger number of patriots than the other corps. The indispensable instruction of their under-officers made these the zealous advocates of liberty and equality. Though, generally speaking, the composition of the army, and its mode of recruiting, rendered the class of soldiers very inferior to what it has been since, the under-officers taken from them were always much distinguished, and very superior to those of the other armies of Europe. A remarkable circumstance contributed to their falling off from the government. The aris-

tocracy of the nobles, the clergy, and the parliaments, alarmed about some of its pecuniary interests, had, in 1787 and 1788, fomented insurrections, of which the egotism of the privileged classes was the primum mobile, but in which the friends of liberty, with entirely opposite views, participated, and which the court desired to suppress by arbitrary measures. The greater part of the officers, especially those of Brittany and Dauphiny, some from a sentiment of patriotism, a much larger number from esprit-de-corps, obeyed, but reluctantly, the king's commands, wilfully misinterpreted them in various points, and set the first lessons of insubordination to their soldiers. Such was the spirit of the officers, that, at the formation of the states-general, in consequence of the remonstrance of a colonel, M. Morton de Chabrillant, the instructions given by the nobility to their delegates, in many instances, contested the competence of the government to exercise a very reasonable right, to which it had just had recourse, in depriving that officer, not of his rank, but of the command of his regiment. The garrison of Strasbourg actually deliberated on a petition to the states-general against the pretensions of the executive power. The gardes-du-corps themselves addressed the states, requiring that the king should be deprived of his right of selecting a portion of their officers out of the corps. Very soon afterwards the scene changed; the prerogatives of the throne appeared to be menaced; they naturally leagued themselves with those of the several aristocracies. The cause of the tiers-état, that is to say, of the nation, was thereby disembarrassed of all considerations foreign to its true interests. From that moment, soldiers, under-officers, and a small number of patriotic officers, began to surmise that

the spirit of insubordination to which they had been incited in defence of the pretensions of the privileged classes was much more applicable to the defence of their own rights, of those of their country, and of the French nation. Thirty thousand troops, with which many foreign regiments had been designedly mixed, were stationed around Versailles, for the obvious purpose of overawing the patriotism of the capital, and dissolving the national assembly. The French soldiers sided with the nation. The regiment of guards set the example by placing themselves under the command of their sergeants, for the purpose of marching to the Bastile, and of maintaining public order in the midst of the revolution of the 14th of July. Lafayette, chosen commander-in-chief of the Parisian insurrection, confirmed this expulsion of the old officers of the guard by giving their rank to the sergeants who had served the popular cause. He admitted into the paid guard of Paris the soldiers of the different corps who had come and joined the movements of the capital. It is necessary to recur to these early elements of the revolution, in order to comprehend the manner in which was formed the spirit that animated, and the impulse that was received by, that army whose astounding labours and prodigious success it would, without this preliminary, be impossible to explain. The troops of the line, like the rest of the nation, exhibited two parties,—the one composed of the majority of the officers, and of some under-officers and soldiers, looked upon as deserters from the popular cause ; the other comprising nearly the whole body of the soldiers, with patriotic officers at their head. These old troops were already nothing more than the vanguard of the nation, which armed, as it were, by enchantment, under the name of national

guards, and rapidly organized itself on the model and under the influence of the guard of the capital.

Lafayette, in assuming the tri-coloured cockade, had declared, at the Hotel de Ville—" I bring you a cockade which will make the tour of the world; and an institution, both civic and military, which condemns all arbitrary governments to this alternative—if they do not imitate it, to be vanquished; or, if they dare to imitate it, to be overthrown." This cockade, a long while worn by Louis XVI. and his brother, Louis XVIII., became the signal of liberty, the ensign of national glory; and in these latter times, again, has it not operated as a talisman on a people and an army intoxicated with joy at seeing it revived?

During the continuance of the constituent assembly, the patriotism of the army necessarily became firmer; but the divisions between the aristocratic officers and their subalterns became more and more decided. The discipline it was of such importance to renew was disorganized, at one and the same time, by the malicious negligence of the officers, by their provocation of the soldiers, and by the anarchical interference of the jacobins, whose clubs were acquiring great influence over the troops. Dupor-tail, minister of war, and the military committee of the assembly, committed a great fault in encouraging their attendance on these clubs. Still the most striking acts of insubordination were rebuked by the decrees of the assembly, and often vigorously put down. An instance of this kind is the affair of Nancy, from which the counter-revolutionary party was promising itself great results, when, with the concurrence of the assembly, the king, the national guards, and some regiments under the command of

M. de Bouillé, who still professed a fidelity to the constitution, this insurrectionary movement was checked by a severe example. The constituent assembly deserved the gratitude and attachment of the army. The soldiers' pay, very inadequate before, was increased; the military enactments were made to harmonize with the spirit of the nation, and with that sentiment of honour inherent in the French soldier, which the passion for liberty rendered still more delicate and noble. A mode of promotion was devised, in which the claims of seniority and those of talent were nicely balanced. We peruse with interest the reports of its military committee, those of MM. Alexander Lameth, its president, Victor Broglie, Beauharnais, father of Prince Eugene, Emery, Bureaux de Pusy, &c. This committee associated with itself the most distinguished officers in each department of the service, and laid the basis of the regeneration of the French army. Mirabeau proposed its being disbanded and instantly reorganized; but this proposition was passed by, and it was thought sufficient to bind the officers by a civic oath. The federation of the national guards and of the troops of the line, on the 14th of July, 1790, constituted one of the most brilliant epochs of the revolution. Fourteen thousand representatives of forty millions of national guards, as well as deputies from every corps of the line, met to bind themselves by a patriotic oath, and cement that amalgamation which had formed the army. But the force of that army was less in the military enactments of the constituent assembly than in the actual principle of the revolution, which, destroying all pretensions of privileged castes, opened an immense career to courage and national talent, and multiplied

a hundred fold our chances against foreign nations, confined within the narrow circle of aristocratic distinctions and court-prerogatives.

The tocsin of the 14th of July had resounded throughout all Europe; the doctrines of liberty, of equality, of the people's sovereignty, had passed entire from America to the old continent; cabinets and courts, castes and privileged corporations, were appalled. Yet, under what pretext was it permissible to oppose this internal movement of France, when the head of its ancient dynasty appeared to concur in it? The king's flight, on the 21st of June, 1791; the manifesto he left behind him to the assembly; the treaty of Pavia with the Austrians, unknown at the time, but which the memoirs of the Marquis de Bouillé* have since revealed to us, did indeed derange, for an instant, the political system of the constituent assembly, founded, as it was, on the positive assertion that the people and the monarch were united as one against the enemies of the revolution; but the king's return, and the acceptance of the constitution, repaired, as far as possible, this mischance. A general peace must have ensued, if the emigrant princes and their friends, urged by the

* Another royalist, M. Bertrand de Molleville, in his last memoirs, has revealed a secret negotiation of the king and queen, through the agency of Count Alfonse de Durfort, with the Count d'Artois and the Emperor Leopold, somewhat anterior to the king's escape, and independent of the journey of Varennes, which did but derange it. It was stipulated that the emperor should send an army to the Low Countries, and invite the other powers to co-operate with him in restoring the king's authority. Painful is it to see unveiled these fatal inconsistencies with those formal declarations which the king felt himself obliged to make, at the same time, to the leaders of the revolution, the French people, and all Europe.—(Note of General Lafayette.)

constitutionalists to rally around the king, to abjure the prejudices of the old régime, in order to enjoy all the advantages of the new, which were profusely tendered to them, had not replied—"All, or nothing!" or, in other words, counter-revolution, or war. It was subsequent to this period, in the closing months of 1791, that the fatal epidemic of emigration began to prevail. It was scarcely perceptible—the fact is remarkable—in the opening of the revolution,* a period of inevitable anarchy. The early disorders were, unquestionably, very lamentable; but taken together, during the first year, throughout France, they are not, perhaps, equivalent to what occurred lately in a single department,† at a time when the king's government was everywhere recognised, the national army disbanded, the strong places restored, and the entire force of the coalition employed in sustaining their work. This fatal emigration was also prior, by some months, to the 10th of August, 1792, and all the subsequent horrors,—events which, but for it, never would have occurred. It had a powerful effect on the spirit and discipline of the army. It instituted a mode of desertion, a point of honour in treason, a system of

* It has been said, that it was the patriots themselves who encouraged the departure of the emigrants, that they might get hold of their property. The true friends of liberty abolished passports because they had always disapproved them. The jacobins renewed them as far as they could; Lafayette procured their abolition towards the close of the constituent assembly. Their renewal was accompanied by still more annoying conditions than before, and this at the instance of the jacobins of the legislative body. Both the one and the other acted consistently with their principles, but neither of them had hit upon that profound speculation which it is ridiculous to attribute to them.—(Note of General Lafayette.)

† In 1815.

abducting the military chests of regiments, and advances made to the officers, which may perhaps be canonized in the catechism of the emigration, but which, by offering a partial justification to the vociferations of the clubs against the nobles and officers, inspired the troops with every species of indignation and mistrust. The malice of foreign governments, inseparable from the very nature of our revolution, and stimulated by the intrigues and misrepresentations of the emigrants, required time for its development. In England, at first, a feeling of admiration and interest was awakened by the incipient workings of our national liberty, which even Mr. Pitt felt himself obliged to respect. In vain did Mr. Burke express his apprehensions that revolutionary France would henceforth be "a great blank" in the affairs of Europe; but little regard was paid to this prophecy, since rendered so ridiculous by the part that the republic and empire subsequently enacted, and which was never accomplished for an instant, until after their destruction. The Empress Catherine and the King of Sweden exhibited their displeasure at first merely in bravadoes. Germany was satisfied with preserving herself from the contagion of French principles and chicanery on the feudal rights of the proprietary princes of Alsace, to whom the most exorbitant compensations were tendered in vain. Yet these very princes, who were then so difficult to satisfy, these very sovereigns, their superiors, who made them a cat's-paw, are the same we have since seen coming to kiss the all-powerful hand which, by a gesture, disposed of their destiny, and to fill those ministerial antechambers, where, for the express benefit of those children of legitimacy, was opened a market of denunciations, acquisitions, and mutual

plunder. The intrigues of the emigrant princes, however, and of their protectors, to which England gave an underhand direction, but much more the fear and hatred of the liberal and popular principles of the revolution, prevailed over other considerations of state, and even over those mutual divisions and jealousies which, up to that moment, had constituted the diplomacy of Europe. The treaty of Pilnitz was signed. This great political act, become the charter of all the privileges of monarchy and aristocracy against the rights of men and nations, has been the type of all succeeding coalitions, which were, in fact, but its inevitable consequence. At this day we see this same system, improved and cemented under less obtrusive forms, and bearing the specious denomination of the Holy Alliance of legitimate governments.

It was on the 27th of August, 1791, at an interview between the Emperor of Germany, the King of Prussia, and the Elector of Saxony, and after four days of conference, at which the Count d'Artois and the Marquis de Bouillé aided, that the first engagement of the different powers was taken " to unite their forces for the purpose of re-establishing in France the monarchy on a basis at once consistent with the rights of sovereigns and the welfare of the French nation." It had been preceded, on the 17th of August, by a *conclusum* of the diet of Ratisbon, on the claims of the proprietary princes, by which the Emperor was authorized to arm the circles of the empire. The constitution was accepted by the king on the 13th of September. A decree of the assembly, sanctioned by the king, declared, upon a motion of Lafayette's, a general amnesty for all acts connected with the revolution, abolished the use of passports, and every oath but the civic. The

form of this decree provided against everything that could be done against the emigrants.* It was at this period that the constitutionalists renewed their entreaties and offers to induce the return and union of all Frenchmen under the new compact just sanctioned by the king. They were refused; and the refusal rendered all renewal of confidence impossible between the people and the king, by whom the emigrants professed to be tacitly directed. This refusal gave the jacobins, and all other agitators, immense means of influence and confusion. The constituent assembly dissolved itself, on the 30th of September, after having digested everything which appertained to the composition, promotion, well-being, and jurisprudence of the army; and when it abolished the orders of chivalry, it preserved, provisionally, the cross of Saint Louis, "until the institution of an order both civil and military,"—an expression which foreshadowed what has since been accomplished by the institution of the Legion of Honour; but, in the midst of all that it did for the benefit, the glory, and strength of the defenders of the state, the first and great impulse of our military prodigies is to be sought for in the revolution itself. It was through it that liberty inflamed every heart with an irresistible enthusiasm, and that equality,

* The legislative assembly, by its decrees of January 30th and 31st, and February 1st, 1792, revived the use of passports for Frenchmen and foreigners; on May 18th, of the same year, it devised rigorous measures of police respecting the latter. The following appeared in "The Revolutions of Paris," (a newspaper by Prudhomme:)—"In pursuance of an insidious motion by Lafayette, the constituent assembly decreed an amnesty and the liberty of travelling through France or leaving it at pleasure. This law, represented as a fine proceeding, worthy of a nation conscious of its force, was at that time nothing better than an act of signal imprudence."

levelling all those barriers that had hitherto kept back courage and talent, laid open to them a vast career, into which there rushed, from the lowest ranks of the national guard and army, a crowd of heroes, and numerous chiefs, who, but for the revolution, would have grown old, unknown to their fellow-countrymen and to themselves.

The first hostile demonstrations of the coalition of Pilnitz belong to the close of 1791. The notification made by the king of his acceptance of the constitutional act received no other replies than such as were cold, ambiguous, and evidently got up in concert by the different powers. The king's ministers at these courts were received with impertinence, or at least without cordiality. The greater part of the powers had their representatives at Coblentz. Count Romanzoff was accredited then from the empress of Russia. The king of Sweden, Gustavus III., was indiscreet enough to announce himself as the future chief of the Anti-gallican crusade. The emperor Leopold, in the beginning, shewed more good sense in what he did in Brabant, with respect to the national cockade and the armed assemblages of the emigrants,* though those very assemblages were tolerated in the ecclesiastical states. The princes of the empire had received the circular of the diet, which ordered the circles to arm themselves and hold the contingents in readiness. The emperor acquainted Louis XVI. with this circumstance, and, in reply to an amicable requisition of the king to the elector of Treves, even before he could have learnt that of the 14th of De-

* In December, 1791, the emperor issued a proclamation in the Low Countries, forbidding, under the worst penalties, the recruiting or mustering any troops not in his service.

cember, he declared, on the 20th of that month, he had already apprized the elector that, in case of any attack on our side, the Austrian general, Bender, would march to his succour.* He added, that the constitution of the empire admitted no indemnity for the proprietary princes in Alsace. This guarantee of the feudal possessions served as a pretext to the courts of Vienna, Petersburg, and Berlin, at the very moment when, scandalously violating the most solemn and recent guarantees, they were engaged in partitioning amongst themselves the remains of Poland. The English government excited, in an underhand manner, those movements against us;† but this prevented not Brissot from saying, at the tribune, the 29th of December, 1791:—"I do not

* (*Moniteur*, sitting of 31st of December, 1791.)—"M. de Lessart, minister of foreign affairs, read *a document, dated Vienna, 31st of December*, in which the chancellor of the empire informed the ambassador of France to Vienna, that the prince-elector of Treves had rendered an account to the emperor of the declaration that had been made to him by the King of the French, relating to the assembling of the emigrants in his states; that the elector of Treves replied to that declaration that he had followed the regulations put into practice by the Austrian Low Countries; that the elector of Treves, dreading the result of such a declaration, had requested the assistance of the emperor; that the emperor, convinced of the moderate intentions of his most catholic majesty, but not feeling certain, from his own daily experience, of the general adoption of those intentions, and fearing that, in spite of the principles of the king, acts of violence would take place against the elector, thought it necessary to enjoin Marshal Bender to yield him the most efficacious succours,——" &c.

† An estimable historian of the revolution, (Toulongeon, vol. i. p. 236,) quotes, on this occasion, a passage from the celebrated Chancellor Bacon, who considers it the great interest of the cabinet of London to crush, in all the nations of Europe, *the slightest desire of becoming really free.*—(Note of General Lafayette.)

believe we have anything, either secretly or openly, to fear from England."

From the official reports, the army of the line, at that period, was composed of 145,000 men, of whom 27,000 were cavalry, and 8000 artillery. Of the 107,000 men of the volunteer battalions of national guards, the half was already formed, the other half on the point of being so, without reckoning 50,000 men of the coast-guard. Forty-five strong places were restored to a state of activity; our arsenals were replenished. The magazines contained one year's provisions for 200,000 men. The number of officers who had abandoned the army amounted to 1900. The proposal of publishing their names had been rejected. In the month of November, however, the first law was framed against emigrants.* The French princes, chiefs of those assemblages, were declared guilty of conspiracy, and were to be punished by death if they did not return on the 1st of January, 1792. The king refused to sanction that law; but he urged, in a proclamation, the emigrants to return, and commanded, imperatively, his brothers to do so. They did not less continue their manœuvres and armaments; the assembly unanimously rendered a decree of accusation against the two brothers of the king, the Prince of Condé, and three other chiefs of Coblentz.†

Narbonne had been, since the 6th of December, 1791, minister of war;‡ extremely frank, clever, and active, he gave a strong excitement to military

* Decrees of the 8th and 9th of November, 1791.

† MM. de Calonne, de Laqueille, and Grégoire Riquetti de Mirabeau.

‡ M. de Narbonne succeeded to M. Duportail, who had given his resignation on the 1st of December.

affairs. The 14th, the king himself came to announce that he had declared to the elector of Treves, "that if, before the 15th of January, every armed assemblage of French refugees had not ceased in his states, he should only behold in him an enemy of France." He added, "that the same declaration should be made to all those who favoured such assemblages; that he had requested the intervention of the Emperor of Germany, who had conducted himself like a faithful ally; but that, if necessary, he should propose having recourse to arms." The minister announced* the formation of three armies of 50,000 men, and said "that the country appointed as chiefs, the Generals Rochambeau, Luckner, and Lafayette." The hall resounded several times with applauses. When Narbonne proposed, in the council, the names of those three generals, the king opposed the appointment of Lafayette. "If your majesty does not appoint him to-day," said the minister, "the national wish will force you to do so to-morrow." His colleagues were of the same opinion, and the king yielded to their advice.

The adversaries of the revolution having been rendered secure from all persecution by the decree which abolished proceedings on account of opinion, as well as the régime of passports, and all the institutions being organized, we have already seen that Lafayette retired with his family to the mountains of Auvergne. Endeavours were made to draw him from thence to induce him to fulfil the functions of mayor of Paris, in which city the jacobins pretended he solicited, *incognito*, that favour; while the aristocrats attributed to him I scarcely know what project,

* At the same sitting of the 14th.

of forming the departments of the south into a republic. The influence of the court, combined with that of the jacobins, caused the appointment of Petion, and the more readily from a great number of the friends of Lafayette thinking they ought to conform to the decision he had taken, and for such a length of time announced, of living in retirement as soon as the constitutional act should be adopted.* He was, however, obliged to leave that retreat, and to repair to the post to which he was summoned by the voice of the government and of his country, then threatened by the powers of the coalition. When he arrived at Paris, Narbonne had already set out to visit the frontier, giving him a rendezvous at Metz, where Luckner and Rochambeau were to be appointed marshals of France.

Lafayette might have been appointed marshal also, by a special decree of the legislative body ;† but he dissuaded several of its members from making such a proposal, not only because a higher rank in the army would have been opposed to the decree of the constituent assembly, which forbade the acceptance of any promotion by a deputy, save that attained by seniority, during the space of two years, but also because his own peculiar situation rendered that new title useless to the defence of the territory. He was received with politeness by the king, and de-

* Petion was appointed the 16th of November, 1791. A fortnight after that election, Manuel and Danton obtained the majority of votes for the functions of attorney-general and of substitute adjoint to the attorney-general of the commune of Paris.

† In consequence of the principles which at that period governed the military organization, the king could not confer the title of marshal on the generals Luckner and Rochambeau ; a decree of the assembly was necessary.

livered these words at the bar of the assembly, from whose members he was greeted with the most flattering marks of confidence :—

(*Sitting of December the 24th.*)—" The national assembly is acquainted with my principles and sentiments. I will therefore limit myself to expressing my deep gratitude for the approbation it has deigned to grant to the selection of the king, and I shall ever unite this feeling to that of my respect for the national assembly, and of my unutterable devotion to the maintenance and defence of the constitution."

The President Lémontey replied—

" The national guards, of whom you created the first movements, will recognise your voice: they will prove worthy of themselves and you. If such be the blindness of our enemies, that they wish to put to the test the force of a great regenerated nation, and resolve to combat against it, the French people, who have sworn to vanquish or die for liberty, will ever present with confidence, to nations and tyrants, *the constitution and Lafayette.*"

When Lafayette quitted Paris, the national guards lined the streets through which he passed. He wished to express his respect for the king by stopping to take leave of him. The jacobins reproached him with having acted like a courtier; the court declared *he had the intention* of braving the king and queen. He let them say what they pleased, and repaired to his quarters-general of Metz,* where it had been agreed upon with Narbonne that the three generals, assembled in that town for a conference, should take up their posi-

* General Lafayette set out this morning, at ten o'clock, to assume, at Metz, the command which has been confided to him. During his passage through Paris, which lasted nearly two hours, he was accompanied by detachments of all the battalions of the national guards, and by an innumerable crowd of citizens, who offered him, with the greatest enthusiasm, their expressions of esteem, confidence, and gratitude. The infantry of the national guard accompanied him to the barriers, and the cavalry to Genesse.—(*Moniteur*, of the 25th of December, 1791.)

tions at Liege, at Treves, and at Coblentz. But the elector of Treves was authorized by the powers who directed him to make his submission. The 3rd of January, 1792, the assemblages were dispersed.* The armies remained in France, preparing for an inevitable struggle. The fine address to Frenchmen, *on the necessity of war*, drawn up by Condorcet, adopted unanimously, the 29th of December, by the assembly, and presented that same day to the king, formed a noble opening for the year 1792, and deserves to be preserved in our military annals.

Luckner had been the most distinguished partisan of the seven years' war. He shared with the Duke of Brunswick confidential commissions in the army of Prince Ferdinand, and commanded the advance guard of the allied army. After the peace of 1763, the Duke of Choiseul drew him into our service, with the rank of lieutenant-general, and a pension of 60,000 livres, which the constituent assembly, by an exception in his favour, allowed him to retain. He was consequently much attached to the new constitution, but without pretending to understand it; and when the jacobins wished to exalt his liberal opinions, in order to calumniate those of their adversaries, he often placed his political admirers in an awkward situation, by making the most absurd mistakes. He had not the power of forming great combinations, but he had a quick eye, the habit of military tactics, and all the activity of youth. Rochambeau, who had made his fortune by arms, had been already in service during the war of Flanders. He distinguished himself in the seven

* This intention of the elector was announced the 1st of January, in a document which M. de Lessart communicated, on the 6th, to the legislative assembly.

years' war, and, by studying, in times of peace, all the new tactics and field manœuvres that no person understood better than himself, he never lost sight of the points most important to the soldier's trade. He was, in every respect, formed for war. Charged with the corps of auxiliary troops that the king sent to the United States, he had only an opportunity of active service at the siege of York; but his discipline and prudence were always admired. These two marshals, very dissimilar in many respects, had one feeling in common, occasioned by the advantages they themselves possessed, but which was a serious drawback on this occasion: this was, too great a distrust of new and inexperienced troops in a struggle against the most renowned troops of Europe. Lafayette did not share this feeling. Animated by the revolutionary movement of the period, and by the confidence natural to his age, he augured better of the enthusiasm of liberty. His experience was confined to the war of the United States, but he had been an American general officer at the age of nineteen. He had been several times successful there, namely, in the campaign of 1781, in Virginia, in which he commanded in chief. With the exception, however, of these three generals, there was not an officer in the whole French army who had ever fought at the head of two thousand men. Their first care was to organize their army, and to re-establish discipline. Rochambeau had more knowledge in this respect than the two others.

It was expected that the revolutionary general would have been more indulgent than the marshals. The reverse of this occurred; while the latter fancied it necessary for them to frequent clubs, Lafayette never once appeared at them. His discipline was more severe than that of the ancient régime.

Seconded by other patriot officers, he succeeded in convincing the soldiers that indecision of command was a proof of aristocracy. He destroyed, at once, the equipage and habits of luxury of the ancient French armies. The other two commanders-in-chief were well pleased at seeing his popularity cover the severe measures of which they, as well as he, felt the importance. They employed themselves, also, in giving to parade manœuvres a more military direction. Lafayette introduced one, the principle of which, peculiarly adapted to the ardour, agility, and intelligence of the French, has been since very generally adopted; it consists in covering masses in action by a body of tirailleurs, ready either to reunite with those masses, or to pursue any advantage they may have acquired. Spanish authors attribute the issue of the battle of Pavia to a manœuvre of this kind by the Marquis de Pescara, who caused fifteen hundred light arquebusiers, well exercised, though not in complete order, to rush suddenly in the midst of the French ordnance. This circumstance, and the opinion of the Duke de Guise on the advantage that might be taken of that species of warfare against the invincible masses of the Swiss infantry and the reitres, are well reported in the twenty-seventh speech of Brantome on the various Spanish commanders.

During his journey in Prussia, Lafayette had particularly studied the use of the mounted artillery; and its use in France, which he had been unable to obtain before the revolution, was one of the results of the power that revolution gave him and the military committee of the constituent assembly, which adopted the same view of the subject. Two companies were formed, one attached to the army of Luckner, commanded by Captain Chanteclair,

who had served under Lafayette in Virginia; the other attached to the army of Lafayette, under Captain Barrois. Pieces of eight were substituted to those of three, which was the calibre made use of by the Prussians. It is pleasing to retrace the origin of an institution which has been of such service to our armies. To preserve complete the squadrons and war battalions, the last squadron and 2nd battalion of each regiment were left in the garrison, and to these all recruits were added. Two battalions of national volunteers were united to the first battalion, commanded by the colonel. The second companies of grenadiers formed, with the volunteer grenadiers, battalions of reserve. Battalions of foot chasseurs and free companies were created. The cavalry was well mounted, and manœuvred well. The corps of artillery and engineers were, without exception, the finest in Europe. The soldiers, under officers, and patriot officers, were zealous in the cause; but that cause was hampered by the ill-will or indecision of the aristocrats, who were either hesitating whether they should desert, or awaiting the moment in which desertion would be most useful to their party. The minister and generals had vainly adjured them, in the name of honour, to remain faithful, or quit the service, which they might do with security to themselves. Nor had any officer cause to repent having confided in this promise. Many examples might be quoted in support of this assertion: for instance, that captain of the 6th regiment of Armagnac, who, declaring his hatred for the revolution, confessed he but remained in service because, under the ancient régime, M. de Bouillé had never been able to obtain the pension due to the wounds he had received in

the colonies.—"Well," replied Lafayette, "the justice that was refused you by the government you regret, shall be granted you by that government you refuse to serve." But instead of being touched with these traits of reciprocal candour, the greatest number of emigrant officers either waited until the public funds might be in their hands, or until their desertion, before an engagement, might disorganize the whole army. To quote but two examples, amongst many others, which occurred the same year:—the colonel who commanded at Longwy, after having long acted the part of a patriot, when he deserted his post, carried off with him 6,000 livres, which the general-in-chief had confided to him for the purpose of obtaining information; and almost all the officers of the *royal Suédois*, with the exception of the colonel, and some other men of honour, deferred deserting over to the enemy until the very night when the first detachment of the army of the centre, under General Gouvion, had passed the frontier, in full expectation of an engagement the following day. The distrust which a great number of officers but too justly inspired, rendered our position painful and uncertain.

Although a war between the divine right of kings and the sovereignty of nations, between the privileged classes of all Europe and the French revolutionists, appeared an inevitable event, the hesitation manifested by all parties, with the exception of two, —the emigrants and jacobins—may lead us to suppose that all public men felt a presentiment of the horrors that war would entail upon humanity; nor were the jacobins themselves unanimous on this point. Several of their chiefs, especially the girondists, but sought in war "an opportunity of

attacking, advantageously, the constitutionalists of 91, and their institutions."* They sought in it, as Brissot again said, in his address to the French, "an opportunity of laying snares for the king, to manifest his want of faith, and his connexion with the emigrant princes." But many other jacobins had not adopted this refinement of policy. We have even since seen the conquerors of the 31st of May make this a subject of accusation against their former friends.

The emigrants, on the contrary, were unanimous in their desire for an invasion, and in their exertions at all foreign courts; they were satisfied with having engaged foreign armies in the quarrel, and plunged them into the bosom of their country; for they felt convinced that the counter-revolution would be the certain result of the contest. It was known that M. de Calonne, the principal agent of the princes, had publicly said, at Brussels, "If the powers delay making war, we shall know how to make the French declare it." The aristocracy of the court experienced the same feeling. The king and queen hesitated between various parties; the queen especially, who would have consented to her own deliverance to Austrian, or even Prussian arms, was withheld by her reluctance to feel herself under

* See, in the "Moniteur," (sitting of April 3rd, 1793,) the reply of Brissot to Robespierre, who accused him of being an accomplice of Dumouriez:—"I had expressed my opinion at the jacobins, and proved that war was the only means of unveiling the perfidy of Louis XVI. The event has justified my opinion. Robespierre believed that he could attain republicanism with greater certainty by taking from Lafayette his command, and the king his power. I felt that, under existing circumstances, that opinion was impolitic, because the constitution was continually brought up against us, and that the constitution could only be destroyed by war."

obligations to *Monsieur*, whom she had never liked, and the Count d'Artois, whom she no longer liked. "The Count d'Artois will then become a hero!" she exclaimed, in a tone of bitterness.

Some moderate royalists, and even some constitutionalists, formerly very ardent in popular opinions, but who had then adopted ideas of the English constitution, endeavoured to take advantage of this disposition of the king and queen, and of the gentle character of Leopold; not that they entered into an understanding with the emigrants, as they have been falsely accused of doing, but they desired, it was said, that the coalition should content itself with merely making demonstrations of action; and they probably intended to make Louis XVI. appear to the people to act the part of mediator, modify the constitution, and fortify the constitutional monarchy. This combination of the *Austrian committee*, much exaggerated by party spirit,* was blameable as regarded the national will and dignity; but was, nevertheless, opposed to the policy of the counter-revolutionists. A committee of some persons entered, with this view, into a correspondence with the queen and her brother, previous to the declaration of war. This served as a pretext for the famous denunciation of the *Austrian committee*, in which was purposely confounded all constitutional

* Carra denounced, May 15th, 1792, in his "Annales Patriotiques," an *Austrian committee*, of which MM. de Montmorin and Bertrand de Molleville were, according to him, the principal counter-revolutionary agents. These replied by an accusation of libel, which brought forward in the legislative assembly new denunciations from Brissot, at the sitting of May 23rd. The denunciations were resumed by Chabot, June 4th, against MM. de Narbonne, de Lessart, Duport Dutertre, Brissot, Lafayette, and the generals. The assembly proceeded to the order of the day.

chiefs, both civil and military, and the generals of the army; Rochambeau, who never entered into any political combination, and Lafayette, from whom that negotiation was more carefully concealed than from any other person, and whose exclusion from all confidence of the kind had been the first condition imposed by the parties interested, whether Frenchmen or foreigners.* Almost all the consti-

* The jacobins attached to Robespierre were opposed to war, because they feared its being directed by their political rivals, and, also, because several of them, from pecuniary interest, like Danton, or from causes of which they were themselves ignorant, were under the guidance of that small party of the court, who, dreading the influence of the princes, were engaged in secret negotiations. The girondists, at that period, wished for war, at any price, in the hope that it would facilitate their vague projects of ambition; the stipendiaries of the powers acted in the same manner, from different motives; but the *Austrian committee* would have wished the intervention of the foreigners to limit itself to threats, the intervention of the jacobins to a demonstration of the errors of the existing constitution, and the intervention of the court to a removal from office, which would have called the directors of this intrigue into the ministry; while we ourselves preferred frankly engaging in war, to submitting to the insolent demands of the European coalition, which may explain the firm and undeviating line of conduct pursued by all those who were attached to us. While we endeavoured to repress the impetuosity of the girondists, we did not wish the French nation to submit to humiliation; we thought the ministry betrayed too much submission in their moderation, and we ourselves testified more inclination for war, in proportion as the coalition made greater efforts to initiate itself in our affairs. Those persons who affirm that MM. de Lameth and their friends but plotted to form a pure and simple revolution, have lost sight of the threads of the intrigue. The object of the correspondence between the court of Vienna, the queen, and them, was to induce the powers to assume a formidable attitude, to discourage our public spirit; the nation would then, they imagined, feel its sole resource was in the king himself, who would remodel it on the English constitution, and confide to those gentlemen the direction of affairs. The extract from

tutionalists thought, with him, that no safety could be obtained except by rallying, without reserve or hesitation, around the constitution of 91, in spite of its defects; that peace ought to be frankly maintained, if it were still possible to do so; but that, in the contrary event, all the odium of the initiative should be left to the foreign courts.

Under these circumstances, the three generals were summoned to Paris by the minister of war. In the council of state, into which they were introduced, the plan of a campaign was debated, then considered inevitable. It was there agreed that Lafayette should enter the Low Countries, at the head of forty thousand men, and that Rochambeau should hold himself in readiness to support him, whilst Luckner was to manœuvre on the Rhine. There were strong

the journal of Adrien Duport suffices to prove this assertion; but many other proofs exist. This intrigue, of which the intention was less culpable than that of the real counter-revolutionists, was, however, attended with a disastrous result. The foreigners felt themselves encouraged by the hope of a secret intelligence with a section of the patriot party, and with men who, having played the first parts of the jacobins, appeared to represent a popular power. The king and queen discovering thus a means of safety between the triumph of the princes, which they dreaded, and the national constitution, which irritated their feelings of self-love, flattered all parties, without making any decision themselves, and feared less the general disorganization which they believed necessary to bring back the people to them. A vast number of good citizens, seeing their underhand intrigues, felt not only distrust for the court, but also for the men who had re-established the throne the 21st of June; and this gave a great advantage to the anarchists. M. Theodore de Lameth, and some others, were suspected of secret connexions with the court; and this accusation was true, as regarded his brothers; but we acknowledge that he very frankly defended liberty and the constitution in the legislative assembly. These gentlemen must be excused, as far as the interest of liberty allows us to do so.—(Note of General Lafayette.)

reasons for hoping that the occupation of Mayence would be the result of that latter movement. The Marshal de Rochambeau had been the first to propose that Lafayette, with his army, should direct the movement of the Low Countries: "For the case in point there is a revolution," said he, with great simplicity, in the council, "and your Majesty knows that M. de Lafayette understands that subject better than any other person." The part the marshal had reserved for himself was best suited to his experience, and the opinion he had expressed in favour of defensive war.

Some intrigues prolonged the residence of the generals in Paris. Lafayette perceived, with regret, the division between the constitutionalists and girondists. If there was found amongst the former some royalists less republican than the others, that party may be said to adhere strictly to the constitution established by the sovereign will of the people, and accepted with enthusiasm by France. The girondists, on the contrary, although many of them were equally constitutional royalists, affected to feel anxiety, and endeavoured to modify, or, rather arrest the progress of, the constitution, without any fixed aim, and merely to avoid being surpassed in popularity by the real jacobins. Notwithstanding the superiority of the oratorical talents of the girondists, the jacobins made use of them as tools, and broke them to pieces as soon as they had together succeeded in destroying the constitutional party. It was vainly that Lafayette endeavoured to reunite the girondists. The motions of the army were all concerted between the generals and the minister of war, when a pretext was offered to the king and his counsellors for dismissing M. de Narbonne. This was a great misfortune.

Two of the ministers were firm and zealous patriots; two others were moderate but honest men; the fifth, M. Bertrand de Molleville, minister of the navy, very aristocratical; the sixth, M. de Narbonne, a constitutionalist, full of activity and ardour. The latter had cause to be dissatisfied with M. Bertrand. Lafayette was consulted;* in the conference which took place on this occasion between him and the ministry, M. Bertrand consented to give in his resignation, and only requested time to justify himself from an imputation cast on him by the jacobins. Narbonne was displeasing to the court from the frankness of his disposition, the patriotism of his conduct, and his attachment to Lafayette. The generals, fearing to lose so useful a minister, had agreed amongst themselves that each should write him a letter expressive of their confidence in him, and the value they attached to his preserving his place; they hoped by this means to support him in the council. These letters were shewn by Narbonne to his friends; they were published without his participation and against his consent.

The king seized this opportunity of dismissing him.† The remaining ministers, who had aban-

* See in the Appendix to this volume, No. I., the extract of a report of M. de Lessart to the king, on these divisions of the ministry.

† In the "Moniteur" of the 10th of March, 1792, may be found a letter from Marshal Luckner to M. de Narbonne, to persuade him not to quit the ministry. The "Journal of Paris," of the 8th, publishes two other letters, written for the same purpose: the one (March 4th), by M. de Rochambeau, the other, by General Lafayette. (See in this volume the correspondence of the month of March.) M. de Narbonne was dismissed on the 9th, at the same time that M. Cahier de Gerville gave in his resignation. The new ministry was thus formed, on the 24th: MM. Dumouriez, for foreign affairs; Roland, for the

doned such a distinguished colleague, could no longer support themselves. It would be unjust to accuse M. de Lessart of treachery, but he had negotiated with lamentable timidity. Brissot had a bill of accusation filed against him before the high national court;* the other three ministers gave in their

interior; De Grave, for the war department; Lacoste, for the navy; Clavière, for public contributions. M. Duranton was appointed, the 14th of April, minister of justice.

* The constituent assembly, after having established the trial by jury in France, resolved that persons accused of state crimes should participate in the benefit of that institution. It decided that a list of grand juries should be formed by all the departments; that the judges should be drawn from the courts of cassation, to which they had been raised by the choice of the departments, and as being the most eminent among the judicial corps in France; and finally established, at thirty leagues from Paris and the legislative body, a tribunal, under the name of "High National Court," from which all accusations must emanate. No combination was ever formed more favourable to justice and humanity. De Lâtre, accused of a conspiracy, was acquitted on the 9th of August, 1792, by the high national court; the French princes, denounced for manifest rebellion, had been condemned in it by default; and although it was itself denounced daily by the jacobins, as being too favourable to the accused, it courageously continued its functions, until the 10th of August substituted a revolution of crimes for the revolution of 1789. The first consequences of this outrage against the laws of all countries were, the destruction of the high court, the translation of the state-prisoners from Orleans to Versailles, where they were massacred, and the institution of the revolutionary tribunals. When we compare the state of criminal jurisprudence in France, during the three first years of the revolution, with what it had been in previous times and what it became after, we cannot refuse paying a just homage to the founders of French liberty. Who does not know in what manner the accusations of *lèse-nation* were conducted by the jacobins? But does any one wish to know in what manner the best of kings understood the prosecution of the analogous crime of *lèse-majesty?* In this manner did Henry IV. express himself on the trial of M. de Biron, his friend:—"I will bring forward what proofs I can of his innocence, and I allow you to do all

resignation.* Lafayette only thought of pointing out worthy members for the new ministry; he proposed Barthélemy and Diétrich; but M. de La Porte, organ of the counter-revolutionary aristocrats, composed, in concert with the jacobin chiefs, a ministry of the girondist party. Dumouriez, a soldier and political intriguer, indifferent himself to parties and opinions, became its chief; for his colleagues they gave him two friends of Brissot, and two jacobins, who were men of honour. De Grave, Narbonne's successor, was only appointed to yield the place soon after to Servan, another friend of Brissot.† Without expressing any dissatisfaction, Lafayette resumed his labours with Dumouriez. He had thought the former minister too timid in his negotiations; he was struck with the eagerness of the present one to provoke war at the commencement of his career. Dumouriez, however, promised the generals that he would only declare it when they should be in readiness to march; but he failed in his engagement with an apparent levity that many suspected was not unconnected with the prediction that had been pronounced by Calonne.‡ Confiding little in such promises, Luckner and Lafayette repaired to their respective destination. Rochambeau was detained some time in Paris, on account of health.

On his arrival at Metz, Lafayette received, officially, a decree, voted at the sitting of January 14th,

you can, until it be ascertained that he is guilty of treason against majesty; for, in that case, a father cannot solicit for his son, a son for his father, a wife for her husband, nor a brother for his brother."—(Note of General Lafayette.)

* MM. Bertrand de Molleville, Duport Dutertre, and Tarbé.

† May 10th, 1792.

‡ See page 287 of this volume.

on the motion of Guadet, a girondist orator, and immediately sanctioned by the king. That decree, which had preceded the appointment of the new ministry, declared " infamous and traitor to the country, guilty of the crime of high treason, any Frenchman who would take part, directly or indirectly, in a project whose aim was, the modification of the constitution, a mediation with the rebels, or that led to the restoring to the proprietary princes in Alsace or Lorraine any of the rights suppressed by the constituent assembly." The whole assembly supported this declaration by an oath, which was afterwards repeated by all the public authorities. Lafayette caused it to be published, according to the express desire of the legislative body, in presence, and in the midst of the applause, of his army. But as the jacobins, continuing to disorganize France by their writings and incessant movements, employed every means most likely to ruin the discipline of the army, or throw contempt on the laws of the state, it was very difficult for a constitutional general to treat with a ministry appointed by the influence of that faction. Lafayette thought himself therefore called upon to address a memorial to Dumouriez, in his own name, and for his colleagues, which was presented to that minister by Rochefoucauld and Jaucourt.* It was a sort of treaty which he proposed to the government, in which the latter should engage, by every means in its power, to cause law, royal dignity, religious liberty, and the constituted authorities, to be respected; to oppose all aristocratical intrigues; not to allow prisoners of war to be treated with indignity, &c. On these

* M. le Comte de Jaucourt, member of the legislative assembly, afterwards of the senate and of the chamber of peers, minister in 1815.

conditions, Lafayette promised to act in concert with the girondist ministry. His memorial was much applauded, but unfortunately produced no result.

War was declared against the King of Bohemia and Hungary, the 20th of April, on the formal proposal of the king, according to the terms of the constitution, and after the report of the minister of foreign affairs, Dumouriez, had been read in his presence. It was not difficult for that minister to prove the evil designs, the insolent or perfidious answers, and the various outrages committed by this monarch against the citizens or new colours of France.* He invoked, in an able manner, the new decree and oath of the 14th of January, which we have just spoken of. Did not these constitutional manifestations, which appeared directed against court intrigues, condemn beforehand, and with still greater force, those deputies who, after having brought them forward themselves, co-operated, not merely to modify, but ruin the constitution?

We must now say a few words of Dumouriez, whose fortunes have influenced so materially the fate of France. We see, in his own memoirs, that during the quarrels between the Genoese and Corsicans, having left Paris to serve one party, he engaged, on his arrival, with the opposite one, which offered him greater advantages.* The following

* In 1763, finding himself at Genoa, at twenty-four years of age, he solicits from the government of that republic the command of the succours it was sending to St. Florent, besieged by Paoli: he is refused, and, not able to serve the Genoese, he resolves to serve against them: he writes to Paoli to offer him his service. He encountered a fresh refusal. He then entered into an intrigue with some Corsicans, repaired to their country, and prepared a revolution in favour of France.—(See vol. i. book i. chap. 3, of "La Vie et les Mémoires de Dumouriez.") In

expressions paint Dumouriez completely: "Honour to the patriots who immortalized the 14th of July and took the Bastile!" he exclaims, in his Memoirs; and a few pages after we find, "that, being at Caen, at the period of July, 1789, when an insurrection was feared in Paris, he composed a memorial on the means of maintaining order and defending the Bastile; that that document, communicated to the Duke de Coigny, and sent to the queen by his valet de chambre, arrived, unfortunately, too late."* The levity he betrays in his justifications, appeared likewise in his affairs. A sister of the famous emigrant Rivarol was his mistress. None believed in his disinterestedness, even before he and his girondist colleagues had given to the public the scandal of their dispute respecting the six millions for private expenses which had been confided to his care.† It has thus never been ascertained whether his

the same work, (vol. iii. book v. chap. 4,) we see in what manner Dumouriez would have been disposed to accede immediately to the views of Lafayette, which he supposes favourable, in 1792, to the form of the English government, and the overthrow of the constitution of 1791. This did not prevent his declaring, a short time after, (vol. iii. book vi. chap 2,) "that if Gensonné and Vergniaud had spoken frankly to him, he would undoubtedly have joined with them."—(Note of General Lafayette.)

* Vol. ii. book iii. chap. 4, "De la Vie et les Mémoires de Dumouriez."

† At the sitting of June 13th, 1792, Dumouriez, who had just taken part in the dismissal of the girondist ministers, MM. Servan, Roland, and Clavière, was accused by Brissot of having missapplied six millions of secret funds. Dumouriez declared he would soon give to the public the dividends and names of those who only now complained from not having been able to devour the whole of the money: he was answered by a challenge to prove one fact; but this quarrel produced no result on either side.

errors were owing to the levity of his character, to his ambitious intrigues, or to foreign causes. But after having declared these severe truths, it is justice to add, that Dumouriez was clever, brave, fertile in resources, and endowed with great military talents. The son of a commissary of war, known by the poem of *Richardet*, he had been wounded during the seven years' war,—at which time he was but a young officer, —and much engaged in the *secret correspondence*, a sort of diplomatic spying system, of which Louis XV. had given the superintendence to the Count de Broglie, one of the most distinguished men of that reign. He had been sent to the confederates of Poland. He was sent, after the revolution, to negotiate with the insurgents of Belgium.* Lafayette had caused him to be proposed for the military command at Lyons,† to the king, who charged the minister, Duportail,‡ to express how much such a choice displeased him, adding, "that that intriguer was known to him, and that people would repent having protected him." This did not prevent the monarch, the following year, on the recommenda-

* See pages 18, 39—41, and 43, of this volume.

† At the commencement of December, 1790, several officers of the national guard of Lyons had discovered a project of counter-revolution. A decree to transfer to Paris the persons accused of this plot was presented to the constituent assembly. It was at this period that Lafayette proposed Dumouriez to the king, as commander at Lyons: he thought him a patriot, somewhat of an intriguer, and well formed to discover a conspiracy. MM. de Lameth opposed that choice, because they imagined that Dumouriez was devoted to Lafayette. The only person not mistaken in the case was the king.—(Note of General Lafayette.)

‡ M. Duportail replaced M. de Latour Dupin in the war department, November 17th, 1790, and gave in his resignation the 1st of December of the following year.

tion of M. de La Porte,* making Dumouriez chief of a ministry, into which entered the three principal members of the jacobin club, Roland, Servan, and Clavière. The latter, under the patronage of Mirabeau, was a zealous partisan of monarchical ideas. Mirabeau, pointing him out to the deputies who came to speak to him in favour of the *suspensive veto*, replied, one day, "Do you see that bald head?—I do nothing without consulting it." And that bald head, republican at Geneva, republican the 10th of August, was then decidedly in favour of the *absolute veto*.

At the moment of the declaration of war, Lafayette made a proclamation to his army, of which a portion was addressed to the nation as well as to his troops. It may not be, perhaps, superfluous to insert it here, as a testimony of the constitutional opinion at the time when France was entering alone into that important struggle of which the efforts and results have been equally gigantic.

GENERAL LAFAYETTE TO HIS ARMY IN MOTION.

(May 1st, 1792.)

"SOLDIERS OF THE COUNTRY,—The legislative body and the king have declared war, in the name of the French people. Since the country, by the constitutional organs of her will, summons us to her defence, what citizen can refuse to lend his arm?

"At the moment when we, who have been first selected for that purpose, are fulfilling the oath pronounced by the armed nation on the altar of the federation, I come to expose to you my intentions, and recal to you my principles.

* M. de Laporte, intendant of the civil list in 1790, was much connected with Dumouriez. The collection of pieces found in the iron-cabinet contained several letters relative to the recommendation here spoken of.

"Convinced, by the experience of a life devoted to her cause, that liberty can only be preserved amongst citizens submissive to the laws, as she can only be defended with troops in a state of subordination, I have served the people without flattering them, and in my constant struggle against licence and anarchy I have merited the honourable hatred of all ambitious men and all factions. And now that the army awaits from me, not pernicious indulgence, but an inflexible discipline, it is by fulfilling vigorously that duty that I shall justify the affection it grants me and the esteem it owes me.

"But when I thus submit freemen to the imperious will of a chief, we must all, general, officers, and soldiers, feel that in this war, become a deadly combat between our principles and the pretensions of despots, depends the rights of each citizen and the safety of all; on it depends the constitution we have sworn to observe, and the sacred cause of liberty and equality; on it depends that national sovereignty from whence we cannot recede—whatever may be the force opposed to us, or the dangers we encounter—without betraying, not only the French people, but humanity itself.

"Soldiers of Liberty, to merit her, it suffices not merely to be brave;* be patient and indefatigable. Your general's duty is to foresee and order all things,—and yours is to obey. Be generous, and respect a disarmed enemy. Troops who would always grant and never accept quarter would be invincible. Be disinterested;—let not the shameful idea of pillage tarnish the glory of our motives. Be humane;—let all men admire our principles and bless our laws. Finally, be resolved, like your general, to see liberty triumph or not survive her.

"Soldiers of the constitution, whilst combating for it, fear not that it will cease to watch over you. Whilst marching to defend the country, fear not that internal dissensions will disturb your homes. The legislative body and the king will undoubtedly unite closely, at this decisive moment, to secure the empire of law; persons and property will be respected. Civil and religious liberty shall not be profaned. The peaceful

* After these words:—"To merit her, it suffices not merely to be brave," General Lafayette had added, "Have not Frenchmen been always so?" His friends, who placed less reliance than himself in the energy of the armies, judged it proper to omit that last expression. The proclamation was only accurately printed at the army and in the neighbouring departments.—(Note of General Lafayette.)

citizen shall be protected, whatever may be his opinion; the criminal punished, whatever may be his pretext. All parties shall disappear, and the constitution shall rule alone over the rebels who attack it with armed force, and the traitors who, perverting it by their own evil passions, appear to wish to make it feared at home and mistaken abroad.

"Yes, we shall obtain the price of our labours and blood. Let us appeal with confidence to the representatives elected from the people, who have sworn not to shrink from the duties of the constitution more than we shall do from its dangers; and to the hereditary representative of the people, that citizen king whose throne the constitution has rendered so inviolable; and to all the other depositaries of authority which the constitution has delegated to us; all will feel that to use that authority is the duty of those to whom it has been confided by the constitution, as obedience is the duty of those on whom it has been imposed; and that we transgress laws by not doing what they prescribe as well as by doing what they forbid. Let us appeal to those national guards whom the budding constitution found united to establish it, whom the constitution, when in danger, will ever find ready to defend it, and whose patriotism renders it glorious to share the calumnies to which that constitution may be exposed.

"As to ourselves, bearing arms consecrated by liberty, and the declaration of rights, let us march on to the enemy!"

We have alluded to the plan which had been concerted in the king's council and in the conferences between Narbonne and the three generals. The lieutenant-general, Montesquiou, was charged with organizing an assemblage of troops in the south. Luckner, Rochambeau, and Lafayette, after having been assured that the new ministry would only order them to commence operations when they had mutually agreed they were all in readiness to march, occupied themselves with accelerating that moment. In the ministry of war there must still exist a letter from General Lafayette, written during the first days of his command, in which he expresses the opinion that the principal invasion of the foreign troops would take place through the defiles of Carignan,

Montmédy, or Longwy,—so that Verdun, until then considered as a rather insignificant place of the third order, appeared to him likely to be one of the first attacked.* He therefore demanded that they would commence by fortifying that place, which was consequently done. Marshal Rochambeau, who had remained in Paris on account of illness, took leave of the ministry, without suspecting the surprise they had prepared for him, two days after his arrival at the army. In fact, the government, or rather, Dumouriez, (who, having the direction of but one department, directed two from the influence he possessed,) conceived the project of playing the French generals that trick which soldiers rejoice in playing their enemies, when they conceal from them a military combination; but, at the same time, the new plan of attack was announced so imprudently in Paris, that the generals-in-chief had not time to read their instructions before it was announced to them by officers who, having learnt it from public rumour, arrived at the quarter-general at the same time as the minister's couriers.

This plan was, according to what Dumouriez himself said, in the sitting of the 4th May, to have Porentruy taken by Marshal Luckner; to send Lafayette from Metz to Givet, and from thence to Namur, to cut off the communication between that town and Luxemburg; to have Furnes taken by a small corps under the orders of M. Delbeck, and alarm Tournay by a corps from Lille, under the command of General Théobald Dillon; while

* See, in the Correspondence, two letters from General Lafayette,—the first, May 6th, 1792, dated from Givet, and addressed to M. de Grave; the second, dated from Maubeuge, June 25th, and addressed to M. Lajard. See the letter of General Lafayette to M. d'Abancourt, July 29th, 1792.

M. de Biron, departing from Valenciennes, quarter-general of Marshal Rochambeau, with ten thousand men, was to take possession of Mons, and afterwards of Brussels. To favour the movement of Biron was the sole object of all the other movements. These various corps, with the exception of Lafayette's, experienced checks.

We must allow the two generals-in-chief to speak for themselves:—

JOURNAL OF THE MARSHAL DE ROCHAMBEAU.

"I received the orders of the king, dated April 15th, to assemble, from the 1st to the 10th of May, three camps,—one of eighteen thousand men, at Valenciennes; the other, of four or five thousand men, at Maubeuge; and the third, of three or four thousand men, at Dunkirk.

"War was declared the 20th. The ministers delayed my departure until the 21st, and I arrived the 22nd at Valenciennes, the bearer of orders which I delayed not one minute to execute on my arrival. Two days after my arrival, the 24th, I received a courier, with instructions unanimously voted by the council, and orders from the king enclosed in despatches from MM. de Grave and Dumouriez. Those instructions ordered me to place under the command of M. de Biron a corps of troops composed of ten battalions and ten squadrons, which were to present themselves, before the 30th, in front of Mons. A similar corps of ten squadrons, under an adjutant-general, is to present itself, at the same period, at Furnes. I am ordered to collect, as soon as possible, at Valenciennes, the remainder of the troops I am able to draw from the garrisons, and to hold myself in readiness to march with that second line to support M. de Biron, of whose success, from the information received by the council, both from the place and country, scarcely any doubts can be entertained."

The marshal proceeds to explain that, arriving alone, without any chief of administration, he had great obstacles to conquer.

"The 28th, Biron took possession of Quievrain. He set out the 29th, to present himself before Mons, the orders and in-

structions of the ministers having been directly addressed to him by M. Alexander Berthier, an eye-witness of what occurred at Mons, and the bearer, undoubtedly, of his despatches. He told me, verbally, that M. de Biron would perhaps retire behind Quievrain, having found an imposing force stationed on the heights above Mons.

"M. d'Aumont, M. Théobald Dillon, from Lille, M. Carles, adjutant-general, from Dunkirk, had also received direct orders. The troops were in want of many things, from the precipitation attending a movement of this kind, which was ten days in advance of any preparation that we had been enabled to make. The French princes, Louis Philippe and Antoine Philippe d'Orleans, conducted themselves with great courage."

In addition to this despatch, information was brought that Marshal Rochambeau, after having examined the advanced posts, had given up the command to Biron; that at Boussu the advanced guards had encountered each other; that, the Austrians having occupied the heights, Biron had retired in disorder on Valenciennes. In fact, the Duke de Biron, a man of talent, of an amiable and easy disposition, and personally brave, did not possess that military tact so indispensable in war; and as his understanding made him keenly sensible of this defect, he fell into a state of irresolution which prevented his taking any decisive measure. He retired in disorder, and thus lost his camp effects and tents, some prisoners, cannons, and ammunition. The consequences of this disgraceful defeat would have been more serious if the marshal had not left Valenciennes, with some troops of reserve, to garnish the heights above the town. The enemy retreated as soon as they perceived anything like a military disposition.

M. Théobald Dillon, having proceeded from Lille to Bezieux, the boundary of the French territory, with twelve squadrons and some battalions, the garrison of Tournay sallied out to meet him. The cavalry was charged and overthrown, and the French

troops pursued until within a quarter of a league of the glacis of Lille. During the defeat, the soldiers were excited against their chiefs. The general, overwhelmed with threats and abuse, was forced to take refuge in a farm, where he was joined by the soldiers, who cut him to pieces, and threw him into the fire. In Lille, the military insurrection was increased by that of all the ill-disposed persons in the town; an officer of engineers, six Austrian prisoners, and a nonjuring curate, were hanged; M. de Chaumont, aide-de-camp to M. de Dillon, ran great hazard of his life.

Marshal Rochambeau, indignant at the change of plan which had been made without his knowledge, of the insult that he had been exposed to, and the horrors a want of discipline had so lately occasioned, closed his reports by demanding their acceptance of his resignation.

The ministry, or, at least, the directing member of the ministry, not yet aware of the rapid marches which French soldiers may be induced to make, and which have since become so common, knowing besides, that, according to the former agreement, the artillery and draught horses were not yet in readiness, flattered himself that Lafayette had not the physical power of arriving at Givet on the appointed day. He prepared to cast on that general the blame of the expedition, if it failed, or was imperfectly achieved. This was discovered by a confidential letter he wrote to Biron, who imprudently shewed it to Berthier, since Prince of Neufchâtel: and by that adjutant-general, then attached to Lafayette, the secret was not kept. But this intrigue was disconcerted at the time by the activity of the troops, and by the generosity of the citizens, who lent their own horses.

General Lafayette wrote the following official letter at the time:—

TO M. DE GRAVE, MINISTER OF WAR.

"Givet, May 2nd, 1792—4th year of Liberty.

"Since my departure from Metz, sir, you have received my requests. I owe you a general account of my movements.

"The new instructions of the council were given me by the aide-de-camp of M. Dumouriez, on the evening of the 24th. That change of plans and periods rendered it necessary to make efforts, which were more difficult, from many resources failing us, and from our being obliged to transport to a distance of fifty-six leagues those means we possessed.

"The 25th was employed in making ready thirty-eight pieces of cannon, which, thanks to the activity of M. de Rissan, was accomplished in twenty-four hours. During that time, the horses that were absolutely necessary were collected together; and our wants, in this respect, were supplied by the zeal of the administrative corps of the municipality, and of the citizens of the town and environs; we procured also shoes, and other necessary articles.

"The 26th, I despatched, under the command of M. de Narbonne, adjutant-general, the artillery, with three companies and a half of the regiment of Auxonne, and successively all the other troops. Those least distant from Givet received the order to repair thither with celerity.

"You had written to me, sir, to be, on the 30th, at Givet: the fear of failing in that rendezvous, on which Marshal Rochambeau had calculated his movement, induced me to proceed there by forced marches. It will appear extraordinary that the convoy of artillery, and the troops under the command of M. de Narbonne should have made a journey of fifty-six leagues, frequently over bad roads, when no time had been given to prepare for their march, and during excessive heat, in the short space of five days. The remainder of the troops were equally punctual at the rendezvous, and their fatigue, as well as privations, appeared to give pain to me alone.

"The same remark applies to the camp at Rancennes, where the common necessaries of life are wanting; but no one complains.

"On the morning of the 29th, our patrols forced those of the enemy to retreat. The 30th, Colonel Lallemand, with the 11th regiment of horse-chasseurs, repaired to Bouvines, half

way to Namur, where two or three Austrian hussars have been killed, and four taken prisoners.

" The 1st of May, M. de Gouvion, adjutant-general, established a post at Bouvines, with an advance guard of three thousand men. The evening before, I had learnt, from Marshal Rochambeau, that M. de Dillon and M. de Biron were falling back. I have since received a letter from M. de Biron, announcing to me his return to Valenciennes, and the one in which you inform me of the atrocities committed at Lille.

" The infamous treatment, sir, which the prisoners of war have received, requires exemplary vengeance; it is not the enemy who demands this; it is the French army. The indignation we have all experienced authorizes me to say, that brave soldiers would be reluctant to fight, if the fate of their vanquished enemies was that of being delivered up to dastardly cannibals.

" In consequence of the intelligence received of the army in the north, I have awaited, at the camp of Rancennes, those articles which are indispensably necessary, both for the movement and preservation of the troops.

" My advance guard is still at Bouvines, &c."

Then follow praises of M. de Laumoy, chief of the staff, and of M. Petiet, principal commissary, as well as that of the citizens, who in all places eagerly seconded the ardour of the troops.

Thus ended this first expedition of the constitutional armies, the lamentable and ridiculous result of which could only tend to discourage every heart, and fortify the prejudice concerning the superiority of the German armies, unfortunately too prevalent with our commanding officers. But this result produced also, perhaps, the good effect of encouraging the imprudence of foreign generals, when, soon after, they so thoughtlessly engaged in their operations in Champagne. There was some treachery in our ranks; some officers only remained to exclaim, " We are betrayed! We are cut off!" It was the 1st of May that almost all the officers of the *royal Suédois*, as we have already stated, deserted during the night. Some inexperienced officers, in good earnest, lost their self-

possession: one of them, after having fled several leagues without stopping, exciting alarm everywhere, returning suddenly to his senses, blew out his own brains.

Marshal Rochambeau persisted in giving his resignation. Lafayette, to induce him to remain, proposed to unite, under the marshal's command, the army of the centre to the army of the north, offering in this manner to serve under his orders; and he might, perhaps, have persuaded the old general to accept this offer, if Marshal Luckner had not suddenly arrived at Valenciennes, sent by the ministry under pretence of giving advice to Rochambeau.* It was agreed, after the resignation of the latter, that there should be but two commands, one extending from Dunkirk to Montmédy, the other from Longwy to the Rhine. General Lafayette was summoned to Valenciennes to concert with the two marshals, before the departure of Rochambeau, a plan of attack on maritime Flanders. Luckner demanded to be charged with this attack, and General Lafayette agreed that during that time he would occupy, with 18,000 men, the intrenched camp of Maubeuge. His troops repaired thither direct from Givet, passing by Beaumont. Some days before, the corps of from 3,000 to 4,000 men at Bouvines had been charged with seizing the forage intended for the enemy, at the same time securing a retreat for themselves on Philippeville. This commission was successfully executed; but the next day General Gouvion was attacked at Hamptinne, near Florennes,

* "How can I resist Dumouriez and the jacobins," said Rochambeau, in reply to the entreaties of his friends, "when Lafayette, who has so many titles to popular confidence, can scarcely defend himself against them?"—(Note by General Lafayette.)

by a very superior force, which had united from several points. The French retired under the cannonade of Philippeville, disputing the ground during their retreat.

The Austrian vanguard was at first twice repulsed by the light infantry; the equipage was directed on Philippeville; but the combat was long sustained by the regiments of chasseurs, under the Colonels Lallemand and Victor Maubourg, by the volunteer battalions of the Côte d'Or, of the Marne, the 55th and 83rd regiments. Three pieces of cannon, of which the horses had been killed, remained in the hands of the enemy; our troops had, however, behaved in a very honourable manner: they had twenty-four men killed, sixty-seven wounded, of whom ten were officers. The enemy's loss was more considerable. The French troops resumed their position three hours after the affair. The movements were executed with a coolness and good order very remarkable in new troops. The artillery did much injury to the Austrians. It was by small actions that this young army prepared itself for more important combats.*

* The first military operations of 1792 are again explained in the correspondence we are publishing, and in the notes of General Lafayette, on the writings of Dumouriez, in the Appendix to this volume.

WAR AND PROSCRIPTION.

FROM THE 11TH OF JUNE, 1792, UNTIL THE CAPTIVITY OF OLMÜTZ, IN MAY, 1794.

THE attack on maritime Flanders, concerted at Valenciennes by the three generals previous to the resignation of Rochambeau and the division of the two armies between Luckner and Lafayette, did not prove successful. As Rochambeau, when quitting the army, and Luckner, when accepting the direction of this enterprise, had requested Lafayette to content himself by garnishing the point of Maubeuge, which did not belong to his command, the movements of the latter in front of that town, at Bavay, and on his return to Maubeuge, were intended to divert the attention of the Austrians by menacing the left of their posts, and thus give more liberty to the operations of Luckner, who obtained, however, no other result than the lamentable burning of the faubourgs of Courtrai.*

Some days before the evacuation of Courtrai, General Clairfait attacked, beyond Maubeuge, the

* The town of Courtrai was occupied the 18th of June, 1792, and evacuated the 29th. All the military details are found in the correspondence of the three generals.—(Note by General Lafayette.)

corps of Lafayette's vanguard; General Gouvion was killed by a ball in that affair.*

Lafayette, however, received from the administration and municipal bodies in all places, complaints of the increasing excess of jacobinism. The clubs usurped all powers, insulted the tribunals and constitutional authorities, domineered over the administration and legislative body, and directed both politics and war. The liberty of the country, its means of defence, the security and property of the citizens, were incessantly compromised by fresh outrages. The enemies of France awaited the moment for taking advantage of that open war organized against the laws and national sovereignty, not only in the clubs, but also in a portion of the ministry and of the legislative assembly. The best patriots foresaw the fearful results that must ensue; but, at the same time, the jacobins appeared so formidable that no person dared openly to attack that powerful sect. Lafayette thought he ought formally to denounce them. They were violating every day the *declaration of rights* that he had first proclaimed, and the constitution to which he had sworn, the 14th of July, 1790, in the name of armed France, of which fourteen thousand deputies of the national guard had rendered him the organ. He thought that an example was necessary to encourage the majority, well-intentioned, but weak members of the assembly, in which were also found some deputies distinguished for their firmness and devotion to their country. All the journals of the period published the letter he addressed, June 16th, to the legislative body, after having communicated it to several of its members, and at the period when the internal divi-

* The 11th of June.

sions of the ministers, occasioning the expulsion of three of them, would leave Dumouriez in power, the most dangerous of them all.*

TO THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY.

At the intrenched camp of Maubeuge,
4th year of liberty (June 16, 1792).

GENTLEMEN,—At the moment, too long deferred, perhaps, in which I was going to call your attention to great public interests, and designate amongst our perils the conduct of a ministry that my correspondence has long accused, I learn that, unmasked by its divisions, it has sunk beneath its own intrigues; for, undoubtedly, the most notorious, the least excusable, of those ministers, cannot, by sacrificing three colleagues, whose insignificance subjected them wholly to his power, have cemented, in the king's council, his equivocal and disgraceful existence.

It suffices not, however, that this branch of the government should be delivered from a lamentable influence; the public welfare is in peril; the fate of France depends principally on its representatives. The nation expects from them its safety; but

* The 6th of June, M. Servan, minister of war, proposed, unknown to the king, to form a camp of twenty thousand men of federated troops in the neighbourhood of Paris. The assembly, by a decree of the 8th, adopted that project, supported by MM. Servan, Roland, and Clavière, who received, on that account, their dismissal from the king. Their colleagues, MM. Dumouriez, Lacoste, and Duranton, remained a short time in power. The 18th of June, the ministry was composed in the following manner:—Foreign Affairs, M. Chambonas,—Interior, M. Terrier Monciel,—War, M. Lajard,—Public Contributions, M. Beaulieu. MM. Duranton and Lacoste retained, provisionally, their situations at the justice and navy departments. But M. Duranton gave in his resignation the 3rd of July, M. Lacoste the 10th. Dumouriez, after having accepted, the 13th of June, the war department, had been replaced the 18th by M. Lajard, and repaired to the army to assume a command there. From a letter of M. Roland, communicated the day it was referred to the assembly, the refusal of the king to sanction the transportation of nonjuring priests, who were denounced by twenty citizens, was also one of the motives for this division in the cabinet, formed in March, 1792.

by giving itself a constitution, it prescribed to them the only means by which they can secure its safety.

Convinced, gentlemen, that as the rights of man are the law of a constituent assembly, a constitution becomes the law of the legislators that assembly has established; and it is to you yourselves I must denounce the too powerful efforts that are making to mislead you from the path you have promised to follow.

Nothing shall prevent me from exercising this right of a free man—from fulfilling this duty of a citizen; nor the momentary delusions of opinion,—for opinions are at present at variance with principles; nor my respect for the representatives of the people,—for I respect still more the people, whose constitution is their own supreme will; nor the affection you have unceasingly expressed for me,—for I shall preserve that affection, as I obtained it, by ever proving my inflexible love of liberty.

You are now placed in difficult circumstances; France is both menaced externally, and agitated internally. While foreign courts announce the project we cannot submit to, of outraging our national sovereignty, and declare themselves the enemies of France, her internal enemies, intoxicated by fanaticism or pride, preserve their illusive hopes, and weary us by their malevolent insolence.

You ought, gentlemen, to repress their criminal efforts; but you will only have the power of doing so, in proportion as your conduct shall be constitutional and just.

You desire, undoubtedly, to do so; but turn your attention to what is passing around you, and in your very bosom.*

Can you conceal from yourselves that a faction, and to avoid vague denominations, that the *jacobite faction*,† has occasioned

* One of the last decrees of the constituent assembly had been issued, September 29th, 1791, to prevent the clubs, under severe penalties, "holding a political existence, exercising any influence or inspection over acts of the constituted powers and legal authorities, appearing, under a collective name, to form petitions or deputations during public ceremonies," &c. But this decree was every day deluded or violated by the disguises of popular societies, who instigated petitions and assemblages, without its being possible to impute to them, legally, these acts, took possession of the tribunes of the legislative assembly, and interrupted its discussions either by applauses or threats.

† General Lafayette occasionally made use of the word *jacobite*, doubtless, in allusion to the plots of the Stuarts, and to unite thus, by the same designation, two parties, which appeared to him equally opposed to the principles of liberty.

all these disorders? I accuse them loudly of the fact. This sect, organized like a distinct empire in its metropolis and affiliated societies, blindly guided by some ambitious chiefs, forms a separate corporation in the midst of the French people, whose powers it usurps, by governing its representatives and proxies. It is there that, in the public meetings, the love of the laws is named *aristocracy*, and their infraction *patriotism*; there, the assassins of Désilles* were greeted with triumphs; the crimes of Jourdan found panegyrists;† there, the account of the assassination which disgraced the town of Metz excited also infernal acclamations. Do these men expect to free themselves from all reproach by boasting of an Austrian manifesto, in which their names have been inscribed? Are they become sacred because Leopold has pronounced their names?—and, because we ought to combat against foreigners who intermeddle in our quarrels, are we dispensed from freeing our country from domestic tyranny? How is this duty changed by the projects of foreigners, their connivance with the counter-revolutionists, and

* An officer of chasseurs of the king's regiment, wounded mortally by throwing himself on the mouth of a gun, to prevent the fire of the garrison of Nancy, in 1790. Forty-one Swiss, of the regiment of Chateau Vieux, had been condemned to the galleys, according to the laws of their country, for rebellion during the troubles of Nancy; the constituent assembly had expressed the wish that the French government should negotiate in their favour with Switzerland, the application of its general decree of amnesty; the 31st of December, 1791, the legislative assembly, without attending to the difficulties resulting in this respect from the treaties, decreed that these condemned men should be comprised in the amnesty; the 9th of April, 1792, that assembly admitted them to its bar and to the honours of the sitting; the 15th, they were carried about in triumph, in a festival organized by the jacobin club.

† Every one has heard of the massacres of la Glacière, directed by Jourdan and his accomplices, which followed the troubles to which the reunion of Avignon and Comtat Venaissin to France had given rise in October, 1792. The 19th of March, 1792, the legislative assembly issued a decree of amnesty for the authors of these crimes; but, at the same time, they were delivered by a band of men at the instigation of the popular societies of the south; Jourdan and his accomplices received festivals at Avignon; the provisional court charged with prosecuting them, was dispersed.

their influence over the lukewarm friends of liberty? It is I who denounce this sect to you; I, who, without speaking of my past life, may reply to those who pretend to suspect me:—"Come forward, at this critical moment, when the character of each man will become known, and observe which of us, most inflexible in his principles, most firm in his resistance, will most effectually brave those obstacles and dangers which traitors would conceal from their country, but which true citizens are aware of, but will encounter for her sake."

And how can I longer delay fulfilling this duty, when each day weakens the constituted authorities, and substitutes party spirit to the will of the people; when the audacity of agitators imposes silence on peaceful citizens, and forces useful men to retire from office; and when devotion to one sect holds the place of the private and public virtues which, in a free country, should be the austere and only means of attaining the first functions of government?

It is after having opposed to all obstacles, to all snares, the courageous and persevering patriotism of an army sacrificed, perhaps, to combinations against its chief, that I can to-day oppose to that faction the correspondence of a ministry, a production worthy of its club, that correspondence of which all the calculations are false, the promises vain, the information deceitful or frivolous, and the counsels perfidious or inconsistent; in which, after having urged me to advance without precaution, and attack without sufficient resources, they were beginning to tell me that resistance was becoming impossible, when my indignation repulsed this cowardly assertion.

What a remarkable conformity of language may be found, gentlemen, between the factious men avowed by the aristocracy, and those who usurp the name of patriots! All wish to overthrow our laws, all rejoice in disorder, rise against the authorities that the people have conferred,* detest the national guard, preach undiscipline to the army, and endeavour sometimes to excite distrust, at other times discouragement. As to me, gentlemen,

* Numerous tumults, excited or supported by the clubs, had just broke out in various parts of France. In the month of March, 1792, M. Simoneau, mayor of Etampes, had been assassinated while opposing law to a band who wished to tax the price of wheat. At the sitting of May 12th, the assembly decreed a national ceremony in honour of his memory, outraged by Robespierre and his party.

who espoused the American cause at the moment her ambassadors declared to me that it was lost, who, from that period, have devoted myself to a persevering defence of liberty and the sovereignty of the people; who, from the 11th of July, 1789, when presenting to my country a declaration of rights, dared to say to her,—"For a nation to be free, it suffices that she should choose to be so," I come to-day, filled with confidence in the justice of our cause, with contempt for the cowards who desert it, and indignation for the traitors who tarnish it, I come to declare that the French nation, if it be not the vilest in the universe, can and must resist the conspiracy of the kings who have coalesced against it. It is not, undoubtedly, in the midst of my brave army that timid sentiments can be permitted; patriotism, energy, discipline, patience, mutual confidence, every civic and military virtue, I find united here.

Here, the principles of liberty and equality are cherished, laws are respected, and property is sacred; here, calumnies and factions are unknown; and when I reflect that France has several millions of men who can become equally good soldiers, I ask myself to what a degree of degradation must a vast nation be reduced,—still more powerful from its natural resources than from the defences of art,—opposing to a monstrous confederation the advantage of single combinations, when the cowardly idea of sacrificing its sovereignty, of compromising its liberty, and negotiating for its declaration of rights, can appear amongst those possibilities of futurity which daily advance more rapidly upon us! But that we, the soldiers of liberty, may combat with efficacy or die with utility in her cause, it is necessary that the number of the defenders of the country should be immediately rendered proportional to that of her adversaries; that the supply of provisions of every kind should be increased, to facilitate our movements; and that the welfare of our troops, their appointments, pay, the cares relative to their health, should be no longer subservient to a fatal or pretended system of economy, which produces precisely the inverse effect of their aim.

It is above all necessary that the citizens, rallying around the constitution, should feel assured that the rights that constitution guarantees them shall be observed with a religious fidelity, which must drive its avowed or secret enemies to desperation. Do not reject this earnest wish, which is shared by all the sincere friends of your legitimate authority. Secure that no unjust effect can be produced by a pure principle, that no tyrannical measure can serve a cause which owes its force and

glory to the sacred basis of liberty and equality, let criminal justice resume her constitutional path, let religious liberty enjoy the full application of true principles.*

Let not the royal power be curtailed,†—for it is guaranteed by the constitution; let it be independent,—for that independence is one of the springs of our liberty; let the king be revered,—for he is invested with the national majesty; let him be able to choose a ministry which bears not the chains of any faction; and if conspirators should exist, let them only perish by the sword.

Finally, let the reign of clubs, destroyed by you, yield to the reign of law; their usurpations, to the firm and independent exercise of the constituted authorities; their disorganizing maxims, to the true principles of liberty; their delirious fury, to the calm and inflexible courage of a nation who is acquainted with her rights, and will defend them; and their sectarian combinations, to the real interests of the country, who, in this moment of danger, must rally round her all those for whom her subjection and ruin are not the cause of an atrocious triumph and infamous speculation.

Such, gentlemen, are the petitions and representations submitted to the national assembly, as they have been submitted to

* The 6th of April, 1792, a decree had suppressed all congregations of men or women, ecclesiastical or laical, and prohibited the ecclesiastical dress. By another decree of the 24th of May, unsanctioned by the king, the local authorities were to be empowered to transport out of France any nonjuring priest whom twenty petitioners should denounce as disturbing public order.

† Threats, in the assembly and clubs, were unceasingly directed against the constitutional use of the royal *veto*. The 29th of May, the assembly itself, in a permanent sitting, in the midst of the agitations which had just been exposed in a report of the mayor of Paris, disbanded the paid guard of the king, a special corps, whose existence had been guaranteed by the constitution, and issued a decree of accusation against M. Cossé de Brissac, its commander. Upon these two legislative decisions, we find the following note by General Lafayette:—"With the exception of the head of the king's private guard, M. de Brissac, the officers were, in general, provokingly aristocratic, and the impropriety of their expressions could not fail to displease all good citizens; but they possessed no power of doing evil. The disbanding the guard was anti-constitutional, and those who voted that act are inexcusable."

the king, by a citizen, whose love of his country no person can with sincerity deny, and whom various factions would hate less if he had not soared above them by the purity and disinterestedness of his intentions; he would have remained silent, if, like so many others, he had been indifferent to the glory of the national assembly, and to the confidence which it is important it should inspire; under existing circumstances, he cannot better prove the confidence he himself feels in that assembly than by thus pointing out truth without disguise.

Gentlemen, I have fulfilled my oath, and obeyed the voice of conscience: I owed this to my country, to you, to the king, and, above all, to myself; for the chances of war do not allow me to adjourn observations which I conceive useful; and it is with pleasure I reflect that the national assembly will see in this address a new testimony of my devotion to its constitutional authority, of my personal gratitude, and my respect.

LAFAYETTE.

The jacobins of the assembly, or rather the girondists, who still believed themselves its chiefs, attacked this letter, not openly, but in an underhand manner, by declaring that Lafayette was not its author.* Seventy-five departments and several large towns hastened to send their adhesion to the principles he had expressed; many others occupied themselves with drawing up addresses of the same nature; it was observed that those least eager to fulfil this duty were also least distinguished for patriotism, and most accessible to certain aristocratical influences. An assembly placing greater confidence in its own means of government would

* On the proposal of M. Guadet, it was sent, that its signature might be verified, to *a committee of superintendence*, whose establishment in the bosom of the legislative body had been decreed the 25th of November, 1791. This extra committee, called the *commission of twelve*, because it was composed of twelve deputies, of whom half were renewed every three months, was to collect the facts sent to them by the assembly, considered as menacing the constitution.

have deliberated upon this letter and its adherents; but terror took possession of its members, when, the 20th of June, bands, armed with pikes, after having marched through the hall in which they held their sittings, as if to associate the representatives of the nation to their acts of violence, overwhelmed the king with insults, in his own palace: he was indebted for the preservation of his life to his own calm courage, to the devotion of his sister, to the efforts of some national guards, and of a small number of friends, namely, a brave chief of division, Aclocque, and Marshal de Mouchy. This event had been prepared by the jacobins, with the connivance of the gironde party, who were enraged at Dumouriez' having played them false, and at the ministers Clavière, Servan, and Roland having been dismissed. It is also probable that the royalists were not sorry that a scene occurred which was calculated, according to them, both to exasperate and justify the foreigners; but it is not true that the girondists excited, or even knew beforehand, the far more decisive tumult of the 10th of August.

Lafayette was encamped before Bavay, and close to the enemy, when he learnt this fresh outrage. He was impatiently awaiting intelligence of Luckner, who, several days since, had left him ignorant of his situation and of the progress of his enterprise; he intended to resume the camp at Maubeuge, that he might force the Austrian corps which covered Mons to make a movement on the left, and to remove it from the army opposed to Luckner and supported by Tournay: he had just charged Bureaux de Pusy to repair to Menin, where he conceived Luckner was stationed, to inquire of him what he intended doing, and whether he approved

of the projected change of position. Lafayette added to the orders given to Bureaux de Pusy that of informing Luckner of his intention of proceeding to Paris, unless his colleague thought this journey would be attended with any danger to the service. Luckner, who was urged to explain himself on this point, occupied, at that time, with his army, Menin and Courtray; he not only did not intend advancing further, but he was even determined to draw back on his road, much dissatisfied with the intrigues to which he was exposed, both to change his political opinions and direct his military conduct. The old marshal blamed, extremely, the intention Lafayette announced of repairing to Paris—"Because," said he, "the *sans culottes* will cut off his head." But as this was the sole objection he made to the momentary absence of Lafayette, the latter, after having placed his army in security under the guns of Maubeuge, set out alone, with an aide-de-camp, to acknowledge, himself, far from the troops, whose sincere affection, it was pretended, emboldened him to brave the jacobins, that letter which, according to another tactic of their orators, he had not himself written.

On his passage through Soissons, Lafayette saw the members of the district administration of l'Aisne, who, while rendering justice to the motives actuating his conduct, entreated him to renounce his intention of going to Paris. Lafayette left them convinced he must sink in the struggle, and that he would only obtain the good wishes and regrets of true patriots. He had concerted this measure with no person; those he best loved were surprised by it. He arrived, the 28th of June, at the house of his most intimate friend, La Rochefoucauld, who had not himself been apprised of this intention, and

pronounced the following speech at the bar of the assembly:—

"I must first, gentlemen, assure you that, in consequence of dispositions concerted between Marshal Luckner and myself, my presence here does not in any way compromise either the success of our arms, or the security of the army I command.

"These are the motives that brought me here. It has been said that my letter of the 16th to the national assembly, was not written by me; I have been reproached with having written it in the midst of a camp. To acknowledge it, it was necessary, perhaps, that I should present myself alone, and separate myself from the honourable rampart which the affection of the troops formed around me.

"A still more powerful reason, gentlemen, induced me to repair in the midst of you. The acts of violence committed, on the 20th, at the Tuileries, have excited the alarm and indignation of all good citizens, and especially of the army. In the one I command, in which the officers, under-officers, and soldiers, are animated by one spirit, I have received from the various corps addresses filled with expressions of their love for the constitution, their respect for the authorities it has established, and their patriotic hatred against factious men of all parties. I thought it proper to stop at once those addresses by the document I now depose on the desk. You will see in it that I have engaged myself to my brave comrades in arms to express alone our joint sentiments; and the second document, which I also depose here with it, confirms them in this just expectation.*

"While I stopped the expression of their feelings, I could only approve of the motives that actuated them; several of them ask themselves, whether it be truly the cause of liberty and the constitution they are defending?

"Gentlemen, it is as a citizen that I have the honour of addressing you; but the opinion I express is that of all Frenchmen who love their country, her liberty, her repose, and the laws she has given herself; nor do I fear being disavowed by any of them. It is time to guarantee the constitution from the outrages committed against it, to secure the liberty of the national assembly, that of the king, his independence and dignity; it is time to quell the hopes of those bad citizens who expect from foreigners the re-establishment of what they term public tran-

* See these two documents in the Appendix, No. 2.

quillity, but which would only be for freemen a shameful and an intolerable state of slavery.

"I entreat the assembly, 1st, to order that the instigators and chiefs of the acts of violence committed the 20th of June, at the Tuileries, should be prosecuted and punished, as guilty of the crime of lèse-nation.

"2nd, To destroy a sect which invades the rights of the national sovereignty, tyrannizes over the citizens, and whose public debates leave no doubt of the atrocity of those who direct it.

"3rd, I finally entreat you, in my name, and in the name of all the honest men in the kingdom, to take efficacious measures to make all persons yield respect to the constituted authorities, especially your own, and that of the king, and to give the army the assurance that the constitution shall receive no outrage internally, while brave Frenchmen are shedding their blood to defend it on the frontiers."

The president replied—

"The national assembly has sworn to maintain the constitution. Faithful to its oath, it will know how to protect that constitution from every outrage; it confers on you the honour of the sitting."

After this speech, Lafayette heard a very awkward and artful one from Guadet.* The debate was not closed when he repaired to the king. The royal family were assembled together; the king and queen repeated they were convinced there was no safety for them but in the constitution.† Never

* M. Guadet demanded that the minister of war should be interrogated, that they might learn from him whether he had granted a leave of absence to General Lafayette. His motion was rejected, and that of M. Ramond was adopted, which referred the general's petition to the *commission of the twelve*, to examine its purport and render an account of it.

† The court was much struck by this measure, which is attributed to the wish Lafayette felt of a reconciliation taking place. Madame Elizabeth appeared peculiarly touched by it, and when it was debating what line of conduct ought to be observed towards him, she said:—"They ought to forget the past,

did Louis XVI. appear to express himself with more thorough conviction than on the present occasion; he added, that he considered it would be very fortunate if the Austrians were speedily defeated. Lafayette, on leaving them, retired to his own house, followed by the applauses of many citizens, and found a detachment of the national guard awaiting him, which was not, perhaps, useless against the projects of the clubs.

It was proved to him, on that same day, that, unless some new stimulant occurred, the legislative assembly, of which two-thirds abhorred the jacobins, whilst the minority included several members who were only jacobins from fear, would not have the courage to take advantage of the opportunity now offered. He endeavoured, therefore, to reanimate its confidence by a manifestation of public opinion. It so happened that Louis XVI. was, the next day, to review four thousand men of the national guard. Lafayette asked permission to accompany him, apprising him, at the same time, of his intention, as soon as he had retired, of addressing the troops, and of doing whatever he might deem for the good of the constitution and public order. But the court did everything in its power to thwart Lafayette's intervention, and Petion, the mayor, countermanded the review an hour before daybreak.* Foiled in his purpose, Lafayette assembled

and throw themselves with confidence into the arms of the only man who could save the king and his family." But the queen replied, "that it was better to perish than to be saved by Lafayette and the constitutionalists."—(Note by General Lafayette.)

* It has been ascertained, through an ex-minister, much attached to the court, and deep in its confidence, that it was the queen who advertized Santerre and Petion of Lafayette's pro-

at his house several influential officers of the national guard; represented to them the danger to which each man's apathy exposed the public cause; urged the pressing necessity of making a common effort against the openly-avowed schemes of the anarchists, and of infusing into the legislative body the firmness it so much required; and predicted the inevitable calamities which must ensue from the indecision and disunion of honest men. They who heard him detested as much as he did the yoke of the jacobins; all were animated by a sincere affection for him; all were patriots, and tried ones. Yet the only fruit of this attempt was a transitory energy, unattended by any civic measure in the least degree decisive. Scarcely was Lafayette at a distance, before they relapsed into their habitual inertness; and, shortly afterwards, the very men whom he had thus fruitlessly exhorted, perished, almost all of them victims of the horrors he had predicted. It is difficult to conceive how the jacobin minority and a handful of self-styled Marseillese* could make themselves masters of Paris, while almost all the forty thousand citizens composing the national guard were in favour of the constitution; but the clubs had succeeded in dispersing the real patriots, and creating an apprehension of vigorous measures; experience had not yet disclosed how much this feebleness and disorganization were doomed to cost. On the other hand, such was the patriotic energy against

ject of taking advantage of this review, in order to address the national guards, and revive public spirit.—(Note by General Lafayette.)

* The body so called, which took part in the 10th of August, did not arrive at Paris till the 30th of July, and sent, on the 2nd of August, a deputation to the legislative assembly, demanding the king's dethronement.

external enemies, that sufficient importance was not attached to the perils of internal ones; and in the midst of these instances of individual remissness, the dishonesty or intrigues of the court, by diffusing suspicion, paralyzed many a brave resistance.

Lafayette could do nothing, by himself, beyond what he had just attempted. His duty was accomplished; he had put the assembly and the capital to the proof, and, without having personally to complain of either, he had found them swayed by a factious power, which, while he was present, seemed for a moment to disguise its plots. All he could do, therefore, was, to concert with his friends measures the most likely to retard, if not to prevent, the impending disasters. It was agreed that the departmental administration of Paris should set the example; La Rochefoucauld, its president, prevailed upon it, within a few days, to declare the suspension of the mayor and attorney of the commune from office, in consequence of their conduct during the riot of the 20th of June. The king subsequently confirmed this decree; but the legislative body, in spite of the patriotic efforts of a portion of it, was pusillanimous enough to annul the double decision of the department and the king, and to restore Petion.*

On the 30th of June, Lafayette returned, dispirited, to his army, having first written this second letter to the legislative assembly:—

* The resolution of the members of the administrative council of the department, declaring the provisional suspension of the mayor and procureur of the commune, was passed on July 6th; the king's sanction was announced to the assembly on the 11th, which, on the 13th, annulled these two decisions. On the 23rd, almost all the members of the council of the department sent in their resignation.

"GENTLEMEN,—In returning to that post where brave soldiers cheerfully confront death in defence of the constitution—but neither will nor ought to shed their blood save for that alone—I carry with me an anxious and keen regret at being unable to announce to the army that the national assembly has deigned to make my petition the ground of any legislative act.

" Daily does the voice of the good citizens of the kingdom, which some wretched clamours vainly attempt to overpower, warn the representatives chosen by the people, and their hereditary representative, that as long as there exists near them a sect which throws impediments in the way of all authority, which menaces their independence, which, after provoking war, labours, by degrading their cause, to strip it of its defenders,—as long as we have to blush at the impunity of the crime of lèse-nation, which has roused the just and urgent alarms of all Frenchmen, as well as universal indignation,—our liberty, our laws, our honour, are endangered.

" Such are the truths, gentlemen, which free and generous minds will never shrink from uttering. Disgusted with the factions of every class, indignant at the cowards who degrade themselves even to wish for foreign intervention, imbued with the principle which it is my pride to have been the first to profess in France, 'that all illegitimate power is oppression, and that then resistance becomes a duty,' they feel the necessity of disclosing their fears to the legislative body; they trust that the laws of the representatives of the people will extinguish them.

" As to myself, gentlemen, I will never change my principles, nor opinions, nor language. I feel that the national assembly, looking at the urgency and danger of the circumstances, will permit me to add the expression of my regrets and wishes to the homage of my profound respect."

On his return to his army, Lafayette had fresh opportunities of ascertaining public opinion beyond the limits of that terror which was enslaving it. As he proceeded, magistrates, citizens, and national guards, came to meet him as usual; and amid the applause they were pleased to testify at his conduct, he heard imprecations against the violence of the enemies of the constitution. His troops were equally obliged to him for what he had attempted.

He had now the mortification of seeing his col-

league return from Flanders without having succeeded. Many of the officers had been disgusted by the first adventure at Mons, and the infamous murder of the commander of Lille; the old marshal himself was not without apprehensions of the recurrence of some scene of the same kind. Lafayette, who was of an entirely opposite opinion, again sent Bureaux de Pusy to Luckner, to persuade him to a combined attack upon the Austrians encamped near Mons, on the spot where the battle of Jemappes was afterwards fought. Luckner obstinately refused. A victory at that time would have materially changed the state of things. The intention of this attack, suggested by Lafayette, might have been masked from the enemy, by means of an operation, already announced, which the French armies were on the point of executing.

The government, without apprising Lafayette, and partly for the purpose of satisfying Luckner, who preferred being employed in the German part of France, had just made a new distribution of the commands originally assigned to the generals. Lafayette was to have the left of the frontier, from the coasts of the channel to Montmédy; while Luckner was to command from Montmédy to the Rhine, having Biron under his orders, who, notwithstanding, retained the title of general-in-chief—a singular arrangement, insisted on by the jacobins, mainly in the view of preparing annoyances for Lafayette.*

* The manner in which the jacobins turned it to account was this:—their object was to injure the constitutionalist general in the partition of the levies of grenadiers and national volunteers intended to reinforce the armies; for this purpose, they began by giving Biron the rank of general, with a distinct command; in the next place, as soon as the distribution of the new troops, according to the wants of the frontiers, began to be considered,

The marshal, moreover, had totally abandoned his enterprise upon Flanders; all that could be now thought of was to defend the frontier, threatened by the Prussians. The two commanders-in-chief had no doubt that the Duke of Brunswick would attempt to enter France by that country which is comprised between the Meuse and the Moselle, and they were impatient to move their forces in that direction. They therefore marched with their respective troops, —Luckner towards the Moselle and the district of Messin; Lafayette towards the right extremity of his new command, a little in the rear of Montmédy. Nothing was changed in the position of the forces stationed on the frontiers of the Low Countries, at the camp of Maubeuge, of Maulde, of Pont-sur-Sambre, &c.; and they were of opinion that, as their two armies were only separated from each other by the distance from Valenciennes to Maubeuge, that is to say, one march, this additional distance, which Luckner would have to make more than Lafayette, in order to reach the district of Messin, was not of sufficient consequence to determine them to separate themselves from troops already organized under their orders, and accustomed to their authority. Such was the very simple arrangement which the jacobins have since so strangely distorted. Many

they prevailed upon the timidity of the minister of war, Abancourt, to consent—first, that he would not send Lafayette the troops of Paris, which the latter desired to have; secondly, (and this was the essential point with them,) that the reinforcements should be equally divided between the commanders-in-chief, and not in proportion to the extent of country which each had to cover; so that, thanks to the sham command of Biron, as there were two commanders-in-chief on the frontier confided to Luckner, the latter received two-thirds of the succours which should have been equally divided between Lafayette and him. —(Note by General Lafayette.)

people still believe that the two generals turned everything topsy-turvy to no other end than that of fatiguing the troops, whilst the exchange of the two commands was confined to merely a change of name, and to a few leagues more to be performed by Luckner's army than by Lafayette's. It seemed as if the clubs, whatever might be the impulse they obeyed, had an interest in seeing the frontier between the Meuse and the Moselle abandoned. The calumnies of their newspapers knew no bounds, especially at the moment when the Duke de Saxe Teschen, at the Duke of Brunswick's request, feigned an irruption towards Bavay, which did not at all disturb the French generals, aware that the troops on that frontier were quite adequate to its protection. Nor did Luckner nor Lafayette think it necessary, in consequence, to suspend their march; but this operation furnished the jacobins with a pretext to pour troops into the camp of Maulde, who, as it turned out, could not reach their first destination in sufficient time, and would have been still more behindhand but for the extraordinary efforts of their commander, Beurnonville. We will here, in order to give a complete and clear view of the position of the armies at this period, anticipate a little, by observing that, after the 10th of August, Lafayette, having commanded Chazot to bring up the regiments intended to reinforce the corps with which he was opposing the invasion of the Duke of Brunswick and of General Clairfait, the jacobin deputies, sent to Flanders with the title of commissioners of the legislative body, gave Chazot the most positive orders not to obey Lafayette's injunctions. After having, in common with their faction, supported Dumouriez in his disobedience to Luckner, and kept back at Maulde the corps for which the mar-

shal was making the most urgent applications, they stopped the march of the reinforcements which Lafayette was expecting, and pushed their malice so far as to intercept his despatches pressing the arrival of the national guards who were to have joined his army. When we connect this conduct with their previous efforts to disorganize the army, to frustrate the demands of Narbonne and the ministers who succeeded him, it is impossible not to perceive how much it favoured the projects of the coalition.

Lafayette expected that the ceremony of the constitutional oath, on the anniversary of the 14th of July, at the field of the federation, would furnish him with a solemn occasion of reminding Frenchmen of their civic duties; but no time was lost, while the troops were yet upon their march, in announcing, through the minister, that but one of the generals would be required; consequently, Luckner, who was the oldest, went to Paris; so much did they apprehend the safety of the king from the confirmation of liberty!

Lafayette now saw but one way of saving the public cause; unhappily, he required the concurrence of others, and these refused to assist him in his project.

Whilst the two generals, in spite of the vociferations of the jacobins, and the feints of the Austrians on the side of Flanders, for the purpose of favouring the Duke of Brunswick's invasion, moved their forces towards that part of the territory the most exposed, namely, the pass between Montmédy and Longwy, it was arranged that Lafayette should march to La Capelle,* some twenty leagues from Com-

* The vanguard and the main body left La Capelle on the 10th and 11th of July; the reserve on the 15th. Marshal

piègne, a royal seat within the limits prescribed by the constitution, of twenty leagues, at furthest, from the capital.*

This circumstance suggested the idea of a project, which was proposed to Louis XVI. The king, accompanied by Lafayette, was to have gone to the national assembly, in mid-day, and announced his intention of spending some days at Compiègne, though for this purpose, by the terms of the constitutional act, a decree of authorization would not have been requisite; on his arrival there, with a small escort of Parisian national guards, he could calculate on the national guard of Compiègne, and on two regiments of chasseurs belonging to Lafayette's army, of whom the latter was perfectly sure; the officers of this chosen body were to offer every kind of guarantee by their well-known patriotism and honour; and it will be enough to say, on this point, that Brigadier-General Latour Maubourg, ex-member of the constituent assembly, was to have commanded it. Thus surrounded, the king, completely sheltered from all violence, in a situation of his own choice, would, from his own proper impulse, have made a proclamation, forbidding his brothers and the emigrants to advance a step further, announcing himself ready to go in person, if

Luckner did not quit Valenciennes till the 12th. (See Appendix, No. 3, for the notes of General Lafayette on this march, and all the military operations of that period, in reply to Dumouriez' memoirs.)

* "The king, as first public functionary, must take up his residence within twenty leagues, at furthest, of the national assembly in session; and, its session over, the king may reside in any other part of the kingdom."—(Constitutional decree of the 28th March, 1791.) The troops of the line might also be stationed beyond this limit, without a previous authorization from the legislative body.

the assembly approved of it, against the enemy, and declaring for the constitution in such terms as to leave not a shadow of doubt as to his real intentions. Such a test, by inspiring not only the sincere constitutionalists with confidence, but even such of the jacobins as were honestly inclined, would have left but a small number of adversaries in the other parties; it would have saved the life of the king and his family, have separated him from perfidious counsels, restored vigour to the national assembly, energy to good citizens, and have discomfited the jacobins and aristocrats. It is probable that Louis XVI. might have returned to Paris amid the universal acclamations of the people; but such a triumph would have been the triumph of liberty, and therefore the court rejected it. Some of the king's personal friends left nothing untried to calm his apprehensions, and to inspire him with confidence in the patriotic general; with tears in their eyes they conjured him to surrender himself to the counsels of the only man who could snatch him from destruction, and thus to save many other lives that hung upon this decision. But his most influential advisers saw no chance for absolute royalty, save in the increase of anarchy and in foreign invasion. The life of their king was nothing to them compared with the recovery of his prerogatives. "We know that M. de Lafayette will save the king; but he will not save royalty,"—was the public language of the Tuileries. The queen remembered that Mirabeau, shortly before his death, had predicted to her, that, in case of a war, "Lafayette would desire to keep the king a prisoner in his tent." She replied to her royalist friends, who had, however, taken the precaution of altering Lafayette's original proposal, in order to make it more agree-

able to royal ears,* alluding, at the same time, to the occurrences of the 6th of October—" It would be too hard upon us to be twice indebted to him for our lives." Thus the intrigues of the court, its abhorrence of every patriotic expedient and of the constitutional general, a system of inaction, and certain expectations held out by the girondists, prevailed. Lafayette was thanked, and refused; and when his aide-de-camp, Colombe, afterwards asked the queen, by what strange infatuation she and the king had come to so fatal a decision—" We are very grateful to your general," was her reply, " but the best thing that could happen to us would be, to be confined for two months in a tower." A remark which cannot but strike us, when we remember that, after the 10th of August, this unfortunate family was transferred to the tower of the temple, at Danton's request, who had been for a long time receiving money from the court, and did not turn against it until he was satisfied that all its means of defence were at an end.

We shall not attempt to penetrate these mysteries, which will be, doubtless, one day revealed. Such, as is well known, was the infatuated confidence of the court in these preposterous intrigues, that it prevailed on the royal family to decline an-

* We see, in the Appendix to this volume, No. 4, that the aide-de-camp charged with carrying this constitutional proposal to the king thought it necessary to put himself in communication with M. de Lally Tollendal. General Lafayette gave his aide-de-camp some memoranda, but wrote to nobody on the subject. In the reflections relating to the project of Compiègne, inserted in the Appendix, not to interrupt the actual narrative, General Lafayette contests or rectifies the inaccurate citation of a pretended letter to M. de Lally Tollendal, taken from a publication not avowed by the latter, and repeated by MM. Bertrand de Molleville and Thiers.

other proposition, by La Rochefoucauld Liancourt,* less exactly constitutional than the project of Compiègne, but equally characterized by devotedness. La Rochefoucauld placed at the king and his family's disposal a million of his own private fortune; the intention was, to receive them at Rouen, where he commanded. From thence they would have gone to embark at Hâvre; but the unhappy prince and his queen, never distrusting for an instant the success of the foreign powers, their principal occupation was to consult the heads of the various factions, and to concert precautionary measures against the influence which would be acquired by the emigrant princes on their return.† Though Lafayette had recently obtained proof of some very malevolent acts of the queen against him, his zeal in her cause was unabated. He knew that, at the very moment he was offering the only chance of safety which remained to her, memoirs, full of asperity, were, by her orders, composed against him, and that a part of the libels daily devoted to his defamation

* The Duke of Rochefoucauld Liancourt, deputy from Beauvoisis to the states-general, must not be confounded with the Duke de Rochefoucauld, deputy from Paris to that assembly, president of the department, in 1791 and 1792.

† The queen looked very coldly on every counter-revolutionary scheme under the auspices of the king's brothers. As to Louis XVI., it is probable he was counter-revolutionary solely through weakness and instigation. As the close approached, he became so from anxiety for his personal safety, distinctly menaced by the anarchists; still he listened to all parties, without a decided preference for any, and dreading the conqueror, whichever it might be. Louis XVI. was sensible that, after the success of his brothers and the emigrants, their credit would be immense; and it was, doubtless, from this expectation or fear that he replied, when solicited by some of his friends to return to Compiègne—"I do not choose to quarrel with my brothers."—(Note by General Lafayette.)

were paid out of the civil list. The jacobins took good care not to leave him in ignorance of these manœuvres, hoping he would resent them; and were mindful to apprise him of certain relations between the court and themselves against the common enemy of both. The testimony of his most devoted and best informed friends strengthened these sources of conviction; but neither his friends nor adversaries ever furnished him with the slightest proof of the king and queen's treachery towards the constitution of the state. One must, indeed, have been blind, not to have perceived their aversion for the new régime, or not to have mistrusted their projects; still it was impossible to reproach them with a flagrant conspiracy, or a formal breach of faith in the engagements they had contracted. Whatever their secret views might have been in the exercise of a power which was very much restricted, and but little dangerous, they outwardly conformed to the laws, which concern themselves with acts, and not with thoughts. After having had recourse, in his endeavours to save them, to measures which the safety of the state and his own personal feelings suggested to him, Lafayette continued his march to Sédan and Montmédy, and directed his attention exclusively to the defence of the frontiers, when the news of a spontaneous reconciliation between the constitutionalist members and the jacobins of the assembly revived in him a momentary hope.*

They had just sworn, a second time, to maintain legal order, to take the constitution as the only rule of their conduct; and the king had, with every ap-

* It occurred at the meeting of July 7th, on the motion of Bishop Lamourette:—"Let those," exclaimed this member, "who both abjure and execrate the republic and the two chambers, stand up!" The whole of the assembly rose.—("Moniteur" of the 8th.)

pearance of sincerity and warmth, made himself a party to this unanimous desire of the representatives of the people. The next day, the jacobins ridiculed this transaction in their publications, a singular proof of the uncertainty, or reciprocal fear, of the different parties on the eve of such momentous events. It proved, however, how little the assembly thought of formally establishing the régime which was about to succeed.

It would occupy too much space to detail all the hostilities of the anarchists against Lafayette; their defamations in the *Patriot* and the *Chronicle* were pushed to the most insane excess. Robespierre attacked him at the jacobins, first requiring that he should not be called upon to prove what he advanced.* The club itself formally denounced him at the bar of the assembly, by the mouth of Collot d'Herbois.† Some members of this faction alleged, as proofs of his criminality, certain letters, which,

* At a meeting of the jacobins, July 13, Robespierre made a speech containing the following passages:—"M. de Narbonne has been here for some days; MM. Beaumetz and La Colombe have also been seen. I cannot conceive that men known throughout France as conspirators, can appear in the midst of this capital at the moment of the federation without an object. Assuredly, Lafayette is meditating a crime that he may be able to impute to the friends of liberty. If it be not committed, it will be because we shall have denounced it at the tribune; if it be committed, all France ought to attribute it to Lafayette; he meditates a crime because he has committed a crime, and that no other method remains to him of pursuing his ambitious career."

† On the 20th of July, a member having remarked, "that this denunciation ought to be abandoned to universal contempt, seeing that it was signed by the jacobins alone, and presented by Collot d'Herbois," Lecointre Puyraveau exclaimed, "How! where is the department, the city, the district, where the name of Collot d'Herbois is not known and cherished? He it is who has made the constitution known and loved by all the inhabitants of the country," &c.—(*Moniteur.*)

when read, were received with patriotic applause. Luckner's arrival in Paris seemed to them a good opportunity to have recourse to fresh calumnies. The old marshal had at the head of his staff an officer, known to be a friend of Lafayette's, General Alexander Berthier, afterwards head of the staff in the army of Italy. During the early years of the revolution, Berthier distinguished himself in the command of the national guard of Versailles, where he exhibited great firmness in disconcerting several jacobin plots; Narbonne had given him a very large share of his confidence, and had placed him near Luckner, in order, as was said, that Lafayette might control both armies, but more probably, until some new arrangement should appoint him to a similar post near the patriot-general, who had the highest and most deserved opinion of his talents. Unfortunately, Luckner arrived alone. Gobet, Bishop of Paris, undertook to intoxicate him at a supper at his house; and six jacobin members, who were guests, declared, the next day, to the assembly, that, according to a confession of the marshal's, the object of Bureaux de Pusy's last mission was to engage him to march, with Lafayette at the head of the army, against the capital. In consequence of this denunciation, signed by its authors, the assembly felt itself called upon to require explanations from the generals, and to summon Bureaux de Pusy to its bar to give an account of his mission.* Lafayette replied, without entering into any detail:—

* We have already observed, (p. 312, note,) that General Lafayette's letter and petition (of June 16 and 29) had been referred to an extraordinary committee of twelve. At the same time that several departmental directories and numerous petitions declared their approbation of the principles manifested in these two documents, addresses from the jacobins, real or ima-

Longwy, July 26th,—4th Year of Liberty.

The minister of the interior has apprised me of a resolution of the legislative body of July 21st, and of the denunciation signed by six of its members.

Were I questioned as to my principles, I would say, that as the asserter and uniform defender of the rights of man, and the sovereignty of the people, I have everywhere, and at all times, resisted every manner of authority that liberty disavowed, and the national wish did *not* confirm; and that I have everywhere obeyed that which a free constitution has prescribed, both its limits and its forms.

But I am interrogated upon a fact. Did I propose to Marshal Luckner to march with our armies upon Paris? To which I reply, by four short words:—*It is not true.*

LAFAYETTE.

Luckner's reply was also negative;* but it may be conceived what became of the accusation, when Bureaux de Pusy, presenting himself and producing the correspondence between Luckner and Lafayette, proved that his mission had no other object than to

ginary deputations, appeared at the bar of the assembly, demanding the impeachment of Lafayette. An inquiry into his conduct was moved for, on July 2nd, by M. Vergniaud, and by M. Brissot, on the 9th. On the 15th, M. Lémontey reported from the committee, and recommended a bill disqualifying general officers from the right of petition. Instead of this new law, Bazire proposed a direct and simple indictment; the assembly adopted M. Quinette's proposition, which adjourned this discussion until the committee to inquire into Lafayette's conduct had made its report. On the 19th, M. Muraire reported from this committee that General Lafayette had committed no act at variance with any positive law, and that the fact of a petition presented by a general-in-command not having been provided for, could not give rise to any indictment. On the 20th, the recommendations of M. Muraire were discussed; and the next day, Guadet suddenly preferred the charge founded on Luckner's avowal, and attested by six members. M. de Pusy, summoned for the 22nd, did not make his appearance at the bar until the 29th. After his speech, it was decided that a third report on this affair should be made within eight days.

* Marshal Luckner replied, July 28th.

propose an attack upon the Austrians before Mons, and that while the jacobins were charging Lafayette with checking Luckner and hindering him from acting, it was on the contrary; it was Lafayette who wished to fight, and Luckner who positively refused. Equally confounded were the libellers by the reading of the letter in which Luckner, after Gobet's not very episcopal supper, apprised his colleague of the intrigues he perceived, and confessed "that Paris shocked him."

The *Moniteur* contains the following report of M. Bureaux de Pusy's speech at the meeting of July the 28th:

Such is the painful extremity to which I am reduced, that, in order to avoid being compromised by a false imputation, of which it is easy to measure the importance and the danger, I am compelled to convict of imposture—whom? either legislators, who ought to be distinguished from their fellow-citizens by their superior moderation, justice, and love of truth, or else the commander of an army, a venerable old man, whose career has been one of glory;—in a word, public men, to whose hands are entrusted the highest interests of the state, to whom the confidence of the nation is essential, and whom it is desirable to see invested with its esteem.

Whatever may be the weight of this consideration, I have no longer the power of hesitating, now that the national assembly, by receiving the denunciation of which I am the object, appears to attach some importance to it; though, I confess, that but for the decree that has summoned me before you, I should have disclaimed to purge myself from the insidious imputations cast upon me by certain pamphleteers. To my mind, this atrocious folly appears to be nothing more than the effect of that inevitable law of nature which has imposed on all living beings the necessity of seeking the aliments proper to their species; for it has ever been my conviction that as Providence has destined certain poisons to be the food of certain reptiles, so, in the social scheme, it suffers calumny to exist as the appropriated food of slanderers. But my business here is not to broach a theory on the evils of humanity; I am called upon to speak to a fact—and I will do it.

If, urged by M. Lafayette to persuade Marshal Luckner to

unite with him in marching upon Paris, at the head of their respective armies, I had accepted the commission, it would have been from a conviction that I could do so without the commission of a crime, and with some prospect of advantage to the public cause; in which case I declare that no power on earth should prevent my avowal of a proceeding that must have presented itself to me in the light of a praiseworthy, or at least innocent act; but in the information which brings me to this bar, all is false; its imposture must therefore be exposed. And as I know but one way of speaking the truth, that is, the whole truth, I must revert to the origin of those events in consequence of which I became mixed up with the correspondence between the two generals.

I will state, in detail, the motives which induced the two missions confided to me. I will produce the letters of which I was the bearer; they can be confronted with the denunciation against me; and between these let the conscience of every member decide. I should add, that, acting under the orders of my commanding-officer, he has placed in my hands all the documents essential to my exculpation; that for their genuineness I will answer with my head; that he has given me full liberty to disclose the plans, the success of which was made to depend upon me; and that I shall use this permission with the less reluctance, inasmuch as their actual publication is in other respects a matter of indifference. And I trust that, should I intersperse my narrative of events with a few reflections, they will be pardoned, in consideration of the necessity imposed upon me of placing my judges, as nearly as possible, in the same circumstances of time and action as those under which I was employed.

It was resolved, at a conference between Generals Rochambeau, Luckner, and Lafayette, that the first of these officers should move, with his whole force, on the western side of the Austrian Low Countries, and attack these provinces by the left bank of the river Lys. Marshal Luckner, I am told, makes no secret of saying that he began this expedition less in the hopes of making any conquests than of publicly demonstrating the defects of the plan on which the war had been opened, the fatality of the design of causing a general rising in Belgium, and the necessity of directing our military resources in conformity with more rational and useful views. One thing, however, is certain, that whatever may have been the opinions of these generals, their acting in concert was the more indispensable, inasmuch as the enemy's forces in the Belgian provinces were at least numerically equal to those we were able to oppose to them.

In consequence of the plan adopted, M. Lafayette, on the 4th of June, quitted the camp of Rancennes, which he occupied, under the walls of Givet, to take possession of that of Maubeuge, which M. de Lanoue left in order to station himself at the camp of Maulde. The marshal had himself reconnoitred that position, which, by menacing Tournay, was intended to compel the enemy to remain in force around that fortified place, and by this means to facilitate the operations about to be executed by our army of the north.

False demonstrations upon Namur fixed the attention and forces of the enemy to the vicinity of that city, and permitted M. Lafayette to march to Maubeuge, which he reached, unmolested, on the 7th of June, the day on which M. de Lanoue left it.

At this period the greater part of the enemy's forces were concentrated under the walls of Mons. All accounts, whether of spies, deserters, or prisoners, concurred in fixing at 25,000 men the number of Austrian troops at this point. They remained there, in the same force, until, Marshal Luckner's purpose being no longer doubtful, they thought it requisite to detach a corps of about 7,000 men to strengthen the force posted before Tournay, for the purpose of observing Marshal Luckner; and they ran the less risk in this operation, inasmuch as their army, in spite of this diminution, was still at least equal to M. Lafayette's, who had not in the whole more than from 16,000 to 18,000 men.

It will at once be perceived, without my stopping to prove it, that in this expedition the part assigned to Lafayette was one purely auxiliary; that his business exclusively was, to keep a part of the enemy's forces in check, to assure the free and undisturbed execution of Marshal Luckner's operations, and to prevent the Austrian troops encamped before Mons from acting; for which last purpose, it was requsite to have recourse to an unwearied activity and continued offensive demonstrations, in order to induce the belief that his object was to molest them, or to attack Mons, one of their points d'appui, and most considerable depôts.

It was equally essential to the interests of the two armies, that M. de Lafayette's, while constantly threatening to act on the offensive, should take all possible care to avoid a general engagement, any advantages from which would be in no degree proportioned to the mischief that would ensue from a check, inasmuch as the greatest success it could have had would have produced no other result than that of forcing the enemy to fall

back, and concentrate their forces under the walls of Mons. But looking at the parity between their strength and ours, it would have been absurd to expect to drive them beyond this point d'appui, of which they were sure, and to carry the place. The most brilliant issue for his troops, therefore, would have led to nothing of more consequence than some slaughter of the enemy, effected by the sacrifice of a few soldiers, more or less, of our own.

Suppose, on the contrary, we had lost a battle; as, in order to offer it, we must have separated ourselves from Maubeuge, what would have become of any division of the army whose retreat on this point should have been cut off? If, contrary to all probability, we assume that it would not have been destroyed, it would, at least, have been compelled to fall back upon Givet by a harassing march; and the least inconvenience that could have ensued would be, the dispersion of our forces; the consequence of this would have been, the utter inability of resisting the movements of the enemy, who, in this case, detaching the greater portion of their army to reinforce that under the walls of Tournay, would have forced Marshal Luckner to retreat, or have brought him to action with such a superiority as, between troops of equal merit, must always be decisive of success.

Under these circumstances, the duty of M. Lafayette was to restrict himself to a circumspect activity, to harass the enemy without committing himself, and to be incessantly feigning a desire to bring on an action, which everything commanded him to avoid. He attained his object; and, during the twelve days occupied in taking up our position before Maubeuge, there was scarcely one without some affair of outposts. These were almost uniformly to our advantage; and the affair of Grisonelle, which deprived the army of a man whose memory will be always dear to it, as it ought to be to all good citizens, so unfortunate in this circumstance, deserves, with this solitary exception, to be set down to the list of our successful days, since our troops, in ceding a position which the superiority of the forces opposed to them rendered it impossible to maintain, made the enemy pay, with a loss double that of our own, for the barren advantage of occupying ground which they were forced to abandon within an hour after they had taken it.

Meanwhile, Marshal Luckner's army had quitted our frontiers; it was operating near Menin, having driven away from Courtrai a detachment of the enemy which occupied that city. The reports of spies and deserters concurred to persuade us that the enemy's troops, encamped before Mons, had penetrated the

motive of M. Lafayette's feigned attacks, had concentrated and intrenched their position, and were about to detach a considerable corps to join the Austrian army before Tournay. It was necessary to prevent this junction; and for that purpose M. Lafayette quitted the camp of Maubeuge, on the 19th, and threw himself, with as much despatch as boldness, into that of Teinières, under the walls of Bavay. This new position was one extremely hazardous to hold; not that it was deficient in any military requisite, but that its natural features required an army of 50,000 men, at least, and M. Lafayette's, as I have already remarked, did not amount to 18,000. It was necessary to counteract this defect. Having fortified the weakest part of the camp, our position, narrowed by intrenchments, and reduced to proportions suitable to our force, became as respectable as could be wished. The enemy was now convinced that it was our serious intention to bring on an engagement; they detached troops from their left to their right, which they fortified by intrenchments and abattis; communications were opened through the forest, in order to facilitate their manœuvres; in a word, occupied with their various preparations, the 22nd of June arrived without their having sent a single man to reinforce the army before Tournay. It was necessary to keep up this apprehension, which paralyzed them: their right had now become much too strong to allow them to fear an attack on that side, unless by forces very superior to those at our disposal. M. Lafayette therefore resolved to make a sudden movement toward the enemy's left, in order to attract his attention to that point, and thus gain time; but he thought it necessary to apprise Marshal Luckner of this new manœuvre. Several days had elapsed since he had received any communication from the latter; he consequently did not know the actual point to which the marshal's expedition had reached; nor what operations of the army of the centre would be most useful to those of the army of the north. He was of opinion, that the divers subjects on which he wished to communicate with the marshal could not, looking to their details, be conveniently comprised within a letter, and that it was indispensable to entrust his despatches to some one who could, if necessary, reply to an objection or unforeseen question, or obtain any explanation that might be required.

While things were in this state, news reached the camp of the events of the 20th of June. This circumstance sharpened a desire long entertained by M. Lafayette of presenting himself at the bar of the national assembly, and there explaining and justifying the object and motives of the petition he had ad-

dressed to the legislative body. One sole consideration arrested him: not any fear of the use his enemies might make of such a proceeding,—this he knew would be bitterly misrepresented,—but an apprehension lest his colleague might regard his projected absence as injurious to the common interest of the two armies: he was desirous, therefore, to have his opinion before he decided on his departure; for this purpose, provided with M. de Lafayette's instructions, I repaired to Menin.

The objects of my mission were these:—First, I was to give Marshal Luckner a detailed account of all the operations of the army of the centre, from the moment of its occupation of the camp of Maubeuge, and more particularly from the period of its moving on Bavay; to explain the motives that had induced the several movements; to acquaint him with the enemy's force and position near Mons, as far, at least, as the circumstances of the war had permitted us to appreciate them ourselves; to make myself complete master of the actual position of M. Luckner's army; to ascertain his ulterior plans; and to concert with him the best means of making our co-operation useful to him.

Secondly, I was to inform myself of all that marshal might have learnt respecting the approach of the Austrians and Prussians, the amount of their forces, the quantity of heavy artillery attached to their army, and the points on which it was surmised they would assemble.

Thirdly, I was to call the marshal's attention to the situation of our internal policy; and had received M. Lafayette's instructions to speak to the following effect:—"The latter, I was desired to say, had recognised in the events of the 20th of June the most appalling violation of the constitutional act; that the internal disorders which agitated us had a tendency to paralyze all active and effectual operations against external enemies; that they discouraged and alarmed the army; that in his own, no small number of persons, beyond all suspicion on the score of patriotism or courage, had more than once demanded of *him* if it was in defence of the French constitution they were going to fight, or for the support of some one of the factions that convulsed the state; that this fatal uncertainty was producing the absolute disorganization of the public force; that it appeared to him, what most vitally concerned the interests of the nation was, the prompt repression of anarchical excess; that he had already announced these truths to the national assembly; that he would dare to repeat them again; that, for this purpose, he was ready to depart; but that, before deciding upon such a step, he desired to know if, in his opinion, any inconvenience would

result from it prejudicial to those military duties with which they were both charged, and for which they were both responsible." A brief letter contained the analysis of the various subjects on which I was instructed to enlarge. It was as follows:—

Letter from M. Lafayette to Marshal Luckner, at the camp of Teinières, June 22nd, 1792.

I have so many things to say to you, my dear marshal, on our political and military affairs, that I have decided on sending you M. Bureaux Pusy, who, I know, possesses your confidence and friendship, as he does mine. From the first breath I ever drew, I have lived for the cause of liberty,—to my last gasp will I defend it against every kind of tyranny; nor can I silently overlook that which factious men are now exercising on the national assembly and the king, by forcing the former to deviate from the constitution to which all of us have sworn, and by exposing the latter to the hazard of his political and physical destruction. Such is my profession of faith. It is that of nineteen-twentieths of the kingdom. But there is fear abroad; I, who am not infected with that disease, will speak the truth.

As to our military position, I am in a camp which would require thirty thousand men, but, by a judicious distribution of the details of its defence, it can be turned to good account; and while retreat is perfectly safe for us, it would be perilous for the enemy. Marshal Clairfait has been thoroughly convinced that it was my intention to attack him; I will endeavour to keep up this impression to-day and to-morrow, and then, it seems to me, I should do well to resume my position on the left of Maubeuge, because I disturb Marshal Clairfait more by constantly changing my attitude than by remaining on the same spot.

Au reste, my dear marshal, I will do whatever you judge most conducive to your own plans; and I feel quite confident that there will be the same unison between us on political matters, since we both of us honestly desire to serve our cause and observe our oaths.

Receive the assurance of my sincere friendship.

LAFAYETTE.

The somewhat extensive mission with which I was charged shrunk within very narrow limits as soon as we began to discuss it. On the first article, all ulterior plans were out of the question, in consequence of Marshal Luckner's decided resolution not to take a single step in advance without orders from

his government,—a resolution which put an end, at present, to any subsequent combined operations between the two armies; and therefore brought my mission, as regarded this point, to a close.

As to the second article, the marshal had received no information more particular or precise than what M. Lafayette was previously in possession of, which was extremely vague and indefinite; so that this point, in itself so important, and the more so from the ignorance in which everybody was of what was doing, occupied only a few minutes' conversation.

With regard to the third article of my instructions, the marshal appeared to me deeply affected at the events that had recently agitated Paris. He confessed that his knowledge of our constitution was too imperfect to enable him to give an opinion upon the matter. But he combated M. Lafayette's purpose on the ground of the personal risk to which it would expose him. I represented that this consideration would have no influence on his decision; I urged, agreeably to my instructions, that he would be good enough to reply to this point;—namely, what degree of importance he attached to his colleague's presence with the army, and if it was his opinion that the few days' absence he meditated could, in any way, prejudice the interests confided to both of them.

The following is the reply I brought back, and delivered to M. Lafayette:—.

Reply of Marshal Luckner to M. Lafayette's letter of June 22.

Head-quarters, Menin, June 23, 1792,
4th year of Liberty.

I have received, my dear Lafayette, the military details forwarded to me through M. Bureaux Pusy. I am sensible, as I ought to be, of the disinterestedness and cordiality with which you have supported, by your different operations, those I myself made, or which were in course of execution by me. I cannot but applaud the bold movement by which you have taken possession of Bavay, in order more effectually to facilitate my operations and those you intend making on the enemy's left, by moving to the entrenched camp of Maubeuge. These different operations must necessarily continue to contribute, as they have hitherto done, to the complete inactivity of the Austrian forces near us. As to the proposition made to me of continuing to direct in concert the combined movements of the two armies, it is impossible for me to reply at the present moment to this request. My ulterior measures depend on the

instructions I may receive from the minister. I have made him acquainted with a sketch of my actual position, the objections that exist to advancing, the little dependence that is to be placed upon the promises of the Belgians, and the almost absolute certainty of the difficulty of any great popular movement in these provinces. After this exposé, you must be sensible that I will on no account incur the responsibility of so delicate an attempt as that of moving upon Ghent, an expedition which might compromise my army, and reduce me, in case of a reverse, to the painful alternative, either of sacrificing my troops to save my baggage, or my baggage to save my troops. I will therefore wait the orders of government. Whatever they may be, you shall be informed of them; and I shall calculate, without reserve, on your patriotism, with which I have been long familiar, as well as on the good services which it will be in your power to render me, and on which you have taught me to depend.

With respect to the opinion you require from me, expressive of my approval or non-approval of your absenting yourself a few days from the army, all that I can do is, to refer you to yourself, and to leave you to be the judge of the inconvenience or advantages of a proceeding on which I cannot exercise any judgment. What I have to request from you is, the combination of your operations with mine, and I am perfectly convinced that you will, in any case, adopt measures calculated to prevent the service and public cause from sustaining any injury. Adieu, my dear Lafayette; and calculate ever upon those sentiments which, with all frankness and sincerity, I have devoted to you.

MARSHAL LUCKNER.

I took my leave publicly, overwhelmed with the marks of kindness and esteem with which the marshal at all times honoured me.

On my arrival at Maubeuge, I found M. Lafayette in the intrenched camp of that place, which he had entered the day before, after having advanced on the enemy's left, and ranged himself in order of battle, according to the intention I before alluded to. He remained in this position as long as the marshal stayed at Menin; and when the latter finally determined to quit the last-mentioned place, and resume his first defensive operations under the walls of Valenciennes and Maubeuge, M. Lafayette immediately made arrangements for leaving the latter place and returning to his camp before Givet; but as, during this general movement of the two armies, a moment must come

when the near approach of the different corps composing it would allow of certain arrangements, into the object of which the enemy would find it difficult to penetrate, M. Lafayette was of opinion that he might turn this circumstance to account in the execution of a plan he had devised, and which he commissioned me to communicate to Marshal Luckner. It was as follows:—

Letter from M. Lafayette to Marshal Luckner.

Intrenched camp of Maubeuge, July 2nd,
4th year of Liberty.

I have received your letter, my dear marshal, and had previously seen that addressed to M. Lajard. The minister informs me that we are to confer with each other on the future plan of the campaign. Consequently, I shall leave this to-morrow for Avesnes, where I shall halt. On the 6th, I shall proceed to La Capelle, where I shall make some little stay, with a view to our stores. From thence I shall move the army, in two or three divisions, for the purpose of reaching my frontier. Thus separated, it will march more slowly, and do less mischief to the crops. On the 5th, during my halt at Avesnes, I will pay you a visit at Valenciennes.

It has, indeed, occurred to me to take the outward road, and make an attempt upon Namur, but the very thing would happen to us there which exists here. The enemy has the cord and we have the bow to describe. His movements are covered; reverses, unless complete, would put him in no worse situation than he is; ours would be fatal, and a surprise is impracticable.

It is, however, a sad thing to see our forces combined to no purpose; and I could very much desire to procure you an advantage which would influence the whole campaign. Should the enemy remain at Mons in his actual position, there could be no hesitation in attacking him the morning after to-morrow, since M. de Lanoue could make an attack by the wood of Sarres, while you would march on the side of Valenciennes, and I should make a false attack towards the bridge of Pierre, and a real one on Gil and Genty. Thus the entire right of their position would be cut off; and we might then try the heights of Berthaumont, which, in the actual state of the enemy's forces, could not resist us. It would then depend exclusively on the inhabitants of Mons themselves to aid us by a rising; and success would secure us the tranquillity of your frontier.

But we must expect the enemy's troops to follow your movements, even though you should endeavour to molest them be-

fore Tournay; and what we have now to determine is, whether our united armies are strong enough to attack the forces which the Duke of Saxe can concentrate by to-morrow at Mons. It would be a noble fight. My own troops, I will answer for it, will fight well; and the trifling success which the vanguard had on the 27th, in killing and wounding fifty men, and making eighty-five prisoners, has considerably increased their ardour.

Consider, then, my dear marshal, what you think best to be done. It ought to be arranged for the 5th, and I should be apprised of it before leaving my camp. The defensive system is not an objection; for there is no good defensive but that which attacks frequently; and it seems to me there are but four serious points to consider,—the number and position of the enemy; the advantage which intrenchments give over new troops; the results of a victory; those of a defeat. Good day, my dear general. Accept my sincere friendship.

LAFAYETTE.

P.S.—Pusy is the bearer of this letter, and will furnish you with all the details we have been able to collect respecting the actual situation of the enemy and their strength.

In addition to this, I received instructions to enlarge on the nature and position of the intrenchments by which the enemy was protected, on the communications by which it was ascertained we could reach them, finally, on the means of retreat available to each of the four attacking columns. I was also to state, that M. Lafayette submitted his proposal unreservedly to the marshal's experience and knowledge, and that, should it not receive his approval, M. Lafayette would give up all idea of it, even though he should feel himself sufficiently strong to attempt it alone, which was very far from being the case.

The marshal judged the project to be impracticable. He wrote to that effect to M. Lafayette, and gave me his reasons; and as it did not appear to me that he had sufficiently developed them in his letter, I asked permission to read him that I was addressing to my commanding officer, in which I had endeavoured to embody them. He approved the summary which I then gave. I begged him to add a word or two to his letter, which would give my report an official character in M. Lafayette's eyes; and this he did in a postscript.

I had promised to give an account of my negotiation by two different couriers; the one, who was to pass by Bavay, would be but two hours and a half on his road; but he ran the chance of being taken; and for this reason, the letter entrusted to him was so vague that, in case of its being intercepted, the enemy could get no information from it. The other was to pass by

Quesnoy and Landrecies; his journey was safe, but must occupy six hours. By this one I was to transmit details that I did not dare confide to the other.

These are the two letters which I addressed to M. Lafayette, with the marshal's reply:—

Copy of a first letter written by me, from Valenciennes, to M. Lafayette.

Your suggestions, general, are not acceded to, and consequently there is nothing to delay your first plan. The courier I have the honour of sending you by way of Quesnoy will be somewhat more circumstantial; he is, moreover, the bearer of a letter from the marshal. Receive, general, the assurance of my respectful attachment.

(Signed) BUREAUX PUSY.

Valenciennes, July 3, 1792, 10 P.M.

Copy of a second letter written by me, from Valenciennes, to M. Lafayette.

GENERAL,—It is the marshal's opinion that the proposal suggested by you is compatible neither with the minister's instructions, of which he apprises you, and which you have probably received, nor with the force of which he can dispose at the present moment, nor yet with the advanced position of M. de Lanoue on this side of Quesnoy; and, in fact, that the information he is constantly receiving respecting the force of the enemy before MONS, is too defective to warrant him in hazarding an engagement. In consequence, general, you should not hesitate to begin your march, more especially as M. Lanoue will be at Maubeuge at a very early hour, say seven o'clock in the morning.

I have read the marshal the summary of the motives on which his refusal is based, and he is to inform you that he approves it.

I shall have the honour of rejoining you to-morrow, at Avesnes, at eleven or twelve, A.M. I beg you to accept the assurance of my respectful attachment.

BUREAUX PUSY.

Valenciennes, July 3, eleven o'clock at night.

Marshal Luckner's reply to M. Lafayette's letter of July 2nd.

Camp of Valenciennes, July 3rd,
4th year of Liberty.

(A part of this letter is foreign to the matter in hand.)

My letter is interrupted by the arrival of M. Bureaux Pusy, who has handed me your despatches, suggesting an attempt

upon Mons, which I do not think it would be easy to effect. He has entered into various details with me respecting the position of our armies; and has done me the honour of informing me that it is your obliging intention to pay me a visit at Valenciennes. I would very willingly spare you half your journey if I knew of any spot where I should be certain of meeting you. As it is, I accept the offer you make me of coming here, and shall expect you to-morrow with impatience. Adieu, my dear Lafayette; I shall be delighted to greet you.

Marshal, Commander-in-Chief, LUCKNER.

P.S.—M. Bureaux Pusy has read me the contents of his letter to you, and I approve them.

I set out the next day, having received, during this business, and in the most unequivocal manner, fresh proofs of that confidence and kindness on which the marshal has for a long while given me good reasons to depend.

Here my relations with him terminated. I have given an unreserved statement of all the details; I have, too, as I promised, declared the whole truth; and I challenge the meddling forger, the most skilful in his art, I defy the most unflinching malignity to furnish, I do not say, a proof, but a presumption, however fragile it may be, which implies that I have dissembled, or even attenuated, one capital point, one leading fact, in connexion with my two journeys, which could give a colour to the imputation that calls me to your bar.

Judge, then, of my astonishment when I heard it said that Marshal Luckner, who honours me with his esteem, who has condescended to desire my being associated with him in his occupations, who has thought me not unworthy to pursue, side by side with him, the new career to which he has devoted himself, had publicly denounced me as guilty of a crime; for less than this, the act of which he accuses me could hardly appear to him, since he qualifies it with the epithet of—*horrible*. But how did my surprise redouble when I perceived this imputation to be invested with a certain gravity by the position and functions of those to whom it was in confidence revealed! And it reached its climax, when I learnt that the legislative body had lent its ear to the preposterous denunciation of a witness who implicates himself; for assuredly, in the case before you, if I am open to reproach, the marshal must divide it with me.

What!— it might be said to him—you were privy to a fact which you consider extremely culpable, which you qualify as horrible, and you were silent! To none of the authorities in-

terested in the knowledge of it did you impart it! Fourteen days are supposed to elapse before the avowal of it escapes from you in conversation! You even sought no explanation from the colleague who has instigated you to a step which you look upon as horrible! nor does there exist, in any part of our correspondence, a single phrase, a single word, which betrays your displeasure at this proposal! Not a single reproach against the agent charged to negotiate it! Will it be said, that, incapable of believing M. Lafayette to be the author of such a suggestion, you attributed it solely to the instrument he employed? Why, then, did you not arrest this rash intriguer on the spot, who was attempting to deceive and compromise you both? Reason falters before this inexplicable conduct, and is utterly confounded when we produce the marshal's letter, written, from Chalons, two days after the charge of which he is said to be the author. It is as follows:—

Copy of a letter from Marshal Luckner to M. Lafayette.

On the road to Chalons, July 19th, three, A.M.

My dear Lafayette,—I have just received your letter, en passant, dated the 17th. I have not examined the rest of your despatches, being on my way to Strasburg. All I can have the honour of saying to you is, that the cabal is about to treat us in the same way, and that, as I am apprised, we are both to be denounced, and that we are actually to be so this very day—to be played off, one against the other. Meanwhile, I can assure you my decision is taken. I am determined to live unmolested; if I cannot, I retire. As respects my acquisition, I will make the most of him. He says I am leading him to slaughter, whereas, he has never yet seen the enemy in my time. Paris is hideous in my eyes.

Adieu; expect my reply from Metz or Strasburg. If you have the kindness to write to me, you may still address your letters to Strasburg.

Marshal Luckner.

To what opinion must we come after the perusal of these documents? Disposed as we may be to believe in the virtues of humanity, it is difficult not to suspect that an odious fabrication is the pivot on which this pretended conspiracy is made to rest, and in which I have been made to play the most conspicuous part. A surmise which will at once be changed into a certainty, as soon as we have taken cognizance of the marshal's second letter. I was on the point of setting out, when M. Lafayette

received it; he stopped me in order to communicate it. I hastened to take a copy of it; and will now read it:—

Copy of a letter from Marshal Luckner to M. Lafayette.

Strasburg, July 25, 1792,—4th year of Liberty; 3 A.M.

I received, my dear general, your letter of the 23rd instant, as well as that of M. Dumouriez, annexed to it; I had already seen the latter, and found proofs in it of his desire, on the one hand, to be commander-in-chief, and on the other, to be entirely independent, a thing utterly at variance with all military principles, and of most mischievous effect. I have written a letter to the king on this subject, of which I send you a copy, which, I trust, will have the result of protecting both of us, in future, from the recurrence of similar tampering with settled plans. The one which you suggest to me has my complete approval, as have, likewise, your exertions to become acquainted with the country with the defence of which you are charged. As to myself, I have come for an instant to Strasburg, which I leave in an hour for Landau. To-morrow I return to Metz, and it will be from this point, that, with a full knowledge of all the bearings of the question, I will give you my ideas respecting the definitive plan of defence, and the most effectual means of combining our operations.

I hasten, my dear general, to express to you my deep regret at the calumnies to which you allude. Knowing me, as you do, I feel very confident that you have rejected, as false and impossible, the language which has been imputed to me. Reliance upon your zeal and activity, the desire of acting in concert with you, the wish of proving to you, on all occasions, the sincerity of my friendship,—such are the feelings which animate me, and of which, my dear general, I shall never cease to give you the assurance.

I return you M. Dumouriez' original letter, of which I have sent a copy to the king.

MARSHAL LUCKNER.

I have nothing more to add; compelled to justify myself from a calumny, it was necessary I should demonstrate the existence of a calumniator; I am of opinion that I have done so. I might go further; I might put my hand on the mask that still conceals him, tear it from him, and reveal him in all his infamy; but I shrink from inflicting so revolting an exhibition on my country. In the hands of the national assembly have I placed the thread which can guide it through all the windings of this tortuous in-

trigue. Let that assembly pronounce! For my own part, I despise the wicked enough to disdain to overwhelm them. Whosoever are the culprits, I have prepared their shame; may you be able to awaken their remorse! To me, it seems, as if my vengeance, warrantable as it may appear, is already too severe; for whatever be the degree of perverseness and corruption to which the heart of man may attain, I cannot figure to myself the existence of men to whom a merited opprobrium has ceased to be a torture.

It remains to me to give one warning to those artificers of plots who may hereafter be disposed to return to the charge, and to weave the meshes of a net less clumsy than that in which they have just tried to entangle me; it is this—that they will infallibly be the victims of their attempt; that, without any other arms than those of truth, I will pursue them with those alone; and after stripping them of their hypocritical covering of probity and patriotism, I will hold them up naked, and in all their hideousness, to the indignation of honest men; that, whatever be the cunning and malice of their manœuvres, never shall they bear down my character, for it is the character of a freeman; that they will never be able to make me forget that it was in this building, and on this spot, that I, taking the lead of every other Frenchman, contracted the solemn engagement to maintain the liberty of my country with all my strength, as well as the constitution which it freely chose; that, in a word, if there be some things which they are qualified to teach that I have no desire to learn, there is, at least, one thing that I can teach, which as yet, beyond all doubt, they most imperfectly comprehend,—the respect that is due to an oath.

I will now lay upon the table the documents I have read, in spite of the unskilful manner in which I have used them. I passed the night in writing my justification; still I request that the assembly would have the goodness to order que MM. les secrétaires signeront et paraphéront, ne varietur.

After this speech, Bureaux de Pusy was informed that, in the groups of the Palais Royal, attempts were making to get up a motion for parading his head on the end of a pike.*

* On the 17th July, a deputation of *federates* had required, in addition to the act of accusation against Lafayette, the disbanding of the various staff-officers and military functionaries ap-

Meanwhile, foreign enemies were scattering about their manifestoes,* hastening the march of their troops at the very time when, by simultaneous movements, the jacobins were redoubling their audacity, and pressing the arrival of the Marseillese, invoked for the express purpose of diffusing terror throughout Paris. The latter at length came, and

pointed by the king, the suppression of all directories and districts which adhered to the letter of the 16th of June, and, finally, the remodelling of all judicial bodies. The assembly contented itself with passing to the order of the day. On the 25th, Chabot was called to order for having moved that the question of *deposition* be retaken into consideration, first mooted on the 12th, in consequence of a petition from the *commune* of Marseilles. On the 26th, three days before M. de Pusy's speech at the bar, the assembly had adopted a form of final citation to the king, presented by M. Guadet, and had, on the proposition of M. Brissot, referred the case of *deposition* to the extraordinary commission. On the 4th of August, the section of Gravilliers went still further, in requiring the immediate indictment of Louis XVI.; its petition was rejected as unconstitutional, pursuant to a report of Vergniaud's.—(Moniteur.)

* The "Moniteur," of July 27, announces an additional article to the treaty of Pilnitz; that the French are expelled from the kingdom of Naples and from Austrian Lombardy. The famous manifesto of the Duke of Brunswick, commander-in-chief of the combined armies of Austria and Prussia, is dated Coblentz (July 25). It is an unquestionable fact, since divulged, that this document was sent to the Tuileries previous to its publication; that it was there examined in a very select committee, composed of the king, the queen, and a few other persons; that nobody was struck with its egregious absurdity, and that it was sent to the Marshal de Castries after being approved. There is reason to think, however, that the king desired a milder manifesto. The Memoirs of M. Bertrand de Molleville throw some light on the mission of Mallet de Pan, in connexion with this document. Mallet de Pan displayed the most ludicrous vanity in Switzerland. It was surely an absurd oversight to employ such an agent, whose sole fear was, lest everybody should not know he was engaged on a secret mission.—(Note by General Lafayette.)

their first experiment was the assassination of some soldiers of the national guard, without this corps concerning itself about the pursuit of the murderers, without a single attempt on the part of any judicial body to punish the crime.* Emboldened by this success, the club, against which thousands of good citizens had just signed a petition, contrived that the king's deposition should be required, not, indeed, in the name of the council of the commune, but rather in the name of the sections which had been usurped by a handful of jacobins belonging to each, and this demand, accompanied neither by any denunciation on the part of the legislative body, nor by any evidence of crime against the accused, was supported by intimidating galleries.† But before

* The decree of the 8th of June, proposed by M. Servan, in pursuance of which a camp of 20,000 federates was to be formed under the walls of Paris, was rejected by the king's veto on the 19th; but, in spite of this constitutional interdiction, the federates had put themselves in movement from all quarters. On the 2nd of July, the extraordinary commission procured a decision that the federates should assemble at Paris, for the anniversary of the 14th, and should repair from there to Soissons. On the 4th, Louis XVI. sanctioned this new decree. The corps styled the *volunteers of Marseilles* was, on its arrival in Paris, on the 30th of July, composed of about 500 men, and marched with three pieces of cannon. That same day it picked a quarrel in the Champs Elysées with the grenadiers of the Filles Saint Thomas; one grenadier was killed, and several wounded. Three days afterwards, the Marseillese volunteers, in presenting their requisition for Louis XVI.'s deposition, at the bar of the assembly, desired to form part of its guard, and accused certain instigators attached to the court of being enrolled amongst the grenadiers at Filles Saint Thomas. The assembly ordered their petition to be printed.

† It was on the 3rd of August that Petion, in the name of the *commune*, demanded the king's deposition. This petition was referred to the extraordinary commission. Since the 14th of July, a *central committee* had been formed of the federates

they would permit the representatives of the nation to deliberate upon a question which they had themselves resolved on beforehand, they were anxious to exhibit their strength by overthrowing Lafayette. On the 8th, Jean Debry, reporter of the extraordinary commission, proposed a decree of accusation against him.* Brissot, who the day before had said, "that Lafayette was the man he esteemed the most," supported it.† The accusers had to bear

assembled at Paris. This secret directory, the existence of which was revealed by Petion himself (see infra, p. 359, note 2nd), held its sittings in the *locale* of the jacobins, directed all the measures of the federates, and concerted with the intriguers of the club, and of various sections of Paris.

* After the third report had been read, M. Pastoret declared that he was charged by several members of the extraordinary commission to observe, that while the commission was deliberating on this affair, it was composed of no more than fifteen members, eight of whom only had supported the decree of accusation. The president, according to the "Moniteur," put the decree to the vote, and declared that it was lost; on which a part of the assembly objected, and insisted on a formal division (*appel nominal*). After considerable discussion, this was acceded to, and the decree of accusation was then rejected by 406 to 224.

† We here insert a note upon M. Brissot. It was addressed by M. Lafayette to one of his *collaborateurs*, in the inquiries to which we alluded at p. 183 of this volume:—"It is impossible not to be struck with various contrasts in the life of Brissot, a clever man, undoubtedly, and a skilful journalist, but whose talents and influence have been greatly overrated both by friends and enemies. The abbé Sièyes said very justly of him, in 92, 'This Brissot is nothing more than a tool.' I pass over certain reflections upon him, in consequence of I know not what speculations in England, as well as the quarrel that arose out of it between the intriguing Morande and himself. Lafayette often defended him, at M. de Montmorin's, from the disparaging imputations of M. Lenoir; he also gave him letters to America, where, thanks to this recommendation, he was extremely well received. On his return, Brissot seemed to be sincere in his support of the principles of liberty. He was, however, re-

the brunt of the eloquent speeches of MM. Vaublanc, Dumolard, and Limousin. Never was Lafayette better praised. At this sitting, the last day of that liberty which had existed in France for three years, the act of accusation was, on the motion of Vaublanc, rejected, after a formal division, by a majority of two-thirds, in spite of the cries and threats of the scoundrels with whom the galleries were thronged. It is worthy of remark, that the independents, who usually sat on the same side with the jacobins, crossed over in a body to vote in favour of Lafayette. The destroying faction now felt that its only resource was that of extreme violence. On that very day, the most respectable members were assailed with stones, bludgeons, and swords, as they

proached with being at all times influenced by a mania for denouncing. He had intimate relations with Clavière, Petion, and an aristocratic stock-jobber, a deputy to the national assembly, named the Baron de Batz. He was always the enemy of Necker and Bailly, against whom he indulged in diatribes that disgusted Lafayette. The latter, notwithstanding, sometimes saw Brissot, who talked republicanism to him. The mot of Lafayette's, that "it is not yet time ....." is true enough. Brissot, in other times, before he became republican, had made the old régime a subject of eulogy. It seems pretty well proved that, a few days before the 10th of August, he and some agitators of his party had been intriguing with the valets de chambre of the Tuileries; even after this insurrection, their only desire was to govern in the name of the prince royal. Brissot, on the very eve of denouncing Lafayette, told the abbé Duvernet, then member of the society of jacobins, and a very sincere patriot, 'that the person he was going to accuse was the man beyond all others that he esteemed and revered the most.' Even while continuing to calumniate Lafayette, he testified in private the same esteem for him to various persons, Lord Lauderdale, among others, a witness whose evidence will hardly be refused, and who often spoke of it in London." These incidental facts and details are, perhaps, somewhat prolix. It is only en passant that one may be allowed to defend one's-self from Brissot.—(Note found in General Lafayette's papers.)

left the assembly. On the next day, the 9th, as may be seen by those editions of the "Logographe" that have escaped mutilation, the assembly rose in a body, and declared "it was no longer free." An appeal to the general of the patriot army, or some other vigorous measure, should have followed this declaration; the legal order might perhaps have even yet been saved. But the time had passed by when the jacobins in alarm effected the great commotion of the 10th, of which, moreover, the possible consequences were less appalling to the foreign jacobin than would have been those of any act of repressive vigour constitutionally exercised. Then occurred the massacre of the Swiss guards, a corps faithful to its duties, which had conducted itself admirably in its co-operation with the national guard of Paris. A part of the latter, consisting of the friends of liberty and public order, were pursued and disarmed.

In an edition of "Memoirs of the Life of Marshal Richelieu," the abbé Soulavie, at that time a girondist, has spoken vauntingly of his party, "as having forced upon the nation what it did not desire to have, by the aid of three thousand workmen."* Petion also boasted, that, when the revolution of the 10th of August was attempted, "there were not five men in France who wished for a republic."† But among the remarkable events of the

* "Three thousand labourers effected the revolution of the 10th of August, in defiance of the whole kingdom of feuillans, the majority of the capital, and of the legislative assembly," &c.—(Vol. ix., p. 384, of the work alluded to.)

† The "Moniteur," of Nov. 10th, 1792, contains a speech of Petion's, in reply to Robespierre, in which we find the following passage:—"The men who have arrogated to themselves the glory of the 10th of August are those to whom it the least

time is the desire which was entertained by the aristocrats for this movement. They had no doubts of the triumph of the constitutionalists; and, feeling sure of the national guard, they flattered themselves with being able to surprise and crush the jacobins while in flagrante delicto against the constitution; they then calculated that the majority of the legislative body, and of the administrative authorities, yielding in the end to a spirit of reaction, would recover sufficient energy to extirpate a sect, the destruction of which was desired by nineteen-twentieths of France. The queen's confidence proceeded from her conviction that she could depend on Danton, to whom she had remitted fifty thousand *écus*, a few days previous to these appalling events. We are not to infer from this, that it was the queen's intention quietly to resign herself to the triumph of the constitutional party; but she was very willing to make use of it as an instrument, reserving to herself the power of crushing it when she might. In fact, certain negotiations with the girondists, the money given to Danton, and the promises which the court were continually receiving, had so thoroughly convinced this princess that the anticipated riot

belongs: it is due to those who matured it; it is due to the imperious necessity of things; it is due to the brave federates and their secret directory, which had long before concerted the plan of insurrection. For a moment—the fact must be avowed—success was doubtful," &c. In the same No. is a letter of Petion's to the society of jacobins, in which he declares, "That he had not a little contributed to bring about the affair of the 10th." "I saved that society," said Petion. "I have seen the time when it consisted of not more than three deputies and from twenty to thirty citizens. Terror had dispersed the rest. I have seen Robespierre trembling—Robespierre on the point of flying—Robespierre not daring to present himself to the assembly. Demand of him if I trembled!"

would be put down, that she received the tidings of its first excesses without alarm. And even amid the various contradictory emotions inseparable from such a crisis, a suspicion flashed upon her that the struggle was merely a scheme of the constitutionalists to frighten the king into seeking an asylum out of Paris, and under their protection.*

* When the assembly appointed the new ministry, the queen said, in the box of the *Logographe*, to M. Bigot de Sainte Croix: —"I trust you do not feel yourself at all less confident of being minister of foreign affairs." On hearing of the progress of the commotion, she observed:—"For all this, the Duke of Brunswick will not be the less in France on the 23rd." The king, who took a juster view of his sad position, replied:—"They will avenge me, perhaps,—but not save me." A few days previously there had been several dinners among the aristocrats, at which there were mutual felicitations on the prospect of the impending convulsion. "Our affairs are going on excellently," said a well-known person among them; "all that is wanting to assure our triumph is a good riot." A commissary, who had an appointment in the Swiss guards, has been since heard to say, that on leaving one of these dinners he would not have sold his appointment for double what it cost him. While some of the aristocrats were leaving nothing untried to save the king in an unconstitutional manner, and others of them, as for instance, the Baron de Vioménil, were endeavouring to prevail upon him to remain at the chateau, and there await the threatened attack, several patriotic deputies persisted to the last moment, to the eve of the 10th of August, in pressing upon him some legal plan, like that of Compiègne. But his objections were still the same.

The queen, while traversing the Tuileries, on her way to the assembly, met a faithful servant who had urged her to accept the offer made by Lafayette; she made a significant gesture to him, expressive of her regret; but, on her arrival at the assembly, and after hearing the president's protestations in favour of the constitution, she again grew confident; for, on hearing the report of the guns firing on the chateau, she exclaimed, addressing herself to M. d'Hervilly:—"Well, M. d'Hervilly, were we not in the right to leave it!" "I trust," replied M. d'Hervilly, whose devotedness to the aristocratic plan is beyond all question, "that your Majesty may be able to ask me the same

It would be easy to prove that the Tuileries, the girondists, the Orleanists, in fact, the anarchists of every party, mutually deceived each other, and that the whole affair was a mire of intrigues.

We may see in the royalist writings of Pelletier with what insolence a handful of aristocrats, the remnant of that nobility which had deserted the king to assemble at Coblentz, despised the national guard, and disdained to wear its uniform; we there see that these men, as imprudent as the cavaliers of Charles I., shewed themselves at their windows with white handkerchiefs around their waists, in effigy of the white scarf. It is in the documents of their own party that we must search for the details.

A few faithful and right-minded servants of the king expressed, during the events of the 10th, their indignation at these follies. This senseless conduct contributed powerfully to alienate the good will of a portion of the national guard; but as respects the latter, it is to be remarked, that when the king decided on quitting the chateau, and had deranged the means of defence by taking for his escort a part of those engaged in it, and even the officers commanding the different posts that were left for its

question six months hence."—(See "Memoirs of M. de Malleville," ch. xxvii., p. 160.)—All this explains why Louis XVI. and his family refused the means of safety tendered by the patriot general; but it does not justify the violation of the constitutional act. The king's feebleness, and the malice of his blind supporters, could not in any way affect the defence of the state; the executive power was too confined, the ministers too well watched, and even ruled, by the assembly. Lafayette, Luckner, or, at least, his directors, Montesquiou, were patriots; the public mind, at bottom, was attached to their principles; there was therefore but one practicable road to counter-revolution, that taken by the jacobins.—(Note by General Lafayette. See also, for a mot of Madame Elizabeth's, the note to page 82 of this volume.)

protection, nothing could be more natural than that the men should think themselves not at all called upon to defend a deserted building.

The political conduct of the girondists was very eccentric; between their professed opinions and those of Lafayette there was much in common, and yet they persecuted him à l'outrance; eulogizing Luckner at his expense, who never comprehended a syllable of liberty; and loudly expressing their preference for Dumouriez, after publishing him in their newspapers as an intriguer and a rogue. They boasted of having co-operated on the 10th of August, and did not know a syllable of it: Brissot received the first intelligence at the assembly. They pretended to have wrought this event in order to establish a republic; and yet, on the king's appearance that day in the assembly, Vergniaud spoke of his fealty to the constitution, and suggested the appointment of a tutor for the prince royal.* They wished to save the king's life, and full half of them voted for his death, and this, too, when their united votes would have given him a considerable majority.†

* When they talked, in the committees, of consulting the people, Merlin told them, "that they were men-pimps for the court, poltroons, and that he could of himself cause the republic to be proclaimed in spite of them." We know how it was proclaimed under the patronage of Collot d'Herbois.—(Note by General Lafayette.)

† The girondists have especial reason to reproach themselves with the king's death. Within three days after the 10th of August, they were utterly at a loss to govern, and many of them already trembled before the *commune*. From the 7th of September, they began to be denounced; inroad upon inroad was made upon their influence, in spite of great efforts to sustain it. Even the idea *of an appeal to the people* was not theirs, it belongs to Danton, who had said, "I will save the king, or kill him." This idea of an appeal was useful to the jacobins, until the girondists got hold of it, intending to make a merit of it, which at once made it unpopular. Then the principal leaders

They suffered themselves to be installed as the ringleaders of the jacobins, after two years spent in abusing the directing committees of the club, and did not foresee that they would be deposed as soon as their names or their talents were no longer required; they instituted the first revolutionary tribunal, and did not foresee that it would not be long before this illegal institution was turned against themselves. The disorders of the first eight months of 1792 they applauded; those of the last four they eloquently condemned; but not a single measure did they take to arrest them, or to protect themselves. Thus it was, that, though, according to the testimony of Madame Roland herself, "to stop the massacres of the 2nd of September, fifty men would have sufficed,"* her friend Petion, the mayor, who had committed the greater part of the victims

of their party voted for the sentence of death, while those who were less prominent—as may be seen from the list of the division—voted against it. It is natural to suppose that the votes of the leaders drew after them many irresolute or insignificant members.

A fine and touching spectacle was that of the virtuous Malesherbes bursting into tears at the bar of the assembly, and asking, in a voice choaked with sobs, a reprieve for Louis. He was on the point of obtaining it; numbers of members, affected by his grief, his age, and his virtues, rushed to the bar, and insisted on a new division, when the execrable Robespierre confirmed the assembly in its fatal resolution. Three years later (in the year five), another defender of Louis XVI., Tronchet, the deputy, made a report on the affair of the property of Madame d'Orleans; when he pronounced the words, "After all the misfortunes of her house," his emotion obliged him to stop; the members of the council looked down in silence, and those who had contributed to the king's murder were themselves not insensible to the feeling which the look and the tone of the venerable old man had inspired.—(Note by General Lafayette.)

* "All Paris looked on ..... And I have no hope that liberty will revive amongst cowards, cold spectators of outrages which fifty brave men, armed, would have sufficed to check."—("Notices Historiques de Madame Roland," 1st edit., p. 75.)

to prison, did nothing to prevent their being slaughtered there; that her husband, minister of the interior, sat at the executive council, side by side with the minister of justice, Danton, who had the assassins in his pay, and under whose official seal was issued that revolting invitation from the *commune* of the 10th of August, to all the other *communes* of France, exhorting them to perpetrate similar atrocities.

The girondists, when no longer able to maintain themselves, displayed much fearlessness, and a rare eloquence in support of doctrines that were excellent; they perished victims of their opposition to the men of terror; their political heirs are all sincere republicans; still, historical truth, and, above all, patriotic truth, does not permit our sanction of every thing the gironde said and did apart from its principles of liberty.*

Here is a collation of facts not a little curious. Amongst the most distinguished republicans of the

* If the papers found in the Iron Cabinet had not passed through the hands of Roland, minister of the interior, and the instrument of the party of the gironde, it is probable we should have had some curious indications respecting the intrigues of his friends with the court. Their judicial assassination was a great misfortune, and a monstrous outrage; but might we not address to each of those who participated in the overthrow of constitutional law, and in the madness of jacobin anarchy, these lines of Corneille?

"Octave, ose accuser le destin d'injustice
Quand tu vois que les tiens s'arment pour ton supplice,
Et que, par ton exemple, à ta perte guidés
Ils violent des droits que tu n'as pas gardés!"

Cinna, act iv., scene iii.

Should the aristocrats apply the same verses to us, our answer would be, that we had always respected the rights violated by anarchists and despots. The girondists cannot say as much.—(Note by General Lafayette.)

period of the 10th of August, we find Condorcet, who, in a note on the word *patrie*, in Voltaire's Philosophical Dictionary, maintains, "there are but three kinds of political existence—monarchy, aristocracy, and anarchy;" Dumouriez, who, seeing the revolution approach, gave the Duke de Coigny, a friend of the queen's, a plan for putting the Bastile in a state of defence; Clavière, who put it into Mirabeau's head to insist on the king's absolute veto as indispensable; Sièyes, who, at the moment that the constitution was completed, proclaimed in the newspapers of the day, "that, in every view of the case, there was more liberty in a monarchy than in a republic."

Such were they who thought it necessary, or professed to think so, to overthrow the national constitution of 91, in order to establish the conventional revolution on its ruins;* and yet, amongst the

* When Lafayette endeavoured to prevent the storm that burst on the 10th of August, M. Merlin de Douai was one of his most active antagonists in the department of the north. It is edifying to compare the republicanism of M. Merlin, in the beginning of 1792, with the opinions expressed in a letter written by him on July 3rd, 1791, which we find in the "Journal des Hommes Libres:"—

"July 3rd, 1791.

". . . . . The *suspensive decree*, which you allude to, was passed on the 25th. As to your ideas on royalty, which you call useless, God keep me from adopting them! If I desired to plunge France into a frightful civil war, and to deliver it up to its bitterest enemies, I should think with you. A people so numerous and unequal in wealth as the French, cannot be organized into a republic; I defy you to name me a single large one that existed for any length of time, or was not subject to continual tempests. We have a constitution; let us keep it.

"I give you the patriotic embrace.

"MERLIN (de Douai.)"

The tone of this letter shews what, on the 22nd of June, were the opinion and feelings of the constituent assembly. We

defenders of the royalty of 91 we find—La Rochefoucauld, who, a few days before the arrest of the king at Varennes, had convened several members of the assembly at his house in order to discuss the choice between a monarchy and a republic; Dupont de Nemours, who moved for the establishment of a republic; Chazot, the only colonel in the army at the time that had declared in favour of republican institutions; Diétrich, the brave mayor of Strasburg, a decided republican; Caffarelli Dufalga, at that period a colonel, and since a general of engineers, who died a republican, under the command of Bonaparte; finally, Lafayette, whose habits and inclinations were anything but doubtful; but all these persons made their republicanism consist in the defence of a constitution based on the declaration of rights, and consecrated by the sovereign will of the French people.

The catastrophe of the 10th of August marks the transition from constitutional revolution to conventional revolution, from the era of liberty, of sound principles, and sound feelings, to the era of terror and incivism. This change, so painful to every enlightened friend of mankind, seems to be effaced from the memory of Frenchmen; or, at least, confounded with all other great convulsions. It was

might add other testimonies in abundance of the *republicanism* of our adversaries. In the works of Madame de Genlis is a notice of two curious works of Barrère's, written in 1788. The "Journal de Paris," of March 13th, 1792, did it not cite a panegyric of the ancient régime by Brissot?—(Note by General Lafayette.)—The work of Brissot here alluded to by General Lafayette was, according to the "Journal de Paris," a discourse that, in 1780, obtained the prize from the academy of Châlons sur Marne. The author therein asserts, that all the lore of the executioner, including the most refined cruelties, may, consistently with humanity, be put in requisition against regicides!

at this point, however, that the demoralization of the French, or, to speak more correctly, of the European revolution, began; not but that there have been other epochs of equal importance and of greater atrocity, but never before had public authority been seen to confirm and enjoin the violation of every principle of government, and of every obligation of society. Without entering into any empty metaphysical discussion, we may observe that, for any thing that we can perceive, they who held themselves aloof from the *doctrine of natural and social right*,* gained nothing by doing so, which secured the safety of their persons, or enhanced the dignity of their character; nor does it appear to us that the system of expedients, from day to day, was at all calculated to promote our country's welfare; but there exist in civilized nations certain principles, certain rights, which they are ever ready to defend against all men; these are the guarantees which, in the midst of the oscillations of parties, of the encroachments of chiefs, can alone prevent the evils and the

* The true doctrine of liberty, that is to say, the *declaration of rights*, was a perfectly efficient guide through the earlier part of the revolution, even during the greatest embarrassments of the government. Unhappily, the vices incident to a long servitude, a want of experience, the audacity of factious men, who were suffered to organize themselves in the state, and the apathy of well-meaning citizens, brought about frightful calamities, at the very moment when that revolution presented the most cheering perspective of prosperity. But the *declaration of rights*, those fundamental principles to which we must always revert, have at least the merit of having preserved its opening from the excesses which despots and aristocrats alone have an interest in identifying with our exertions. We easily comprehend the fury of such persons against the promulgation of the rights of mankind, and of truths destructive of their pretensions; what is certain is, that to these very truths the oppressed of all parties have appealed in turn.—(Note by General Lafayette.)

degradation of subjection. In France, the political catechism was no sooner learnt, than the most infamous outrages against the rights and principles it contained were defied; not that that doctrine itself was ever declared worthless,—better would it have been to have done so; not that the people were dissatisfied with it,—they were even enthusiastically attached to it; but solely because a small organized number of factious men having been successful, and having taken possession of the public force, the whole nation was obliged to yield and appear to agree with them.

The 10th of August shook so completely the republican doctrine, that it required three years before it was possible to remodel the constitution. Is not that constitution dated the year three, from the 10th of August? Has not the new one been violated, as well as the other, under pretence of the public good? It must be acknowledged that the deputies of the two councils, when voting, at a later period, that the men of the 10th of August had deserved well of their country, subscribed beforehand to their own transportation, for which there were, at least, as good grounds as for the attack of the Tuileries. We do not wish to awaken here personal hatred, nor to provoke a painful reaction against the past; but it is essential for humanity, justice, liberty, the honour of our country, and the tranquillity of all legal government, that the truth relating to this period should be at length consigned somewhere, that it may be one day universally acknowledged. It is a sacred duty to the victims who perished for the defence of the constitutional laws; it is an important point for those proscribed men who suffered so many persecutions while defending the national sovereignty of their country, by opposing a supplement

of revolution, of which they then foretold the effect, and of which we have seen the frightful and deplorable consequences.

It would not have been difficult for Lafayette to have united with the chiefs of the usurping party. A few months before the constitution was overthrown, he had rejected offers on their part which might have tempted a man whose ambition had been different from his own. The jacobins felt he possessed much influence over public opinion and the army; they thought it necessary to publish in one of their papers that he had approved of the 10th of August;* the minister Clavière, charged, *ad interim*, with the war department, endeavoured to keep on terms with Lafayette, when writing to him.

The deputy commissioners,† even after their arrest, sent to apprise him that it but depended on himself to obtain the highest power under the new government, and act the first part in it. But

* In "la Chronique" of Condorcet, two remarkable passages may be seen; one, before the 10th of August, in which, notwithstanding all preceding abuse, the patriotism of Lafayette is acknowledged; and the other, immediately after the 10th of August, in which the wish of preserving fair terms with him is carried so far as to make them declare they have received intelligence that he has caused the events of that day to be approved by his army. These various proceedings prove the inconsistency of their accusations, and their strong desire to number him amongst their accomplices. Louis Romeuf must remember what was said to him by Lord Lauderdale, of the conversations held by the latter with the girondists, namely, with Kersaint, who returned an enthusiastic admirer of the good defensive order established in the army. Latour Maubourg received also insinuations in favour of the constitutional general. Tracy recollects several circumstances which prove the proposal made to Lafayette, by the commissioners sent to Sedan, to place him at the head of the new order of things.—(Note by General Lafayette.)

† Kersaint, Péraldy, and Antonelle.

the first, the sole ambition of Lafayette was, that his country should be free and just; this feeling excluded all possibility of his conniving at the projects of factious men. Had he yielded in the slightest degree, at what point could he afterwards have stopped? how could he have recalled principles whose violation had been authorized by his own example? Before engaging himself in that vast career in which, according to Cromwell, "men never go so far as when they know not whither they are going," Lafayette had denied himself all chance of being misled by assigning beforehand the limits of obedience and authority, of legitimate power and usurpation; and he sought not these limits in the caprices of his imagination, or in the calculations of his interest, but in the evident and imperishable rights of nature and society. By what sign could the chief of a doctrine of liberty presented to all mankind, make a distinction between that holy liberty and licence, revolt, and anarchy; between the imprescriptible sovereignty of nations and the outrages of the most culpable tyranny, if, while the despots and aristocrats of Europe endeavoured to discredit those principles by their calumnies, at the very time the jacobins dishonoured them by their actions, he himself extinguished the torch he had promised to keep constantly elevated, that, in the midst of so many profanations, the eternal virtues of liberty might never be mistaken? In short, was it at the moment when so many generous martyrs of the laws had just expired while invocating his own maxims, that Lafayette would unite with men covered with their blood, against the rights of humanity and justice, against those of the French people, against his principles, and the glory of his whole life?

Lafayette learned the events of the 10th of August by a national guard who had escaped from the massacre, and by an officer of the army, who, finding himself at Paris for some purpose relative to the service, joined, at the Tuileries, a battalion of which he had once formed part, and made his escape by forcing, with a pistol in his hand, his way through the barrier. The suppression of all letters and papers, except those of the jacobin party, sufficiently confirmed the news of some great outrage having been committed against public liberty. When further particulars became known, it was ascertained that one of the two great authorities was imprisoned, and that the other was reduced to two hundred and forty members, less than a third of the legislative assembly;* that the commune elected by the people had been violently replaced by what was termed *the commune of the 10th of August*. The head-quarters of Lafayette were then held in the jurisdiction of the municipality of Sedan; his first act was to declare to the mayor and municipality that, in the state of captivity and impotence to which the legislative body and the king had been reduced, the military power, not to remain independent, would demand orders from the administrators of the Ardennes, as being the highest constituted authority then remaining free; that he rendered equal homage to the administrative bodies of the other departments over whom his military com-

* In the same number of the "Moniteur" in which the appointment of the ministers of the 10th of August is announced, it is also mentioned that the majority of the chamber had been driven away, and that those only remained who formed the minority on the 8th. Is it not singular that Danton, appointed by that minority minister of justice, was precisely the man whom the court had paid for two years, and employed as a spy upon the jacobins?—(Note by General Lafayette.)

mand extended, and that in the meantime he submitted to the civil power which was nearest to him. His letter to the administration of the Ardennes, framed in that spirit, was, in some degree, but an extract from the *declaration of rights* and the first constitutional principles; he sent copies of it to some other administrative bodies, to his colleague, Luckner, and to the mayor of Strasburg, a republican from inclination, but a faithful observer of existing laws.

To calm the agitation occasioned by the various reports the troops received, Lafayette published, with the order of the day, the facts precisely as he had learnt them, recommending the most exact discipline, and fidelity to constitutional duties. A general, who has remained in service, and afterwards several chiefs of corps, having inserted, the following days, in their private orders, reflections which, though doubtless well intentioned, were imprudent, the general-in-chief took measures to prevent the recurrence of this measure. The first expressions of almost the whole army were those of surprise and indignation. The latter feeling appeared peculiarly strong in the minds of the patriot officers. Some very active jacobins intrigued in an underhand manner, and endeavoured to recruit partisans for their cause. The aristocrats who remained in the army took little part in the passing events; by serving the constitutional cause they had already fancied they were submitting to usurpation; the king had appeared to them a prisoner ever since the decline of his former power; and having once conquered their first feeling of dissatisfaction, they considered all other aggravations but as new shades in the popular revolt.

No plan had been formed to march on Paris after

the 10th of August, nor would it have been possible to do so. Both foreign and internal enemies had taken good care to prevent such a measure. The simultaneous movements combined by the heads of the jacobin party, into which many foreigners had insinuated themselves, and the entrance of the Duke of Brunswick into France, merit the most serious attention of historians.

It must be acknowledged that no circumstance could be more favourable to the factious party than the presence of the hostile armies that kept Lafayette at the frontier. It was not possible, at that moment, to close with them in battle, and yet they were near enough to take advantage of every internal quarrel, and of any measures the generals might have taken to repress the outrages committed against the constitution. And to those measures would also have been attributed, in any case, the successes the enemy might obtain, and even the invasion itself, which would be rendered easy by the slightest remissness on the part of the corps employed for external defence. It must also be added, that the conduct of the king on the 21st of June of the preceding year had left painful recollections. However just may have been his cause on that occasion, inevitable distrust, real and recent errors, repressed the zeal of many good citizens, who thought it was no longer possible to identify the rights of royalty with those of the people. The nation, in short, was deficient in that sort of civil energy which, in people accustomed to liberty, makes every individual sensible of all social injuries, or the violation of the common right.

Lafayette was sufficiently sensible of these various causes of discouragement to be fully aware of the perils attending an almost desperate struggle; but

he felt it was his duty to attempt every means of supporting liberty without compromising national independence. A letter from him, addressed to the former ministry, informed the new ministry of his feelings and intentions.

On the other side, the letters of several generals, and, amongst others, of Arthur Dillon, lieutenant-general of a detachment in Flanders, appeared to answer for their fidelity and that of the troops.*

Lafayette also knew that, a short time before the 10th of August, Montesquiou, general-in-chief of the army of the south, questioned by a girondist chief, in one of the committees of the assembly, as to the effect that would be produced on the troops under his orders by the news of any hostile step against the king, very plainly answered—"They will defend the constitution, and I shall give them the example of doing so." The generals employed under Luckner, with the exception of some aristocrats and Orleanists, were all constitutionalists. The army could not abandon its post; but it was even much to hope for its support.

Lafayette conceived the project of forming a sort of congress of the united departments. The administrative corps of the Ardennes adopted, without hesitation, all his views, as may be seen by a very firm decree of the 15th of August. The administration of the Aisne possessed as much courage as patriotism; that of the Meuse testified the same disposition; and those departments that had adhered to the denunciation of the 16th and 29th of June against the anarchists might be fully depended on.

Of the four commissions of deputies sent to the

* See the note, page 383.

armies, in the name of the minority of the subjected legislative body, one was intended for Montesquiou; the second had set out for Flanders, where Dillon commanded; the third for Strasburg, where Dietrich was stationed; and the fourth, destined for the head-quarters of Luckner, at some distance from Metz, was to pass first by that of Lafayette, at the gates of Sedan. This commission, on entering the department of the Ardennes, wrote to Paris that the people of that frontier adhered to Lafayette. The three deputies who composed it were received at Mézières with marked disapprobation by the administration and citizens of the place. As they were obliged to pass through Sedan to arrive at the camp, they presented themselves at the general council of the commune, who gave them a public audience. Indignation was strongly excited against them in the town and amongst the troops, not only because, as deputies of a faction, even before that faction had pretended to consult the country by suffrages without liberty, they came to require oaths against the social compact, but because a report had been spread that they brought with them the dismissal of Lafayette. Kersaint, who was spokesman on the occasion, thought he ought to begin by justifying his party from this last accusation, which he treated as a calumny, and professed the highest esteem for the general: this induced a person present to observe, "That he had, however, voted against him in the sitting of the 8th of August, and that he would not, undoubtedly, express the same opinion of Lafayette, if the latter were placed in the midst of the assassins of the jacobin faction." The mayor, a firm and virtuous magistrate,* imposed silence on the spec-

* M. Desrousseau.

tators, and, with much calm dignity of deportment, politely interrogated the commissioners, and forced them to acknowledge that, at the time when the decrees were voted of which they were the bearers, the assembly was not free.* In an eloquent speech, he then represented to them "the full horrors of the 10th of August; the duty which forced all citizens, and, above all, magistrates, to maintain the constitution, and prevent the deputies of a rebel faction from coming to excite a peaceful and patriotic commune to a violation of the laws; he added, that their presence in the army, essentially injurious, from tending to weaken the confidence of the troops in a general devoted to liberty, and lessen their affection for him, was also a crime against the constitutional act, which declared that the legislative body had in no case the right of sending commissioners to the armies." This respectable mayor, having taken the unanimous opinion of the general council of the commune, then declared—"That to maintain legal order, and retain hostages, would reassure the department of the Ardennes as to the fate of its deputies imprisoned in Paris, the general council of the commune of Sedan ordered that these self-styled commissioners should be placed under arrest." Two municipal officers conducted the latter to the fortress of Sedan; others came in a deputation to the head-quarters, situated outside the town, to apprise Lafayette officially of a measure

* The 9th of August, the day after the proposal for impeaching Lafayette before the high national court had been rejected, the assembly voted a bill to declare "it was not free." That bill was cancelled on the 10th. It is nevertheless true, that it had been once issued, and on this account the deputies sent to Sedan did not dare to make a positive declaration to the contrary.—(Note by General Lafayette.)

which, as may be well supposed, had been concerted with himself. Then, on the demand of the municipality, two companies of grenadiers—one of national volunteers, and the other of the line—were charged by the general, under the command of a colonel, with the guard of the prisoners. The next day, on another request of the municipal corps, communicated to the administration of the district of Sedan, and on that of the department, which had been informed of the arrest of the commissioners, Lafayette caused the national guard of the town and the troops in the camp to take arms, under the command of General Latour Maubourg, for a solemn renewal of the civic oath. The mayor and the municipality were present at this ceremony; the commissioner-general, according to military law, pronounced the formula of the oath; the general-in-chief, the general officers, the national guard, and all the corps, took the oath with alacrity, with the exception of one battalion and company, that were sent the next day to a garrison. Lafayette received, that same night, a courier from Clavière, minister of war *ad interim;* the name of the king was effaced from his passport, and the minister announced, with some degree of circumspection, the appointment of the council. Lafayette placed the courier under arrest, and sent the letter to the administrators of the department, observing to them, that the arbitrary erasure of the name of one of the first constituted authorities, the usurpation of a ministerial power against the forms of delegations instituted by the national sovereignty, did not allow any reply to be made to such a communication: he demanded, at the same time, their orders, and gave them some military details. They expressed their approbation of his conduct.

This was, undoubtedly, offering a strong resistance; and yet, in the whole measure, not one expression could be found contrary to the principles of liberty and the constitution. Respect for law was carried so far, that the municipality of Sedan, seeing the liberty of the press and the secrecy of letters destroyed by the jacobins, thought itself authorized, in such a case, to suspend, in the town, the distribution of packets, filled with incendiary epistles and newspapers, and proposed to Lafayette to do the same respecting the post of the army; but the latter replied—"These means are unworthy of our cause; let us leave them to our adversaries." The municipality adopted his opinion. The same day, Lafayette was informed that some jacobins of a more distant corps of the army had addressed to the assembly a petition against himself, which had just been sent to the post-office; he said they must allow it to pass.

The example of a *holy resistance to oppression* was given: if the citizens of Paris, recovering from their first surprise, would have employed, to recover their rights, the arms they allowed to be taken from them by the orders of pretended municipal officers, whom they had not appointed,—if some fugitive deputies had had either power or resolution to join Lafayette, the resistance of the department of the Ardennes would have been the signal for a noble opposition to the two species of tyranny that came forward at the same moment. Those deputies might have formed the majority of the legislative body; they might have assembled either on the side of Chalons, or towards Flanders, to form at least a large committee. Lafayette held himself in readiness to send them an escort, which, in the former case, would have been commanded by one

of the officers under him, and in the latter case by General Chazot. This would have sufficed to have protected the real representatives of the country from the outrages of factious men, until the national succour they would invoke should be afforded them. But resistance was less founded on the almost impossible re-establishment of an assembly forcibly dissolved, than on the public spirit and organization that existed in the administrations of the departments.

As the greater part of those administrations and of the municipalities of the frontier in which Lafayette commanded, had expressed their indignation against the jacobins, their representatives assembled in congress might have declared that, forced by circumstances to exercise provisionally the functions of two powers annihilated by a faction, they would only resume their own functions when the great authorities should be re-established, or when the nation, freely formed into primary assemblies, had manifested its sovereign will respecting the changes to be made in the constitution. It was evident that the convocation proclaimed by Condorcet, in the name of the legislative assembly,—in the midst of assassinations, of violent expulsions, of the disarming of the citizens,—must inevitably produce, by the extension of such a régime in the departments, not a *national convention*, but, with few exceptions, as has since been proved, a representation of the clubs and minority of the country. The re-establishment of the constitution, or the institution of a glorious republic, would have been the result of a true appeal to the national sovereignty. France would not have been associated with the crimes committed in the capital; liberty would have been preserved from the stains which sullied her

triumph; and the frontiers would have been better defended by the pure enthusiasm of the citizens than by those unworthy measures of terror which at a later period brought on such fearful outrages.

But while the department of the Ardennes, the magistrates, the citizens, the troops of that part of the frontier, maintained a free and patriotic attitude, everywhere else the best resolutions gradually faded away. At Metz, Luckner, summoned by a jacobin mayor before a prudent and well-disposed municipality, but in the midst of an audience worked upon by the club, could only stammer out, while shedding tears himself, a species of assent; he then wrote to Lafayette, conjuring him to guard well the commissioners, "whom he should not know what to do with if they were to find their way unto him."* It was also his frontier that was invaded, and even if he had been most disposed to have an opinion of

* The real sentiments of Luckner may be seen in the harangue he made to his soldiers on his first reception of the letter from Lafayette, announcing to him the arrest of the commissioners, and the decision taken to defend the constitution against the triumphing faction. This singular piece of rhetoric was written down immediately and brought to Lafayette by his aide-de-camp. Strange to say, it was loudly applauded by the troops. It is thus, precisely, that Alexandre Romeuf heard it delivered:—

"Officers, unter officers, soldiers,—A fery creat accident has just happent in Paris: te enemy who are before us, I mock at tem; but te enemy who are behint us, I mock at tem not. If money be give to you, take eat, I mock at tat: do not abanton me; I will nefer abanton you.

"Officers, unter officers, soldiers,—Cheneral Fayette has put unter arrest two commissioners who come to put tisorder in his army: we shall soon have te same fisit, we will receif tem te same. Here is te aide-de-camp of Fayette, who bring me tis news, and who will tell Fayette te good tispositions of te soldiers of te army of old Luckner."—(Note found in the papers of General Lafayette.)

his own on the subject, he could only turn his attention to war. At Strasburg, Diétrich, Caffarelli Dufalga, Victor Broglie,* and some others, offered an energetic resistance; but they were finally obliged to yield to the jacobins supported by Biron, the commanding-general on the Rhine. Biron was the intimate friend of the Duke of Orleans; but, to judge of the opinions of the general officers of Alsace at that period, it is necessary to read the letter of Lamorlière to the king after the 20th of June,—a letter that, be it observed, Custine requested to sign.† In the south, Montesquiou testified to his army the same constitutional feelings that he had proclaimed in the committees of the legislative assembly, until the arrival of the commission, which he obeyed. In Flanders, General Arthur Dillon, a royalist in opinion, instead of arresting Dumouriez and sending him to the head-quarters of Lafayette, for disobeying the commands of his general-in-chief, Luckner, who had

* The father of the Duke de Broglie, at present member of the house of peers.

† The 4th of July, General Lamorlière addressed a speech to the soldiers of his army, at the camp of Polsheim, placing in the centre of the extended line a banner of the national colours, surmounted by a cap of liberty. After the speech, in which he announced that he thought himself called on to reply to their feelings of devotion for liberty and the constitution, he read to them a letter to the king, beginning thus:—"Sire, the soldiers I command knew of no other enemies to the constitution save those assembled beyond the Rhine; they were most eager to combat them. Your dangers have taught them that other enemies existed, and that you were surrounded by them. They have shuddered with indignation," &c.—"P.S. I cannot refuse the entreaties of the general officers with me, who are anxious to sign this profession of the faith of every good French soldier. (Signed) Custine, Martignac, and Victor Broglie."—("Moniteur" of July 18th, 1792.)

ordered him to rejoin him, preferred treating with Dumouriez, and acknowledging the commissioners of the conquering party. General Chazot, who had demanded a republic after the 21st of June, 1791, was the only one who offered any resistance in Flanders; but he was forced to obey Dillon and Dumouriez. Dillon had taken, both in writing and verbally, engagements diametrically opposed to the measures he was then adopting;* the commissioners, desirous of recompensing him, rendered his command an independent one, and forbade, without considering for a moment the foreign invasion, the departure of the troops from Flanders, which Lafayette had requested. Some towns, like Rouen, fancied they did a great deal by not explaining themselves concerning the decrees of the 10th of August. It was difficult to resist the influence of the new government and the submission of the capital,

Every means of corruption and intrigue was employed, by the numerous jacobin or Orleanist emissaries, to shake the good resolutions of the only camp in which the rights of the nation were recognised; they could not fail to act on a part of the troops and on the least enlightened portion of the nation. The example of all the armies except this one; and that of the departments, except the department of the Ardennes; the reception of the commissioners, wherever they presented themselves,

* The "Moniteur" of the 18th of August, contains an order, of the 13th, addressed by General Arthur Dillon to his army when he learnt the events of the 10th. In it he declares "that the constitution has been violated, and that those who have perjured themselves, whoever they may be, are the enemies of the French nation." General Dillon retracted this opinion in a letter to the assembly, dated Valenciennes, August 21st, 1792.

except at Mézières and Sedan; the uninterrupted and uncontradicted budget of decrees which were transmitted under the usurped name of the legislative body, lent an appearance of revolt to the resistance of Lafayette, so legitimate in itself. The moment was approaching when that resistance could no longer be continued without bringing into close opposition the troops who remained faithful to law and the troops who had already been seduced; a fearful division, of which the enemy would not fail to take advantage. The former little army was soon to be placed between two great perils; on one side, it was exposed to an enemy with whom Lafayette would hold no relations but those of war; and on the other side, to the party who had taken possession, by employing means of terror, of all the resources of the government, and consequently of the subsistences of the troops.

It may be very well conceived that the general, continually occupied, throughout the revolution, in keeping up a military force, under the orders of the civil authority, could bestow no time in organizing the means at his disposal to meet an intestine war. He depended entirely on the assent of the country, the influence of a generous example, and this first exhibition of feeling, which was repressed by terror.

Up to the 19th of August, Lafayette persisted in his resolution; but after that, his presence, no longer capable of being in any way useful, was becoming evidently mischievous. New commissaries had arrived; he was dismissed, and a decree of accusation was impending over him.* Ought he to

* This decree of accusation was passed at the meeting of August 19th. Pursuant to another decree of the 25th, the property belonging to Lafayette and the other accused persons, in the colonies, was seized, to be put up to sale for the benefit

have contested the command with his successor, to have divided and compromised French soldiers in his own personal cause, for that of liberty was no more? At one moment he thought of going to Paris, and meeting his accusers face to face. Gladly would he have found an occasion to throw away his life in some encounter with the enemy; but he could not attack with advantage, and he felt that the lives of brave men, about to become so necessary to their country's independence, ought not to be made subservient to the desperate resolutions of their chief. All that now remained to him was, to seek an asylum in a *neutral country*, in order to save his proscribed head from the scaffold, and with the hope of being one day again useful to liberty and France.

His chief anxiety was to prevent his departure from being prejudicial to the army and the frontiers. He never suffered great political interests to furnish him with a pretext for neglecting any military duty. Within an hour after the intelligence of the 10th of August, he had, for instance, sent off a despatch urging that the march of the national guards he was expecting might not be retarded by that event. And now, within an hour of quitting his camp, he made arrangements of which his successor could advantageously avail himself. He then went to Bouillon, whence he sent orders to the different

of the public. On March 24th, 1792, the *procureur of the commune*, Manuel, demanded the removal of the busts of Lafayette and Bailly from the Hotel de Ville. This proposition was rejected; but on the 25th of August, at the recommendation of the same person, another meeting of the *commune* decided that the die of the medal struck in honour of the first commander-in-chief of the national guard should be broken by the public executioner.

corps, enjoining such precautions as he deemed it necessary to take with respect to the enemy;* he also issued instructions which had the effect of placing his army under the command of Luckner, who was at no great distance, until Dumouriez' arrival; his next concern was to provide, as far as he was able, for the safety of the worthy magistrates of Sedan, the administrators of the Ardennes, and all other citizens compromised by their defence of the laws. It was, in itself, a matter of no slight advantage to them to be relieved, by his retiring, from any further exposure to the perils of his enterprise; but he wished to give them the air of having favoured it through constraint rather than inclination, and thus to take the whole blame upon himself. With this design, he made an antedated statement, in which he set forth all that had been said or done, by every civil authority whatsoever, against the insurrection of the 10th of August; in this way furnishing them with a means of disavowal. At the same time, as he crossed the frontier, he took leave of the municipality of Sedan in the following words:—

Bouillon, August 19th, 1792.

GENTLEMEN,—Could the last drop of my blood be of use to the commune of Sedan, it would have a right to it, and the sacrifice would cost me less than the one I now make; but the moment I feel, for reasons which are obvious, that my presence in the midst of your citizens would very shortly be the means of com-

* The reports made by the commissioners arrested at Sedan prove that, in the midst of all their lies, they could not avoid testifying to the excellent discipline and good feeling of the troops. These deputies, especially those of the gironde, have often since spoken in very flattering terms of Lafayette's care for the safety of his army, and with a profound regret of their behaviour to the only man who would have saved them from the fate that awaited them.—(Note by General Lafayette.)

promising them, it is my duty to spare the city of Sedan the calamities to which, on my account, it might be exposed. The best way, therefore, of serving, is to relieve it from the presence of one whose head, proscribed by all the enemies of liberty, will never bow before despotism of any kind, be it what it may. Filled, as I am, with affliction, at being no longer able to be of actual service to my country, my only consolation is in framing wishes that the cause of liberty and equality, degraded—if degraded it can be—by a faction's crimes, will soon break loose from its enthralment; and in renewing, to a truly patriotic commune, the oath of fealty I have taken to principles which have actuated my whole life.

Lafayette was under the necessity of observing the greatest secrecy in his departure, in order to avoid increasing the number of his companions in exile, who consisted only of Latour Maubourg and his two brothers, Bureaux de Pusy,* his aides-de-camp and staff officers in the Parisian national guard, and some friends exposed to certain death, in consequence of their generous participation in his last efforts against anarchy. He also took away with him the head of his staff, and the patriotic colonel who had been appointed to guard the commissioners. Fifteen officers of different rank accompanied him. At Rochefort he was joined by a

* Bureaux de Pusy had been distinguished by his popular conduct in Franche Comté, previous to the convocation of the states-general, by his presiding three several times over the constituent assembly, by the distribution of France into departments, by his speeches and exertions, whether as simple deputy or member of the military committee, everything he did was redolent of the love of real liberty; he, at last, earned his proscription by the energy of his recent denunciations against the factious. Latour Maubourg, connected from infancy with Lafayette by the warmest friendship, shared with La Rochefoucauld the glory of the purest sacrifices, an unalterable devotion to the national cause, and a courageous opposition to aristocracy and jacobinism. They are, perhaps, the only two patriots that calumny did not dare assail.—(Note by General Lafayette.)

young general officer and five others of inferior rank, who would follow, in spite of him. Alexander Lameth, pursued by gens-d'armes, with orders to arrest him, was met at Sedan by Bureaux de Pusy.* The latter, apprised of Lameth's danger, found himself placed in a delicate and painful predicament. By adhering to his general's injunction to keep their departure secret, he must cause Lameth to lose time that was precious to him, in seeking Lafayette in a camp where he no longer was, and thus expose him to be arrested. Such a contingency had not been foreseen; Bureaux de Pusy thought it his duty to tell Lameth that the commander-in-chief had been under the necessity of withdrawing, and consequently, if he wished to join him, it was at Bouillon that he must do so. The service thus rendered became calamitous to him that accepted it. His accidental association with Lafayette and his companions was the cause of a harsh captivity, which he would probably have escaped had he never joined them. In this way, the number of officers who withdrew, with Lafayette, including those he took with him, and those who joined him, amounted to twenty-three; several of whom were able to get back successively into France.† It may be seen, by a

* M. Alexandre de Lameth was a major-general, in command at Mezières.

† At that period many constitutional officers abandoned their posts, either to return to their homes as simple citizens, or to serve as volunteer soldiers. A few aristocratic deserters went over to the enemy; but the number was small. Of the officers who were decided by Lafayette's example, there were but two who did not join him—one, the commanding officer of his vanguard, an excellent soldier, withdrew to Switzerland, after a duel with an emigrant who had insulted the national cockade; the other, Colonel d'Averhoult, had distinguished himself in the Batavian revolution of 1787; he was afterwards deputy from

printed letter of Adjutant-general d'Arblay's, that these persons pushed their scruples so far as to seal up all the plans and memoirs on which they had been employed, in order that no military information of any kind should be lost to their successors.

Bouillon is on the extreme frontier of France. Lafayette left his ordinary escort there, that it might not be exposed to the risk of being intercepted by the enemy on its return; he did more, he even sent back the orderlies that form part of a general officer's suite, not wishing to deprive his country of a single arm that it was willing to employ. This feeling was shared by his companions; and one of his aides-de-camp soon afterwards dismissed a man who had left the service, but could still be useful to it. The last orders of Lafayette, transmitted through the orderlies, were to direct that the advanced posts should fall back behind the Chiers. The consequence of this was, that when General Clairfait, on hearing of his departure, wished to take advantage of it by attacking the French army, he found it so well posted and intrenched as to give him no hopes of making an impression, and he therefore abandoned the idea. The feelings and conduct of Lafayette at this painful juncture are illustrated in a letter written by him in his solitary prison of Magdeburg to M. d'Archenoltz.* His wish was to go to Holland,

the Ardennes to the legislative body, and had just left the assembly in order to defend liberty at the head of his regiment, under Lafayette's orders, to whom he was doubly attached in his compound character of French and Batavian patriot; being arrested on the frontier, he blew out his brains.—(Note by General Lafayette.)

* M. d'Archenoltz, author of a work on the seven years' war, edited a newspaper at Hamburg, entitled, "La Minerve." In the correspondence of the fourth volume will be found a letter from him.

where he hoped for the countenance of the patriots: he would have claimed the protection of the American minister at the Hague, and from there his intention was to go to Rotterdam to his friend Peter Paulus,* whose house would probably have been respected. How happy would the proscribed general have been to have directed a Batavian expedition, with the view of causing a diversion on the enemy's rear. But the Orange influence was dominant in Holland; he must have gone to England, and there waited until some more auspicious opportunity presented itself of connecting himself in France with new efforts in the cause of liberty. England was the only country in which he was beyond the reach of an arrest; and it had always been his conviction, that he would be lost if ever he fell into the hands of a despotic sovereign.

Absorbed in their various reflections, the proscribed patriots approached the burgh of Rochefort, seven leagues from Bouillon. They were quite sure of not falling in with any of the enemy's corps on this road; but the most contradictory reports made it impossible for them to know whether or not there were any troops in Rochefort. This uncertainty continued to the last moment; for, in approaching by the road which they took, Rochefort does not come into view until you are upon it. It was now about night-fall; the fires of an advanced guard, posted a little outside the town, gave them the first notice of its being occupied by troops; but to avoid their dilemma was impossible. By moving to the right, they must have fallen in with the chain of posts intended to secure General Clairfait's commu-

* See, in reference to M. Paulus and the relations of General Lafayette with the Dutch patriots, the note at p. 202; also at p. 219 of the Correspondence of Vol. II.

nications between Namur and Luxemburg; while, on the left, they would have encountered the French patrols in the vicinity of Givet, or the corps of emigrants occupying the territory of Liege; on every side, the risk was the same. They persisted in their first intention of advancing, to which they submitted with the better grace, inasmuch as the exhausted condition of their horses left them without a choice. Bureaux de Pusy was sent forward to the advanced guard, to desire to speak with the commanding officer of the post; this request was immediately acceded to. He was conducted by a corporal to the officer, to whom he at once declared, that some officers, compelled to abandon the French army, but who were in no manner to be confounded with the emigrants, as they would neither serve against France, nor have any relations with her enemies, desired a safe passage through Rochefort, on their way to Holland. The commanding officer, M. d'Harnoncourt, having given his consent, the little band, being requested to advance, was received into the town, and took possession of the quarters assigned to it. A few moments after his arrival, Lafayette was informed he had been recognised, and, as nothing better could be thought of under this new mishap, he desired Bureaux de Pusy to declare the truth to the commandant, apprising him at the same time of his intention to set out before daybreak; but M. d'Harnoncourt, without hinting a doubt of the right which Lafayette and his companions had to proceed, required that they should go through the formality of providing themselves with a pass from General Moitelle, in command at Namur. They were obliged to yield to necessity. Bureaux de Pusy was again charged with the commission of obtaining the pass. He set out with an

Austrian officer, who, on his arrival, handed General Moitelle letters from the officer in command at Rochefort. Bureaux de Pusy waited until these letters had been perused before he opened the object of his visit, but ere he could utter a syllable of explanation he was obliged to undergo the most extravagant bursts of joy from the general. "Lafayette! Lafayette!" exclaimed M. Moitelle, "run instantly and inform Monseigneur the Duke of Bourbon of it. . . . Lafayette! Lafayette!" Then, addressing himself to the officer, "Set out this moment and carry this intelligence to his royal highness at Brussels!" and on he went muttering to himself, "Lafayette!" It was not until he had given orders to write to all the princes and generals he could think of, that Bureaux de Pusy could put in his request for a pass. It was, as may easily be conceived, refused; and instead of it, an order was despatched to Rochefort to transfer the French officers to Namur, which they reached the next day under a strong escort of hussars.

The first care of M. d'Harnoncourt, on learning who his prisoners were, had been to apprise General Clairfait, who, thanks to the precautions alluded to, was unable to take any advantage of it. As to the prisoners, they all of them subscribed the following declaration:—*

Rochefort, Aug. 19th.

THE undersigned French citizens, deprived, by an irresistible concurrence of extraordinary events, of the happiness of serving their country's liberty, which has been their constant aim,—unable any longer to resist the violation of a constitution, the offspring of the nation's choice,—declare, that they cannot be considered as enemies in arms, inasmuch as they have abandoned their respective posts in the French army; and still less con-

* It was published in the "Moniteur" of Sept. 8th, 1792.

founded with that portion of their countrymen whose interests, feelings, and opinions, diametrically opposed to theirs, have leagued them with powers at war with France; but that they ought to be regarded as foreigners claiming a free passage, assured to them by the laws of nations, and of which they would avail themselves, in order to reach with all despatch a territory, the government of which is not in actual hostility with their country.

Signed—Lafayette, Latour Maubourg, Alexandre Lameth, Laumoy, Duroure, A. Masson, Sicard, Bureaux de Pusy, Victor Latour Maubourg, Victor Gouvion, Langlois, Sionville, A. Romeuf, Dagrain, L. Romeuf, Curmer, Pillet, Lacolombe, V. Romeuf, C. Latour Maubourg, Alex. d'Arblay, Soubeyran, Ch. Cadignan.

On their arrival at Namur, the subscribers to this paper found M. Moitelle no longer in command, having just joined the army; he was relieved by the Marquis de Chasteler, an officer of distinguished talents and urbanity. He informed Lafayette, that Prince Charles of Lorraine (formerly Prince of Lambesc) had come from Brussels to consult him on the situation of affairs in France. To this piece of information, delivered in a significant tone, Lafayette replied, rather sharply, "that he presumed no one would venture to address any questions to him to which it did not become him to reply;" and when Prince Charles entered he met with a reception from Lafayette and his companions which the civility of his manner certainly did not call for, but which was at once accounted for by the nature of his commission. This interview, for conversation it can be hardly called, was soon over. The Marquis de Chasteler, before forwarding his report to Brussels, was so obliging as to shew Lafayette a letter, in which he had endeavoured to extenuate some of his *revolutionary offences*, and, amongst others, *his love of equality;* on which La-

fayette, reminding him of the share he had taken in the decrees respecting the nobility, begged him to erase whatever implied a disavowal of his conduct, in which there was nothing he was anxious to excuse; or of his principles, from which, in a single particle, he had no inclination to recede.

The prisoners were conducted from Namur to Nivelle, where they were closely guarded. A few days afterwards came an order from the government to seize the public money which it was taken for granted Lafayette had carried off. He gaily remarked, "that doubtless their royal highnesses felt, that, had they been in his place, they would have carried it off." While he was laughing with his companions at this amusing piece of impertinence, the commissioners, not a little confused, had ascertained that, deducting the price of several horses sold since their arrival at Nivelle, the twenty-three prisoners had not amongst them all more than the amount of two months' pay. That same day they were divided into three parties; such as had not served in the national guard were released, with orders to leave the country; the others, especially Lafayette's aides-de-camp during the revolution, were confined in the citadel of Antwerp, where they remained for two months; the four members of the constituent assembly were removed to Luxemburg. At the moment of their departure, Lafayette had only time to embrace his aide-de-camp Romeuf, who happened accidentally to be with him; he had not the consolation of bidding adieu to any of his other friends. Louis Romeuf, bursting into tears, was convinced that he saw his general for the last time: Lafayette charged him to publish, after his death, a testimony of his unshaken

political faith, which was consigned in the following letter, addressed, at a subsequent period, to Bureaux de Pusy:—

"When the four members of the constituent assembly were separated from us at Nivelle, previous to their being removed to Luxemburg, I happened to be the only aide of the general who could receive his adieus. As I embraced him, with the afflicting impression that I did so for the last time, I was so much struck with what he said to me, that I wrote it down upon the spot. It was a testament, destined to be published after his death. Here are the very words of our general:—

"'I was well aware that, should I fall into the power of arbitrary governments, they would avenge upon me all the mischief I had done them; but having to the last moment defended the free and national constitution of my country against the factious, I abandoned myself to my fate, thinking it far better to die by the hands of tyrants than by the misguided hands of my own fellow-citizens. Especially was it requisite to avert the injury which a great example of ingratitude might do to the cause of the people with all those who little know that there is more of satisfaction in a single service rendered to that cause than there can be suffering in all the personal vicissitudes it may occasion. But come what may, struggle as they will, the truths I have proclaimed, and my labours in either hemisphere, will not have been in vain. Aristocracy and despotism have met their death-blow; and my blood, crying aloud for vengeance, will rally many a new champion around the cause of liberty.'

"Such was the last expression of Lafayette's sentiments, which was to have been transmitted through me to the French people. LOUIS ROMEUF."

On their arrival at Luxemburg, the four prisoners were separated from each other. Lafayette received, while in this city, the reply of the Duke of Saxe Teschen to the direct demand of a passport which he had made to him when at Nivelle. This commander-in-chief, an uncle of the emperor, informed him, "that he should have esteemed it a great honour to have commanded an army against Lafayette, while acting by the orders of his king and country; but since the chief of the French insurrection, compelled to expatriate himself by the very people whom he had been teaching the lesson of revolt, had fallen into the hands of the allied powers, he would be detained until his sovereign should, in his clemency or his justice, dispose of his fate."

This significant menace was followed, within eight days, by a Prussian detachment, which conducted the prisoners to Wezel.

A council of the coalition committee, which always followed the armies, was held in reference to them, at which the Baron de Breteuil was present, as ambassador from Louis XVI. It was then agreed, "that Lafayette's existence was incompatible with the safety of the governments of Europe;" a very honourable declaration, which, five or six years afterwards, was repeated to him who was the object of it, at the moment when these very governments were constrained to release him.

For three months the prisoners were strictly guarded and watched at Wezel, in prisons strongly barred, with double doors secured by locks and

padlocks, cut off from all communication, and so completely separated from each other, that when Latour Maubourg, informed, through the indiscretion of one of his gaolers, that Lafayette was seriously ill, asked permission, as the dearest friend which that person had in the world, and one so nearly within reach of him, to receive his last sigh, the answer was, "that it could not be allowed." The prisoners having complained of being thus cut off from all communication, even with their nearest relatives, a report to that effect was made to the government. Shortly after, the commandant and a notary presented themselves to Lafayette, and gave him a paper from the King of Prussia, inviting him, as the means of bettering his position, to give counsels against France. "The King of Prussia is very impertinent," was Lafayette's reply.

Availing himself of a permission accorded to them of writing to the king's adjutant-general, Lafayette informed him, "that he was far from denying the share he had taken in the revolutions of America and France;" and, speaking of the constitution which had been acknowledged by the powers now combined against it, he predicted, "that this hatred against liberty, with royalty or without it, would only serve to swell the number of republicans." From Wezel they were removed to Magdeburg, where they suffered close confinement for a year; Lafayette was then transferred to Neisse, and Latour Maubourg to Glatz, in spite of their request not to be imprisoned in different fortresses. To the latter, Bureaux de Pusy was removed two months afterwards. Alexander Lameth gradually obtained his freedom, which was at last fully granted to him.

Meanwhile, the three friends, after being once again imprisoned together for about twelve days, at

Neisse, were, in the month of May, 1794, delivered up by Prussia to the emperor, and transferred to the prison of Olmütz,—that prison where, separated from each other from the very first day of their confinement, and kept in mutual and complete ignorance of each other's fate, they experienced, from governments hostile to liberty, those dastardly refinements of vengeance which the eloquent language of Charles Fox so indignantly denounced.*

We will close this recital with the declaration that had not the emigrants and foreign troops entered France at the period of the 10th of August, the jacobins would have been put down. On the other hand, if the jacobins had not paralyzed the recruiting and march of the reinforcements, the army would have received the supplies essential to its defensive operations two months earlier; for it is to be observed, every soldier of the army assembled in the plains of Champagne had marched thither in consequence of requisitions signed Luckner and

* On the 16th of December, 1796, General Fitzpatrick, the same person who had served in the American war, made a motion in the House of Commons—"To represent to his Majesty that the imprisonment of General Lafayette, Messrs. Latour Maubourg and de Pusy, was extremely mischievous and prejudicial to the Emperor of Germany, and to the common cause of the allies; and to beseech his Majesty to intercede in favour of the prisoners of Olmütz." Charles Fox supported this motion with great eloquence, but it was lost by a majority of 132 against 52. Mr. Sheridan and Mr. Grey also supported it. Mr. Pitt replied to General Fitzpatrick with great circumspection, mainly resting on the assertion—first, that the English government had never been a party to the acts complained of; secondly, that it had no right whatever to interfere with them. This debate was translated into French, and published, in 1797, at the press of the "Journal d'Economie Publique, Morale et Politique," under the title of "Motion faite, le 16th Decembre, 1796, dans la chambre des communes, en faveur du General Lafayette, &c."

Lafayette. The jacobins thwarted the measures most imperatively required for the defence of the country, from the very opening of the campaign to the moment of their usurped power over the national constitution.

Dumouriez, reconciled to the gironde, succeeded to the command of Lafayette's army. The enemy's advance extricated him from all embarrassment; he took up a strong position in front of them. Dumouriez, who, until then, had played but a subordinate part, very much surpassed any expectations that could have been formed of him. He displayed a great deal of talent, and large views; and for some little time his patriotism was estimated by his success.

CORRESPONDENCE.

FROM THE MONTH OF JANUARY UNTIL THE MONTH OF SEPTEMBER, 1792.

TO M. DIETRICH, MAYOR OF STRASBURG.

Metz, January 22nd, 1792.

THE last accounts that I received from Paris have very much reassured me on the subject of our last conversation respecting the private intentions of the king.

I am reprinting here our exposition of *the advantages possessed by a French citizen;* send me also copies of the manifesto of M. de Condorcet, in French and German, as well as the first chapter of the constitution, containing the *declaration of rights, the guarantees, and the abolitions.* Might it not be useful to write, in French and German, a little treatise for foreign soldiers, to shew them that they are fools to fight against themselves for their princes? My intention is to tie up the four pamphlets together in small parcels, and to entrust them to the charge of my light troops, contractors, observers, and all those who may be likely to hold any intercourse with the country opposed to us.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

Head-quarters, Metz, Jan. 22nd, 1792.

MY DEAR GENERAL,—This is a very different date from that which has announced to you my return to the sweets of private life,* a situation hitherto not very familiar to me, but which I, after fifteen revolutionary years, had become quite fit to enjoy. I have given you an account of the quiet and rural mode of living I had adopted in the mountains where I was born, having there a good house, and *a late* manor, now unlorded into a large farm, with an English overseer for my instruction. I felt myself very happy among my neighbours, no more vassals to me, nor to anybody, and had given to my wife and rising family the only quiet weeks they had had for a long time, when the threats and mad preparations of the refugees, and still more the countenance they had obtained in the dominions of our neighbours, induced the national assembly and the king to adopt a more vigorous system than had hitherto been the case.

Three armies were formed, fifty thousand men each, *on paper;* the right and left ones under Luckner and Rochambeau, that of the centre under me. I had refused every public employment that had been offered by the people, and still more had I denied my consent to my being appointed to any military command. But when I saw our liberties and constitution were seriously threatened, and my services could be usefully employed in fighting for our old cause, I could no more resist the wishes of

* That letter, dated Chavaniac, has been lost.

my countrymen: and as soon as the king's express reached my farm, I set out for Paris, from thence to this place; and I do not think it uninteresting for you, my dear general, to add, that I was everywhere on the road most affectionately welcomed.

Now the surrounding German princes have consented to dismiss every armed corps of refugees, to forbid all recruiting, collecting, or equipping, by noble deserters, so that the poor fellows are hunted by our ambassadors from petty courts to other petty courts; to cut short, a formal application will be made to the emperor and diet of the empire at Ratisbonne.

Monsieur, the king's brother, has been constitutionally divested from his right to the regency;* so will the younger brother; they, as well as Prince Conde, and some others, are to be tried for their life (in their absence), before a national court. Indeed, measures have been heaped, and rather hurried, to throw them out.

But the most important part of our business is, to know what part the great powers of Europe will act. That every one of them hates us is obvious; but notwithstanding they would crush us to pieces, they are afraid to touch us, lest their subjects catch what they call the French evil. We have boldly asked the emperor for a categorical answer by the 10th of February. A bill has passed, with the sanction of the king, declaring it infamy and high treason to listen to the proposal of any alteration whatsoever—

* The 28th October, 1791, the legislative assembly had decided that a proclamation should be issued to require Monsieur to return to France. He replied by an insulting letter, for which he was placed in accusation, the 1st of January, 1792, and declared to have forfeited his right to the regency the 16th of the same month.

any negotiation—with respect to the principles and letter of the constitutional act.

The army I command will, of course, be the first to act. I am to have twenty thousand men to garrison the frontiers from Montmedy to Bitche, and thirty thousand to take the field. I do not hope to come up at first quite to those numbers; but in case I want reinforcements, the national guards will help me. I will send you an exact return of my army when it is finally arranged; for I always consider myself, my dear general, as one of your lieutenants on a detached command.

The regular regiments are short of their complements. The volunteer battalions do very well; in general, the soldiers and non-commissioned officers of the army are patriots, but want discipline. A third part of the officers are good, another third gone, the remainder very ill-affected, and will soon, I hope, go out; they are tolerably well replaced. We want general officers, most of them being tories. I am going, and am the only one whose popularity can stand it, to establish, in spite of the clubs and jacobin clamors, a most severe discipline, and I think the army afterwards will do pretty well.

Adieu, my dear general; remember me most respectfully to Mrs. Washington. My best compliments wait on Hamilton, Knox, Jefferson, Jay, Major Washington, Cokran, and all other friends.

With respectful and filial love,

I am, my dear general, &c.

TO M. DE NARBONNE, MINISTER OF WAR.

March 4th, 1792.

AFTER having made use of the entreaties and advice of friendship, I shall take advantage of the right my situation gives me to repeat, that your resignation, under present circumstances, would be pernicious, and consequently culpable. You have merited and obtained the confidence of all good citizens, and especially of the army, to whom you are of essential service, and who place entire dependence on your frankness and devotion to the constitution. It is from this feeling, and under this impression, that the generals of the army are decidedly of opinion that your services in the war department are indispensable; and I am myself too well convinced of this truth not to desire ardently that you should not fail in the imperious duty of remaining in the ministry.

FROM M. DE NARBONNE TO GENERAL LAFAYETTE.

I RECEIVED with your letter, my dear Lafayette, one from M. de Luckner, and another from M. de Rochambeau, indicative of the same feelings you deign to express. I may, indeed, feel proud of the concurrence of such suffrages. It is true that, not agreeing in opinion with one of my colleagues, whose private character I esteem, but whose ministerial conduct I do not equally approve, I conceived it was my duty to retire rather than to allow a division to subsist which must prove injurious to the constitutional action of the government. But since you do me the favour to believe me useful to the defence of our cause, since one of the best supporters of liberty

deigns to associate me with his efforts, I must remain at my post, at least so long as we are menaced with a war, which we must make great preparations to support gloriously, or to obtain the still greater happiness of avoiding.

I shall continue, therefore, for some time longer courageously to serve the true interests of the king, against every species of obstacle, if he deign to accept my services; and the approbation of such a man as you shall be my guarantee for the esteem of the public.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

Paris, March 15th, 1792.

My dear General,—I have been called from the army to this capital for a conference between the two other generals, the minister, and myself, and am about to return to my military post. The coalition between the continental powers respecting our affairs is certain, and will not be broken by the emperor's death.* But although warlike preparations are going on, it is very doubtful whether our neighbours will attempt to stifle a flame so very catching as that of liberty is.

The danger for us lies with our state of anarchy, owing to the ignorance of the people, the numbers of non-proprietors, the jealousy of every governing measure, all which inconveniences are worked up by designing men, or aristocrats in disguise, for both extremes tend to defeat our ideas of public order.

Do not believe, however, my dear general, the exaggerated accounts you may receive, particularly

* The Emperor Leopold II. died the 2nd of March, 1792.

from England. That liberty and equality will be preserved in France there is no doubt; in case there were, you well know that I would not, if they fall, survive them; but you may be assured that we shall emerge from this unpleasant situation, either by an honourable defence or by internal improvements. How far this constitution of ours insures a good government has not been as yet fairly experienced. This only we know, that it has restored to the people their rights, destroyed almost every abuse, and turned French vassalage and slavery into national dignity and the enjoyment of those faculties which nature has given and society ought to ensure.

Give me leave, my dear general, to you alone, to offer an observation respecting the late choice of the American ambassador. You know I am personally a friend to Governor Morris,* and ever, as a private man, have been satisfied with him; but the aristocratic, and indeed counter-revolutionary, principles he has professed, unfit him to be the representative of the only nation whose politics have a likeness with ours, since they are founded on the plan of a representative democracy. This I may add, that, surrounded with enemies as France is, it looks as if America was preparing for a change in this government, not only that kind of alteration which the democrats may wish for and bring about, but the wild schemes of aristocracy, such as the restoration of a noblesse, a house of lords, and such other political blasphemies, which, while we are living, cannot be re-established in France. I wish we had an elective senate, a more independent set

* It will be seen, in the Correspondence of the 4th volume, that, in spite of these differences of opinion, General Lafayette and his family have been under great obligations to M. Gouverneur Morris.

of judges, and a more energetic administration. but the people must be taught the advantages of a firm government, before they reconcile it to their ideas of freedom, and can distinguish it from the arbitrary systems which they have just now got over. You see, my dear general, I am not an enthusiast of every part of our constitution, although I love its principles, which are the same as those of the United States, excepting hereditary in the president of the executive, which I think suitable to our circumstances. But I hate everything like despotism and aristocracy, and I cannot help wishing the American and French principles were in the heart and on the lips of the American ambassador to France. This I mention *for you alone*, and only for the case when arrangements suitable to the governor's wishes might in future be made; and yet I beg this hint of mine may never be mentioned to anybody. Give me leave, my dear General, to add the tribute of praise which I owe to Mr. Short, for the sentiments he has professed, and the esteem he has acquired in this country. I wish this gentleman was personally known to you.

There have been changes in the ministry.* The king has chosen his council amidst the most violent popular party,—namely, the jacobin club, a jesuitic institution, more fit to make deserters from, than converts to, our cause. The new ministers, however, being unsuspected, have a chance to restore public order, and say they will improve it. The assembly are wild, uninformed, and too fond of popular applause; the king, slow and rather backward in his daily conduct, although now and then he acts fully well. But upon the whole, it will do;

* See note at page 292 of this volume.

and the success of our revolution cannot be questioned.

My command extends on the frontiers from Givet to Bitche. I have sixty thousand men, a number that is increasing now, as young men pour in from every part of the empire to fill up the regiments. This voluntary recruiting shews a most patriotic spirit. I am going to encamp thirty thousand men, with a detached corps of about four or five thousand in an intrenched camp; the remainder will occupy the fortified places. The armies of Marshals Luckner and Rochambeau are inferior to mine, because we have sent many regiments to the southward; but in case we had a war to undertake, we might gather respectable forces.

Although we have much cause to be, as yet, dissatisfied, we may hope everything will, by and by, come to rights. Licentiousness, under the mask of patriotism, is our greatest evil, as it threatens property, tranquillity, and liberty itself.

Adieu, my dear general; think sometimes of your respectful, loving, and filial friend.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE LETTER (OF THE 18TH OF APRIL, 1792,) TO MADAME LAFAYETTE.*

When Madame Lafayette was arrested in her residence in the department of the Haute Loire, the 11th of September, 1792, the following letter was found upon her. Its negligent style proves that it was written in haste, and in the effusion of the most intimate confidence, to a person who, being acquainted with any fact, required but a word to understand completely every idea. There were ten thou-

* These observations on the letter addressed to Madame de Lafayette are by General Lafayette.

sand chances to one that this letter would never see the light; it clearly proves that La Rochefoucauld, Lafayette, and their friends in the legislative assembly, although they were personally on bad terms with Condorcet, and with several members of his party, and although they were sorry to see a jacobin ministry formed, were, however, determined to support that ministry, and not to oppose the jacobin party, if these men, having once obtained power, would but use it to promote the public good. We see that, on the 18th of April, Lafayette still flattered himself that the girondists would adopt this good resolution; and yet the *high jacobins* continued, as well as the others, to employ a system of disorganization. At a later period, after all the detestable proceedings of the ministry towards him, he expressed the same intentions at Givet, in the presence of the Generals Latour Maubourg, Narbonne, and Tracy.* Rœderer, with whom Lafayette personally had every reason to be satisfied, appeared sincerely desirous that his friends should concur in the patriotic aim of the constitutional general; he already considered Dumouriez as an aristocrat disguised under the mantle of jacobinism, and lamented the confidence which the heads of that party placed in him. As to Lafayette, he never opposed the jacobin ministers until he felt thoroughly convinced that their ultimate resolution was to disorganize all things, as they sufficiently proved at the time this letter was written. The fête of Châteauvieux, celebrated by all the journalists of that faction, is spoken of in this letter.† The period is not, therefore, distant from the one in which the leaders of the party intrigued

* See in the Appendix, No. V., some documents upon the mission of M. Rœderer to General Lafayette in the month of June, 1792.

† See the note of page 314 of this volume.

most with the court. Apparent contradictions may, it is true, be found in their conduct; but this is the fault of the history, and not of the historian.

TO MADAME LAFAYETTE.

Metz, April 18th, 1792.

'I CANNOT conceal that war becomes probable. Some hope still remains; but I would lay any bet for war. We shall encamp about the 10th of May.* Parties are at present divided in this manner. Robespierre, Danton, Desmoulins, &c. &c., form the jacobin sink. These puppets are moved behind the scene, and serve the court by disorganizing all things, by exclaiming that we are beaten without resource, and by attacking Lafayette, "who has deceived, they say, the people and the court, guided the conduct of the far less culpable M. de Bouillé, and who is more dangerous himself than the aristocracy." Duport wrote me word, with great naïveté, "that the party accused me of republicanism; and that if I would only come to an understanding with them, he should find himself on my side, even without intending it." I laughed at the frankness and confiding simplicity of Duport, who will, I fancy, be much blamed for this phrase. I am reproached also with being anti-Austrian.† The other party,

* Lafayette, who had come to pass some weeks at Paris, had agreed not to commence encamping until towards the 10th of May, to place the troops together for some days before they begun any operations.—(Note by General Lafayette.)

† We perceive by this passage, that Lafayette then looked upon the disorganizing party, of which Robespierre was only the apparent chief, whilst Danton was its animating spirit, as

called the *high jacobins*, and which supports the present ministry, is composed of Bordelais, the abbé Sièyes, Condorcet, Rœderer, &c. These men hate and fear Robespierre, but dare not render themselves unpopular. They think that war is inevitable, fully appreciate Luckner, feel that Rochambeau is retiring, and have for some time agreed together that, even while they personally hate me, it is necessary to place confidence in me, as in a steady friend of liberty and equality, and an incorruptible defender of the constitution.*

Through the medium of my friends I had an explanation with the two ministers with whom I am to treat on business; and that explanation will necessarily occasion one with the principal members of the assembly, without my demanding it. I had renewed my profession of faith to a friend charged to learn on what I might depend. I demanded that they should respect civil and religious liberty, that they should labour for public order,—in short, many things of the kind, on which you know my principles. These appear to have been adopted.† As

an instrument which intriguers employed for the interest of the court. This suspicion is unaccompanied by proof; but Danton's letters appear a conclusive evidence that it was not for anti-republicanism, nor for his attachment to the Austrians, that the jacobins vociferated daily against him. By coming to an understanding with the councillors of the court, means might have been found of silencing Danton and the other denouncers. —(Note by General Lafayette.)

* It but depended, then, on the girondists themselves not to quarrel with Lafayette. To accomplish this it was but necessary not to wish forcibly to overthrow a constitution that the national will had established, and to maintain liberty, equality, and public order.—(Note by General Lafayette.)

† This relates to the note sent by Lafayette to his friends to be communicated to the girondist party and the ministers.

concerns myself individually, I have only thanks to return to the present ministry, or, rather, the two ministers for foreign affairs and war, for having granted me all I could desire.* Such is my situation: I belong, as I wrote before to you, to no party, except to that of the French nation; but my friends and I will serve whoever will do good, defend liberty and equality, and maintain the constitution by repulsing everything tending to render it aristocratic or republican; and when the national will, expressed by the representatives chosen by the nation and by the king, shall tell us that war is inevitable, I will do all that lies in my power to promote its success.

Adieu. I embrace you all very tenderly.

P.S.—The national guard of Paris conducted itself extremely well in the affair of Châteauvieux, which only became at length a disgusting farce, very prejudicial to the jacobins themselves. The two principal figurantes belonged to the first party I spoke to you of.

It contained nearly the same opinions as this letter respecting the maintenance of the constitution, and produced no result but that of drawing forth compliments.—(Note by General Lafayette.) See page 295 of this volume.

* The minister for foreign affairs was Dumouriez, who was afterwards appointed, for a few days, to the war department, which he already governed. We see that Lafayette was desirous of being pleased with him if he would but have acted with sincerity in the constitutional interest; but to judge accurately of Dumouriez and his subsequent conduct, it is necessary to read his whole work. In it are found, a record of his conduct at the different periods of the revolution, and confessions that might be supposed to be written by a hostile pen.—(Note by General Lafayette.)

TO M. DE GRAVE, MINISTER OF WAR.*

Metz, April 21st, 1792—4th year of Liberty.

I AM told that the formation of the horse artillery offers some difficulties. Permit a man, sir, who has conversed on this subject with the late King of Prussia, Prince Henry, the Duke of Brunswick, General Müllendorf, with the Marshals de Laudon and de Lascy, in short, with the principal generals of Prussia, Austria, and Germany; who has examined carefully and reflected deeply on this institution; permit him to declare, that the prompt formation of a horse artillery is one of the greatest services that the minister of war can render to the French army. I am very anxious that M. de Salmont should arrive at Metz; you know, sir, how much time a general loses when the chiefs of the different departments are not within reach of receiving and executing his orders.

The general in command, LAFAYETTE.

TO M. DE GRAVE.

Metz, April 21st, 1792—4th year of Liberty.

IT is more important for the assembly to maintain the most severe discipline, as this system, conformable to the public interest, has the advantage of depriving the aristocrats of the pretences with which they sought to palliate their defection. I beg you to treat M. Dermenonville well: if all the others had conducted themselves like this superior officer, there would have been less reciprocal distrust; but I earnestly request you to give us patriotic substitutes. You will find men in the regiments and national guards, especially in the national guard of Paris, who would immediately replace our losses; and, generally

* We have been obliged to make a selection in the correspondence of General Lafayette with the various ministers of war, from the period of his command until the 19th of August, 1792. Our rule in this respect has been, to publish, by extracts, the documents which explain or confirm the principal facts of the relations we possess. Those documents are chiefly found in the war archives. They are printed here with the same types used for the memorials to the king and the speeches of General Lafayette.

speaking, patriots alone can possess the resolution, strength of purpose, and authority, necessary to render law respected.

Would a Swiss officer who should clamour against the Helvetic constitution, an English officer who should curse the magna charta, possess any influence over their soldiers? No, undoubtedly; nor would it be proper they should have any influence.

I repeat, sir, in this private letter, the necessity of hastening all that has been hitherto delayed. I shall set out at the stated period to plant my tent at Dun; but if nothing should arrive, how can you expect me to take thirty thousand men there?

If I knew any method of accelerating all things, I would put it in execution with all my heart, for I feel as impatient as any person can do to encamp my army, and I conceive that this political and military attitude cannot be too speedily assumed.

TO M. DE GRAVE, MINISTER OF WAR.

Metz, April 25th, 1792—4th year of Liberty.*

When I requested you, sir, if war were indispensable, only to declare it when we should be in readiness, I foresaw that that declaration would place us in the alternative either of being forestalled by the enemy, or of forestalling them with incomplete measures.

Your courier having brought me the proposal of the king to the assembly, I only thought of taking the best advantage of the present situation; and my first act was to announce this news to the troops, who received it with cries of—"Vive la nation! Vive le roi!"

Yesterday the last instructions of the council were brought me, between four and five o'clock, p.m., by an aide-de-camp of M. Dumouriez.

We had, as you know, agreed that I should form, at first, a camp of six thousand men on the Moselle; that afterwards, as soon as the formation of the battalions and war-stores would permit, we should assemble at Dun the body of the besieging army with its artillery, and after having passed some days there, the army, thus united, should bear upon Givet.

* Five days after the declaration of war.

This, sir, is the position in which we received the change of instructions.*

* * * * *

I shall be, on the 28th, at Givet, before any of the troops, and M. de Gouvion will precede me there; I believe, sir, that it would be difficult to achieve more with fewer resources.

I have at present two questions to ask: the territory of Liege being Austrian, on what footing am I to announce myself there?

It is impossible that the ten thousand men and their artillery should be able to march on the 30th; but if you conceive it would be useful to the cause to insult the Austrian territory on that day, I would push forward some light troops, that the account of this proceeding might arrive at the assembling of the states.

Permit me, sir, to observe to you, that your secrets are instantaneously divulged, I know not in what manner. A fortnight ago, my movements, and those of the other generals, were announced in the drawing-rooms of Metz, and the details of the instruction I received were given me in the letters of several of my friends at the same time as by your aide-de-camp. I have seen no person arriving from Paris who did not know quite as much as myself on the subject.

* * * * I wished to explain to you our situation, give you an account of our efforts, and I wish, with all my heart, that I may soon have to speak of our successes.

P.S.—The question I address to you, sir, respecting the manner in which I must invade the territory of Liege, relates also to all invasion of territory not acknowledging dependence on the King of Bohemia and Hungary. No person knows better, nor has more constantly practised than I have done, the principle, that every usurper of the sovereignty of the people cannot be recognised by free men; but the constitution has decreed forms for the declaration of war in the name of the nation, and I am anxious you should reply to me on this subject.†

* Here are found some military details on the situation of General Lafayette, when he received the order to repair with his corps from Metz to Givet.—(See his letter of the 2nd of May, page 306 of this volume.)

† The minister of foreign affairs replied, the 28th of April, to General Lafayette, that the Austrians had violated all the rights of the empire, by placing troops at Liege for the execution of the decree of the imperial chamber against the people of

FROM M. DE GRAVE, MINISTER OF WAR, TO GENERAL LAFAYETTE.

April 30th, midnight.

I LEARN, my dear general, that M. de Biron has found a corps of six thousand men intrenched on the heights of Mons, and that it is very uncertain whether he will be able to take possession of this town. The unfortunate Théobald Dillon has been completely beaten at Bézieux. On his return to Lille, pursued by the Austrians, the people of Lille cried out, "Treason! Cut him to pieces!" His aide-de-camp, M. Chaumont, and M. Berthois, an officer of engineers, were beaten with bludgeons. Such horrors are opposed to the habits of a people who ought to love liberty. Six Tyrolese chasseurs, prisoners of war, met with the same treatment.

Such is our sad intelligence.

It now appears to me proved that Brabant is nothing less than disposed to insurrection, and I am of opinion you ought only to attack when almost certain of success. You will perhaps be better informed than the minister for foreign affairs* has been of the movements of Brabant; your very name may awaken in the hearts of nations the love of liberty; for, unless we have certain proofs of the intention of the Belgians to shake off the Austrian yoke, I request you to risk nothing, for a second check would be the most unlucky thing that could occur to us. Therefore, my dear general, only follow the instruction I have sent you, with the fullest hope of success.

The Minister of War, DE GRAVE.

TO M. DE GRAVE, MINISTER OF WAR.

Givet, May 6th, 1792—4th year of Liberty.

MY despatches of the 4th of May have informed you, sir, of the movements of the corps you directed on Givet. Since that period, the account from Flanders, from foreign countries, my

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Liege in favour of the prince-bishop; that since the national assembly and the king had declared war against the emperor, the French general had the right of pursuing the Austrians in any place in which they were received.

* Dumouriez.

own situation, and your letters, have confirmed me in my determination of occupying the position of Rancennes, and of only having vanguards on the Austrian territory, of which one extends on the side of Luxemburg; the other, a more numerous one, remains at Bouvines, pushes detachments forward, and endeavours to procure forage, which is extremely scarce. I have myself visited that part of the country, and the inhabitants everywhere appeared to me satisfied with the conduct of our troops; but all that has been said to you concerning the dispositions and resources we should find has been strangely exaggerated.

You know, sir, that we have stood in need of the most necessary articles, and that we are far from being completely supplied with these at present.

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The corps under the command of M. de Ricé, near Longwy, has had much to endure; but the occupation of that point was of such importance as to justify the exposure to every privation in order to attain it.

TO M. ROLAND, MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR.*

Camp at Rancennes, May 30th, 1792,
4th year of Liberty.

I DO not examine, sir, with what intention your letter was written, but I cannot believe that my aide-de-camp should

* M. Roland, the 23rd of May, had written to General Lafayette, and had denounced to him MM. La Colombe and Berthier as having said, *that as the French soldiers were cowards, the numerical superiority of the army could not be too great.* These officers, according to M. Roland, presented themselves under pretext of conferring with him, on the part of the minister of war, as to the selection of the battalions that might be withdrawn from the environs of Paris and sent to General Lafayette's army. Even in his letter of the 23rd, the minister of the interior declared himself, on military grounds, against the utility of this increase of force. M. La Colombe denied the words ascribed to him, and asserted he had only applied the word *coward* to those who had fled under the command of General Biron. M. Roland wrote again, on the 5th of June, to General Lafayette, to complain of his silence, and of the denial of M. La Colombe: he only obtained the reply herein published. The denial of M.

have been to a man whose existence was unknown to him before the gazette announced to him he was minister, and whom he at this moment scarcely knows by name, for the express purpose of calumniating the French nation and his own general's army.

No, undoubtedly, he never told you that I was doubtful of my brave soldiers, whose patriotism as courageously combats the foreign enemy as their discipline drives the internal enemies of the country to despair, and whose attachment to the principles which they and I profess deranges the unconstitutional views of more than one party. MM. La Colombe and Berthier may have expressed their indignation against the fugitives of Mons and Tournay, whose flight was the evident but fearful effect of an infernal combination between the culpable agents of despotism and aristocracy and those vile hypocrites who make a profession of liberty, for the disorganization of the country.

No person has experienced more fully than myself, sir, the cowardice of the deserting officers. My explanations with them have been so frank, so impartial, that, in spite of the opposition of our sentiments, such an act of perfidy, even according to their own peculiar ideas on the subject, cannot escape from the dishonour that awaits it everywhere.

As to my army, as it exists at present, I rely as fully upon it as that army relies on me; our mutual confidence is grounded on a love of liberty, a respect for laws, a hatred of factions, and a contempt for their chiefs.

P.S.—I dispense sir, with marking out your military errors; they have been refuted beforehand in the correspondence of Marshal Luckner and myself with the minister of war.

TO M. SERVAN, MINISTER OF WAR.

Camp at Rancennes, June 1st,—4th year of Liberty.

I HAVE the honour to inform you, sir, that some deserters and some persons of Liege have presented themselves, asking for service. Although I have no official knowledge of the decree on the organization of the free companies, which I perceive

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La Colombe, and the two letters of M. Roland, filled with malevolent insinuations, were inserted in the "Moniteur" before the same paper rendered the reply of General Lafayette public.—(See the "Moniteur" of the 1st and 3rd of July, 1792.)

with pleasure are preferred to the legions, I have charged provisionally with the formation of one of these companies M. Ransonnet, of Liege, whose two brothers have distinguished themselves in the service of France and Prussia, and who is himself as clever as he is a good patriot.

M. Lajard will also speak to you of an idea I have of forming a company of gamekeepers, who offer themselves to me, and of which I think some use might be made; for if those free companies be not increased, the Tyrolese and other light troops of the enemies will unceasingly torment us.

I am awaiting, sir, definite orders for the organization, payment, and clothing of these companies, and M. Lajard will immediately forward them to me.

TO M. SERVAN.

Intrenched Camp at Maubeuge, June 11th, 1792,
4th year of Liberty.

.....This morning the enemy, in force, attacked my vanguard, which they doubtless hoped to surprise or cut off; but, apprised of this in time, M. de Gouvion sent back his baggage to Maubeuge, and began, as he fell back himself, a combat, in which his infantry was constantly covered by hedges, and in which the hostile columns suffered much from the fire of the artillery, and especially from four pieces of horse artillery under Captain Barrois.....

I ordered the troops to march in advance, and the enemy abandoning the ground to us, some of their wounded and dead were carried back to their former camps. We advanced one league beyond the camp of the vanguard, which resumed all its posts.

I should therefore, sir, only have to congratulate myself on the slight success of this attack, if, by a cruel fatality, it had not deprived the country of one of its most useful officers, and me of a friend of fifteen years standing, M. de Gouvion.* A cannon-

* The reading of this letter at the legislative assembly was interrupted at this place by the liveliest testimonies of affliction. The affair of the 11th of June had been preceded by one on the 23rd of May, in which General Gouvion had already distinguished himself. We will not publish the official account, printed in all the newspapers of the time. It was a repulsed

ball terminated a life as virtuous as it was useful. His death is mourned by his soldiers and by the whole army, and will be mourned by the national guard of Paris, and by all those who feel the value of pure civic virtues, undeviating sincerity, and the union of courage and talent. I do not speak of my private grief; my friends will pity me. Our loss limits itself in other respects to twenty-five wounded men; the number of dead is less considerable. The enemy left more than we did on the field, and carried off a great number. We have taken some prisoners, and I am not aware that any of our men have been taken.

TO THE KING.

Intrenched Camp at Maubeuge, June 16th, 1792,
4th year of Liberty.

SIRE,—I have the honour of sending to your Majesty the reply of a letter to the national assembly,* in which you will find the expressions of the opinions that have animated my whole life. The king knows with what constancy and ardour I have been ever devoted to the cause of liberty, the sacred principles of humanity, equality, and justice. He knows that I have ever been opposed to licence and factions, and that no power I think illegitimate has ever been recognised by me. He knows my devotion to his constitutional authority, and my attachment to his person. These feelings, Sire, have been the basis of my letter to the assembly; these shall guide my conduct towards my country and your Majesty in the midst of the storms that so many hostile or factious combinations vie with each other to entail on us.

It would ill become me, Sire, to give to my opinions and measures a higher degree of importance than ought to belong to the isolated actions of a simple citizen; but the expression of my thoughts has always been a right, and has now become a duty, and although I should have fulfilled that duty sooner, if

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attack at Hamptinne, near Florennes.—(See pages 308 and 309 of this volume.) General Lafayette speaks of this encounter with the enemy, as of all opportunities of the kind of which he was enabled to take advantage in 1792, in terms which do not allow us to exaggerate their importance. We have seen that M. de Gouvion was major-general of the national guard of Paris.

* The letter of the 16th of June.—(See p. 312 of this vol.)

my voice, instead of rising in the midst of a camp, could have been heard from the retreat from whence I have been torn by the dangers of my country, I do not conceive that any public function, any private consideration, can excuse me from exercising this duty of a citizen, this right of a free man.

Powerful from the authority that the national will has delegated to you, persist, Sire, in the generous resolution of defending constitutional principles against their enemies; let this resolution, supported by all the actions of your private life, as well as by a firm and complete exercise of the royal power, become a pledge of the harmony that, above all, in moments of crisis, cannot fail to be established between the elected representatives of the people and their hereditary representative. In this resolution, Sire, will be found glory and safety for yourself and for the people. By persisting in it, all the friends of liberty, all good Frenchmen, will range themselves around your throne, to defend it against the plots of rebels and the enterprises of the factious. And I, Sire, who in their honourable hatred have found the recompence of my persevering opposition, shall ever merit that hatred by my zeal in serving the cause to which my whole life shall be devoted, and by my fidelity to the oath I have taken to the law and to the king.

Such are, Sire, my unalterable opinions, to which I now annex the homage of my respect.

TO M. DE LAJARD, MINISTER OF WAR.*

Camp at Bavay, June 22nd, 1792,
4th year of Liberty.

I MOST earnestly recommend you, my dear Lajard, to form, immediately, my companies of horse artillery. I should wish at least for four; one for the van-guard, one for the reserve, and one for each wing. I should receive a greater number with pleasure; my affection for this corps has increased since the successful manner in which we employed it at Grisvelle; and if I were to fight in the extended position I now occupy, I am certain the four pieces would be very useful. I hesitated, at first, between four-pounders and eight-pounders; but I ascertained, from experience, that the eight-pounders and mortars are very preferable.

* See note of page 312 of this volume.

You recollect, my dear Lajard, my idea on the formation of a free company at Saint Germain. It will be easy for you to put it into execution.

As respects the affair of the Swiss guards, as well as that of the battalions of grenadiers of the national guards, and the Swiss regiments of Salis, you can at present form a superb reserve for me.

All these subjects, my dear Lajard, although very important, are less so than our political situation. It is on this point the efforts of all good citizens should be directed. There is not one effort I will not make rather than see liberty, justice, and my country, sacrificed to factious men. My struggle with them is a deadly one, and I intend to terminate it speedily; for, were I obliged to attack them alone, I would do it without reckoning their force or number.

I most affectionately, my dear Lajard, bid you farewell.

TO M. DE LAJARD.

Maubeuge, June 25th,—4th year of Liberty.

I own, my dear Lajard, that I know not how to arrange a combination of war as long as our internal affairs remain in this anarchical, criminal, and unconstitutional situation, which increases the resources of our enemies, and deprives us of those we ought to possess.

* * * * *

The most important point is to garrison, completely, all the fortified places. There has been much negligence in this respect, and I have been obliged to make, for Longwy and Montmédy, some rather bad bargains, which would not have been the case if a general system had been pursued. Verdun, which they persist in considering as of third rate, and which is become, in fact, the most important point of my command, merits all your attention, and I think no expense ought to be spared in fortifying and supplying it with provisions. M. de Bousmard is well acquainted with it; and this officer, although very aristocratical in the constituent assembly, serves with as much sincerity and zeal as talent.

We must find means of reinforcing our regiments of the line, for our squadrons and battalions of depôts are reduced to nothing. The officers of the line possess, however, a little more experience than those of the volunteers; the under officers are much better informed and more firm, and if vigorous

measures of recruiting be not employed, we shall see, at first the second battalions, and afterwards the first, melt away, without the new creations of volunteer battalions being sufficient to replace them.

In the cannoniers the deficit is truly alarming; yet this is the only important point of superiority we possess over the Prussians. Take care, also, of the horse artillery, which forms an excellent arm. The king of Prussia brings on, it is said, six hundred horse cannoniers; at least M. Dumouriez wrote me word so, from a letter of M. Kellermann. I wish that all our eight-pounders and mortars were served by mounted cannoniers.

Obtain for me, my dear Lajard, the two battalions of Swiss guards, and the one of Salis, which is at Rouen; it would be an excellent thing for me to have a good Swiss reserve.

I have not yet received the official letter by which I am only to command unto the Moselle, and I wish I had received it. Do not forget, in the arrangement of the armies, to place me as near my frontier as possible, looking upon the pass of Carignan as my centre.

In truth, my dear Lajard, while I dictate this letter, I ask myself to what end these dispositions will serve, if they should delay a little longer to bring back internal order, and to make that constitution respected of which one of the powers has been lately so atrociously debased, and may, perhaps, ere long, be openly attacked?

The indignation of the army on this account is an honourable feeling, which I experience more deeply than any other person.

ROUGH COPIES OF LETTERS FROM THE KING TO MM. DE LAFAYETTE AND LUCKNER.*

June 30th, 1792.

I RECEIVED with pleasure the account you gave me, sir, of the state of the troops, and their disposition. I charge you to express to the officers, under-officers, and soldiers, my deep sense of the proofs of interest and attachment they have given me on this occasion; tell them my decision is taken; that I will never alter it; that I am ready to perish with them to support the liberty and independence of our country. I doubt not but that

* These letters are found in the collection of the pieces of the iron cabinet.

they will share my feelings. Yours are well known to me, sir, and you love liberty too well not to desire ardently to see public order and the reign of law re-established in the kingdom.

I learn, sir, that several officers and general officers, employed in your army, wish to give in their resignations. Under the circumstances in which we are now placed, you will employ, doubtless, all the authority your conduct and principles give you over them, to represent to them how injurious such a measure would be to the public cause. Their affection for me becomes a still more urgent reason to induce them to remain in service, and to second me in my unalterable resolution to defend our country against all its enemies.

TO M. LE DUC DE SAXE TESCHEN.

Head-quarters, July 4th,—4th year of Liberty.*

I HAVE the honour of sending to his royal highness M. le Duc de Saxe Teschen, a lieutenant and two cadets of his army, who wish to return to Mons, and who will be followed by a captain of hussars, as soon as his wounds allow him to move.

Although no cartel yet exists, I do not doubt the punctuality of his royal highness to give back in exchange the French officers of corresponding rank—namely, those of my army who have been taken in arms.

A detachment of the police, that had pursued a robber to Chimay, has been set at liberty, and the generals of his majesty the king of Hungary and Bohemia will find me ever ready to come to an understanding with them in order to arrest brigands who may seek, in the hostile state of the frontiers, a protection for their misdeeds.

From the same principle, I must denounce to his royal highness the excesses committed in almost all the villages into which his troops have penetrated. The inhabitants subjected to the Austrian government have not been exempt from this grievance; it is for them, as well as for the French citizens, that I complain of it, with more reason, as there has not been the slightest irregularity nor injustice of the kind committed by the troops under my command.

* The Duke of Saxe Teschen replied, the 8th of July, from Mons, by sending M. de Foissac, adjutant-general, to General Lafayette, to negotiate the exchange of some prisoners.

I have the honour of presenting to his royal highness the assurance of my respect.

TO M. DE LAJARD, MINISTER OF WAR.

Camp at Clairfontaine, July 8th, 1792,
4th year of Liberty.

* * * * *

Amongst the prisoners we have made, my dear Lajard, there were a captain, a lieutenant, and two Austrian cadets. These gentlemen were extremely desirous of returning to Mons, and I thought I ought to send them there, because it is essential to destroy the prejudice that the generals of the enemy's army endeavour to create respecting the pretended rigour we employ towards our prisoners. So great is this prejudice, that some houlans, when the surgeon was coming to dress their wounds, fancied they intended to kill them. These officers have been very sensible of the manner in which we have treated the prisoners, and I am convinced the account they will give of it will produce a good effect.

I send you a copy of the letter I wrote on this subject to the Austrian general, and which was concerted by M. Luckner and me. It must be very important to find some means of establishing a cartel; for the prisoners, on both sides, are rendered miserable by detention; and as we can, in a few days, give a patriotic education to those who fall into our hands, it is well to send them back to destroy the prejudices that are given to those troops, and replace them by the principles of the constitution. This measure is the more desirable for us, because, so long as the enemy believe they shall find no quarter in the French army, they will fight with redoubled fury.

TO M. DE LAJARD, MINISTER OF WAR.

Camp at Clairfontaine, July 8th, 1792,
4th year of Liberty.

It is essential, my dear Lajard, that you should write a circular to the departments, that they may complete their battalions of volunteers; but a fresh difficulty will occur,—this is, the equipment. Some men have already arrived, who demand arms; and you know we are ill provided in this respect. A report is spread

that the enemy will enter by Flanders; but I believe they themselves have raised it, for that is not their road; and the marshal thinks, as I do, that a very small corps may suffice to manœuvre between the fortified places.

Accept, my dear Lajard, the assurance of my sincere affection.

FROM M. DIETRICH TO GENERAL LAFAYETTE.

Strasburg, July 26th, 11 o'clock A.M., 4th year of Liberty.

M. DE BROGLIE sat up all night with the marshal on receiving your courier. You will have reason to be satisfied with his answer. I send this by the return of an extraordinary express despatched by the minister of the interior to the marshal. I presume that the object of those despatches is to make him explain himself. We shall defend the constitution in our corner, and we shall fight bravely. Why has M. de La Rochefoucauld given up the game? *

DIETRICH.

TO M. D'ABANCOURT, MINISTER OF WAR.†

Longwy, July 29th, 1792,—4th year of Liberty.

WHEN the king's council, desirous of giving to Marshal Luckner the command of the army of the centre and of the Rhine, wished me to take that of the army of the left, I might, had I

* M. de La Rochefoucauld had just given in his resignation as member of the administrative council of the department of Paris.—(See the note of page 325 of this volume.)

† M. d'Abancourt, appointed minister of war the 23rd of July, wrote, three days after, to General Lafayette, to express to him some anxiety respecting his movement on Montmédy, which had been concerted with Marshal Luckner, while the imperialists had just occupied Bavay. M. d'Abancourt appeared to blame the general for having passed beyond Givet, as the extreme point of his command to the right; requested him to draw nearer Sambre; lamented the inferiority of the forces opposed to the enemy by General Arthur Dillon, the brother of him who had been massacred in the defeat of Bezieux;

thought of my own interest only, have limited myself to the defence from Dunkirk to Givet.

But as all the ministerial despatches, and all the accounts we received, announced to us that the combined army, under the Duke of Brunswick, were bearing towards the Rhine, and would probably invade that part of the frontier, I only consulted my ardour in the cause, and did not refuse the wish expressed by Marshal Luckner to extend my command to Montmédy. I am aware, sir, that this extent of country had been often refused by the Marshal de Rochambeau, who had, however, a right to expect at that time the command of a disposable army of 50,000 men. That general often repeated to the minister, in the committees of the constituent assembly, and in military conferences, that it was essential to extend from Dunkirk to Montmédy; yet he never consented to advance further than Sedan, which he only occupied by an intrenched camp of three or four thousand men.

As to me, who expected the principal forces of the enemy in that part of the country, and who did not believe so easily as others appear to do, in the taking of the fortified places of Flanders—while any general of tolerable capacity would be able, at the head of a detachment, to throw garrisons into them before they were invested—I repaired towards Montmédy with the greatest part of my forces, to be in readiness to lend a helping hand to Marshal Luckner; I am advanced to this point while awaiting his arrival, and the marshal has thanked me for the act.

I declare to you, sir, that, quite unmoved by the clamours, calumnies, and reasonings of those who do not understand the trade of war, I would not, to avoid them, turn aside one quarter of a league from the path I thought most useful to the public weal. I am convinced, sir, that you think the same, and that this feeling will form the groundwork of the instructions I am expecting.

I proposed to Marshal Luckner to leave at Sedan six thousand intrenched men, and to extend my command to that place; but he is very desirous that I should proceed as far as Montmédy; and the answer I received from him since I communicated to him your letter, is positive on this subject. He is convinced that, while things remain in their present state, I cannot pre-

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and insisted, above all, on the necessity of calming the more alarming than reasonable fermentation of the public, and of a portion of the national assembly.

vent the enemy from advancing on the frontier of Flanders, of taking posts, of scouring the country, of alarming the neighbouring departments, which will necessarily excite clamour and terror. Marshal Luckner and I concurred that all this was a slighter evil than would be incurred by not leading the greater portion of the two corps, styled armies, on the frontier from Montmédy to Longwy.

It is true that the marshal is within reach of occupying important posts, and that he will probably be reinforced before the commencement of the great operations of the Duke of Brunswick.

A change of troops between the armies of the north and those of the centre has been much talked of, and no person has said that there were only two short marches distance between the army of M. Luckner and mine, and that it would undoubtedly require more than two days to reorganize the two armies. Nor has one single garrison been changed.

I must add one further observation, which is, that, if the enemy should attempt to march through the pass of La Capelle, I am far from being able to oppose their intention; but I again repeat, that Marshal Luckner and I thought the most urgent and important point was, to come here. You are surprised, sir, that the left of my command is not provided with all things; a longer residence in the ministry will teach you the penury of our resources, and the insufficiency of our organization for these various demands.

Now that you are acquainted, sir, with the result of the conference held at Valenciennes between M. Luckner and me, the situation of the frontier, that of the enemy, and the reluctance the marshal feels to my removing to a distance from him, I request you to fix, in a precise manner, the limits of my command, and the extent of the frontier I must defend. I will place at the extremity of that frontier, whatever it may be, an intrenched corps of six thousand men, to serve as a support to the defensive plans of the centre army.

* * * * *

Should you conceive it proper for my frontier to extend from Dunkirk to Givet and Rocray, I shall place six thousand men at Givet, and repair myself with the remainder of the troops within reach of the passes by which the army of the Low Countries might advance towards Paris.

Should you fix my frontier at Sedan, I shall place the camp of six thousand men at Sedan, leaving M. Arthur Dillon with a detached body on the side of Valenciennes, repairing myself to

those points that appear to me most exposed. I might even either draw M. Dillon nearer to me, or draw nearer to him, according to circumstances.

If, on the contrary, my frontier must extend towards Montmédy, Flanders must remain almost abandoned to the forces that at present defend it; for I should not be within reach of arresting the progress of the enemy, or of combating with them; but they would have in front of them fortified places, into which sufficient garrisons are to be occasionally thrown.

I request you, sir, to send me a precise decision; for it is time that the generals should know what frontier they have to defend, and on what number of troops they may depend.

TO M. DE LA COLOMBE, AIDE-DE-CAMP OF GENERAL LAFAYETTE.

Brouelle, near Sedan, August 3rd, 1792,
4th year of Liberty.

I RECEIVED, my dear Colombe, your favour by Bureaux de Pusy; I learn from it that my frontier is to extend from Dunkirk to Givet. As far as my own responsibility is concerned, this is, undoubtedly, all for the best; but I would just remark, that in my letter to you I alluded to its being extended to Sedan,—that is, to my having the whole of the Ardennes within my command.

My two principal motives were these:—In the first place, it is to be presumed that the Duke of Brunswick will attempt, with his largest army, to penetrate between the Moselle and the Meuse. Our armies, unless extraordinarily reinforced, are not in a condition to face him. What, then, remains for us to do? To fall on the flanks of the combined army, cut off its communications, and force it, if it persist in its advance, to come and fight us on ground fortified by every resource of art. You will observe that the position of Sedan, its intrenched camp being extended, is the most convenient one for the general of the army of the north, to whom this operation would devolve, and that the execution of this part of the campaign requires too much tact to be indifferently confided to any hand.

Another very decisive motive with me is, Marshal Luckner's obstinacy on this point. He positively insists on my going to Montmédy, a thing quite unreasonable, since I should be obliged to defend the whole pass of Carignan, and thus be prevented

from paying any attention to that of La Capelle; but matters would be still worse should they require him to take charge of the country as far as Givet, for, in that case, I am convinced he would write to the king and assembly, and tender his resignation. In this dilemma, my dear Colombe, it strikes me the minister might include the whole of the Ardennes within my command, provided it were well understood that my frontier terminated at Sedan, and that the defence of Montmédy, Verdun, and all the department of the Meuse, belonged to Marshal Luckner.

I should then have a corps under the command of M. Dillon, who, having the camp at Maulde, would go to Valenciennes and Maubeuge; I should have a very strong intrenched camp at Sedan; I should have a third corps in reserve, which would enable me, as circumstances might direct, to support either the camp at Maubeuge, or that at Sedan.

I am very well aware that in this manner I run a much greater risk of compromising myself; but the public good is the first question; and this, in my opinion, is the way to it. You must observe, moreover, that this would in no degree affect the arrangements you allude to; for, as I am to form a camp of six thousand men at Sedan, all it would be requisite to say would be, that though the military frontier is naturally comprised between Lille and Givet, I was required to extend my surveillance as far as the intrenched camp at Sedan. I should then have it in my power, should the Duke of Brunswick attempt to enter by the pass of Carignan, to support Marshal Luckner; but, ostensibly, my whole concern would be with the pass of La Capelle, and my aid to that of Montmédy might be made to appear an act of supererogation. I am of opinion that this plan of campaign would be the most beneficial to the country.

It would be requisite that the letter to the marshal, depicting the uneasiness of Paris, and stating the necessity of blocking up the shortest road to the capital, should promise him the means of defending the pass of Montmédy. It is, for instance, expedient that the 102nd and 103rd regiments should be sent to Verdun and Montmédy, instead of remaining at Châlons, as also the 13th regiment of light infantry. As to M. de Montesquiou's battalion, it is absurd to oppose more troops to the King of Sardinia than to the Emperor and King of Hungary. It is of the greatest consequence, my dear Colombe, to regulate the departments which are to furnish us with national guards; contrive that I should have as many of them as you can. Brit-

tany, Normandy, especially Paris, ought to supply me with battalions of grenadiers. Should the two armies receive, each of them, thirty or forty thousand national guards for three months, and the country people offer any resistance to the enemy's detachments, the Duke of Brunswick would be puzzled to forward his escort to Paris. It is essential that the minister should address direct requisitions to the departments to send the marshal and myself their companies of grenadiers completely equipped.

I cannot help feeling uneasy at seeing the strong places in Flanders in the exclusive custody of the Swiss. Consider, that nothing more than a simple order from the cantons is required to make them lay down their arms. It has perpetually occurred to me, that my having some of their grenadiers with me would be like holding hostages for their good conduct; pray hint it to the minister; I think you would find it easy to arrange, through M. d'Affry, by appealing to his friendship for me,—so that the two companies of Salis, at Rouen, the six companies in Flanders, and the four companies of Swiss guards, might be formed into a battalion of grenadiers, under the command of M. de Maubourg. So small a detachment could not be prejudicial to the king's guard at Paris, and might be extremely useful under any circumstances.

You are aware that I returned M. Luckner the five squadrons and six battalions that remained to me in Flanders; so that I have discharged that debt. It is necessary, my dear Colombe, that you should send me some companies of grenadiers of the line. I can resist the enemy only by very fleet manœuvres and picked troops. I prefer three battalions of grenadiers to six battalions of the line, for the kind of war that I must maintain. I am told they have changed the destination of several companies that were going to Flanders; keep an eye upon them, I beg of you.

Is it possible Paris cannot send me two fine battalions of grenadiers, composed of citizens? The battalion of the Filles Saint Thomas has sent, they tell me, its grenadiers to Metz; it would be singular, indeed, if, though the levies of Paris should naturally find their way to my army, the battalion of the Filles Saint Thomas had set the example of sending them to any other. If the composition of these battalions be not that of the real national guard, I am just as well pleased that they should go elsewhere; but if they be good, and consist of citizens who give themselves the trouble of going thither of their own accord, send them to me.

Be so good, my dear Colombe, to read over this letter with Dumas, to whom Lamoy has written to the same effect. I repeat once more, that if, as concerns my own responsibility, it would be better to go no further than Givet and Rocrois, the public interest requires that my surveillance should be extended to Sedan.

Circumstances may arise, on the Duke of Brunswick's entrance, which will require that the manœuvres around Sedan should not be entrusted to a bungler; and, besides, it is by no means clear to me how you can prevail on Marshal Luckner to take charge either of the department of the Meuse, or that of the Ardennes. Such, my dear Colombe, are the first ideas that present themselves; but as soon as the minister's express has arrived, I will send off another. Let me add, that the attachment borne me by the department of the Ardennes would render the appointment of any other general officer than me somewhat difficult, and that Sedan, especially, would be very loath to have to do with anybody else.

* * * * What you tell me, my dear Colombe, of the king's sentiments, gives me pleasure; but in the matter of liberty I will trust neither him nor anybody; and were he disposed to play the sovereign, I would fight against him now just as I did in 1789. But if, full of respect for the national sovereignty, he is willing to confirm to this country a free constitution, to play, as far as he is personally concerned, a praiseworthy part, and to avoid the inevitable moral and physical destruction which awaits him at the close of any counter-revolutionary game, then we may talk on the subject; and never but with the declaration of the rights of man in my hand. * * *

Adieu, my dear Colombe. Affectionate regards to you and Dumas.

TO M. D'ABANCOURT, MINISTER OF WAR.

Head-quarters, Brouelle, Aug. 4th, 1792;
4th year of Liberty.

* * * Your letter of the 26th, sir, was to reproach me for not having advanced on the other side of Givet, and more especially for having marched as far as Montmédy. You consider the frontier between Dunkirk and Givet as being my particular charge, and that, by my operations on the right of Givet, I leave the frontier of the north dangerously exposed; you seem alarmed at the enemy's position at Bavay, and at the situation

of our fortresses, neither of which, I must confess, has given me a moment's uneasiness; because, in the movement on Bavay, I see nothing more than a feint, and in the position of our fortresses, and the facility of throwing garrisons into them, I discern only the grounds of a cheerful confidence.

A second letter from you, of July 27th, repeats similar apprehensions about this movement on Bavay and that which I made on Montmédy, of which the enemy took advantage. You complain, with reason, of the dispersion of our forces on the frontier of the north, which has the effect of leaving all points weak.

A third, of July 30th, again touches on your alarm at the enemy's taking up a position in the city of Bavay, as well as in those of Maubeuge and Avesnes; an alarm, before yielding to which it would, perhaps, have been just as well to ascertain if the enemy had a single piece of heavy artillery in their possession.

To these different letters, sir, I replied; and on the 27th, I stated to you the motives that induced me to approach the frontier menaced with an attack. I knew that the Duke of Saxe could not, with his present means, take our fortresses, nor occupy positions that might benefit an enemy in the course of the campaign; and I was by no means sure that the Duke of Brunswick might not avail himself of the actual position of that frontier, and turn it to good account. In addition to this, both Marshal Luckner and myself were of opinion that as the enemy's forces were on the Rhine, I should always have time enough to return to Flanders. In that despatch, sir, I offered you these suggestions; the first restricted my command between Dunkirk to Givet, and my surveillance to any attempt that might be made by the enemy on either of these two points; the second supposed my frontier to extend itself as far as Montmédy, according to Marshal Luckner's wish, which, while it enabled me to defend the gap of Carignan, would, as you may easily conceive, put it out of my power to resist any direct attempts on the Low Countries. I cannot remain here unless in considerable force, for by remaining I must calculate on fighting, and should the enemy penetrate by Flanders, I can neither abandon the points here entrusted to me, nor reach there, with a corps, in time to check their irruption. The third was based on the supposition that my frontier did not extend further than Sedan, but that I should have in that camp a corps of reserve always ready to support Marshal Luckner, either by falling on the flank, or cutting off the communications of any army whose irruption between Sedan and Longwy he had not been able to prevent.

Such, sir, were the three suggestions to which I requested a precise answer; annexing at the same time the number of disposable troops I could muster here, and reminding you that M. Arthur Dillon had already acquainted you with the number of his own troops.

Your two letters, of August 1st, do not notice the request I had taken the liberty of making you—namely, which frontier it is the king has entrusted to my care, and what place it is that bounds my extreme right? This ascertained, it is then my affair to combine the means of defence requisite for the frontier, and of concerting with Marshal Luckner the means of effectively opposing the attempts of the enemy; but beyond all things, it is indispensable I should know precisely how far my command extends. * * *

* * * Hitherto, sir, your predecessors, from M. de Narbonne to M. Lajard, both included, left a great latitude to commanders-in-chief. It is more convenient, as concerns their responsibility, to be without it; but in that case it is requisite that their orders should be most precise. Since the national assembly and the king subordinate other military arrangements to apprehensions evinced by certain departments, and even to vague rumours, and since the king commands me to use every method of extinguishing these apprehensions, I infer that I must not, in the course of this campaign, break up the camp of Maulde, and consequently desire to know how many battalions and squadrons the king chooses should remain there. I would also remark, that your letter of July 27th complained of the dispersion of the troops, which left all parts weak, and contributed to diffuse alarm. Actually, it is their concentration which must cause alarm, for they cannot be concentrated without leaving points exposed that are now occupied.

The fears expressed to you by Marshal Luckner proceed from your official letter of July 26th, which I communicated to him, seeing that by reproaching me for the operations on my right, it induced me to make one towards my left.

It is, of course, sir, perfectly understood that my army is to protect Marshal Luckner's left; but your letter of the 26th indicates, with a view to such a protection, the position of Givet as the right of my command. The marshal's desire is, that I should protect his left, by moving towards Montmédy, and not considering Flanders as seriously open to an attack; it was also possible for me to protect it by confining myself to my position at Sedan.

It was concerted between Marshal Luckner and myself to

move our two main bodies in this direction, and then wait for news of the enemy.

You must have received, sir, the details necessary to acquaint you with the composition of the forces under my command; but allow me to say, it is not by such local estimates that we can determine this great question:—From what one point to another of the frontier ought the surveillance of the head of an army to extend? This decision, more especially modified by the topography of the country, and the means of defence which art has supplied, is of the greater consequence to me, inasmuch as every enemy's patrol that steps upon the French territory will furnish matter for a courier belonging to some department or municipality, for a denunciation to the national assembly, and for a species of reproach from the king's council to the general.

Very far am I, sir, from making any against you: there is none who renders you more justice than I do. I even depend greatly on your personal kindness towards me; but as I have only the nation for me, and against me a handful of suborned aristocrats and agitators, who make more noise than all the world besides, I feel that you ought, for the sake of your own personal safety, to have all your transactions with me on record; and I am sure you will not take it amiss that I in turn require something specific to guide me.

In a word, sir, I beg most urgently, that, after due consideration of the political, topographical, and military features of my position, you would have the goodness, by return of courier, to specify the extent of my command, the fortified places on my extreme right,* the general officers to be employed with me, the additional troops you design for me, what camp you choose I should occupy, in order to quash, in conformity with the king's instructions, existing apprehensions, unless, indeed, like myself, you look unconcernedly on apprehensions that seem totally destitute of foundation.

Your two predecessors, when they indicated to Marshal Luckner and myself the limits of our commands, gave us carte blanche; but such a privilege becomes perfectly illusive the moment these direct arrangements between the minister and the lieutenant-generals of our armies are permitted to change the plans we have matured.

* It was not until August 7th, that M. d'Abancourt replied to this letter, deciding, conformably with the king's intentions and Marshal Luckner's wishes, that the right of General Lafayette's command should be bounded by Montmédy.

You desire me, sir, to transfer to Marshal Luckner a number of battalions and squadrons, equal in amount to those you left in Flanders, and I am quite of your opinion, that it would be better this division should be replaced by an equal number of troops from my right. Accordingly, as soon as I learnt that those under M. Dumouriez had not marched, I lost no time in sending to Metz six battalions of national guards and five squadrons, including those of chasseurs, which had the effect of supplying the marshal with an equivalent number.* I am extremely glad of having anticipated your wishes on this point * * *

The death of adjutant-general Desmottes† must have been announced to you by M. de La Colombe. I have the honour to give you official notice of it. The country loses an excellent officer, and I sustain, as you know, a personal loss in him, which the friendship I entertained for him makes me feel deeply.

I understand, sir, through an indirect channel, that an inten-

* Dumouriez, upon leaving the ministry of war on the 18th of June, had taken the command of the camp of Maulde as lieutenant-general in Marshal Luckner's army. On the 10th of July, just when the generals of the two corps were proceeding, one towards Montmédy, the other towards the country of Messin, it was agreed on between them at Valenciennes, that Dumouriez should be charged provisionally with the command of the department of the north until General Dillon relieved him, and that he then should join Marshal Luckner with his division at Metz. A few days after, Dillon arrived, about the time that the imperialists took possession of Bavay. Dumouriez made a pretence of this attack of the enemy in order to disobey Marshal Luckner, by refusing to join him at Metz. He gave a colour to this decision by getting it adopted by a council of officers, whose opinion the national assembly approved, in spite of the severe precautions suggested by the minister. But Marshal Luckner, under whose orders he was about to serve, declared he no longer considered him as belonging to his army. Things being in this state, Dumouriez remained in command at the camp of Maulde under General Dillon, and consequently under Lafayette, whose command comprised all the corps encamped on his left, from Dunkirk to Maubeuge.—(See p. 383 of this volume.)

† M. Desmottes, formerly aide-de-camp to General Lafayette, the same that was despatched to M. de Bouillé during the disturbances at Nancy.—(See p. 129 of this volume.)

tion exists of employing in my army certain general officers who were destined for that of Marshal Luckner's. * * *

But a piece of news which passes my belief, and that I regard merely as a jest, is, the decision attributed to you of appointing M. Dumouriez to the army under my command. I have publicly accused him of folly or treachery towards the state and myself. I do not stop to inquire if I am right or wrong, but—and I would have made this appeal to his very patrons themselves before their leader, M. Brissot, had proclaimed him the vilest of intriguers—is it possible that a commander-in-chief who has expressed such an opinion of a lieutenant-general, should be expected to entrust him with the destiny of any part of the men or the fortresses confided to him?

I ought to add, that so great was Marshal Luckner's dissatisfaction with Dumouriez, that he wrote to request the king would deprive him of his command, and assured me by letter of his determination never to hold any correspondence with him. How can it possibly be supposed that the confidence which Marshal Luckner feels himself unable to repose in this general officer can be accorded by me under the circumstances in which we stand to each other?

In a word, sir, the ministers who will thus take upon themselves to determine with such nicety the position of camps, the distribution of the forces, and, above all, the selection of the general officers to whom the commander-in-chief must confide his operations,—the ministers, I say, who do this, encounter a heavy responsibility, and I am free to declare, for my own part, that I will take no share of it upon myself.

If I mistake not, sir, I have replied to all the points of your letter bearing on the great operations of the war. M. de Laumoy, at the head of the staff, and M. Petiet, commissary-general, have received orders to forward you the details you require.

* * * * *

I think it right to observe, sir, that I am greatly crippled by the want of cavalry, and that the Prussians will add the advantage of numbers to that which they derive from the skill and talent of their officers in this arm of war.

Both your predecessor and yourself must have received numerous complaints of our platoon horses. Marshal Luckner's army has not been exposed, as we have, to the inconvenient vicinity of the Austrian light troops. The horses are detestable, the pack-saddles constantly breaking, and it becomes impossible to manœuvre near the enemy without leaving on the

roads, and often in their power, a part of our baggage. I foresaw this annoyance before the war, and very strongly urged the use of wagons, which can pass wherever artillery does. * * * *

In conclusion, sir, I must repeat to you my expectation of receiving precise replies on the different points submitted to you, in conformity with which alone I can make any definitive arrangement with Marshal Luckner, and regulate my own proceedings. My aide-de-camp will receive your answer, and send it to me by an express. When this reaches me, and not before, my responsibility towards the public cause will commence.

I beg you to accept, sir, the expression of my sincere regard.

TO M. D'ABANCOURT.

Camp at Moreton, Aug. 8th, 1792,
4th year of Liberty.

It belongs, sir, neither to my feelings nor to my character to form complaints, and to shun responsibility; but I owe it to the public interest and to myself to seek an explanation with you on one point: you have deprived Marshal Luckner of general officers he is in want of, to place them in my army; you have connected me with M. Dumouriez, my opinion of whom all the world knows, whom Marshal Luckner has rejected as a refractory person, and who will assuredly be less submissive to my orders than to his; you direct, by means of a correspondence with M. Arthur Dillon, all the arrangements that have relation to the left of my command, and the orders which I transmit him are frequently contradicted by those he receives from you.

I do not dispute, sir, your right of exercising an authority which the constitution confers upon you, and to which the proximity of the frontier of the north offers a plausible inducement; but as, in the art of war, unity of command and certainty of obedience are indispensable, as you have given me, in spite of myself, one lieutenant-general on whose obedience I cannot depend, and that the obedience of the others is made to rest on the accidental conformity or difference between your measures and mine, I am very well content to continue to write to the general officers in command from Dunkirk to Maubeuge; but I disclaim all responsibility for anything that may happen on this frontier, or even for the measures intended to affect the right of that body of Austrians which may penetrate by La Capelle. I have already besought you, sir, to inform me defi-

nitively which frontier it is the king confides to my care, what means are to be at my disposal for the required defence, what general officers are to be employed under me, what instructions and what latitude are to be given me, and what operations I am at liberty to make beyond this frontier should I have cause to think I could render myself useful to Marshal Luckner's army.

You must be very sensible that, situated as I am, it is essential to me that there should be a perfect understanding between us on these points; and to speak plainly to you, sir, I decline neither responsibility nor carte-blanche where I have the entire command, but I desire to know where and whom I do command.

FROM M. D'ABANCOURT, MINISTER OF WAR, TO GENERAL LAFAYETTE, AT MONTMEDY.

Aug. 8th, 1792.

I HAVE communicated to the king and council, sir, your reasons for putting your army into cantonments; and this operation appeared to them a highly proper one, after a fatiguing march in bad weather. Conceiving that the enemy cannot come up with you for several days, nothing can be more prudent than to give rest to troops that are full of courage and zeal. Nevertheless, this measure has caused uneasiness in the assembly: they talk of a movement made by your army; I demonstrated that it was not what is called a movement. But why canton the troops in the presence of the enemy? Mistake the second. However, I only succeeded in appeasing the agitation by yielding to the king's orders to lay before the commission all the official despatches it asked for. I myself read your last, which perfectly explains your conduct. * * * *

TO M. D'ABANCOURT, MINISTER OF WAR.*

Intrenched Camp at Sedan, Aug. 12th, 1792, 4th year of Liberty.

I UNDERSTAND, sir, there has been considerable agitation in Paris, and you may conceive with how much anxiety I am ex-

* M. d'Abancourt was superseded, after the events of the 10th of August, by M. Servan; but during the absence of the latter, who was at that time with that army, M. Clavière dis-

pecting more accurate information than has yet reached me. The disturbances of the capital are, doubtless, paid for by foreign powers, to promote the cause of counter-revolution; an opinion the more probable when we consider how exactly they are made to time with the belligerent movements of these powers. I shall, on the present occasion, confine myself to military details, and proceed to inform you, that my troops occupy the same position as notified in my last despatch. A corps of at least eight thousand men, on their march from the Low Countries by way of Luxemburg, encamped the day before yesterday at Saint Hubert. It seems they were there yesterday morning; several accounts state their numbers still higher.

I sent some light troops, with some infantry and six pieces of artillery, to Muno, Saint Cécile, Chiny, and Jamoigner, under M. Lallemand, to clear the other side of the Semois of the Austrian hussars, who had pushed forward some parties, but afterwards retired.

I am told, sir, though the report is still a vague one, that my requisitions to various departments have been stopped. I lose no time in forwarding you copies, and should those signed by me not have reached their destination, I beg of you to transmit those copies certified by you.

The news of the disturbances in Paris, still imperfectly known to us, will soon spread through the troops, and cause an indignation so much the greater, inasmuch as the true defenders of their country are weary of seeing the kingdom distracted by internal factions, at a time when it is the duty of every man to rally round the constitution.

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charged the functions of minister of war, *ad interim*, and replied, on the 14th of August, to this letter of General Lafayette's of the 12th:—"Beyond all doubt, sir, the disorders of the capital have been instigated and paid for by foreign powers. The coincidence of a plot which was to have destroyed a multitude of good citizens, with the external movements to which you allude, would seem to prove that these events were expected by them. Happily, the measures of traitors have been disconcerted by the vigour of the people; once again it has vanquished a despotism which it supposed it had laid prostrate in 1789.

"The commissioners must have communicated this event to the army, and I have no doubt of its having increased the ardour of the soldiers of liberty in its defence.

"Nothing, sir, is known at the war-office of any of your requisitions being stopped; nevertheless, I forward those transmitted by you to M. d'Abancourt, to the departments of your division."

FROM THE MINISTER OF WAR TO GENERAL LAFAYETTE.

Aug. 12th,—4th year of Liberty.

AT the very moment of coming into office, sir, I received three letters from you, addressed to M. d'Abancourt,—one of the 4th, the other of the 7th of August.* When I announce to you, sir, in my despatch of this day, that, until further orders, you are at liberty to direct whatever operations you may think required by the position and manœuvres of the enemy, I reply to one part of the requests preferred in these letters. The chief object of your concern appears to be the extent of your command; all that I can now permit myself to say is, that it still continues to be the same as when originally confided to you, and that I will forward you forthwith a decision of the council on this subject, as well as on the number of troops and generals under your orders. There can hardly be a doubt, sir, but that the army under your command will have numerous enemies to contend against; but the valour of the troops, the ardour of the citizens, the strength of our positions, and the love of liberty that will combat for us even in the hearts of our enemies,—all give presage of that success which, from the goodness of our cause, we have a right to expect.

TO MESSIEURS THE ADMINISTRATORS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARDENNES.

Intrenched camp at Sedan, Aug. 15th, 1792, 4th year of Liberty.†

GENTLEMEN,—I have received no official account of the late events that have sullied the capital; but on this occasion, as on

* In this letter of the 7th, General Lafayette confined himself to repeating the question, which was to be the extreme point of his right? It was not till the 17th he was superseded, by Dumouriez, in the command of the army of the north, and summoned to Paris to explain his conduct, pursuant to a resolution of the provisional executive council, signed, Roland, Clavière, Danton, Monge, and Le Brun.

† On the same day, the directory of the department of the Ardennes passed a resolution conformable to the principles of this letter.

every other, I open the constitution to which we all of us have sworn, and there I read my duty.

Convinced that every society which has no well-assured warranty for its rights, and no well-defined partition of its power, is without a constitution, I ever, and with my whole energy, resisted the arbitrary government of France; and having been the first to proclaim that the principle of all sovereignty resides essentially in the nation, that neither any corporate body, nor any individual, can exercise an authority other than expressly emanates from that, I submitted to the constitutional act which the constituent assembly gave us, and felt that my first duty, as a citizen and soldier, was, fidelity to it. As a citizen, I will always be obedient to laws passed by the representatives of the people, agreeably to those forms which the constitution has prescribed; as a soldier, I must recognise the king as supreme head of the army, and obey all orders conformable to the constitution which the minister of war has countersigned. But at the present crisis, gentlemen, when, in the midst of massacre, the king, when intervention is a recognised part of the legislative power, has been—not deposed, a thing applicable to certain cases entirely distinct from this, but—suspended from his functions, a right which the constitution delegates to no one; when the legislative body, violated, a few days before, in the persons of its members, for decrees passed by a large majority, can no longer be considered free, now that cannon is thundering around it, and armed bandits are thronging through its hall; I no longer recognise those constitutional forms which enable us to distinguish legitimate from usurped authority. It behoves, then, gentlemen, a faithful observer of the principles common to all freemen, and of the laws adopted by his country, to seek in these very laws for that civil authority under which he can enlist himself, because that military force which ceases for a single instant to be guided by a civic and constitutional authority becomes dangerous to public liberty.

I perceive, sir, by the constitution, and the laws made by the legislative power while yet independent, that the troops of the line are not to act, save on the requisition of administrative bodies; here, then, is a civil, constitutional, and incontestible authority, to which I can legally address myself; and as I happen to be, gentlemen, in the department of the Ardennes, with a great part of the armed force confided to me, I come to explain to you, to consult you, and to ascertain what, in the present grave emergency, are your intentions.

You are not ignorant, gentlemen, of the legislative body

having deputed commissioners, selected from its own members, to proceed to the army, and put in force certain decrees which could not, under actual circumstances, have received the king's sanction, and which do not appear to me to have passed the legislative body itself while in the unconstrained exercise of its power. You must be sensible how necessary it is to me, in my capacity of commander-in-chief, to ascertain your opinion on this point.

As to my own individual opinion, you know me well enough to be aware that, independent of all factions, interests, and dangers, I will never, to any despotism whatever, bow down a head which, from the first moment of my existence, has been devoted to the cause of liberty and equality, and often risked for it in both hemispheres. The declaration of rights was my sole guide, until a constitution was adopted by the national will; and as I swore to obey that, I will never be wanting to my oath.

Receive, gentlemen, &c.

TO MADAME DE LAFAYETTE.*

Rochefort, August 21st.

WHATEVER may be the vicissitudes of my fortunes, my dearest love, you know that my heart will never allow itself to despond; but you know me also too

* We have seen that General Lafayette had quitted his residence at Chavaniac, in December, 1791, to take the command of one of the armies. Madame de Lafayette had remained in Auvergne with her family. This letter, the one of the 18th of April, 1792, and of the 25th of August, (see page 453,) were found upon her the 11th of September, 1792, when she was arrested, to be conducted to Paris, on an order signed the 2nd of September. Arrived at Puy, Madame de Lafayette demanded to read those letters aloud, publicly, in the hall of the department, because they were, she said, the precious testimonies of the opinions of him for whom she was proud of becoming responsible, and whose opinions she gloried in sharing. —(Verbal Process of the Arrest.) The two letters to Brissot, which terminate the correspondence of this volume, contain details of the arrest of Madame de Lafayette.

well not to pity the anguish I experienced on quitting my country—that country to which I have devoted all my energies, and which would have been free, and worthy of being so, had not private interests concurred to corrupt the public mind, to disorganize the means of external resistance, and of internal security and liberty. It is I who, proscribed by my country for having served it too courageously, have been obliged to traverse a territory subjected to a hostile government, to fly from France whom I should have been so happy to defend. An Austrian post was on the road; the commandant conceived it his duty to arrest us; from thence we are to be conducted to Namur; but I cannot believe they will have such want of faith as to detain, for any length of time, foreigners who by a patriotic and constitutional declaration, have taken care to separate themselves from Frenchmen emigrating for opinions so opposed to their own, and who announce their intention of repairing to a neutral country—Holland or England. These are the names of the persons at present with me: the three Maubourgs, the three Romeufs, La Colombe, Langlois, Laumoy, Masson, Pillet, Bureaux de Pusy, M. du Roure, d'Agrain, his aide-de-camp; Soubeyran, Maubourg's aide-de-camp; Sicard, colonel of the 43rd regiment, Sionville, officer of the regiment, formerly of Bouillon, d'Arblay, and Alexander Lameth, who, hunted about by a decree of accusation, came to join me at Bouillon, from whence I set out. You know better than I do the list of all the patriots who have been massacred, either by the Marseillese, or by the orders of MM. Pétion, Santerre, and Danton. They appear to have attacked those who served liberty. As to me, my ruin has been long determined. I might, had I possessed more

ambition than virtue, have been in a far different situation; but never shall I have anything in common with crime. I have been the last to maintain the constitution I had sworn to observe. You know that my heart would have been republican, if my reason had not given me a shade of royalist opinions, and if my fidelity to my oaths, and to the national will, had not rendered me a defender of the constitutional rights of the king; but as others dared less resist, my voice was raised more loudly; and I became the mark for all attacks. The mathematical demonstration that I could no longer be of use by opposing myself to crime, and that I should but occasion the commission of one more crime, induced me to withdraw from a struggle in which it was evident I should perish in a fruitless manner. I know not how long my departure may be delayed; but I intend repairing to England, where I wish all my family to join me. May my aunt also consent to the journey. I know that the families of emigrants are detained; but those are emigrants armed against their country, and, thank God! there is no monster who could suspect me of belonging to that class. The imperial and jacobite posts will read the few letters I shall write. I care not for that, provided they reach their destination. I have never had a single opinion I wished to conceal.

I offer no apology to my children, nor to you, for having ruined my family; not one amongst you would wish for a fortune purchased by the sacrifice of conscience. Come and join me in England; we will establish ourselves in America, where we shall find that liberty which no longer exists in France; and my tender affection shall endeavour to make amends for all the enjoyments you will lose. Farewell, my dearest love.

TO M. DE LA ROCHEFOUCAULD.*

Nivelle, August 25th, 1792.

WHERE are you, my dear friend? Are you still alive? Is it possible that so many virtues, such a pure and constant love of liberty, can have escaped the proscription? I love and esteem you too much not to tremble for you; and I should now hesitate to write to you if our friendship was not already known to every one, and especially to the chiefs now in power. I tell them nothing new by communicating to you the dreadful anxiety which preys upon my mind, and I feel you must be impatient to learn whether I am still alive, and in what corner of the world I shall carry a proscribed head, which glories in having merited proscription, but which could scarcely have expected that the constant and inflexible defender of the people would have been persecuted in the very name of that people.

* This letter was never received by M. de La Rochefoucauld. There are some particulars of the assassination at Gisors found in a note of General Lafayette's: "It was from an order of the infamous commune of the 10th of August that this unfortunate and most noble-minded friend was arrested at Forges. The commissioner charged with the execution of it had been to La Rochefoucauld, under the disguise of a beggar, and had several times received alms from him. That commissioner continued to follow the escort unto Gisors where, a tumultuous crowd assembled around the inn in which La Rochefoucauld was dining with his mother and wife. The prisoner shewed himself on a balcony to the infuriated mob, who loudly called for him; and, at the moment when he was descending to address them, the commissioner, who, during the journey, had endeavoured to delay his progress, said he might descend, because the guard sent from Paris by Santerre had just arrived. La Rochefoucauld replied, 'If that be the case, I am lost.' He descended with a firm step into the street, and, on reaching it, was massacred."

We have had no communication together since the 10th of August. The great majority of the assembly had pronounced judgment on my affair. The outrages of the 10th and 11th, the decrees that were issued, all proved to me that the national assembly was not more free than the king. I had always thought that the assembly ought not politically, and had not the power legally, to change the constitution. I then perceived that it evidently did not desire to do so. I had long wished that the legislative body, by shaking off the yoke of the tribunes, that the king, by absenting himself for some time, at a constitutional distance from Paris, (Fontainebleau or Compiègne,) could prove to foreign powers their own freedom, assume the tone which suits our national independence, destroy our anarchy, our internal licence, those causes of the complaints and disapprobation of Europe, and treat in a dignified manner for that peace which my judgment (against my interest) made me consider necessary, or defend vigorously the constitution, by rallying around it all those persons who had been induced by public disorder to abandon it. I know not whether I have been mistaken; but the utility of this line of conduct appeared to me as clear as day. The assembly and the king were too feeble; they were too much beset, the one by the jacobins, the other by the aristocrats, to be able to listen to a man who, wishing for public order, liberty, and equality, could not suit any one of these factions.

As soon as the events of the 10th of August were announced, I saw the constitution overthrown, its defenders dispersed, public force disorganized, and the king and national assembly equally placed under subjection: but the captivity of the king, frightful as it is, gives him at least the advantage

of not being responsible to posterity for any public calamity; while the assembly, on the contrary, appears to be the accomplice, or even instigator, of all that a faction has judged proper to do.

I well know that there are reports of plots in the palace, of an understanding with the enemy, of follies of all kinds committed by the court. I am neither its confidant nor apologist; but the constitutional act is there, and it is not the king who has violated it; but the palace has not attacked the faubourgs, nor has it summoned the Marseillese. It is the king himself who has denounced the preparations that have been making for the last three months. It is not he who has had women and children massacred, who delivered up to death all who were most known for their attachment to the constitution, who destroyed in one single day the freedom of the press and of the post-office, the trial by jury, the distinction of powers,—in a word, all that secures the liberty of men and nations.

Under these cruel circumstances, I have remained faithful to the constitutional act, submissive to the constituted authorities which most immediately demanded my services; I hoped that good citizens, by rallying around their municipalities and administrative bodies, would obtain the liberty of the assembly and that of the king. The arrest of the commissioners was in consequence of the determination taken by the department of Ardennes. I believe that if there had been a little energy amongst those who still wished to observe the constitution, we might have extricated the assembly itself from the evil path into which it had been plunged by violence.

But while menaces of pillage and assassination alarmed all citizens and all public men who dared

to raise their voices against the despotism of the day, means, unfortunately but too efficacious, were employed to disorganize the army. You are conscious that no army can resist the combined efforts of the legislative body and executive power, especially when the judicial power has been left without force, so that no misdemeanour could be punished by law, and that all crimes were, on the contrary, recompensed or applauded; when confidence in their chiefs and attachment to the sworn constitution were treated as proofs of contempt of law, and when a crowd of disorderly men were sent under the disguise of recruits into all the corps.

An ever increasing division of opinion, a progressive relaxation of discipline, a secret fermentation, announced to me that the explosion was not far distant. I had seen that the department of Ardennes and the town of Sedan were on the point of being persecuted by all who hold the present reins of government. Dissension in the army would have occasioned bloodshed without fulfilling any end. I had made every possible effort for liberty. At Paris, poniards were raised against my friends. It only remained for me to keep some public forces together, to save the public authorities who had resisted oppression, as I had done, to put an end to the proscription of my friends, to escape the decree of accusation which had been planned long before, and of which the result would have been a political assassination,—it only, I repeat, remained for me to spare my countrymen the committal of one more crime, and to withdraw from the perils surrounding me.

The choice of a road was not left me. It would have been better for me to have embarked directly; but could I do so? I therefore determined to tra-

verse this country until I reached Holland. I gave all my attention to secure the safety of my army, whose somewhat exposed divisions I recalled to their station. Beloved as I am by the troops, you will feel that I might have carried away many men with me; but such an idea was as opposed to my feelings as my principles. I even sent back the lowest of my orderlies. The officers, of whom I send you the list, with our declarations, and whom five others have since joined, are all that remain with me of that nation of twenty-five millions of men, who, in more prosperous days, surrounded me.

Alexander Lameth, against whom a decree of accusation has also been issued, has joined me at Bouillon, and united himself to our caravan. We passed over the territory of Liege. At Rochefort we fell in with an Austrian post, which was consequently on neutral ground. This event gave me pain, on account of the impropriety of communication between us, but not from any suspicion of what would occur. Bureaux de Pusy told the commanding officer that we were French citizens formerly attached to the constitution, completely opposed to the French bearers of white cockades, who now appealed to the right of nations for a free passage over Dutch territory. We were desired to enter; and we were arrested, conducted from thence to Namur, and finally here, where we are guarded until answers be received from Vienna.

I own, as I said to the commandant of Namur, that the injustice of arbitrary governments affects me far less than that of the people. It appears very natural to meet with vexations and ill-treatment here, and if the coalition of foreign powers persecutes me, I attribute that malevolence to recollections on which I pride myself. I think it is

impolitic in the court of Vienna to violate the right of nations towards us, who have shewn ourselves so opposed to the jacobinism of which it complains, and whom it can only reproach with love of liberty, and fidelity to a constitution for which it professes no hostility. Still uncertain, however, whether passion or policy will be the ruler of our fate, I feel more at ease under a persecution I have merited by my liberal feelings than when suffering from the injustice of the people towards their most faithful friend.

If I recover my liberty, I shall retire into a village in England, because I cannot divest myself of the interest I feel for my own country; but in case despotism and aristocracy on one side, and faction and disorganization on the other, should deprive me of the hope of ever seeing that country free, I shall again become an American; and on that happy soil, inhabited by an enlightened people, attached to liberty, observant of law, and grateful for the happiness I have enjoyed of having been useful to it, I shall relate to my respectable friend Washington, and to my other revolutionary comrades, how France, in spite of me, has been polluted by crimes, worked upon by intriguers, and ruined by corruption and ignorance, which have now become the instruments of the basest passions.

26th.

Our situation has by no means improved since yesterday evening. Our parole had been demanded as if we were prisoners of war. I replied I would not co-operate in an act of injustice by giving my assent, and that they had no right to detain us. This evening, the major who commands our guard placed sentinels at my door and at that of my com-

rades. Whatever may happen, you know that your friend will never do anything unworthy of a freeman, who cannot bend beneath an illegitimate yoke. It is at least a consolation to me, that those who now persecute me are not profaning the name of liberty, and that they imprison us merely for their own satisfaction.

TO MADAME DE CHAVANIAC.

Nivelle, August 25th, 1792.

I AM in good health, my dear aunt; and this is the most agreeable piece of intelligence I can give you. You have learnt by what a chain of fatalities and proscription the most constant friend of liberty has been forced to abandon his country, which he considered it such a happiness to serve. I have seen, for the last six months, the fearful progress of disorganization. Fidelity to our constitution appeared to me the best means of safety. With the assembly, the king, and all good citizens, I have endeavoured to do everything I could, without departing from a constitutional line of conduct, to unite and strengthen us. My efforts have been fruitless. My name is become the signal for proscription; faction on one side, and the court on the other, have ruined the public cause. It became at length necessary to perish myself without doing good to others, or bend beneath the jacobin yoke, or withdraw myself from the infernal machinations that have been accumulated against me. If juries had still subsisted; and I could have hoped for a legal trial, I would have offered my head to the laws of my country, with the conviction that not one action of my life could have compromised me in the estimation of true patriots; but since the arbitrary will of the first

group you meet with decides the question of life or death, a friend of liberty could not disgrace himself by appearing before such a tribunal. I was therefore forced to adopt the painful measure of quitting the frontier. You must be aware that I might have brought away with me a portion of the army; I most scrupulously sent back even the lowest of my orderlies. I had previously taken every precaution to secure the safety of the troops confided to me; and I directed my steps to the neutral territory of Liege. I there encountered an Austrian post; we declared we were Frenchmen, attached to the constitution, diametrically opposed to the emigrant aristocrats, no longer belonging to the service, and claiming the right of nations for crossing the territory. We were arrested, and against every shadow of justice conducted to Namur, to await, they say, in that small town, the decision of the emperor at Vienna. I told them I preferred having cause to complain of the injustice of arbitrary governments rather than of the injustice of the people; and that the imperial persecution appeared to me far more natural than the Parisian proscription I was labouring under. I must add, however, that we are treated with great politeness, and that they have carried attention so far as to forbid any emigrant with a white cockade from coming near us. I am sending M. Bureaux de Pusy to Brussels, to represent to the government of the Low Countries the violation of the right of nations of which they have been guilty towards us, and I hope we shall obtain immediate justice from these representations. I shall then repair to some farm in England, of which the address will be learnt by applying to the minister of the United States in London. I shall lead there the most retired life, and earnestly hope that my country

may find a defender who will serve her with as much zeal, disinterestedness, and love of liberty, as I have done. My misfortunes, however, have not changed my principles, feelings, nor language. I am in all respects, at present, the same as I have been my whole life. My heart, I own, is deeply grieved; but my conscience is pure and calm. I doubt whether the chiefs of the different factions who have defamed me can say the same themselves. Madame de Lafayette and my children are no longer, probably, at Chavaniac; I much wish, my dear aunt, that you may have consented to follow them. In any case, shew or send them this letter. I beg you will remember me affectionately to the sisters, and to all who dwell at Chavaniac. Tell the inhabitants of the commune of Aurac that it would be wrong in them to dislike the constitution because a fellow-citizen they love is persecuted. This is as great an act of injustice as was the restraint of their consciences; both acts are abuses; but under the former régime abuses were far more frequent; and the revolution, in spite of all present evils, will eventually secure the happiness of the people. They will therefore always, I hope, remain good patriots. Adieu, my dear aunt; you have, at least, the consolation of thinking that I am no longer exposed to the perils of war. I own that I do not share your satisfaction on this subject, and that the idea of my country's being invaded, and not defended by me, deeply wounds my heart,—but they would have it so. May this proscription not turn to the disadvantage of my country and the cause of liberty!

Once more adieu, my dear aunt. I love you most affectionately.

TO MADAME D'HÉNIN.*

Neville, Low Countries, Aug. 27th, 1792.

You must be much occupied by my most singular situation, my excellent friend; and amongst the various chances your friendship has calculated for me, the present one has, doubtless, never occurred to you. I wrote to you that I should defend the constitutional throne as frankly as I had combated that of the ancient régime; and although the jacobin faction made me the finest proposals to induce me to change my conduct, I never would hold any communication with them. My affair with the assembly, by uniting against the brigands a majority of two-thirds of the votes, was on the point of winding up anew the political machine, when the fearful crisis of the 10th overthrew everything. I found in the declaration of rights, and in the constitution, as well as in my feelings of indignation and of deep interest for my country, every inducement to resist this rebellion, equally opposed to all principles and all laws. The department of Ardennes, in which I was stationed,—the municipality of Sedan, of which all the citizens are excellent,—a portion of my

* This is the first time that the name of the Princess d'Hénin appears in our collection; the children of General Lafayette can but very feebly here express the deep feelings of gratitude that render the memory of this admirable friend so dear to them. She was, at the period of the writing of this letter, in England: the greatest number of the letters General Lafayette was enabled to write during his captivity were addressed to her. While Madame de Lafayette, and almost all his relations and friends, were immured in the prisons of the Terreur, Madame d'Hénin was the centre of their correspondence, and endeavoured to give to each consolations and intelligence of the others. The letters of the fourth volume will prove how great was the devotion of her friendship.

troops,—these are the means of resistance I at first employed. Three commissioners of the assembly, of whom Kersaint was one, were, amidst the acclamations of all Sedan, arrested and shut up in the fortress, from whence they beheld the national guard and the troops renew, before the municipality, their civic oath to the nation, the law, and the king. A courier was despatched to me from M. Clavière, with a passport, from which the name of the king had been effaced; I sent the man to prison. I refused to hold any correspondence, except with the directory of the department of Ardennes, until liberty had been restored to the king and the national assembly, which I saw were both equally in a state of captivity. I proposed to the other departments to form a coalition, and a sort of little congress, which might have acted in the name of the king until the executive power had been restored to him; so that his suspension might be declared, by an imposing majority of the kingdom, a criminal act, to which France would not submit. But what avail the most energetic efforts when terror reigns everywhere? The departments have been slow in declaring themselves; in other places the administrators have been driven away; several errors committed by the court—those errors which I have so frequently and loudly blamed—have been recalled in a triumphant manner; the capital has given an example of cowardice, which has been but too well followed. Dillon, with the whole left of my army, from Dunkirk to Maubeuge, bent beneath the commissioners, and has not even sent me the troops I demanded, and on whom I fully depended. Luckner was present at the nocturnal meeting in which the suspension of the king was accepted by the municipal and administrative bodies, who, as well as

the general, were half dead with fear. In this manner all the neighbouring civil authorities, all the troops, except the corps immediately with me, bent beneath the yoke. Several of my regiments were seduced; and amongst the infernal manœuvres put in practice, I will only mention one,—which was, enlisting in the country, and sending as recruits, the most determined agitators. The whole battery of dismissals, decrees of accusations, in short, all that could weaken confidence, was on the point of showering upon me. I still possessed some regiments and a large number of officers. I wished to enclose myself in a fortress, and plant, for and against all men, the constitutional banner; but it was represented to me that, surrounded at the same time by the combined powers and the jacobite power, I should only, by resistance, shed fruitlessly the blood of my friends, yield myself up to my enemies, and cause, perhaps, the assassination of the king, his family, my own, and all persons known to be attached to me. During that time, the imprisoned commissioners entreated me to grant them a conference, which would, they asserted, settle everything; it but depended on me, they assured La Colombe, to be the first man in France. I believe, in truth, that if I had forgotten their crimes, sacrificed the king, united myself to their party, I might have become a useful chief, whom it would have served their purpose to conciliate; but as I felt certain that their proposals could not be in accordance with my conscience, I refused even to see them. In such a situation, there remained nothing for me but to quit France, because my death would have been useless. My *hegira* dates from the 19th of August; I repaired to Bouillon with Maubourg, Bureaux de Pusy, and some other officers. We set

out under pretence of a reconnoitring expedition, leaving my escort of hussars behind us. I sent back on the road all the orderlies, with orders to recal the divisions of the army that were exposed to danger, and also with despatches to acquaint Luckner, my own generals, and the municipality of Sedan, with my departure; in a word, far from carrying off, as I might have done, the officers and troops, I chose to act in a way to which the most fastidious delicacy could not object. On our arrival near Rochefort, on the territory of Liege, from whence we intended to pass over to Holland and England, we learnt there was an Austrian post, which there seemed no reason for our either seeking or avoiding. But, to prevent any possibility of alarm or surprise, Bureaux de Pusy detached himself from his companions to make to the commanding officer a declaration like the one I am now sending to you. We were desired to enter, and you will be as much surprised as I was to learn that we have been treated as prisoners of war. Conducted to Namur, and afterwards here, we are in such close confinement, that I have a sentinel at my door, and am not allowed to walk in a little garden at the foot of my staircase; we only walk in the court. This conduct towards us is equally unjust and impolitic. But whatever may be my fate, I shall always remain the same you have hitherto known me, my dear princess; should justice and policy prove victorious over private feelings of malevolence, I intend shortly to repair to England, where I shall be delighted to see you.

Adieu, my dear princess; I love you most affectionately.

FROM MADAME DE LAFAYETTE TO M. BRISSOT.

Puy, September 12th, 1792.

SIR,—I believe you are, in truth, a fanatic for liberty, and I confer on few persons, at present, the honour of such an opinion. I do not examine whether this kind of fanaticism, like religious fanaticism, generally acts contrary to its proposed aim; but I cannot believe that a zealous friend of the blacks can be an agent for tyranny; and I conceive that if the aim of your party excite your enthusiasm, the means it employs must be repugnant to you. I am certain you esteem, I may almost say respect, M. Lafayette, as a courageous and faithful friend of liberty, even while persecuting him because opinions differing from your own on the manner in which that liberty may be best consolidated in France, supported by a courage such as his, and by an unshaken fidelity to his oaths, may be opposed to the party you have embraced, and to the new revolution. I believe all this,—and therefore it is I address myself to you, disdaining to address myself to others. If I be mistaken, write to tell me so,—and this is the last time I shall importune you by my applications.

A lettre de cachet from M. Roland, of the 2nd of September, issued in consequence of a decree of the committee of general safety of the 19th of August, occasioned my being brought here last Monday, by an individual, a justice of peace of that town, charged with bringing me to Paris, with my children, if found with me, after having concerted measures with the department of the Haute Loire, in which jurisdiction my retreat was situated. I acknowledge, with pain, that the attorney-general of the department had the weakness to give the commissioner of M. Roland a

requisition for the armed force,—and with gratitude, that that commissioner, and the troops accompanying him, paid every attention to us on the road. My eldest daughter was with me, and far from endeavouring to conceal herself, she was delighted at being comprised under the order of arrest. An aunt of my husband, on whose account I remained separated from him the whole of last winter, has had the kindness to accompany me here.

When M. d'Aulagnier (this is the name of the commissioner) asked me where I wished to go in the town, I replied that I wished to place myself under the protection of the municipality, and go to the department of Puy, to which belonged the jurisdiction over Chavaniac, the place of my abode, that being within the district of Brioude and the canton of Paulhaguet. What I said on arriving at the place of assembly,—what was determined by the council-general and the commissioner who had arrested me,—is found, nearly verbatim, in the process-verbal, in which I expressed my wishes and requests to the department. My aunt was desirous of my speaking of the fatigue of the journey, after the various trials to which my health has been exposed, but I could not make use of pretexts when I had such good reasons for not going to Paris. I intended speaking of the dangers that the events of the 2nd of September might lead us to fear, but having asked the date of M. Roland's letter, and seeing it was dated on that same day, I wished to spare him reflections that might have shocked him; for I do not choose to address myself to him, but will not say anything injurious to him. I contented myself with telling the members of the department, that, since I was under their protection, it was for them to foresee and prevent the dangers to which I

might be exposed. They are to write in concert with M. Aulagnier, and I confide in their prudence.

I am ignorant of what may be the answer. It is easy to perceive, that if that answer be dictated by justice I shall be restored to unrestricted liberty; if it be in accordance with my own feelings, I shall be united to my husband, who wishes me to join him in England the moment he is freed from captivity, that we may go and establish ourselves together in America, as soon as the voyage is practicable; but if they be resolved to detain me as a hostage, they would soften my imprisonment by allowing me to remain at Chavaniac, on my parole, and on the responsibility of the municipality of the village. By assisting me, you will have the satisfaction of doing a good action by softening the fate of a person unjustly persecuted, and who, you know, has neither means nor desire to do evil.

I consent to owe this service to you.

FROM MADAME LAFAYETTE TO M. BRISSOT.

Puy, Oct. 4th, 1792,

The day before my departure for Chavaniac.

I OUGHT no longer to write to you, sir, after the use you make of my letters;* but the feelings of indignation that had been excited in my mind by my unjust captivity, and especially the necessity of ap-

* The preceding letter had been communicated by M. Brissot to M. Roland, who wrote himself the answer in very offensive terms, while granting Madame de Lafayette the permission of returning to Chavaniac as a prisoner on parole. It is but just to add, that M. Roland, having recovered from his first vehemence of party spirit, himself contributed to the sort of provisional state of liberty that Madame de Lafayette obtained, until she was again arrested in October, 1793.

plying to the enemies of those I most love, nay, even those that the repeated calumnies M. Roland addressed to me could not fail of awakening in my heart, have been superseded, since yesterday, by my alarm and deep grief for the far more dreadful captivity of him who deserves far more than I do to be free. Do not, therefore, expect to find in my expressions either feelings of bitterness, or the pride of injured innocence. I shall plead my cause with the sole desire of gaining it; I have already written to M. Roland by the latest express. I had just read in your gazette, the only one in which I find any account of my husband, that he was separated from MM. de Maubourg and de Pusy, and transferred to Spandau. His misfortunes, the risk to which his health is exposed, all that I still fear, all I am ignorant of, all these evils are, in truth, more than I can support at such a distance from him. And when I reflect what good the country can derive from all the tortures I endure, I cannot believe that they can persevere in binding me by the heaviest chains, on a parole that I offered, perhaps, too inconsiderately; for this price of the meliorations granted to my imprisonment makes me fear compromising responsible administrations, which are sacred in my eyes. In truth, sir, by thus detaining me, too much importance is attached to me individually, and much too little to an act of injustice.

After all your credit has accomplished, after all you have so courageously done against a murderous faction, I cannot believe you have not both the power and the will of obtaining from the committee a complete revocation of its decree. At the time that decree was made, it was feared that M. Lafayette could still support some citizens in their fidelity to

the constitution. I cannot believe but that you will be able to obtain the revocation of the order of M. Roland, which is only founded on that decree, and that my entire liberty will be restored to me. It is impossible that a certificate of residence in the dungeons of the enemy for having devoted himself to the cause of liberty should not procure for the wife of M. Lafayette the same advantages that an artist's wife would obtain from the certificate that her husband was travelling for the improvement of his art. I will not speak of the general cruelty of keeping women as hostages; but I will say, that he is totally deprived of the power of doing good or evil in any cause. Allow me to add, that nothing but his present situation could prevent him from serving the cause of liberty.

I confess, sir, that I never can believe that he who has laboured for so many years for the abolition of the blacks can refuse to use his eloquence to deliver from slavery a woman who asks no other freedom than that of enclosing herself in the prison, or at least of being near the walls of the citadel, of Spandau. M. Roland has the kindness to assure me he is convinced I have neither the means nor wish to do evil; let him, then, set me free; for, according to the principles acknowledged by himself, we must do good to all, with the least possible evil to each individual. My liberty can injure no person. Let foreign enemies exhaust their hatred on a sincere friend of liberty; do not unite with them to persecute him in all that is most dear to him; and let them feel, that in our own country there are courageous representatives of the people, who abhor useless crimes, and support innocence, at least, when she is suffering and weak.

I trust I shall receive a speedy answer to this letter, which will prove to you that I am very unhappy; but no words can paint the agony my heart endures, nor the deep gratitude I shall feel for my liberators, whatever may be the evils they have hitherto heaped on me.

NOAILLES LAFAYETTE.

APPENDIX.

I.*

EXTRACT FROM A REPORT FROM M. DELESSART TO THE KING.

Friday, 5 o'clock, a.m., March, 1792.

PURSUANT to the intention of which I had the honour of apprizing the king, I waited on the minister of justice between ten and eleven last evening. There I found, not only M. de Bertrand and M. Tarbé, but also M. Cahier. Almost immediately afterwards, Lafayette arrived. He told us nothing would have given him more pleasure than to be able to effect a reconciliation between ministers; that, however, he had never indulged much hope of doing so, looking at the dissidence existing between M. de Narbonne and M. de Bertrand; but that as matters now stood, he should decline all further interference. He insisted particularly on the publicity given to the letters of the generals, and more especially on M. de Narbonne's reply to him. He declared he had no share in the publication of these documents, had never in any way consented to it, and that he received his first notice of it from the newspaper itself. After this explanation, which was cold and short, he withdrew.

II.†

GENERAL ORDER.

Intrenched Camp at Maubeuge, June 20, 1792, 4th year of Liberty.

THE general acknowledges the receipt last night and this morning, of addresses from the various corps of his army, declaratory of their fidelity to the constitution, their attachment to him, and their eagerness to combat foreign enemies, and internal faction.

* See p. 292 of this vol. † See p. 322 of this vol.

The general recognises in these acts the pure and unalterable patriotism of an army which, having sworn to maintain the principles of the declaration of rights, and of the constitutional act, is resolved to defend them against all manner of persons. He is deeply affected by these testimonies of the confidence and affection of his troops, and is well aware how much the late disorders, fomented by agitators in the capital, must revolt every true friend of liberty, every man who contemplates in the king of the French a power instituted by the constitution, and essential to its defence.

But while the general thus participates in the feelings of the army, he is apprehensive, lest these collective proceedings of a force whose essence is obedience, lest these energetic offers from troops, to whom the defence of the frontier is especially entrusted, should be traitorously misconstrued by our enemies, whether open or concealed. Enough for the present, that the national assembly, the king, and all constituted authorities, can be assured of the constitutional temper of the troops; enough, that the troops can depend on the patriotism and sincerity of their brothers in arms of the national guard, who will know how to triumph over all the obstacles and all the treachery by which they are environed.

Anxious as the general may be to avert from the army even the faintest shadow of a reproach, he assures it that, as far as his own *individual* acts can contribute to the prosperity of our cause, and the support of our constitution, he will stand in the breach alone, and face with devoted zeal every calumny, and, if need be, every danger.

ORDER OF THE EVENING OF THE 26TH.

Intrenched Camp at Maubeuge, June 26, 1792,
4th year of Liberty.

THE general has felt it incumbent on him to set bounds to the army in the expression of its sentiments, which, though but an additional testimony of its fidelity to the constitution, and respect for constituted authorities, might, from the peculiar form of its manifestation, or the energy of its tone, have furnished arms to malevolence.

But the more the general has felt himself called upon scrupulously to adhere to that line of conduct which becomes the armed force of a free people,—and because free, obedient to the

laws,—the more does he feel himself personally obliged, in his capacity of citizen, to give utterance to sentiments that are common to his troops and him.

It is with the design of fulfilling this duty to his country, his brave companions in arms, and himself, that after having taken, according to his agreement with Marshal Luckner, measures to secure the army from any hostile attempt, he intends, in a flying visit, personally to address the king and the assembly, in language worthy of a Frenchman, and at the same time to request that the various wants of the troops should be provided for.

The general enjoins the maintenance of the strictest discipline, and hopes, on his return, to receive none but the most satisfactory accounts. Major General d'Angest will assume the command.

The general repeats his intention, and desires to return immediately. General of the Army, LAFAYETTE.

III.*

ON THE LIFE AND MEMOIRS OF DUMOURIEZ.†

(A Paris, chez Badouin, 1822.)

"ON the 12th of July, 1792," says Dumouriez, "the Duke of Saxe-Teschen executed his design of invading the French territory, and encamped himself at Bavay.‡" There is somewhat more than inaccuracy in thus representing the enemy's encampment on an extreme frontier as an invasion of the French territory.

"On his arrival at Sedan, in the morning of August 28, 1792, he (M. Dumouriez) found the mischief far greater than it had been described to him. The army was divided into two corps; the vanguard, of six thousand picked troops, occupied, on the right bank of the Meuse, on the heights of Vau, a camp which required forty thousand men. The main body, composed of seventeen thousand men, was encamped three leagues in the rear on the heights commanding Sedan. This camp was useless."§

* See p. 327—331, and 383 of this vol.

† The notes by General Lafayette, which we here publish, have reference to a work written by Dumouriez himself.

‡ Life of Dumouriez, vol. ii., b. v., cap. iii., p. 354.

§ Ibid., cap. v., p. 382.

It surely would not have cost M. Dumouriez much to have acknowledged, what he could not be ignorant of, that this distribution of the troops was not that left by Lafayette on his departure; that, very far from scattering them, he had united to the main body the vanguard and reserve, previously separated from it; and that he had concentrated the whole in the camp of Vau, which, naturally a very good one, and, let M. Dumouriez say what he will, very capable of being defended by five-and-twenty thousand men, had been strengthened by works and batteries. Unexceptionable evidence of the care taken to make this position as respectable an one as possible, is to be found in a letter from Colonel Lafitte (died 1793 or 1794) to Bureaux de Pusy. These two officers were at this time the only two engineers attached to Lafayette's army, and divided between them the construction of the works required. It will be seen by the numerous precautions alluded to in Colonel Lafitte's letter, that, down to the 13th and 14th of August, nothing had been neglected that could contribute to the defence of Vau. "It is very certain, that had the Duke of Brunswick pushed forward only a corps of ten thousand men on Sedan, between the 22nd and 28th of August, this army must have dispersed itself among the fortified places, or have fled as far as Paris."* M. Dumouriez is doubtless not aware that the commandant of the Austrian post which arrested Lafayette immediately gave notice of this circumstance to General Clairfait; that the latter, in consequence, reconnoitred the position of the French army, and did not think it prudent to run the hazard of an attack.

"Lafayette had quitted his camp on the 21st of August, 1792, with nearly all his general officers, and with his staff; three major-generals, Ligneville, Dangest, and Dietmann, were all that remained. Besides the generals and staff, most of the colonels and lieutenant-colonels were gone.†—Lafayette set out on the 19th, not the 21st of August. At that time there were in his army two lieutenant-generals and nine major-generals. Of the two lieutenant-generals, one, Lastic, remained; the other, Leveneur, who had at first withdrawn into the interior, rejoined the army shortly afterwards. Three major-generals, as stated, remained; Lallemand left France for Switzerland, after being wounded, in a duel at Luxemburg, by an emigrant who had insulted the national cockade. Durour, informed of the road taken by Lafayette, came and joined him at Rochefort. Alexander

* Life of Dumouriez, vol. ii., b. v., cap. v., p. 382.
† Ibid., p. 378.

Lameth did not belong to this part of the army. Employed at the camp of Maubeuge, under La Noue, he thought it necessary, after the 10th of August, to remove from that city, where he had perceived some violent symptoms of revolt that made him apprehensive for his personal safety. He reached Lafayette on the 13th or 14th, who placed him at Mezières; on the night of the 18th or 19th of August, he was compelled to secrete himself from the pursuit of two gendarmes, and joined Lafayette unexpectedly at Bouillon. Thus, the general had confided to none of these three general officers his intention of withdrawing; his association with two of them was purely casual, and the only ones in his secret were Latour Maubourg and Laumoy. He had with him but two officers attached to the staff; and one of these was Major-general Laumoy, already mentioned; all his other companions were his aides or officers, who, personally attached to him by a conformity of feelings, must have been sacrificed, if they had not followed him. It is impossible for us to state the number of superior officers who left the army after the 10th of August; but one thing is very certain, that Lafayette did not take with him, besides the three general officers just mentioned, more than three superior officers in actual command. Sicard, colonel of the 43rd regiment of infantry,—it was he who had been charged with the arrest of the three commissioners; his two lieutenant-colonels remained; Victor Latour Maubourg, colonel of the 3rd regiment of mounted chasseurs, and Cardigan, lieutenant-colonel of the 12th regiment of dragoons. All the other superior officers of these two regiments remained.

M. Dumouriez says of a *Military Memoir* which he composed for the jacobins, "that this treatise produced the only effect he desired from it, that of overturning the idea of election by the soldiers. The military committee of the assembly adopted its principles; but, in order to do something new, it framed a form of oath so ridiculous as to produce a schism among the officers, to be the cause of several quitting their posts, and of rendering those that remained very bad servants of the constitution."* The military committee of the assembly was unanimous in its opinion that the officers ought not to be disbanded, much less that others should be chosen by the soldiers to succeed them. Several members of this committee, Emery, Crillon, Rostaing, Bureaux de Pusy, Bouthillier, Thiboutot, knew nothing of this Memoir of Dumouriez'; others, as Noailles, Lameth, Menou, Beauharnais, Broglie, had no need of the jacobins to induce them

* Life of Dumouriez, vol. ii., b. iii., cap. v., pp. 105 and 106.

to reject anarchical measures: it is not likely, therefore, that this Memoir did much towards deciding the opinion of the committee. As to the form of oath, imagined in order *to do something new*, it was supported in the military committee by only one member, not a military man; but Chabroud contrived to get it passed in the grand committee composed of the five committees consolidated. It was bad, but occasioned no schism, for it was never sent to the troops. In fact, this form, adopted a few days before the king's departure, being rendered useless by that event, a new oath was required from the army.

"Lafayette had the imprudent vanity to cause the red-riband to be given to him."* What the object of this assertion was, we know not; but, in contradiction to it, it would be easy to invoke the testimony of more than a million of Frenchmen.

When war had been declared, in spite of Dumouriez' promises to do nothing that should accelerate a rupture, and to wait until the troops were ready, it was agreed to assemble fifty thousand men under Lafayette's command; the latter desired that they should be assembled at Givet; Dumouriez, as a sort of compromise on this proposition, said that Lafayette should have an army of thirty thousand men at Givet, be joined by twenty thousand men of Rochambeau's army, detached under the command of Biron. Lafayette had an intention of attacking the rear of the Low Countries. "The plan was a good one," said Dumouriez, "and he thought it very possible Lafayette might succeed."† He flattered Lafayette with hopes that this plan should be carried into effect, "and did so without deceiving him."‡ Lafayette dissembled his resentment;§ what the cause of it could be was, it seems, beyond all surmise; but it was at least clear that Lafayette "acted with good faith up to the moment of the failure of the plan;"‖ that is to say, that all the broken promises, and all the ill turns he experienced, did not prevent him from contributing everything in his power to conform to the alterations which the minister, without any previous intimation, was constantly introducing with settled plans, and that he did not speak out until he saw the public interests were being compromised.

Lafayette is accused, by Dumouriez, of having wished to supplant Rochambeau in the command of the expedition to the Low Countries.¶ The fact is, that under Narbonne's ministry,

* Life of Dumouriez, vol. ii., b. iv., cap. i., p. 202.
† Ibid., vol. ii., b. iv. cap. iii., p. 226. ‡ Ibid., p. 227.
§ Ibid., p. 228. ‖ Ibid., p. 228. ¶ Ibid., p. 231.

Rochambeau had himself declared that this expedition should be entrusted to Lafayette. As to Luckner, perfectly satisfied at that time with his command in Alsace, and absorbed in making arrangements with Dietrich for the invasion of Mayence, subsequently executed by Custine, it would hardly occur to him to complain of not commanding the expedition to the Low Countries.

M. Dumouriez could never have seriously calculated on Lafayette's taking the chateau of Namur, for he had written to him to insult it in passing, and then to move upon Liege. It is true that, in another place, he says that the chateau of Namur is a weak place, and that, should it think of holding out, it must be *bombarded.* There was but one objection to this; that Lafayette had received a special order to march with as little encumbrance as possible, and take no other artillery than his field-pieces. To be sure, M. Dumouriez had also promised him that one-half the garrison was ready to desert; and there was in the correspondence between the general and the minister, a letter from the latter, of which the sole purpose was to recommend him to make his band play the air of "Voyage qui voudra," &c. This was to be the signal at which the regiment of Wersey was to blow up the walls of the city.

Biron's check was so much the less a motive for pushing on the attack upon Namur, that no sooner were ministers informed of the defeat at Mons than they sent off an express to Lafayette forbidding him to advance further;* and in a subsequent letter, they rejoice that their first express had found him still at Givet; they desired him to leave his troops in *statu quo,* which explains why the remainder of his men were left in cantonments in the bishoprics, on the very frontier where it was always expected the enemy would attempt their invasion.

M. Dumouriez says, that Biron was *a military man of no great merit.* Why, then, immediately after this expedition, did he write and say it was his wish to procure for him the command of Lafayette's army? This fact escaped through Biron's indiscretion, to whom General Berthier, a friend of Lafayette's, presented in person the letter in which Dumouriez announced this intention.

"The circumstances under which M. Dumouriez opened his campaign in the Low Countries"† were precisely those Lafayette would have desired to secure; but at that time M. Dumouriez threw every obstacle in the way.

* See, in the Correspondence of this vol., a letter from M. de Grave, p. 417.

† Life of Dumouriez, vol. ii. p. 239.

It was at the express desire of Rochambeau that Lafayette had sent a small corps towards Philippeville, which, being attacked by three times its number, retreated in good order under the cannon of the fortress, with a loss of sixty men.* Lafayette moved upon Maubeuge, because in the conference at Valenciennes between Luckner, Rochambeau, and himself, it was agreed that the first, who was already in command of the army of the north, should attack Flanders. Thus, we see how ridiculous it is to represent Lafayette's march on Maubeuge as one of the motives for giving the command of the army of the north to Luckner. Lafayette never gave Dumouriez the opportunity of refusing him this command, as he never applied for it.

It was to facilitate Luckner's expedition that Lafayette had complied with his request, by proceeding to occupy the camp at Maubeuge; very far from having contributed to the marshal's retreat, he was surprised and grieved at it. Lafayette did not interfere with Luckner's operations; the only relations of such a nature with him were confined to the arrangement made at Valenciennes respecting the attack on Austrian Flanders, and, after the abandonment of that expedition, to the proposal of a combined attack on Mons, which he declined.

Luckner could not have accused the ministry of rashness † in the plan of attack on maritime Flanders, for it was not the ministry, but Rochambeau, who proposed it at Valenciennes; Luckner approved, and undertook to execute it, while Lafayette, at Maubeuge, was to keep the imperialists in check under the walls of Mons.

At the very moment when every one should have remained at his post, in order to defend that part of the frontier he had reconnoitred with troops equally familiar with the country, the minister of war and the two generals concerted a movement the most extraordinary and dangerous possible; that of transferring the army of Luckner to Metz, and the army of Lafayette to Valenciennes. This movement had the effect of leaving the two frontiers uncovered for two days, of exhausting both armies by a march of eighty leagues, and, what was still more singular, of uniting the two generals and all their troops for two days near La Capelle, at forty leagues from Paris.‡ The minister had, indeed, given Lafayette the department of the north, and that of the centre to Luckner, at the latter's request, who, as Dumouriez says, "was very well content to return to Metz." But at the

* Life of Dumouriez, vol. ii., pp. 239, 240. † Ibid., pp. 328, 330.
‡ Ibid., vol. ii., b. v., cap. iii., p. 347.

time of this arrangement, the armies were not, the one at Metz, the other at Valenciennes; they were both on the frontiers of Flanders; so that this exchange of command was merely nominal, and not that shuttle-cock movement, that truck of positions, which Dumouriez would make of it. Luckner's army was encamped before Valenciennes, Lafayette's before Maubeuge, a smart march distance (eight post leagues) from each other. They both of them marched on their right, and almost parallel to each other, to post themselves, the one under the walls of Metz, the other towards Montmédy; and thus to protect the two frontiers exposed without any means of defence against the invasion of the Prussians, but, at the same time, without uncovering that of Flanders, where, as we shall presently see, a sufficient force had been left. The only movement in a direction inverse to that of the two armies was that of eight battalions, almost all newly levied, that Lafayette sent under Chazot from the camp of Sedan to that of Valenciennes; but these eight battalions only passed from one point of Lafayette's command to another.

The two armies did not perform a march of eighty leagues. Luckner's passed over about this distance; but Lafayette's only marched thirty-five leagues in going from Maubeuge to Montmédy.

The two armies were not united for two days at La Capelle, for this simple reason, that the two armies did not take the same route. That of Lafayette marched by Avesnes, La Capelle, Maubert Fontaine, Mézières, and Sedan; that of Luckner, by a road more in the interior, by Landrecies, Vervins, Rhétel, and Verdun. These two roads nowhere cross each other, and, at their nearest points, towards La Capelle, are forty leagues from each other.

"Young d'Abancourt, minister of war, was entirely devoted to Lafayette's faction."* Lafayette had no acquaintance with *young d'Abancourt*,—had, in all probability, never exchanged a word with him,—and had never written a line to him but when he was minister. Though M. d'Abancourt was well disposed, the fear of being denounced rendered him, to a certain point, submissive to the influence of the jacobins. Whatever reason Lafayette may have had to complain of him, not a line that was not official ever passed between them.

Is it not strange that Dumouriez, in order to prove that the march of the French troops from Flanders into Lorraine was

* Life of Dumouriez, vol. ii., b. v., cap. iii., p. 351.

a movement extremely imprudent and ill-timed, *very extraordinary and very dangerous*, should take great pains to usher in this assertion by a statement the best calculated to justify the arrangement he censures? "The Prussians," he says, "had assembled in the territory of Luxemburg and the electorate of Trèves. A part of the imperial army was marching up from the Low Countries, under General Clairfait, in order to effect a junction with them. The emigrants were flocking thither in crowds in the train of the king's brothers."* And M. Dumouriez finds it *extraordinary and ill-timed* that the French should have moved their forces on the frontier menaced by these great preparations! Will he assert that this movement, which he styles as imprudent as dangerous, left the frontier of Flanders naked?

But, by his own confession, there were "fifteen battalions and five squadrons" at the camp of Maulde,† which cannot be estimated at less than ten thousand men; the camps of Maubeuge and Dunkirk, which had not been curtailed of a single man, amounted, one with the other, to twelve thousand men.‡ Can it be said that a frontier is left unprotected when defended by about twenty thousand men, backed by two or three lines of fortresses, and having not more than thirty thousand men opposed to them? for M. Dumouriez has himself testified to the latter fact. "The Duke of Saxe Teschen assembled an army at Mons of about twenty thousand men; and the camp of Tournay held ten or twelve thousand more."§

M. Dumouriez seems, therefore, to have declared that the imperialists would invade the department of the north, merely for the purpose of confuting his assertion by his own reasoning and by the fact; for I have already observed upon the absurdity of construing into an invasion of the French territory a few days' occupation of a camp near Bavay by the Duke of Saxe Teschen.

His refusal to obey was, because his departure "would have left Flanders unprotected, at the very moment of the enemy's penetrating into it."‖ We have just proved that Flanders could not be unprotected, while, with only thirty thousand men threatening it, it had for its defence about twenty-two thousand, assisted by all the fortresses on the frontiers. But this state of things was that which existed on the 12th of July, at the time of Luckner's departure. "After that time, Chazot reached Valenciennes on the 20th, with eight battalions of Lafayette's army. . . . On

* Life of Dumouriez, vol. ii., b. v., cap. iii., p. 347.
† Ibid., p. 353. ‡ Ibid., p. 353. § Ibid., p. 351.
‖ See note at p. 437 of this volume.

the 22nd Dillon arrived . . . . followed by four or five battalions he had collected in his march. Dumouriez had, on his side, given orders for getting together as many battalions from the garrisons of Picardy and D'Artois."* Omitting the latter, which were not yet mustered, there would still be an increase of thirteen battalions, making from seven to eight thousand men, which, added to the twenty-two thousand that M. Dumouriez previously had, would form a force of from twenty-nine to thirty thousand men. Deducting four thousand men from Luckner's rear-guard, the army of Flanders would still amount to twenty-five or twenty-six thousand men. Is M. Dumouriez really in earnest, then, when he asserts that twenty-six thousand men, supported by all the fortresses that bristled along their frontier, were not in a condition to oppose the entrance of an army not possessed of the same advantages, and only exceeding the French army by a numerical superiority of four thousand men? Is he in earnest when he asserts that his disobedience, not implied, but positive, has saved everything? How! you are bold enough to assert, "that the whole force which France had for the protection of that frontier the nearest to Paris amounted, in the department of the north, to forty-five battalions and twenty squadrons, divided into three camps; that the Duke of Saxe Teschen, after detaching General Clairfait, had scarcely any more troops on the frontier, and was not in a condition to undertake anything of importance; and that, therefore, on this point, the weakness was about equal." What! with such means you not only supposed that you were not too weak to defend yourself, but that you were even strong enough to act on the offensive, and *to propose to Dillon to march together against the Duke of Saxe Teschen.*† And is it possible you could seriously have feared, that by abridging your force of six battalions and five squadrons, the frontier nearest to Paris would have been thrown open, and the department of the north sacrificed? Your perpetual contradictions will furnish us with more light. A little later, after the taking of Longwy, you drew from Flanders all the troops of the camp of Pont-sur-Sambre,‡ eight battalions and five squadrons; four battalions and five squadrons from the camp at Maubeuge;§ twelve battalions and three squadrons from the camp at Maulde, with French, Belgian, and Liege light infantry, amounting to eight or nine thousand men;‖ forming, in the whole, more than twenty-four battalions and eleven squadrons.

* Life of Dumouriez, vol. ii., b. v., cap. iii., p. 354.
† Ibid., vol. ii., b. v., cap. iii., p. 354.
‡ Ibid., cap. iv., p. 362.
§ Ibid., vol. ii., b. v., cap. vi., p. 393.
‖ Ibid., p. 396.

Let us pause a little on these facts, and see what it was compelled you to weaken, to the amount of nearly eighteen thousand men, the body of troops left for the defence of the frontier of Flanders. "It was," you say, "that there were not more than forty thousand men there, whether of Lafayette's or Luckner's army, to oppose to more than eighty thousand veteran troops, led on by a powerful monarch and renowned commanders; that you had not more than from four to five thousand cavalry to oppose to a cavalry four times as numerous, and of distinguished reputation; that you could expect no prompt succour, by reason of the remoteness of the army of the north; that all you could depend on receiving from Paris was, battalions, levied in haste, without officers, without discipline, ill-equipped, and not even knowing how to fire a musket; and in matter of cavalry, nothing better than national gensdarmes—that is, mounted police, incapable of forming and manœuvring in squadron; or light cavalry, newly levied, which you could not oppose to the Prussian and Austrian cavalry."* These reasons are good; but do they make exclusively for you? Were they not as valid in the month of August as in July? When, at the former date, Lafayette and Luckner marched to cover the frontiers of Champagne and Lorraine, was it not in face "of these eighty thousand veteran troops, of this powerful monarch, these renowned commanders, this distinguished cavalry, four times as numerous as their own?" In July, were not the armies of Lafayette and Luckner as feeble, those of the Prussians and imperialists as strong, as you had found them, in the month of August, on the frontiers of the departments of the Moselle and the Ardennes? That of the Duke of Saxe Teschen, was it not the same? By curtailing, in the month of August, the means of defence appropriated to Flanders, to the extent of about eighteen thousand men, your only fear was, lest "the superb plain between Lille, Douai, Saint Amand, and Orchies, should be uncovered, (that is to say, an extent of more than fifty square leagues, forming a fifth or sixth of the department of the north;) but the perils of France were then too pressing to permit so slight a consideration as the devastation of the plains of Flanders to detain us; all we could trouble ourselves about was, to secure their fortified places; and even, as respects the latter, there was not much room for apprehension, as the Duke of Saxe Teschen was not in sufficient force to undertake sieges."† And yet you have styled *imprudent, ill-timed, extraordinary, dangerous*, a movement, which, according to your own shewing, was as reasonable

* Life of Dumouriez, vol. ii., b. v., cap. vi., p. 386.
† Ibid., vol. iii., b. v., cap. xiii.

as necessary, which you yourself executed under circumstances that quadrupled the chances of devastation to Flanders, inasmuch as you deprived it of an amount of defence four times greater than Luckner would have done; and yet the event proved, and you yourself maintain, that the danger was extremely small! It is easy to shew the source of so many contradictions.

You desired the revolution of the 10th of August, since designated by you a crime, a frightful catastrophe. In the month of July you had induced the jacobin club of Lille to send an address to the national assembly, urging the king's deposition; in a letter to Paché, you afterwards boasted of the support you had given to the 10th of August. But when Lafayette and Luckner directed the defence of the country, the revolution of the 10th of August was not yet accomplished, and it was only consummated when you were at hand in the departments of the Ardennes and the Moselle. Until this denouement, your party was without a corps at its disposal, or a commander in its confidence. Therefore was it why M. Dumouriez found as much favour for his disobedience as it deserved rebuke. Hence, the sortie of the girondist and jacobin newspapers against the march of the troops from the frontiers of Flanders to that between the Meuse and the Moselle, a march it was necessary the public should not judge absurd, in order to justify the obedience of Dumouriez. It was deemed far better to compromise the safety of the state, by preserving to the grasp of a factious general the troops essential to the defence of another frontier, than to place them at the disposal of constitutional and patriotic officers. In the month of July, M. Dumouriez was a subordinate, and in order to be a general-in-chief, it was necessary he should bring into discredit one of the two who held that rank, consequently, that he should censure their measures, while he thwarted their operations. In this way was prepared, in the event of a reverse, the compound satisfaction of having caused them to fail, and of having predicted their failure. But in the month of August, M. Dumouriéz, no longer hampered by the man who gave him the most umbrage, and now become general-in-chief, could hit upon no better expedient of recommending himself than by conforming exactly to that line of conduct he had so much censured while it was an obstacle to his own personal ambition.

M. Dumouriez, relates further on, his negotiations of the 27th of March, 1793, through the agency of a colonel of the enemy's, M. Mack, "for the purpose of connecting the operations between the two parts of the imperial armies under the Prince of Cobourg and the Prince of Hohenloe, while he, Dumouriez, was to march

on Paris, and the fortress of Condé was to be delivered up to the Austrians as a security; all other fortresses, if requiring the aid of the imperialists, to receive garrisons, one-half under the command of the French."*

This treaty was the more easy to break or to elude, for, being verbal, it had no other warranty than the good faith and disinterestedness of the coalition of which M. Dumouriez has expressed himself elsewhere in these terms:—"He was aware that by different treaties the powers had provided for their indemnities, that is, for the partition of France . . . . . even had he been in ignorance of it, the fate of Poland would have been sufficient to enlighten him. The presence of Frenchmen in the pay of foreigners, marching in obedience to the manifesto of a Prussian general, and without even the right of throwing garrisons into the fortresses of Longwy and Verdun, was an additional proof that the coalition was working on its own account."†

(Continuation of Notes on Dumouriez.)

ANSWERS OF GENERAL DE WITCH TO SOME QUESTIONS OF GENERAL LAFAYETTE.‡

Q. Did the defensive posts, occupied by General Lafayette, continue to be so during the ensuing years?

It is evident that Lafayette's intention was to block up the pass of Carignan, and to take his post at the extreme right of his command, which ended at Montmédy; that in case Luckner's frontier was attacked on the side of Longwy, as he presumed would be the case, his army should be placed on the right flank of the enemy's march, and within reach of supporting his colleague.

* Memoirs of Dumouriez, vol. iv., b. viii., cap. ix.

† Letters from General Dumouriez to the translator of his Life, pp. 18, 19.

‡ Here are found the answers of General de Witch to some questions relative to the military operations of 1792. This officer, who retired some time after the 9th Thermidor, to Denmark, his own country, is one of the most honourable and best general officers France possessed during this war. He commanded a battalion of grenadiers in Lafayette's army, and served as colonel in the vanguard of Dumouriez, who raised him to the grade of major-general. What General de Witch has here reported, he publicly said to Dumouriez, at the house of the Prince de Hesse.—(Note by General Lafayette.)

It appears that if, after the taking of Mayence, which had been agreed upon long beforehand, Custine's corps had fallen back on Treves and Longwy; if the commissioners of the national assembly, and Dumouriez, had not detained in Flanders the troops whom Lafayette had ordered to reinforce him; and if the jacobins had not stopped the national requisitions made by Luckner and Lafayette, the former would have had sufficient force to occupy the position of Dumouriez in Champagne, and Lafayette might, at the same time, have had a corps on the right flank and in the rear of the enemy.

A. After the retreat of the Prussians, the some posts were retaken, and during the offensive war of the Austrians, in 93 and 94, those posts were occupied and defended by the second division of the army of Ardennes, until the retreat of the Austrian army rendered those positions useless.

General de Witch commanded a portion of them in 93 and 94.

The pass of Carignan could not be better defended than by the camp at Vau, which Lafayette had established there, and which also defended the passage of the Chiers, in almost the only place in which this river is fordable.

We can decide nothing as to the movements that Luckner's army might have made, not having been within reach of knowing the force or position of this army.

The circumstances in which Dumouriez was placed, undoubtedly obliged him to assemble all the troops he could; and he conducted himself with bravery, by retaining his position, although turned by the king of Prussia; but there are some points on which details would be desirable:

Q. What are the dates of the various movements that occurred before the retreat?*

Is it true that, when the allies repassed on the right of Dumouriez, presenting him the flank of an army in great disorder, and whose artillery, cavalry, and baggage, were in want of horses, Dumouriez, refraining from attacking them, made Kellermann, then on his left, advance to bear against them? and that Kellermann having arrived too soon, he then decided on sending him away to bring forward the troops on the right, who would have had time to do something, if Dumouriez had not stopped them?

A. We cannot reply to the first question in a positive manner; but the dates and movements may be found in Dumouriez' memoirs, and this is the most correct portion of the work.

* The retreat that followed the battle of Valmy, the 20th of Sept. 1792.

General de Witch has lost the journal he kept o this campaign ; he can only, therefore, give particulars from memory.

It appears evident that the intention of Dumouriez was not to close with the Prussians on their retreat; for he made the army of Kellermann advance, which was situated at the greatest distance, and caused it to retreat as soon as it was within reach of attacking the enemy.

If the intention had been to take advantage of the bad position of the Prussians, the troops of the army of the north, and of the centre, would have been employed in preference, to follow the enemy upon Vouziers and Grand-Pré, and not those of Kellermann, which were of course intended to retake Verdun and Longwy.

It appears evident to us, that the intention was to give the Prussians time to retire, for the army was left several days in a state of inaction; and when a portion of the troops of the northern and centre army were ordered to march forward, the Prussians had such an advance upon it, that it was impossible to overtake them.

Q. On what day, and in what place, did Kellermann tell General de Witch that he understood nothing in all this mystery?

A. It was at the camp of Hans, the day after the Prussians had quitted it. That camp was occupied on the same day by the corps of General Dubouquet, in which de Witch was serving; it was there that the latter accosted Kellermann and Valence, who, at the head of the carabiniers, passed through the camp in pursuit of the Prussians.

Two days afterwards, General Dubouquet's corps received orders to march upon Vouziers, where we were much astonished at meeting Kellermann and Valence, who were returning from their pursuit of the Prussians.

Q. On what day, and in what village, did the colonel of hussars, commander of the French vanguard, tell the commander of the enemy's rear that he advised his setting out in an hour, because he could not restrain the hussars?

A. It was the day after the Prussians began to retreat. We have forgotten the name of the village; but the colonel of hussars was called Barbier, and he was then colonel of the regiment, formerly colonel-general of hussars.

Q. Was there not still time enough to pursue the Prussian army, when Dumouriez brought forty thousand men with him towards Flanders?

A. There is no doubt but that, if Dumouriez had made the whole army advance in pursuit of the Prussians, when he gave

orders to "let them take the Flanders road," he would have captured a portion of the Prussian army, and have taken all their artillery and baggage, which they had much difficulty in carrying away, although no person molested their retreat. It is therefore evident, that in the arrangement, which was always kept secret, between the king of Prussia and Dumouriez, one of the points agreed was that the Prussians should not be molested on their retreat.

Q. If the hostile army had been in such a bad position as to allow the French to take the Low Countries in the rear, would it not have been advantageous to cut off the retreat of the Duke of Saxe Teschen?

A. To reply to this question, it would be necessary to know what movements the army of the Duke of Saxe Teschen could have made; my peculiar situation did not allow me to make any observation on this subject.

IV.*

ON A MEMORIAL OF M. DE LALLY TOLLENDAL, AND SOME OTHER PIECES RELATIVE TO THE PROJECT OF COMPIEGNE.†

PERSONS have endeavoured to take advantage, against Lafayette, of a memorial in his favour, attributed to M. de Lally Tollendal. We know, in fact, that amongst the testimonies of generous interest which Lafayette, when in misfortune, experienced from M. de Lally, in spite of the difference of their opinions, there was a letter of the latter to the king of Prussia.

One letter was published in France only, where it excited but little attention, because it was easy to trace in it the malevolence of the editors, of whom one belonged to the ancient Austrian embassy of M. Mercy d'Argenteau.

* See page 333 of this volume.

† The following observations were written by General Lafayette, from 1797 to 1800, on a pamphlet published in Paris, and entitled, "Memorial of Lally Tollendal to the king of Prussia, to demand the liberty of Lafayette, accompanied by a letter from Lally Tollendal to Louis XVI.; of a reply of Louis XVI.; of a plan concerted between the constitutional generals to withdraw the court to Compiègne; and of several interesting pieces connected with the history of the revolution." (51 pages in 8vo.)

That letter was printed in Paris, in 1795, from a manuscript, *which was,* they said, *delivered by a traveller to whom it had been confided.* To this strange guarantee for accuracy is added, that the object of the publication is to prevent republicans from compassionating the fate of the imprisoned Lafayette. The editor even acknowledges that the original, presented to the king of Prussia, differs from the copy he offers to the public.* These avowals might suffice to prevent our examining such a pamphlet, but the principal points it contains are true. Lafayette did support the constitutional throne; he wished to save Louis XVI., and to place him, at Compiègne, under the protection of his own troops. Facts such as these, presented with the oratorical skill, and ingenious embellishments, that suit a difficult cause, by an eloquent advocate, addressing himself to a member of the coalition of kings, assume a very different character from the entreaties of Lafayette, that his jailors might not be flattered by any alteration of his true principles, and of the conduct of his whole life.

We see, for example (page 13), that Lafayette, in concert with the *committee of constitution,* had wished that time should be taken to bring to perfection, in some secondary details, the decree of the 17th of June, 1790, for the abolition of titles, of the use of liveries, arms, &c.; and that the king's council hastily sanctioned it, fearing it might be meliorated; but Lally supposes that Lafayette supported the decree to render himself popular; and when, in 1792, the latter entreated the king to yield himself up, for the interest of the public and his own safety, to the constitutionalists, Lally recals that former idea of rendering armorial bearings and liveries free for the use of all citizens, as is the case in America, as if the deputies and Lafayette, who shared the same opinion, had wished to preserve or restore to the nobility some privileges.† It is not Lafayette who would have

* "The memorial had been first addressed to the king of Prussia; it was afterwards presented to his council. In that latter copy, we perceive alterations and erasures; but the original text has been restored in this edition, by the hand of M. de Lally-Tollendal. The manuscript was confided last year to a traveller in Switzerland, who placed it in our hands. We do not conceive it will lead republicans to compassionate the fate of a general who has proved himself so much opposed to republican principles." (Page 6, notice from the anonymous editor, at the head of the papers of which we have just given the title.)

† "He voted for the decree that destroyed nobility, but others had proposed it: the decree was on the point of being adopted; some motives of interest, whether rational or not,—the weak ambition, if you choose, of not being outdone in popularity, induced him to say a few words

encouraged such pretensions; he who, at Namur, at the moment when his fate was deciding, would not allow General Chasteler to suppose he yielded one item on that point, and who, after having received, in his prison of Magdeburg, a letter from a celebrated professor of Gottingen, in which the title of *marquis* was given him, declared in his answer against that title, "preferring," he said, "being accused of pedantry by his friends, to being suspected of shewing any weakness towards the governments that were to read his letter." Who knows not, besides, that in America, as in Europe, he constantly served the cause of equality, both from principle and taste?

At the end of that memorial, we find the minutes of a meeting held the 4th of August, 1792, by some friends of the king.* We perceive they depended on the zeal of Lafayette to save that unfortunate prince, and they were right in doing so. The editor quotes, doubtless as an accusation against Lafayette, this passage from one of his letters to his friend, Madame d'Hénin, written in captivity:—"If the king could have determined to quit Paris, as I, after having taken secure measures for bringing him to Compiègne, had proposed to him, he would have avoided great dangers, and great calamities." (p. 51 of the papers published in 1795.) That whole pamphlet is a mixture of truths and inaccuracies; but the following letter is in support of our observations. It was addressed by M. de Lally to M. d'Archenholtz, during the captivity of Lafayette at Olmütz:—

which served no purpose, and injured only himself. That same evening, he acknowledged how heartfelt such a decree would be. The next day he opposed its receiving the royal sanction; he would have prevented it, if the nobility had not declared themselves for it, as an additional proof of the injustice of their enemies." (Page 13,—Extract of a memorial to the king of Prussia, by M. de Lally. See also on the decree of the 17th of June, 1790, pages 393, 394 of the second volume of this work, and pages 450, 452, two letters addressed to the king.)

* "I had received an anonymous letter, in which a conversation at Santerre was denounced to me, announcing the intention of marching on the Tuileries, killing the king in the confusion, &c. We all determined that the king must leave Paris. We depended on M. de Liancourt, and also on M. de Lafayette. The last declaration of the king was, that he preferred exposing himself to all dangers, rather than to begin civil war. It was announced that the forfeiture of the crown was to be pronounced the following Thursday. I knew of no other resource, except the army of M. de Lafayette." (Extract of the minutes of a meeting held the 2nd of April, between MM. de Lally, Montmorin, Bertrand, de Clermont-Tonnerre, Malouet, de Gouvernet, and de Gilliers Page 49 of the said pamphlet.)

London, July 21, 1795.

"It is true, sir, that I had the honour of addressing to the king of Prussia, in 1793, a memorial, in which I demanded, for Madame de Lafayette, and for her children, the liberty of her husband and their father. I cannot conceive by what breach of trust that memorial, purely confidential, could become public. You write me word it is printed in Paris, and that extracts from it have been inserted in the German gazettes. But you do not send me those extracts. I cannot judge whether that publication be accurately rendered, entirely forged, or partially misrepresented; I can give no opinion on the subject. All that I confidently assert is, that if the memorial published under my name be against M. de Lafayette, that memorial is not mine.

"I may add, that my true memorial, as well as the pieces of justification I have subjoined to it, cannot be quoted by extracts, but must be read and judged of in its complete state. If that publication be not a forgery, this expression of mine to the virtuous Louis XIII., relating to M. de Lafayette, will be found in it:—"He is ready to sacrifice himself for liberty, as well as for the monarchy he no longer separates from it."* Consequently, when asking a king to deliver him, that I should have insisted more on his being a victim of *monarchy*, as, when asking the Americans to assist him, I should have insisted more on his being a victim to liberty, may easily be accounted for; both are indisputable truths; but I was to bring forward the one best suited to the persons to whom I applied.

"I may further add, sir, that although we both, poor Lafayette and I, wished for the liberty of our country, our public opinions were so widely differing, during the space of two years, that even when they drew nearer together we each retained a marked shade of distinction. It is, therefore, just to listen to M. de Lafayette himself rather than to a third person, whose mind may be prejudiced, even when his heart is devoted to a friend in misfortune. I have the honour of sending you an authentic letter, written by himself, the 25th August, 1792, to the unfortunate Duke de la Rochefoucauld,† whose opinions I also combated, but whose character I revered, and who was torn to pieces by the jacobins, as M. de Lafayette has been incarcerated by their enemies, for having wished to save France and Louis XVI. Woe unto him who can read this letter without pitying and respecting the person who wrote it!"

* This phrase is found, page 38 of the pieces published in 1795, in a letter of the 9th of July, addressed to Louis XVI., by M. de Lally.

† See this letter, p. 447 of this volume.

Oh! if M. de Lafayette's country knew what proofs of devotion he has given it, what sacrifices he has made to it in the interior of his dungeon!——but the time to reveal them has not yet arrived. LALLY TOLLENDAL.

With what address the advocate of M. de Lafayette takes advantage (p. 14,) of the absurd accusation of the jacobins upon the flight of Varennes, and the emotion into which he allowed himself to be surprised, when the arrest of the king destroyed the hopes to which he thought he could not in conscience yield, unless the king had made a civil war.* Lally says, (p. 16,) "That the Sunday after the return of the king to Paris, the principal chiefs of the national assembly met together in a committee, to deliberate whether the king should be tried, and the republic established," and that Lafayette pronounced only these words:—"If you kill the king, I warn you that, the next day, the national guard and I shall proclaim the prince royal." Lafayette could not have made such a declaration in opposition to the right the *constituent* assembly possessed of forming a republic; this would have been contrary to the doctrine he constantly professed, and to what he said the same day to the assembly, in a declaration inscribed in his process verbal; but he could say, "the king's assassins would gain nothing by their crime, for the national guard would constitutionally acknowledge the prince royal." It is certain that Lafayette refuted, with horror, the idea of the unfortunate Louis XVI. being tried: nor did one of his friends ever support this project.

Lafayette has not adopted any new principles: the determination to support the throne, *at whatever price it might be*,† cannot

* "The republicans now accuse M. de Lafayette of having closed his eyes on the departure of Louis XVI.,—of only having sent after him when it was no longer possible to overtake him; and all probabilities seem in their favour. But intimate friends of M. de Lafayette, in whose probity I trust as in my own, have assured me that, during the three days the state of uncertainty lasted, they often heard him calculate the hours the king had gained upon them, and flatter himself he would not be retaken. They were with him when he learnt that the king had been arrested at Varennes, and assured me he appeared as if thunderstruck by this intelligence."—(Pages 14 and 15 of the *Memorial to the King of Prussia.*)

† "I did not awaken in him the determination to support the throne at whatever price it might be; I found him thus disposed on my arrival in France, in March, 1792. But I never ceased exciting him, and plunging him into the boldest and most decisive measures in favour of the king and royalty." (Ibid., p. 21.)

have been seriously suspected by him who said, at that same period, to M. de Bertrand Molleville,* "that Lafayette only supported the throne for the interests of liberty, and because the national sovereignty had established it."

Lafayette was intimate with Lally before the revolution; they occasionally wrote to each other after the 6th of October, but not at the period mentioned in the memorial. They met in June, 1792, at a lady's house of their acquaintance, and this was the first time since October, 1789, that these two friends had an opportunity of embracing each other; but there are minds whose feelings are of a stamp to become more deeply impressed, and develop themselves more fully, on occasions that intimidate and alienate the generality of mankind. Lally had been harsh, and sometimes unjust, towards Lafayette; but Lafayette was no sooner unfortunate than he consecrated to him his time, his attention, his superior abilities, his admirable eloquence, and knew no other fear than that of overlooking some means of serving him.

Lally had the power of knowing, through their mutual friends, the projects of Lafayette for the safety of the king; he had even seen some notes, with which the general had charged an aide-de-camp,† to engage the king not to allow himself to be massacred at Paris. We have not been able to obtain those notes from which the letter of the 8th of July, attributed to Lafayette, appears to have been framed:—

Copy of the Letter published in 1795, with the Memorial of M. de Lally, and other Papers.‡

July 8th, 1792.

"I had disposed of my army in such a manner, that the best squadrons, the grenadiers, the horse artillery, were under the command of M. ——, at the fourth division; and if my proposal had been accepted, I should have conducted, in two days, to Compiègne, fifteen squadrons and eight pieces of cannon; the rest of the army was placed in *échelons*, at one march distance; and any regiment, not at first advancing, would have come to my assistance, if their comrades and I had been once engaged.

"I had gained over Luckner so completely, that he was

* See further on, page 493 of this volume.

† M. de la Colombe. See page 333 of this volume.

‡ We have not found it in the manuscripts of General Lafayette, and it forms in no way part of that portion to which we intercalate it. We limit ourselves, on account of the refutations or explanations of General Lafayette, to publish this letter as it was printed for the first time in 1795.

to march to the capital if the security of the king required it, and if he gave the order; and I could dispose entirely of five squadrons of that army, Languedoc, and . . . .; the command of the horse artillery is exclusively at my disposal, and I depended on these also marching to Compiègne.

"The king has bound himself to attend at the federal banquet. I regret that my plan has not been adopted; but we must make the most of the one selected.

"The measures I have taken, the adhesion of several departments and communes, that of M. Luckner,—my influence over my army, and even over the other troops,—my popularity in the kingdom, which has rather increased than diminished, though much restrained in the capital,—all these circumstances, joined to several others, have given some anxiety to the factious, and roused the attention of honest men; and I trust that the physical dangers of the 14th of July are much diminished. I even believe they no longer exist, if the king be accompanied by Luckner and me, and surrounded by the chosen battalions I have prepared for him.

"But if the king and his family remain in the capital, do they not continue in the power of factious persons? We shall lose the first battle; of this there can be no doubt. The counter-blow will be felt in the capital. Nay, I further assert that the mere supposition of a correspondence between the queen and the enemy would suffice to occasion the greatest excesses. The least act of violence would be carrying off the king to the south; and this idea, which at present excites such horror, would appear quite natural when leagued kings were drawing near us. I perceive, therefore, immediately after the 14th, the commencement of a series of dangers.

"I repeat again—the king must leave Paris. I know that, if he were not sincere, this step might be attended with inconveniences; but when the question is debating whether to trust or not to the king, a man of integrity, who can hesitate for an instant? I am most impatient to see the king at Compiègne.

"The present project I have in view relates to these two points:—1st. If the king should not yet have written for Luckner and me, he must do so immediately. Luckner is for us, and we must bind him still more strongly to us; he will say that we are together, and I will say the rest. Luckner may come to fetch me, so that we may both be in Paris on the evening of the 12th. The 13th and 14th may supply us with opportunities of acting on the offensive; the defensive at least will be secured by our

presence,—and who knows what effect mine may produce upon the national guard?

"We shall accompany the king to the altar of the country. The two generals, representing two armies that are known to be much attached to them, will prevent any attempts that might be made to infringe the dignity of the king. I, for my part, may find that some will resume their habit of obedience to my voice; the terror I always inspired in those who were disposed to be factious, and perhaps some natural power of taking advantage of a crisis, may render me useful, and enable me, at least, to avert danger. My request is more disinterested, because my situation will be unpleasant, when compared with what it was at the grand federation; but I consider it a sacred duty to be near the king under these circumstances, and my mind is so fully impressed with this idea, that I exact, in the most positive manner, that the minister of war should write for me, and that this first part of my proposal should be adopted. I request you to inform our mutual friends, the king, his family, and council, of this circumstance.

"2ndly. As to my second proposal, I conceive it equally necessary, and this is the manner in which I understand it:—the oath of the king, and our own, will pacify the minds of those who are only weak; and, consequently, rogues will be for some days deprived of their support. I wish that the king would write confidentially to M. Luckner and me, a letter addressed to us in common, which should find us on our road the evening of the 11th or morning of the 12th; in it the king would say, "that after taking our oath, the next thing was to prove to foreigners his sincerity; that the best means of doing so would be, for him to pass some days at Compiègne; that he charged us to supply some squadrons, and unite them to the national guard of the place, and a detachment from the capital; that we should accompany him to Compiègne, from whence we should each rejoin our army; that he wished us to select squadrons whose chiefs were known for their attachment to the constitution, and a general officer who should leave no doubt on that subject.

"On receiving this letter, Luckner and I should charge M —— with this expedition; he should take with him four pieces of horse artillery, or eight, if they please; but the king must not speak of it, because the odium of the guns must rest on us. The 15th, at 10 o'clock, a.m., the king will proceed to the assembly, accompanied by Luckner and me; and whether we had a battalion, or fifty men on horseback devoted to the king, or of my

own friends, we shall see if the king, the royal family, Luckner, and I, shall be stopped.

"And granted that we were so. Luckner and I should return to the assembly to complain, and threaten it with our armies. The king, on his return, would not be in a worse predicament, for he would not have departed from the constitution; he would have no men opposed to him but the enemies of the constitution; and Luckner and I should easily bring detachments with us from Compiègne. Observe that this would not compromise the king as effectually as he will be necessarily compromised by the events now preparing.

"From aristocratical folly, the funds of which the king can dispose have been so completely wasted that there is no doubt but that very little can remain; and some must be borrowed, if necessary, to turn to good account the days of the federation.

"There is one other chance to guard against; which is that of the assembly issuing a decree to prevent generals coming into the capital. It will suffice for the king to refuse immediately his sanction.

"If, by an inconceivable fatality, the king should already have given his sanction, let him only give us a rendezvous at Compiègne, even if he be arrested on setting out. We will open a road for him to come there *free and triumphant*. It is needless to observe, that in any case, once arrived at Compiègne, he will establish his own private guard on the footing granted by the constitution.

"In truth, when I find myself surrounded by the inhabitants of the country, who come ten leagues, and even more, to see me, and swear that they place no confidence but in me, and that my friends and enemies are theirs also; when I find myself cherished by my army, on which the efforts of the jacobins prove of no avail; when I receive from all parts of the kingdom testimonies of adhesion to my opinions; I cannot believe that everything is lost, and that I have no power of being useful."

Although we find in this letter intentions thoroughly constitutional, it has been altered. If those words, *free and triumphant*, were ever written, they have been put in italics to pervert their meaning. What is certain is, that the skilful advocate made use of the more or less imperfect knowledge he possessed of facts to aid the cause he was pleading to the King of Prussia; and if surprise should be excited at his proclaiming himself the tutor of the convicted Lafayette, we must observe, that M. de Lally, having no pretext for applying to the court of Berlin in favour of a man who was neither his relation nor of the same party as him-

self, was obliged to seek some apparent motive for the step he was taking, and preferred that of a duty imposed by his own conscience towards a general whom he had ruined by influencing his conduct.*

We also see in that letter of the 8th of July, a phrase respecting Luckner which appears to indicate that that general—not during the visit of Pusy, in the latter days of June, for there was then undoubtedly no question on the subject, but in the month of July—had told Lafayette, that if the constitution were violated in the king's person, and if he received an order from the constituted authorities, he would march to support law.

In the letter of Lally to Louis XVI., the 9th of July, it is said, that the king's friends reckoned on Lafayette only for "the liberty of that prince and the destruction of the factious;" and that they repeated, with their usual and often-deceived confidence—"What must follow, will follow."† Thus, that the members of the Austrian committee, the same men who formerly said to their jacobin friends—"Do not fear pushing on Lafayette as far as possible; we shall never disgust him with liberty;" only then wrote to the court, as may be seen in a letter of Duport, published at that time, "that they might make use of the resolution of Lafayette to maintain the constitution." And he himself, in the midst of these contending parties, followed implicitly his principles of liberty and legal order.

While pointing out the involuntary or benevolent errors of the papers we have just examined, we feel the deep respect the talents and virtues of M. de Lally merit, and we should prefer giving up this examination, or leaving it imperfect, to allowing one word to escape us towards him which was not expressive of our feelings of affection, gratitude, and admiration.

* "If I could resist every other motive, there is one against which I could not stand; this is, that I sacrificed M. de Lafayette to Louis XVI. During the last four months I wrote incessantly to him, and the king knew it. His proclamations to his army, his famous letter to the legislative body, his unforeseen arrival at the bar after the horrible 20th of June; not one of these acts was unknown to me—not one was done without my participation."—(pp. 21 and 22 du Mémoire de M. Lally au Roi de Prusse.)

† "M. de Lafayette believes his project can be modified in twenty different manners. He prefers a retreat in the north to one in the south, as placing him more within reach of assisting that side, and from dreading the southern faction. In a word, *the king's liberty and the destruction of the factious*, those are his aims, in the full sincerity of his heart. *What must follow, will follow.*" (Page 39 of the papers published in 1795.)

(Continuation of Notes on the project of Compiègne.)

ON SOME ASSERTIONS OF M. DE BERTRAND MOLLEVILLE.*

COMMON sense must be sufficient to prove that Lafayette, having wished to expel M. Bertrand from the ministry, and never having spoken to him in his life except on that awkward occasion, could not have placed him in his confidence. The truth is, that he neither spoke nor wrote on the project of Compiègne to M. Bertrand, nor even to M. de Lally, whom he met in the month of June, in Paris, from whence he had believed him absent. Lafayette had given some notes to an aide-de-camp, as instructions, and that the king might receive the ideas of his general on this subject.

That aide-de-camp entrusted the notes to a person who persuaded him to address himself to M. de Lally, because he knew that Lafayette had more esteem and affection for this friend than for any other man whose opinion could influence the king. M. de Lally expresses, in his conversation with M. Bertrand,† his noble and benevolent intentions. In spite of his ardent wishes that the general should support the king, he acknowledges that "the principle of the sovereignty of the people, and the national will, are the sole ties by which Lafayette can assist in the maintenance of royalty; and it is easy to perceive that the idea afterwards expressed by M. Bertrand, of going, perhaps constitutionally, further on than Compiègne," is either a mistake or mis-statement of his own.‡

Lafayette not only had no direct communication on this subject with M. Bertrand, nor even with M. Lally, but he was

* We have detached these reflections of General Lafayette's from some notes that will appear on the fourth volume, on the *Mémoires particuliers de A. F. de Bertrand-Molleville, ministre et secrétaire-d'état sous le règne de Louis XVI.*" (Two volumes in 8vo, à Paris, chez Michaud, 1816.)

† This conversation, according to M. Bertrand, took place the 2nd of June, at M. de Montmorin's. The plan of Compiègne, which was not yet formed, was not spoken of, but only the confidence M. de Lally felt in the *constitutional* opinions of General Lafayette. (Page 83, chap. xxiv. *des Memoires de M. Bertrand.*)

‡ The 9th of the following July, I met M. de Lally at M. de Montmorin's. He came towards me, and said, in a triumphant manner, "*Read these papers,*" &c. It was a letter from M. de Lafayette, containing a plan of which the means of execution were already prepared, and of which the object was to place the king in safety, either at Compiègne, or somewhere in the north of France, where his liberty would be secure against every attack, and all this was to be done *constitutionally.*" (Page 87, chap. xxiv., *des Memoires de M. Bertrand.*)

ignorant that either of them knew anything of the matter. It is also evident that M. Bertrand only regretted that Lafayette would not be, as he said himself, *another Monk*, instead of labouring solely to preserve the constitution and the lives of the king and his family. The court of the Tuileries, and its royalist and aristocratical counsellors, were very right in saying, according to his own expression, "that the proposals of Lafayette were not calculated to fulfil any object of the kind:" for those gentlemen considered but as "poor calculations" those that did not extend beyond the constitutional circle. But these Memoirs of M. Bertrand contain one valuable confession, which is, "that if the king and his family had not felt so repugnant to owe their lives to the general, who was defending, at the same time, the cause of liberty, he would have saved them."* We must observe that it was the intimate confident of Louis XVI. who made this confession.

We shall add, that the whole part of the plan of Lally, formed in concert with MM. de Clermont Tonnerre and Lalouet, was completely unknown to Lafayette. The latter never had the slightest relation with that coalition: the idea of Compiègne only occurred to him after the month of June, when he had exhausted all his efforts in Paris to secure the maintenance of legal order, the freedom of the constituted authorities, and the safety of the king and his family.

(Continuation of Notes on the project of Compiègne.)

ON THE PUBLICATION OF M. DE LALLY TOLLENDAL'S LETTER OF THE 9TH OF JULY, AND ON THE LETTER (JULY 6TH) ATTRIBUTED TO GENERAL LAFAYETTE, IN VOLUME II. OF THE HISTORY OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION, BY M. THIERS.†

[*Vol. ii., p. 369, of "L'Histoire de la Revolution Francaise, par M. Thiers.*]

.....We have now reached M. de Lally's Memoir, in which his imagination, his sensibility, the strong desire of per-

* "The effort M. de Lafayette made would probably have had a very different result, if, before his arrival, his friends in Paris had occupied themselves with persuading the majority of the national guard, which was completely devoted to him, to support firmly the measure he intended taking," &c. (Page 85, chap. xxiv. *Memoires de M. Bertrand.*)

† In order to collect in this place all the documents in our possession

suading Louis XVI., and of interesting Frederic-William, have hurried him into the commission of errors incompatible with the declarations of the friend of whom he has constituted himself the interpreter. It is very true that, when he indicates the presumed consequences of the plan of a journey to Compiègne, it is he who speaks, who supposes, and not the general; but the tendency of M. Lally's letter to the king is to inspire him with cheerful notions respecting the austerity of Lafayette's principles, and more especially with regard to that apprehension instilled into him by Mirabeau and the courtiers, who were constantly muttering "that he would be a prisoner in the tent of the patriot-general." M. de Lally availed himself of some notes* furnished by Lafayette, and which seem to have been dictated as arguments to be put forward—when persons more acceptable to the unfortunate prince than the latter were trying to prevail upon him to permit them to save his life—but not as a letter to the king or his minister. The uses which had been made in 1789, of a note of M. de Lafayette's to M. de Saint Priest† was by no means encouraging. We observe, moreover, in the pretended letter of the 8th, attributed to Lafayette, certain expressions at variance with his style and manner, usually so respectful towards the representatives of the nation, the majority of whom were in his favour, as may be inferred from the decree of the 8th of August, 1792. Again, these notes themselves disavow most unequivocally the letter which serves as their introduction; for the tenour of these is the recommendation "not to deviate from the constitution, to have none opposed to us but the enemies of the constitution, to prove to foreigners the king's sincerity," which completely contradicts M. de Lally's assertions as to the alleged conversion of Lafayette. The latter might very possibly have confessed to his friend, while chatting together in the evening, that the assembly had committed faults, and other common-places of this kind, which General Lally might think he could turn to account. It was thus that M. Mounier, after a vague conversation, was

bearing on the Compiègne project, we have detached these notes, originally forming part of those written by General Lafayette on M. Thiers' works, and which will appear in the next volume.

* "Dare I say that *this note* appeared to me to have been deliberately framed by him alone, who, in a day for ever memorable, vanquished, by his heroic courage, a whole army of assassins?" &c. (Postscript to the letter of July 19, addressed to the king by M. de Lally Tollendal.)

† See page 319 of vol. ii. of this work. The allusion here is to a note written to M. de Saint Priest, shortly after the events of October, 1789.

thoroughly convinced that Jefferson justified the Anglomania of the day in its political opinions. In Lafayette's letter to the assembly, of the 16th of June, in the confidential letters written to his wife, and other persons, seized after the 10th of August, in the declaration of the proscribed constitutionalists at Rochefort, at the time of their arrest; in the manifestoes of principles put forth in opposition to M. de Chasteler; in fact, in all that was said and written before, during, and after his captivity, it is easy enough to see a perfect consistency in his feelings and opinions. We shall find, there, the uniform application of the following passage in a letter of his to M. Archenholtz, written from Magdeburg:—"I sacrificed my republican preferences to the circumstances and pleasure of the nation; I obeyed its sovereignty in the constitution it had conferred upon itself."

V.

(EXTRACTS FROM THE CHRONIQUE DE CINQUANTE JOURS DU 20 JUIN, 1792, AU 10 AOUT, PAR P L. RŒDERER, 1 VOL. IN-8e; IMPRIMERIE DE LACHEVARDIERE, 1832.)

(B. i., p. 9.)—"M. de Lafayette received on the 15th the intelligence of the dismissal of the three ministers in his camp at Maubeuge. I was then with him, and had gone thither at the request of Servan, minister of war, who had charged me to assure Lafayette of his zealous co-operation in everything that could promote the welfare of the army and success of the war, and at the same time to intimate a desire, on his part, to have at all times the fullest understanding with the general, on all points affecting their respective duties. We had been conversing a quarter of an hour, when one of Lafayette's staff came in, to receive orders. I retired to his cabinet, to wait until our conversation could be renewed; and I was still there when a loud burst of joy informed me that the general had received the news of the dismissal of the three ministers. This intelligence put an end to my mission. I returned to Paris. On my arrival, I learnt that M. de Lafayette had written on the 16th to the assembly. His letter, in fact, was read at the sitting of the 18th."*

* "It is evident M. de Lafayette was ignorant, down to the 16th, of the real motive of the dismissal of ministers. The Moniteur did not publish

(B. v., ch. vi., p. 285 and 286.)... "The men of the gironde wanted nothing more than a minister devoted to their principles. M. de Lafayette, in addition to this, wished for a court professing constitutional opinions; and, to bring this about, his scheme was to make himself master of it by means of the king's gratitude towards himself and his party. His ambition appeared to me praiseworthy and judicious, his plan ingenious; but I thought it based on illusions, and without any chance of success. Unhappily, the girondists deceived my expectation, as the friends of M. de Lafayette did his. The former had an additional difficulty to conquer before they could succeed. For it was surely less difficult and unreasonable to destroy the jacobin societies, as the general dared to project, than to follow or precede their violence against the court, until it became necessary to make them succumb, and then to expect to bring them to a dead stop, and compel them to moderation, silence, and retreat, as the girondists flattered themselves they should be able to do."

Roland's letter till the 15th; it could not have reached Maubeuge by the 16th.

* * * * * * * *

"After the 10th of August, it was believed that I had gone to conspire with M. de Lafayette against the jacobins and the assembly. This offence, added to those imputed to me on that day, gave occasion to the order for my arrest, and the seizure of my papers; I had thought it best to place myself out of reach of this order. Madame Rœderer deemed it necessary, in my absence, to write to M. Servan on this subject, and afterwards to publish, in the Moniteur, her letter and M. Servan's reply, who, after the 10th of August, had been re-appointed to the ministry. These letters appeared in the Moniteur of September 1792."—(Note by M. Rœderer, member of the constitutional assembly, *procureur-général-syndic* of the department in 1792.)

END OF VOL. III.

THOMAS C. SAVILL,
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ERRATA.

Page 50, line 8, *for* our peril is delicate *read* our position is a delicate one.

Page 51, line 12, *for* with the declamations which the constitutionalists have offered as the continual promoters of insurrection *read* with the declamations which have represented the constitutionalists as the continual promoters of insurrection.

Page 54, line 10, *for* exchanging their service *read* exchanging their days of service.

Page 59, line 4, *for* religious societies *read* religious service.

Page 63, line 4, *for* He relates in them the reports of the court, &c., *read* He there states his own and the court's relations with Mirabeau, "on whose ambition and cupidity they could depend," he says, while Lafayette was but an enthusiast and a madman.

Page 65, line 19, *for* council of conscience *read* religious advisers.

Page 65, line 19, *for* gave his resignation *read* gave in his resignation.

Page 75, line 5, *for* or quitted it is uncertain which the court *read* or quitted, it is uncertain which, the court.

Page 125, line 13, *for* for oaths *read* of oaths.

Page 127, line 20, *for* bandit *read* band.

Page 142, line 18, *for* expressed through your means *read* conveyed through you.

Page 154, line 29, *for* calculate on obstacles so badly *read* miscalculate obstacles so sadly.

Page 159, line 13, *for* doubt of the *read* doubt the.

Page 181, line 11, *for* and although *read* although.

Page 187, line 7, *for* itself *read* themselves.

Page 188, line 12, *for* home *read* hence.

Page 209, line 26, *for* declaimers of the present day, who have discovered *read* declaimers of the present day who would discover.

Page 210, line 28, *for* when my arrival *read* in which my arrival.

Page 213, line 4, *for* had need of some virtue *read* had need of more virtue.

Page 213, line 22, *for* but little instruction *read* the least instruction.

Page 216, line 5, *for* obstacles the event met with *read* obstacles the court met with.

Page 217, line 20, *for* This institution was perverted; within, *read* this institution was perverted within.

Page 217, line 30, *for* which now, on the contrary, political equality was about to give free scope to, and talent and patriotic enthusiasm were combining with, *read* while now, on the contrary, political equality was about to give free scope to talent, and patriotic enthusiasm was combining with.

Page 223, line 10, *for* persuaded *read* they were frustrated.

Page 223, line 17, *for* when *read* whose.

Page 225, line 5, *for* led for the demand of going to Versailles *read* yelled forth their desire of going to Versailles.

Page 227, line 26, *for* most criminal prosecution *read* great criminal prosecution.

Page 228, line 9, *for* increased *read* was increased.

Page 237, line 4, *for* did not engraft *read* should not engraft.

Page 239, line 23, *for* then I beheld *read* therein I beheld.

Page 244, line 19, *for* more hopes by the people's axe *read* more bereavements by the people's axe.

Page 250, line 21; *for* in possession of most of its good will *read* mostly in possession of its good will.

Page 251, line 31, *for* the stupid presence of a distaff *read* the stupid present of a distaff.

Page 255, line 16, *for* a true constitution *read* a free constitution.

Page 266, line 13, *for* invite *read* invited.

Page 268, line 24, *for* manner in which was formed the spirit which animated *read* manner in which was formed, the spirit which animated.

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